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Corporate Governance of Family Businesses in Croatia – 
Legal Framework and Open Challenges2
 ■ ABSTRACT: The importance of family businesses in the Croatian economy is well 
known. In this respect, Croatia is part of the larger picture in which family businesses 
are considered of fundamental importance to the European Union’s economy. The most 
specific feature that sets Croatian family businesses apart is that they are all relatively 
young, as they were mostly established in the 1990s. This is due to the socio-economic 
development of Croatia as a country that was part of the former Yugoslavia. In this 
regard, although the traditions of certain crafts and products are significantly older, 
the modern legal vehicles through which such business is conducted, that is, Croatian 
companies, are only around thirty years old. This fact contributes to the hypothesis 
that governance issues related to family businesses are an underdeveloped legal area. 
However, the need to address the specific needs of Croatian businesses is on the rise, 
as a significant number of the founders are now retiring, and the issue of successful 
transfer of these businesses has never been more important. The goal of this article is to 
question whether available legal instruments for enhancing the governance of family 
businesses from comparative law and practice such as family constitutions and family 
councils can be applied in Croatian practice as well. To this end, this study analyses the 
most significant legal forms in which a family business can be established in Croatia: 
crafts, family farms, and all types of commercial companies (with an emphasis on 
limited liability and joint-stock companies). Analysis of the Croatian legal framework 
from the perspective of family businesses will contribute to the comparative discussion 
regarding the specific legal needs and challenges of such businesses.
 ■ KEYWORDS: Croatian family business, family governance, corporate gover-
nance, family constitution, family council.
 1 Assistant Professor, Department of Commercial and Company Law, Faculty of Law, University 
of Rijeka, Croatia, mbraut@pravri.hr, ORCID: 0000-0002-2476-545X.
 2 The writing of this paper was supported by the University of Rijeka project (uniri-drustv-18-43) 
“Legal Aspects of Companies Restructuring and Transition Towards New Corporate Gover-
nance Culture.”
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1. Introduction
There are no official statistics on the number of family businesses in Croatia.3 However, 
it is undisputed in literature and practice that family businesses are among the most 
significant types of businesses in Croatia, with the prevailing opinion that they fall in 
the category of small-and medium-sized enterprises.4 At the EU level, analyses have 
shown that at least 60% of all types of enterprises fall under the category of family 
businesses.5 Thus, it is no surprise that family businesses have been the topic of EU 
documents, analyses, recommendations, etc.6 However, all EU sources represent 
soft-law mechanisms for improving the framework for family businesses, while the 
extent to which these measures should be adopted is left entirely to the disposition 
of the member states. The corporate governance of family businesses is recognised 
as a specific type of corporate governance with specific challenges in both practice 
and literature.7 However, the awareness of these issues as well as the development of 
practical solutions vary greatly throughout the member states. In this paper, the author 
elaborates on the soft law mechanisms that are most commonly applied in comparative 
practice to address the challenges of family businesses, such as family constitution 
and family council. The goal is to question the legal framework of available legal forms 
for conducting businesses in Croatia to determine whether these mechanisms can be 
applied to improve corporate governance. Analysis of the Croatian legal framework 
from the perspective of family businesses will contribute to the comparative discussion 
regarding the specific legal needs and challenges of family businesses.
2. Overview of the most commonly used corporate governance 
instruments for addressing the challenges of family businesses
Specific challenges for family businesses arise from the overlapping of ownership, 
family, and business.8 Potential conflicts among family members threaten the existence 
of the entire business.9 To address these new challenges, many authors have argued 
that corporate governance of family businesses should be divided into business gover-
nance and family governance,10 where governing the family gains equal importance 
 3 The Croatian Bureau of Statistics does not recognize family business as a separate category of 
business in Croatia. 
 4 CEPOR, 2012, p. 5
 5 See, for example, European Commission, 2009, p. 8.
 6 For a detail overview, see Braut Filipović, 2020.
 7 See, for example, Kormann, 2017; Eisenmann-Mittenzwei, 2006; Hougaz, 2015; Botero, I. C. et 
al., 2015.
 8 See Lansberg, 1983, p. 40.
 9 Kormann, 2017, p. 98.
 10 See Koeberle-Schmid, Kenyon-Rouvinez, and Poza, 2014, p. 11.
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as governing the business of the company. Within family governance, literature and 
practice most often call for the application of soft-law mechanisms, with the most 
popular are the creation of family constitutions, family councils, and family offices.11 
In this paper, the author provides only a brief overview of these instruments, as the 
primary goal is to examine their possible use in Croatian commercial companies and 
other available legal forms for conducting business.
Family constitutions are documents developed by family members, who are 
usually shareholders of the same family business. They are often described as the main 
strategy of the family for governing both the family and the business, with the goal of 
ensuring harmonious family relations and successful business across many genera-
tions of the family.12 It should be emphasised that family constitutions are usually not 
legally binding but serve as a starting point from which agreements achieved in that 
document are transferred, for example, to the articles of associations of the company, 
which then become binding for the shareholders of the family business.13 Some have 
even argued that a family constitution should be used to interpret the constitutive acts 
of commercial companies, as they incorporate shareholder tendency or intent on a 
certain issue.
Family councils are special bodies established within family businesses, usually 
in the case of commercial companies such as joint-stock and limited liability compa-
nies, which serve as the point of connection between the family members and the man-
agement of the company.14 These bodies do not replace management or other formal 
company bodies. They are established voluntarily, and their scope of the duties, role, 
and composition is typically provided for in the constitutive act of the company, such 
as the articles of the association. However, it has been argued that these bodies can 
be established contractually, whether through family constitutions or shareholders’ 
agreements.15 Decisions made by family councils are generally not legally binding but 
can heavily influence the management and business strategy of a company, primarily 
through the family members who, as shareholders, transfer family council decisions by 
voting for them in the company’s shareholders’ meetings.16 The influence of the family 
council is greater if they include managers of the company as their members, which de 
facto provides a way for the shareholders, that is, family members, to express their will 
through an informal body to the management of the company.
Finally, in comparative legal systems, especially in the USA, members of the 
family business have developed so-called family offices that can serve the different 
needs of the family members but the primary role of which is managing their private 
 11 See Koeberle-Schmid, Kenyon-Rouvinez, Poza, 2014, p. 11.
 12 Baus, 2016, p. 107.
 13 See Braut Filipović, 2018, p. 543. For such a conclusion regarding comparative German practice, 
see Schween et al., 2011, p. 13.
 14 See Lächler, 2016, p. 814.
 15 See Sanders, 2017, p. 963.
 16 Haagen-Eck, 2016, p. 690.
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assets, which they presumably gained from the successful family business.17 The need 
for such services arises when the family business is successful for a longer period of 
time, allowing for family offices to be established as a separate asset management 
company that manages the portfolio of family members.18 In other words, family offices 
become asset managers, and family members become investors.19
These soft-law mechanisms for improving the corporate governance of family 
businesses are known in various comparative legal systems, particularly Germany, 
the USA, and Spain.20 There are additional initiatives to boost the development of 
these instruments in practice by raising awareness about them at the EU level through 
adoption of soft-law corporate codices and others.21 As family businesses are of crucial 
importance for the economy of member states, the author considers that both political 
participants who draft the country’s development strategy and private entrepreneurs 
who manage family businesses should continuously be reminded of the special chal-
lenges that family businesses face and possible instruments that could boost the 
success of family businesses for generations.
3. Possible application of corporate governance instruments on the 
various legal forms for conducting business in Croatia
To the best of my knowledge, there are no family constitutions, family councils, 
or family offices established in Croatian practice. the author considers the lack of 
introduction of these instruments detrimental to the development of Croatian family 
businesses who currently find themselves in a peculiar period – the transfer of the 
business.22 The preferred solution for the founders of a Croatian family business is 
to transfer their business to their children.23 To do this successfully, entrepreneurs 
should develop a long-term plan of how to connect the family and business before the 
business is transferred based on soft-law instruments such as family constitutions 
and family councils that have been proven to help in comparative jurisdictions. The 
author examines Croatian legal framework regarding various legal forms available for 
conducting business in Croatia, as family businesses exists in various legal forms and 
sizes,24 to determine whether it is possible to introduce family constitutions and family 
councils in Croatian family businesses.
 17 Wessel, 2013, p. 2.
 18 Decker and Lange, 2013, p. 301.
 19 Zetzsche, 2017, p. 156.
 20 For an overview of existing studies, see Matherne et al., 2013. See also Fleischer, 2017, p. 104.
 21 See, for example, the German Governance Kodex für Familienunternehmen from 2004 and the 
Slovenian Corporate Governance Code for Unlisted Companies from 2016.
 22 See Alpeza, Grubišić, and Mikrut, 2015, p. 21; Senegović, 2015, p. 181.
 23 Mezulić Jurić and Alpeza and Oberman Peterka, 2020, p. 19.
 24 Smith, 2017, p. 14.
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 ■ 3.1. Available legal forms for conducting business in Croatia – a brief overview of 
practice
Commercial companies and crafts are the two main categories of legal vehicles for 
conducting business in Croatia. The types of commercial companies are strictly regu-
lated and provided for in the Croatian Companies Act,25 while crafts are regulated by 
the Croatian Crafts Act.26 Crafts are traditionally very popular in business practice, and 
they represent more than 30% of all business subjects in Croatia.27 Within the category 
of commercial companies, the most common form for conducting business is the 
limited liability company (društvo s ograničenom odgovornošću),28 which represents 
more than 55% of all business subjects in Croatia.29 As previously mentioned, there are 
no official statistics on the number of family businesses in Croatia, partially due to the 
fact that there is no definition of a family business.30 However, as the limited liability 
company is considered the most popular legal form for conducting business in Croatia, 
most of the family businesses in Croatia can be presumed to be established as limited 
liability companies.31
From the agricultural sector, the most popular form for conducting business 
is family farms,32 which is an additional legal form created solely for the agricultural 
sector and regulated by the Family Farms Act.33
The choice of legal form for family businesses depends on many factors, particu-
larly taxes and legal framework. Within the legal framework, the most influential issues 
are the simplicity of the company’s establishment and functioning, freedom to tailor 
the legal relations within the company, and the liability of the members towards third 
persons.34 With the development of soft-law instruments for governing family busi-
nesses, the possible introduction of these instruments into the legal framework may 
also be taken into account in the process of establishing or restructuring a company. 
Considering the aforementioned data, the author analyses how family constitutions 
and family councils can be integrated into Croatian commercial companies, crafts, 
and family farms.
 25 Official Gazette, No. 111/93, 34/99, 121/99, 52/00, 118/03, 107/07, 146/08, 137/09, 125/11, 152/11, 
111/12, 68/13, 110/15, 40/19.
 26 Official Gazette, No. 143/13, 127/19, 41/20.
 27 See Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2020.
 28 Jurić and Braut Filipović, 2020, p. 70.
 29 See Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2020.
 30 See the proposal for the definition of a family business in Croatia, which is in accordance with 
the proposal on the EU level by the Expert Group in the aforementioned Overview of Family-
Business-Relevant Issues: Research, Networks, Policy Measures and Existing Studies, in CEPOR, 2012, 
p. 7.
 31 See, for example, Orbico Group Ltd, https://www.orbico.hr/en/about (16.2.2021.); Gavrilović 
Ltd, https://www.gavrilovic.hr/en/ (16.2.2921.); AutoZubak, https://www.autozubak.hr/ 
(16.2.2021.). For related findings for Austria, see Kalls, 2017, p. 22.
 32 Croatian Farmers register, 2020.
 33 Official Gazette, No. 29/18, 32/19.
 34 For similar considerations, see Lieder, 2017, p. 31.
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 ■ 3.2. Croatian commercial companies – the possible introduction of family constitu-
tions and family councils
There are five types of commercial companies that can be established under the 
Croatian Companies Act: general partnerships (javno trgovačko društvo), limited 
partnerships (komanditno društvo), economic interest groupings (gospodarsko 
interesno udruženje), limited liability companies, and joint-stock companies (dioničko 
društvo).
The general and limited partnerships are among Croatian law types of com-
mercial companies that have legal personality but have their origin in contractual 
partnerships,35 which leads to their main feature – a high level of autonomy in determin-
ing relations among members.36 Between these two companies, the limited partnership 
is characterised as a type of general partnership37 with the main distinction that the 
liability of some members towards third persons can be limited.38 Consequently, limited 
partnerships are minimally regulated, and provisions of general partnerships apply to 
limited partnerships as well unless otherwise provided by the Companies Acts or by the 
members in partnership agreements.39 For this reason, the author analyses the possible 
combined use and implementation of the family constitution and family council to 
these companies. Notably, these legal forms are rare in Croatian practice, compared to 
other types of commercial companies. However, they can be used in the case of family 
businesses as they can be drafted according to the needs of their founders.
Both general and limited partnerships are established by registering a partner-
ship agreement in the court registry.40 As these partnerships enjoy high contractual 
autonomy, the prevailing number of provisions of the Companies Act regarding the 
legal relations among members are dispositive in nature,41 meaning that members can 
arrange their relations rather freely, with the exception of a small number of manda-
tory provisions (for example, the members’ right to information regarding the business 
of the company)42 and the general limitation of the contractual freedom (all contracts 
must comply with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, mandatory laws, and 
the morals of society43).44 On the contrary, the liability of the members towards third 
persons is a mandatory provision stating that all members of the general partnership45 
and general partners of the limited partnership46 are liable for the obligations of the 
partnership unconditionally regarding all of their assets.
 35 See Barbić, 2019, p. 399.
 36 See Jurić, 2020, p. 7.
 37 See Barbić, 2019, p. 565.
 38 Article 131 of the Companies Act.
 39 Article 132 of the Companies Act.
 40 Articles 133-134 of the Companies Act.
 41 Article 71 para. 2. of the Companies Act. 
 42 Article 84 para. 2 of the Companies Act.
 43 Article 2 of the Croatian Obligations Act, Official Gazette, No. 35/05, 41/08, 125/11,78/15, 29/18.
 44 See Barbić, 2012, p. 485.
 45 Article 94 of the Companies Act.
 46 Article 131 of the Companies Act.
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The content of the partnership agreement is not expressly regulated, but it can be 
derived from some of the provisions of the Companies Act. However, the analysis shows 
that the mandatory content concerns only basic information regarding the company, 
such as the identification of the company’s members, the company’s name, and the 
place of business.47 The lack of any other information in the partnership agreement 
can be substituted by the application of the default provisions of the Companies Act.
Such findings clearly lead to the conclusion that members of the general and 
limited partnerships can introduce nearly any mechanism of corporate governance to 
improve the relations among them. As there is no obstacle for members to conclude 
contracts among themselves outside of the partnership agreement, they are free to 
draft a family constitution as well.
It remains to be discussed whether a partnership agreement is the only legal act for 
arranging legal relations among members with an obligatory effect for the partnership. 
Although there are very few mandatory provisions that must be set by the partnership 
agreement, the Companies Act expressly states that the legal relations among members 
are to be arranged in the partnership agreement.48 In particular, the management of the 
company can be freely determined by the members, but variation from the Companies 
Act is valid only if implemented via the partnership agreement.49 Thus, the author con-
cludes that any decision pertaining to legal relations among the members of a general or 
limited partnership reached outside of the partnership agreement, such as, for example, 
within the family constitution, should be implemented via the partnership agreement to 
ensure the obligatory effect for the members and for the partnership.
As for introducing a family council in the partnership, one must consider that 
general and limited partnerships do not have organs. All or some members manage the 
company.50 However, they can establish a body that is not an organ but can be tasked 
with advisory, supervisory, or other functions in the company.51 It cannot represent 
or manage the company (regardless of whether it consists only of members),52 as only 
members are permitted, whether all or only some of them are provided for in the part-
nership agreement. Thus, it is possible to establish a family council in both general and 
limited partnerships but only as an advisory body.
Further, as there is no requirement that any additional body should be estab-
lished in only the partnership agreement, there are no obstacles to establishing the 
family council via the partnership agreement or outside of the partnership agreement, 
for example, via the family constitution.53 However, if members want to ensure that the 
 47 See Barbić, 2019, p. 405.
 48 Article 71 para. 1 of the Companies Act.
 49 See, for example, article 78 para. 2 of the Companies Act.
 50 Articles 78 and 136 of the Companies Act.
 51 See Barbić, 2019, p. 471.
 52 For the same view in comparative German legislation for Personengesellchaften, see Sanders, 
2017, p. 966.
 53 It is a common practice to establish the family council first via the family constitution. See 
Smith, 2017, p. 636.
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role of the family council is respected by all current and future members rather than 
only those who have signed the family constitution or some other contract outside the 
partnership agreement, they should provide the establishment, the role, the composi-
tion of the family council, and other elements via the partnership agreement.
To conclude, internal governance of both general and limited partnerships is 
mostly left to their members. Thus, members are free to arrange their relations and 
improve the functioning of the company by introducing additional instruments of 
corporate governance, which, for family businesses, could mean the introduction of 
the family constitution and family council.
An economic interest grouping is a legal vehicle introduced at the EU level,54 
which has the goal of facilitating and improving the economic activities of its members 
across different member states.55 The Croatian legislature implemented Regulation No. 
2137/85 in its Companies Act. This type of company is not relevant to the challenges of 
family businesses, as it represents a company of which the members are entrepreneurs 
who conduct their main business through other legal vehicles but use the economic 
interest grouping to promote their business. The members of these companies can only 
be those whose economic activities are connected with the activity of the economic 
interest grouping,56 and the inheritance of membership is discouraged.57 Thus, this will 
not be further analysed in this study.
The joint-stock company is the most heavily regulated type of company with the 
highest number of mandatory provisions under the Companies Act. The relationships 
among the members and the functioning of the company through division among 
ownership, management, and supervision are strictly regulated, with additional 
requirements if the company is listed on the stock exchange.58 As family businesses 
are constituted and operate through the legal form of the joint-stock company,59 it is 
important to determine the extent of shareholders’ autonomy in the arrangement of 
their relations.
The joint stock company’s constitutive act is the articles of association (referred 
to as a “statut” in Croatian), and the company is established after registration in the 
court registry.60 The mandatory content of the articles of association is expressly deter-
mined by the Companies Act.61 In the articles of association, shareholders can deviate 
from the provisions of the Companies Act only if such a possibility is expressly provided 
 54 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Group-
ing (EEIG), OJ L 199, 31.7.1985, p. 1–9.
 55 For the main features of this company, see Barbić, 2019, p. 683.
 56 See Article 584 of the Companies Act.
 57 See Article 598 para. 2 of the Companies Act.
 58 For particularities when the family business is a joint-stock company listed on the stock 
exchange, see Oppitz, 2017. For a Croatian perspective, see Čulinović-Herc, 2003.
 59 A Croatian example is the family business Vindija, established as a joint-stock company which 
is currently in the process of transition to the next generation. See http://www.vindija.hr/
en-GB/About-us/Business-System-Vindija/Vision-and-mission.html?Y2lcNjI%3d (16.2.2021.).
 60 See Barbić, 2013a, p. 153.
 61 Article 173 para. 43 of the Companies Act.
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for by the relevant provisions of the Companies Act.62 Examples of what can be modified 
by the articles of association are restrictions regarding the transfer of shares, such as 
pre-emption rights63 and changes in the management or representation of the compa-
ny.64 Thus, mandatory provisions are a general rule for joint-stock companies, while 
any modification by shareholders is an exception that must be expressly allowed.
On the other hand, shareholders are free to enter into agreements among them-
selves outside the articles of association. They can even make agreements with the goal 
of arranging their relations within the company, the most common example of which is 
shareholder voting agreements. However, these agreements are not legally binding for 
the company, that is, for the functioning of its organs and decision-making processes. 
In other words, the obligations enacted by such a contract cannot be enforced on the 
contractual party when it acts as a shareholder in the general meeting of the company 
or in another capacity within the company. They can, however, be binding on the basis 
of the obligations law, meaning that the party in breach may be liable for damages to 
other contractual parties.65
Thus, if shareholders draft a family constitution and arrange their relations as 
family members, these provisions are not legally binding for the joint-stock company 
or shareholders. However, family members as shareholders can transfer some of the 
rules of family constitution by implementing such provisions in the articles of associa-
tion or through shareholders’ agreements.66 Even if it is not legally binding, the family 
constitution does not lose its primary role as a starting point for arranging the relations 
among the family members.
Regarding the introduction of the family council, a joint-stock company 
has organs, and its functions are strictly regulated to protect the balance between 
shareholders (owners) and management.67 Consequently, any introduction of a new 
body cannot influence or replace the scope and duties of the existing organs, such 
as the general meeting, management, and supervisory board. However, in practice, 
joint-stock companies often establish additional bodies, usually with advisory or super-
visory roles, to support the work of management or supervisory boards.68 Thus, the 
introduction of an additional body such as a family council is possible. In fact, in the 
comparative practice of family businesses listed on stock exchanges, the introduction 
of an additional advisory body that would enhance the connection among sharehold-
ers, management, and supervisory boards is seen as desirable and necessary.69 Family 
councils can be established in articles of association or contractually by shareholders. 
 62 Article 173 para. 4 of the Companies Act.
 63 Article 227 para. 2 of the Companies Act,
 64 See articles 240 and 241 of the Companies Act.
 65 See Barbić, J., 2013a, p. 163.
 66 Zellweger, 2017, p. 72.
 67 For an overview of the one-tier and two-tier board systems available in Croatia, see Maurović, 
Gonan Božac, and Grgorinić, 2009.
 68 See Barbić, J., 2013a, p. 164.
 69 Kormann, 2017, p. 232.
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In comparative practice, they are often provided in family constitutions.70 However, 
if they are established outside of the articles of association, it will affect only those 
shareholders who entered into that contract. Thus, in the author’s opinion, such a body 
should be introduced in the articles of association, together with the regulation of its 
scope, composition, and role, to avoid any uncertainties regarding its possible effect on 
the work of the company’s organs.
To conclude, family constitutions and family councils are viable mechanisms 
for improving the corporate governance of joint-stock companies, regardless of the 
fact that these companies are rigidly construed as having the possibility of only modest 
changes in the legal relations between the company and shareholders. They serve pri-
marily as a starting point for arranging the legal relations among family members.
Finally, the author analyses the most popular company type in Croatia and in 
comparative practice – the limited liability company. As in partnerships, members of 
the company enjoy a high level of autonomy in arranging their legal relations within 
the company, which is one of the most important considerations for family business-
es.71 However, a limited liability company retains the main advantage of a joint-stock 
company – the members are not liable for the company’s obligations towards third 
persons.72
The constitutive act of a limited liability company is termed društveni ugovor, 
which, literally translated, means a partnership agreement. However, it differs from 
the partnership agreements of general and limited partnerships. Specifically, it is 
not necessary that all members agree to the modification of the agreement,73 and the 
mandatory content is expressly determined with a much higher number of mandatory 
provisions. Although it bears a different name, it has the same role as and is more 
similar to the articles of association (statut) of a joint-stock company. Several authors 
have proposed that the constitutive acts of both joint-stock and limited liability com-
panies should be referred to as articles of association (statut), while partnership agree-
ments (društveni ugovor) should be reserved for partnerships.74 Thus, in this article, 
the author uses the translation of articles of association to mark the constitutive act of 
the limited liability company.
The mandatory content of the articles of association is set by the Companies 
Act,75 although to a lesser extent than for joint-stock companies. Members enjoy more 
autonomy in arranging their legal relations in the articles of association,76 although 
they do not often use it in practice. Instead, they use widespread models – forms of 
articles of association that usually consist of minimum provisions, while for all other 
 70 Baus, 2016, p. 50.
 71 The high level of autonomy in limited liability companies is seen as the main advantage for 
family businesses in comparative laws as well. See Lieder, 2017, p. 57.
 72 Jurić and Braut Filipović, 2020, p. 70.
 73 Barbić, 2012, p. 500.
 74 Jakšić and Petrović, 2016, p. 1142.
 75 See Article 388 of the Companies Act.
 76 Barbić, 2012, p. 501.
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issues, including the relations among the company’s members, the default provisions 
of the Companies Act apply. However, contrary to joint-stock companies, mandatory 
provisions for members’ legal relations are exceptions.77 Examples of mandatory rules 
regarding the relations among members include the requirement that each member 
must retain at least one voting right in the general meeting 78 and members’ right to 
information regarding the business of the company.79
Modifications of legal relations among members should be done through the 
articles of association in order to be legally binding for all members and the company.80 
Examples of when the modifications must be done through the articles of association 
include the introduction of special benefits for a member,81 management and repre-
sentation of the company,82 restriction of the transfer of a share,83 and sharing of the 
profit84. It is clear that the members are free to conclude contracts outside of the articles 
of association, including the family constitution, but it appears that it is highly unlikely 
that any provision of the family constitution could be legally binding for the limited 
liability company. The only possible scenario in which a family constitution would be 
binding for all members of the company is if they would all be parties, that is, signato-
ries of the family constitution, and if they would agree upon a member’s right that can 
be modified outside the articles of association. However, in the author’s opinion, this 
would only be the case for civil law obligations among the members or between the 
members and the company but not for members’ rights.
The introduction of a family council would be possible because limited liability 
companies can introduce additional bodies within the company85 under the condition 
that they do not alter the mandatory scope of obligations of mandatory organs of the 
company: general meetings and the management board. As previously stated, family 
councils could be established contractually outside of the constitutive acts of the com-
panies, but it is preferable that their role and composition are determined by the articles 
of association to ensure their application to all members, current and future, and to 
determine their interaction with the organs of the company. Additionally, introducing 
a family council through the articles of association ensures that its existence is more 
permanent because it cannot be terminated with the sole revocation of the members 
but, rather, only through a change in the articles of association.86
 77 Article 405 of the Companies Acts states which provisions cannot be modified by the members 
of a limited liability company. These are not the only cases, but it declares that mandatory 
provisions are treated as an exception.
 78 Article 445 par 3 of the Companies Act. See Barbić, 2012, p. 502.
 79 Article 447 of the Companies Act.
 80 Barbić, 2012, p. 509.
 81 Article 392 of the Companies Act.
 82 Articles 422 and 426 of the Companies Act.
 83 Article 412 para. 4 of the Companies Act.
 84 Article 406 para. 2 of the Companies Act.
 85 Barbić, 2013b, p. 326.
 86 For the same view in comparative German legislation, see Sanders, 2017, p. 963.
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To conclude, the family constitution and family councils could be introduced to 
help with the challenges of family businesses when they operate as limited liability com-
panies. As this is the company that enjoys the benefits of both partnerships and joint-
stock companies, it represents a vehicle that is most common in practice and thus likely 
the most relevant for family businesses as well. As the analysis shows, relations among 
members can be significantly modified, but in order for them to be legally binding for 
the company and for all members, these modifications must be implemented through 
the constitutive act of the company – that is, the articles of association. This once again 
leaves family constitutions and family councils as tools of primarily soft-law spheres, 
the introduction and enforcement of which are voluntary. It seems that the main task of 
scholars is to demonstrate the usefulness of these instruments to entrepreneurs and to 
entice them to use such instruments to improve the governance of their family business 
in the long term. It is yet to be seen whether these instruments will be recognised in 
Croatian practice as they have been recognised in comparative jurisdictions.
 ■ 3.3. Croatian crafts – the possible introduction of family constitutions and family 
councils
Crafts are a very popular legal form for conducting business in Croatia and the only 
true rival to the popularity of limited liability companies. They have a long history and 
tradition in Croatia.87 The Crafts Act states that craft refers to ‘permitted economic activi-
ties performed independently and permanently […] that are carried out by natural persons 
with the objective of generating profits by means of activities performed in the market in the 
field of production, traffic or services.’88 Craft does not have a constitutive act, as would be 
a partnership agreement of articles of association. It is established via registration in 
the Croatian Craft register.89 It usually consists of only one person – the craftsman – but 
it is possible for two or more persons to establish the craft mutually. In that case, the 
relations between the craftsmen must be determined by a written contract, which is, 
in its legal nature, a civil law partnership agreement.90
Even in cases in which there is only one craftsman, crafts have the potential 
to become a family business when the founder transfers the business to his/her chil-
dren or after the death of the craftsman. However, even before the transfer, crafts are 
traditionally considered family businesses.91 Thus, the Croatian legislature expressly 
regulated that members of the family household can help the craftsman conduct the 
business without the need to conclude an employment agreement,92 which significantly 
simplifies the possible introduction of family members into the business. Family 
members who help the craftsman do not have to register and do not become members 
of the craft.
 87 See Alpeza, Oberman Peterka, and Has, 2018, p. 39.
 88 Article 2 para. 1 of the Crafts Act. See Petrović, 2013.
 89 Article 15 para. 1 of the Crafts Act.
 90 Article 33 of the Crafts Act.
 91 See Crnković Pozaić, 2008, p. 3.
 92 Article 30 of the Crafts Act.
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Can the relations among the members in a craft be analysed if crafts do not 
have such relations? Strictly speaking, we can speak of the legal relationship among 
the members only if there are at least two craftsmen who hold the craft mutually. 
However, family members are often employees of the craft, and the craftsmen face 
the issue of transfer of the craft, with which the drafting of the family constitution 
may help. In family constitutions, craftsmen and their families can state their values, 
conditions under which the children can be employed in the craft, succession plans, 
and so on. Thus, family constitutions can have the same role for crafts as they have for 
commercial companies, regardless of whether the craftsman manages the craft alone 
or mutually or whether the family members help with the business.
Regarding family councils, the author is of the opinion that, although crafts 
have no organs, they could be introduced on a contractual basis. However, crafts do 
not have members, even in cases in which family members help with the business 
and even if they are permanently employed in the craft. To establish a family council, 
one should start by determining who would be a party to a contract establishing it, as 
such a contract would be relevant solely for the contractual parties. As the craftsman 
is the only one who represents the craft,93 it could not be altered by the introduction of 
the family council. However, the possibility of arranging the relations among family 
members or even introducing a voting mechanism to reach certain decisions regarding 
the craftsmen or others may make the family council a valuable tool for allowing family 
members to participate more actively in the management of the craft.
To conclude, crafts are traditionally considered to be family businesses in Croa-
tian practice, despite the fact that they do not have members. However, there are no 
obstacles to family members and craftsmen concluding contracts or other acts when 
the possibility of introducing family constitutions and family offices, with the neces-
sary adaptions to the specifics of the relevant craft, could offer valuable new options for 
craftsmen to include the family members more actively in the business and to reach a 
more successful transfer of the business to the next generation.
 ■ 3.4. Croatian family farms – possible introduction of family constitutions and 
family councils
Croatian family farms are the most popular legal form for conducting business in the 
agricultural sector. In fact, 95% of farms in Croatia are registered as family farms, 
among which the average size of the farm holdings is rather small, that is, approxi-
mately 5.6 hectares.94 Until 2018, the regulation of family farms was fragmented, being 
covered by various regulations, and they were not recognised as a separate entity with 
legal capacity for conducting business. However, the Family Farms Act of 2018 cor-
rected this situation. Thus, family farms are now regulated as a separate legal form for 
conducting business, with more defined relations among members and the position of 
family farms towards third persons.
 93 Article 28 of the Crafts Act.
 94 See Lončarić, Lončarić, and Tolušić, 2016, p. 337.
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The family farm is defined as the ‘organizational form of a natural person (farmer) 
who, in order to generate income, independently and permanently performs agricultural activ-
ity and related ancillary activities, and is based on the use of own and / or leased production 
resources and on the work, knowledge and skills of family members.’95 Family farms can 
be established only through registration in the Register of Family Farms under the 
condition that the holder or one of the members has ownership over the production 
resources necessary for conducting agricultural activities.96 The basic features of 
family farms are that they do not have legal personality97 and that they can consist of 
one or more members (sole holders of family farms are dominant in Croatia).98 The 
holder of the family farm is a person who is a manager of the business99 and is solely 
liable for the obligations of the family farm to third persons with all of his/her personal 
assets, regardless of whether the family farm has one or more registered members.100 
Members can only be natural persons who are part of the holder’s household or are 
the holder’s family members,101 which leads to the conclusion that family farms are 
construed as conducting family business in the field of agriculture. They face the chal-
lenge of transferring farms to the next generation. In a study conducted on Croatian 
family farms, it was found that around 50% have the chance of successful transfer of 
family farms to the next holder, and larger farms with only one designated successor 
(mostly a son) have higher chances.102
Compared to commercial companies, family farms remain rather rudimentary. 
Family farms do not have articles of association or any other legal act that would govern 
the legal relations among their members. Although the holder represents and manages 
the family farm, it remains unclear whether and how the other members can influence 
its management of the family farm. Relations among the members of a family farm 
are usually informal; thus, the legislature felt no need to introduce formal meetings of 
the members or the division of powers between the manager and the members as for 
commercial companies.
On the other hand, members of the family farm are not prohibited from intro-
ducing a more formal mechanism for decision-making processes. For example, it is 
expressly stated that if the family farm has two or more holders in cases of a jointly 
held family farm (holders are familially related but do not live in the same family 
household), the relation among holders shall be arranged via a written contract.103 The 
contract is, in its legal nature, a partnership agreement.104 There is no restriction on 
 95 See Article 5, para.1.a. of the Family Farms Act.
 96 See Article 31 of the Family Farms Act.
 97 See Article 15 of the Family Farms Act.
 98 See Article 15 of the Family Farms Act.
 99 See Article 5, para.1.i. of the Family Farms Act.
 100 See Article 41 para. 1 of the Family Farms Act.
 101 See Article 5, para.1.g. and para.1.h. of the Family Farms Act.
 102 Žutinić and Bokan, 2011, p. 347.
 103 See Article 22 para. 2. of the Family Farms Act.
 104 See Article 22 para. 3. of the Family Farms Act. Partnership agreements are governed by the 
Obligations Act.
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members entering into other contracts as well, which resembles the so-called share-
holders’ agreement, although such a development is unlikely in practice because of the 
nature of their relationship and the size of the business.
In this type of legal framework, members can introduce family constitutions by 
which they address business and family issues. As there is no constitutive act, there is 
no need to discuss the potential relationship between a family constitution and the con-
stitutive act of the family farm. Members of the family farm enjoy greater contractual 
freedom in governing the relations among members as well as between the manager 
– the holder – and the members. The only restriction appears to be that the holder is 
the liable person for the obligations of the family farm towards third persons. In the 
authors’ opinion, the use of family constitutions could be of paramount importance for 
enhancing the governance of family farms. Additionally, family constitutions could 
be used to set the criteria for choosing the holders of the family farm to determine 
issues that should be decided by the members in managing the family farm and other 
issues for governing the relations among members. If signed by all members, family 
constitutions have a higher potential to be obligatory for those members. The reason 
for this is the absence of articles of association or similar legal acts, which means that 
relations between the management and members can be set in any other act or contract 
produced by the members, which very well could be carried out through the family 
constitution if it is accepted by all members.
Further, there is no prohibition on introducing additional bodies, such as family 
councils. Family councils could enhance decision-making processes within the family 
and the relationship between the holder and members. As only family members or 
members of the same household can be members of the family farm,105 the introduction 
of a formal body could be seen as redundant. Still, if seen as a tool for including family 
members more actively in the management of the farm, it could produce long-term 
positive effects, especially for the transfer of the family farm.
To conclude, family farms are of great importance to the agricultural sector. 
However, as a legal vehicle, it represents a very simple form of conducting business. 
The primary goal was to simplify business operation for farmers, allowing them to use 
household or family members to perform agricultural activities.106 However, the author 
believes that introducing additional self-regulation of the relations among members 
through a family constitution could enhance such relations among the members, espe-
cially in cases of the transfer of management to another holder of the family farm.
 105 See Article 28 para. 1. of the Family Farms Act.
 106 Household or family members can help with agricultural activities without the need to con-
clude an employment contract. See Article 25 of the Family Farms Act.
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4. Conclusion
The primary conclusion of this article is that there are no obstacles to introducing 
a soft-law instrument, such as a family constitution and family council, in all of the 
analysed legal forms for conducting business in Croatia. However, the fact that these 
instruments have not yet been used in Croatian practice testifies to the lack of aware-
ness of these instruments and their potential use for Croatian family businesses. As 
many Croatian (family) businesses are currently facing the challenge of transferring 
the business from one generation to the next, successful planning must begin with 
establishing a more satisfying governance that connects and balances family and 
business in family businesses. The aim of this article is twofold: to raise awareness of 
these instruments among Croatian entrepreneurs and to demonstrate that the Croatian 
legal framework supports the introduction of instruments developed in comparative 
practice to enhance the governance of family businesses, namely family constitutions 
and family councils.
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The analysis covers the regulation of Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
and Poland. Each country is dealt with in separate chapters, followed by a summary 
chapter. First, the concept of food sovereignty is briefly introduced, which functions as 
a frame of reference in this study.
The acquisition of agricultural land ownership by legal persons is a highly topical 
issue. In recent years, not only the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the 
EU)4 but also the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (hereinafter 
referred to as the FAO)5 issued soft-law documents connected to the problem.6
Given that all of the examined countries are EU member states, their legal 
systems are also determined by EU law. As can be seen in the following chapters, there 
are several occasions when the free movement of capital is among the pillars of the EU’s 
single market and the national land regulation conflict, at least from the European Com-
mission’s viewpoint. There are legal arguments and counterarguments as to whether 
the national land regulation in question is in conflict with EU law, although we do not 
aim to join these debates. After presenting the legal regulation of the issue in the four 
countries examined in this study, in the concluding chapter, we examine the respective 
regulations in regard to the compatibility of the paradigm of food sovereignty.
This article seeks to answer the question of whether the regulation of examined 
states can contribute to better realisation of food sovereignty, and if so, what the advan-
tages and disadvantages are with regard to following this approach.
1. Food sovereignty as a frame of reference
This article considers the following definition of food sovereignty as a frame of 
reference:
“Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to define their own food and agriculture; to protect 
and regulate domestic agricultural production and trade in order to achieve sustainable 
development objectives; to determine the extent to which they want to be self-reliant; to restrict 
the dumping of products in their markets; and to provide local fisheries-based communities the 
priority in managing the use of and the rights to aquatic resources. Food Sovereignty does not 
negate trade, but rather it promotes the formulation of trade policies and practices that serve 
the rights of peoples to food and to safe, healthy and ecologically sustainable production.”7
 4 (A) Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Land grabbing – a warning 
for Europe and a threat to family farming (own-initiative opinion). Adopted on 21 January 2015 – 
NAT/632-EESC-2014–00926-00-00-ac-tra; (B) European Parliament resolution of 27 April 2017 on 
the state of play of farmland concentration in the EU: how to facilitate the access to land for farmers 
(2016/2141(INI)); (C) Commission Interpretative Communication on the Acquisition of Farmland 
and European Union Law (2017/C 350/05).
 5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (2012) Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food 
Security, Rome, FAO.
 6 See the analysis of these documents in detail: Szilágyi, 2019.
 7 People’s Food Sovereignty Network (2002) is cited by Windfuhr and Jonsén, 2005, p. 1.
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In this definition, certain elements are of paramount importance for this study. A key 
to understanding the intention behind this article is to emphasise that one of the consti-
tuting elements of the food sovereignty approach conceived as mentioned above is that 
it aims to protect and regulate domestic agricultural production to achieve sustainable 
development objectives.
Nonetheless, it is also advisable to conceive food sovereignty in relation to the 
paradigm of food security. Simply put, we can see the increasing confrontation of two 
paradigms in the 21st century: the approach of food security based on neoliberal political 
philosophy and neoclassical economics, which seeks to minimise state intervention8,9 
and the paradigm of food sovereignty, which seeks to question each inherent feature 
of the industrialised food system, including the dominance of agribusiness.10 The 
neoliberal food system is the consequence of the ongoing structural transformation 
of agriculture in Europe and North America, which is dominated by large agri-food 
businesses.11 Additionally, the rise of supermarkets and hypermarkets in the second 
half of the 20th century, which changed the market entirely following their entry, must 
be considered. Smaller producers suffer the greatest losses and, in general, may find 
themselves in a much more difficult commercial environment, given the demands of 
increased quantities and shorter deadlines.12
The question arises as to how legal regulation can reflect the approach of food 
sovereignty in connection with the ownership acquisition of agricultural and forestry 
lands by legal persons.
2. Hungary
In the final years before the regime change in 1989, Hungary’s land act was Act I of 
1987. Its material scope covered all agricultural lands, buildings on agricultural lands, 
and other installations situated within Hungary, with the exception of forests. These 
categories were labelled immovable properties. Based on § 6 (1) of the Act of 1987, legal 
persons could own immovable property, including agricultural land. Pursuant to § 
38 (1) foreign legal persons (as well as natural persons) could acquire ownership of 
immovable property, including agricultural land, with the prior approval of the finance 
minister. However, the conditions were not coherent. The Decree of the Act of 1987 was 
the Decree of the Council of Ministers no. 26/1987 (VII. 30). This decree in its § 1 defines 
the notion of a ‘foreign legal person’: a legal person with a registered office abroad, 
as well as a legal person with a Hungarian registered office operating with foreign 
 8 Johnson, 2018, p. 30.
 9 One of the three most important goals of economics (macroeconomics) based on neoliberal 
political philosophy is financial and trade liberalisation. See more: Martínez-Alier and Mura-
dian, 2015, p. 154.
 10 Mann, 2014, p. 3.
 11 Andree, Ayres, Bosia, and Massicotte (eds.), 2014, pp. 3–4.
 12 Maxwell and Slater, 2003, pp. 535–536.
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interests. The Decree of the Finance Minister no. 37/1988. (IX. 5.) on the ownership 
acquisition of immovable property by foreigners determined the criteria which had 
to be considered when making the decision on granting permission for the ownership 
acquisition of the immovable property of foreigners. The next decree adopted on the 
same subject13 maintained these provisions with minor modifications. The Constitu-
tional Court of Hungary found that this latter decree as well as the second part of the 
definition of the notion of a ‘foreign legal person’, which referred to legal persons with 
a Hungarian registered office operating with foreign interests as foreign legal persons, 
were unconstitutional and annulled them.14 In a later decision, the Constitutional Court 
found unconstitutionality in the form of an omission as 11 months had passed since 
the publication of its earlier judgement, and the government had not adopted new 
rules on the issue; thus, the acquisition of immovable property by foreigners was still 
based on the unconstitutional practice, and the legal vacuum resulted in uncertainty.15 
More than half a year after this latter judgement, a specific provision appeared in a 
new decree which declared that the ownership of arable land could not be acquired by 
foreigners.16 Therefore, both foreign natural and foreign legal persons were excluded 
from the right to acquire ownership of arable land beginning 1 January 1992.17
We now consider Hungarian legal persons. According to a 2020 judgement of 
the Constitutional Court, Act I of 1987 followed the concept of distinguishing between 
general immovable property and agricultural land. Regarding the latter, Hungarian 
legal persons could acquire ownership. In contrast, the ownership acquisition of agri-
cultural land was not possible for them, not because it was forbidden by law but because 
new commercial companies could have been established only beginning 1 January 
1989; thus, there were and could have been no legal provisions to entitle legal persons to 
acquire ownership of agricultural land.18 Evidently, similar to other countries belong-
ing to the Soviet bloc, the ownership of agricultural lands was linked to the state and 
farmers’ cooperatives.
Therefore, the acquisition of agricultural land ownership by legal persons was 
complicated. In theory, Hungarian legal persons were able to acquire ownership of 
agricultural lands until the 1994 land act’s entry into force, but the issue’s regulation 
with regard to foreign legal persons was contradictory from 1 September 198719 to 31 
December 1991, as shown above, with the help of Constitutional Court judgments. 
Beginning 1 January 1992 foreign legal persons were unequivocally deprived of the 
right to acquire ownership of agricultural land.
 13 Decree of the Council of Ministers no. 145/1989 (XII. 27) on the ownership acquisition of immov-
able property by foreigners.
 14 Constitutional Court Judgment no. 12/1990 (V. 23).
 15 Constitutional Court Judgment no. 29/1991 (VI. 5).
 16 Decree of the Government no. 171/1991 (XII. 27) on the ownership acquisition of immovable 
property by foreigners, § 1 (5).
 17 Szinay, 2020, p. 40.
 18 Constitutional Court Judgment no. 11/2020 (VI. 3), [30].
 19 This was the day on which Act I of 1987 entered into force.
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After the change of regime, Hungary’s first and completely new land act was 
Act LV of 1994 on arable land, which entered into force on 27 July 1994. The rules were 
straightforward. It was the first legal source to introduce an almost complete ban on 
land acquisition by legal persons. Foreign legal persons could not acquire the right 
of ownership of agricultural land at all, while at the same time, several exceptions 
were determined for specific Hungarian legal persons: the Hungarian state, local 
governments, associations of forest holders, and public foundations could be owners 
of agricultural lands. Additionally, ecclesiastical legal persons could also acquire 
ownership of agricultural land on the basis of disposition of property upon death, 
donation contract, or personal care agreement.20 The explanatory memorandum of Act 
LV of 1994 found that Hungary was in a transitional period from a planned to a market 
economy. The market of agricultural land and its real value had not yet been developed 
appropriately because of the artificially restrained real estate policy over a long period 
of time. The memorandum also declares that agricultural land, as a natural resource, 
is available to a limited extent; it cannot be propagated or replaced by anything else.21 
The Hungarian Constitutional Court22 ruled that the regulation which excludes legal 
persons from the right of land acquisition is constitutional.23
Because of Hungary’s accession to the European Union, national rules must be 
in accordance with EU requirements, although in connection with land regulation, 
Hungary was granted a transitional period (seven years from the accession), during 
which it could maintain its existing legislation. The European Commission later 
accepted Hungary’s request to extend the seven-year transitional period by three more 
years;24 thus, restrictions continued to remain in force until 30 April 2014.
Hungary’s new legislation on agricultural and forestry land came into force on 
1 May 2014. Despite EU requirements, Act CXXII of 2013 maintained the prohibition of 
the acquisition of land ownership by legal persons. Similar to the previous regulation, 
there are some exceptions to the general rule. Evidently, the Hungarian State is entitled 
to acquire land ownership for the enforcement of land policy objectives determined 
by law,25 public employment, and other general interest objectives.26 In addition to the 
state, some churches27 and their internal legal persons can acquire land ownership 
based on specific titles,28 as can mortgage credit institutions for a maximum period of 
 20 Act LV of 1994 on arable land, § 6(1)–(2) and § 7 (1).
 21 Explanatory memorandum of Act LV of 1994 on arable land.
 22 Constitutional Court Judgment no. 35/1994 (VI. 24).
 23 Téglási, 2012.
 24 Kozma, 2011.
 25 More specifically, determined by Act LXXXVII of 2010 on the National Land Fund.
 26 Act CXXII of 2013 on the acquisition of agricultural and forestry lands, § 11(1).
 27 Currently, 27 churches determined by the Annex of Act CCVI of 2011 on the freedom of con-
science and religion, as well as the status of churches, religious denominations, and religious 
communities, for example, the Hungarian Catholic Church, Hungarian Reformed Church, 
Hungarian Evangelical Church, etc. 
 28 On the basis of the disposition of property upon death, donation contract, or different types of 
personal care agreements.
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one year through a winding-up or enforcement proceeding29 and local governments 
in which the land concerned is situated for the aim of public employment, social land 
programme, and settlement development as well as in the case that the land in question 
is considered a protected site of local importance.30
Following an examination of Hungary’s land regulation in its entirety, the Euro-
pean Commission launched infringement procedures, arguing that the total ban on 
legal persons’ acquisition of land ownership was not in compliance with the law of the 
European Union.31 Some authors consider the total ban to be one of the most important 
principles of Hungarian land regulation as it aims to prevent the complex chain of 
owners that is uncontrollable in practice, which is in sharp contrast to the objective of 
retaining the population of rural areas.32
As can be seen, there is significant disagreement between Hungary and the 
European Union concerning the regulation of land acquisition by legal persons. No 
other member states regulate this issue in a strict manner. According to the European 
Commission’s position,33 this categorical ban violates the principle of the free move-
ment of capital.34
3. Slovakia
The accession of the Slovak Republic to the European Union has opened a new chapter 
in the country’s history and has brought about dynamic changes in its land regula-
tions. The member states such as Slovakia that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 were 
obliged to bring their national legislation in line with EU laws and abolish restrictions 
on land regulation that were applicable to nationals of the other Member States of 
the European Union. However, for a certain transitional period, the acceding states 
were permitted to maintain their national rules related to the restrictions on the 
acquisition of ownership of agricultural and forestry land in force during their 
accession period. This was the point at which the most dynamic period of the Slovak 
land regulation began. This is also emphasised by the fact that in October 2020, the 
Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic prepared 
a proposal to amend the law on the acquisition of ownership of agricultural land 
which is intended to be adopted in an abbreviated legislative procedure and which 
would be effective beginning 1 May 2021. In the present article, after defining the 
main sources of the Slovak land law, we present and analyse the most important 
 29 Act XXX of 1997 on mortgage credit institutions and mortgage bond, § 10(4).
 30 Act CXXII of 2013 on the acquisition of agricultural and forestry lands, § 11(2).
 31 Szilágyi, 2018.
 32 Olajos and Andréka, 2017.
 33 See https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1827: “Hungary has a very 
restrictive system which imposes a complete ban on the acquisition of land by legal entities 
and an obligation on the buyer to farm the land himself.”
 34 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 26(2) and Article 63(1).
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landmarks of the land regime, focusing particular attention on the reasons for which 
the European Commission initiated the infringement procedure against the Slovak 
Republic. The article also focuses on the acquisition of agricultural land by legal and 
natural persons as well as on the limits of acquisition of the ownership of agricultural 
land in Slovakia.35
 ■ 3.1. The main sources of land law in Slovakia
Agricultural land as a natural resource is an integral part of every country’s natural 
heritage, and every country is required to protect it. In the Slovak Republic, this legal 
obligation was declared in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic36 (hereinafter 
referred to as the Slovak Constitution) on 1 June 2017.37 As the Slovak Constitution is 
considered to be at the top of the Slovak hierarchy of sources of law, the duty to protect 
the country’s agricultural land is assured at the highest level. Based on the text of the 
Slovak Constitution, the state focuses closely on the exploitation of natural resources 
and particularly on the protection of agricultural land and forest soils. These two 
natural resources were defined as non-renewable38 natural resources, and because 
of this, the Slovak Constitution provides special protection for them to ensure food 
security in the country.39
At the constitutional level, the Slovak land regime is a system of complex legal 
norms. Regarding land law, the most important source of law is Act No. 140/2014 Coll. 
on the Acquisition of the Ownership of Agricultural Land (hereinafter referred to as 
the Land Act). This act regulates the process of the acquisition of the ownership of 
agricultural land by transfer of ownership as well as the powers of public administra-
tion bodies regarding this process.
 ■ 3.2. The acquisition of the ownership of agricultural land by legal persons
The accession of Slovakia to the European Union on 1 May 2004 was an important 
landmark in the history of Slovak land management. In general, member states, 
including the Slovak Republic, which became a member of the European Union in 
2004, were obliged to adapt their national rules in line with EU regulations upon 
accession. The seven-year transitional period expired in 2011, but the Slovak 
Republic submitted a request to the European Commission to extend the deadline 
by three years.40 As a result, the European Commission issued Regulation No 
 35 For further information, see Lazíková–Bandlerová, 2011; Lazíková–Bandlerová, 2014; 
Ilavská, 2016. For English language literature, see Dufala–Dufalová–Šmelková, 2017; 
Lazíková–Bandlerová–Lazíková, 2020; Drábik–Rajčániová, 2014; Lazíková et al, 2015; Palšová–
Bandlerová–Melišková–Schwarcz, 2017.
 36 Act No 460/1992 Coll. The Constitution of the Slovak Republic, as amended. In Slovak: Ústavný 
zákon č. 460/1992 Zb., Ústava Slovenskej republiky.
 37 The amendment to the Constitution was adopted on 16 May 2017.
 38 For further see (in Hungarian language): Hornyák, 2017, pp. 188–204.
 39 Article 44 (4) and (5) of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.
 40 Lazíková–Bandlerová, 2014.
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2011/241/EU approving the application and extended the transitional period until 
30 April 2014.41
Following the extended 10-year-long transitional period, the European Com-
mission conducted a comprehensive review of the national regulations of the newly 
joined member states. As a result of this procedure, the European Commission found 
that national legislation in Slovakia was still restricting the fundamental economic 
freedoms of the European Union. More specifically, among the fundamental freedoms, 
the restrictions on the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment 
were affected; as a result, these restrictions could lead to a significant reduction in 
cross-border agricultural investment.42 Due to these facts, in 2015, the European Com-
mission decided to initiate an infringement procedure against Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia.43
In the case of Slovakia, the main issue was the existence of 10 years of permanent 
residence or registered office in the Slovak Republic and the criterion of at least three 
years of commercial activity in agricultural production. The most problematic was 
the existence of a longer residence criterion, which resulted in the discrimination of 
EU citizens.44 The Slovak legislature responded to this situation by amending certain 
paragraphs of the Foreign Exchange Act,45 which resulted in the agricultural land 
market being opened not only for EU citizens but for third-country nationals as well. In 
addition, numerous rules concerning the purchase of agricultural land were adopted.46 
After these amendments were enacted, the Land Act regulated the transfer of agricul-
tural land in detail, ensuring relatively wide contractual freedom. In the explanatory 
memorandum of the Land Act,47 the main objective of the Act is to regulate the acquisi-
tion of agricultural land while preventing speculative purchases and thus to create 
an optimal legal environment that would allow agricultural production in the Slovak 
Republic as intended. It is clear that the most important objective of the aforementioned 
act is to utilise agricultural land for its intended agricultural purposes.48 The Land Act 
also introduced a mandatory bidding procedure. On this basis, a seller was obliged 
 41 2011/241/EU: Commission Decision of 14 April 2011 extending the transitional period con-
cerning the acquisition of agricultural land in Slovakia Text with EEA is available at the 
EUR-Lex portal: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32011D0241 
(Accessed: 14 January 2021)
 42 Szilágyi, 2017, p. 176.
 43 See the press release of the European Commission: ‘Financial services: Commission requests 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia to comply with EU rules on the acquisition of 
agricultural land’. Available at the website of the European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1827 (Accessed: 14 January 2021)
 44 Szilágyi, 2017, p. 176.
 45 The Foreign Exchange Act No. 202/1995. Coll., Section 19 (a): ‘A foreigner may acquire the owner-
ship of a domestic real estate property if its acquisition has not been restricted by separate laws’.
 46 Lazíková–Bandlerová–Lazíková, 2020, p. 100.
 47 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Act. No. 140/2014 Coll. on the acquisition of agricultural 
land is available online (in Slovak): https://www.nrsr.sk/web/Dynamic/DocumentPreview.
aspx?DocID=399288 (Accessed: 1 February 2021).
 48 Kollár, 2019.
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to register the selling interest49 in a database operated by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development of the Slovak Republic at least 15 days before land transfer. In 
addition, the landowner had to publish his selling intention on the bulletin board of 
the territorially competent municipality. The publication on the official bulletin board 
of the municipality was free of charge; moreover, the municipality was required to 
cooperate in publishing such offers.50 After these conditions were fulfilled, ownership 
of the agricultural land may have been acquired by a natural or legal person with 10 
years of permanent residence or registered office in the Slovak Republic and who had 
been engaged in agricultural activities for at least three years prior to the conclusion of 
the contract.51 If no one indicated their intention to purchase the land offered for sale in 
this way, the land could be claimed by a person with a permanent residence or domicile 
in the municipality in which the land was located. In the absence of interest, natural 
or legal persons residing or having their registered office in a neighbouring settlement 
had the opportunity to purchase the land.52 If there was no interest in purchasing 
agricultural land from the neighbouring municipality, the offer could be extended to 
persons who had a permanent residence or seat outside the municipality or the territory 
of the neighbouring municipality. Furthermore, the law also stated that if no person, 
regardless of their domicile or registered office, had expressed an intention to purchase 
land in the bidding procedure, the seller could freely transfer ownership of the land to 
a third party at the same starting price. However, in this case, only a third party who 
had been a citizen or resident in the territory of the Slovak Republic for 10 years could 
acquire ownership of the land. Nevertheless, a transfer was possible no later than six 
months after the unsuccessful bid.53 The district office was responsible for verifying the 
existence of legal requirements for the transfer of ownership of agricultural land.
Before the European Commission began the infringement procedure, a number 
of professional and political debates surrounded the Land Act because of several of its 
provisions. As a result, two groups of the National Council of the Slovak Republic (here-
inafter referred to as the Parliament) submitted a petition54 to the Constitutional Court 
of the Slovak Republic.55 The Constitutional Court deemed the limitations excessive 
because they limited the right to ownership, both of the sellers and of the purchasers.56 
The decision of the Constitutional Court resulted in a fundamental change, especially 
with regard to the acquisition of agricultural land. The decision of the Constitutional 
Court has resulted in the fact that currently, in Slovakia, both natural and legal persons can 
 49 The procedure for the transfer of ownership of land has been outlined in Section 4 of the Land 
Act.
 50 Lazíková–Bandlerová–Lazíková, 2020, p. 101.
 51 Kollár, 2019.
 52 Land Act, Section 4 (7).
 53 Relevans advokátska kancelária: Pravidlá nadobúdania poľnohospodárskych pozemkov a ich 
pripravované zmeny. https://www.relevans.sk/pravidla-nadobudania-polnohospodarskych-
pozemkov-pripravovane-zmeny/ (Accessed: 29 December 2020).
 54 The petition was filed on 2 July 2014.
 55 Drabik–Rajčániová, 2014, p. 84.
 56 Decision no. PL. ÚS 20/2014 of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic.
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acquire ownership of agricultural land with almost no restrictions.57 The only restriction is 
that agricultural land cannot be owned by a citizen, a resident, or a legal person of a state 
whose legal system does not allow ownership of agricultural land by Slovak citizens, residents, 
or legal persons. This rule does not apply to the inheritance of agricultural land or to 
member states of the European Union, the European Economic Area, Switzerland, and 
countries bound by an international treaty which is also binding for Slovakia.58
The year 2021 will undoubtedly be a year of change for Slovak land management 
regulations, and at the end of October 2020, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment of the Slovak Republic submitted an amendment proposal for inter-ministerial 
conciliation and requested its negotiation in an abbreviated legislative procedure.59
The two main novelties of the new Land Act are the introduction of a system 
of pre-emption rights and maximisation of land acquisition limits.60 Regarding these 
novelties, the introduction of land acquisition limits seems to be the most controversial. 
At the same time, it is almost certain that if the proposed amendment is approved in 
its original form, its constitutionality will presumably be re-examined by the Consti-
tutional Court of the Slovak Republic.
The bill received 108 comments, of which 56 proposed significant changes. For 
example, a review was sent by the Slovak Chamber of Agriculture which complained 
that the proposal did not cover the fact that the majority of plots were, in many cases, 
owned by a large number of unknown owners. In this context, several questions arise: 
How can pre-emption rights be enforced in such a case? On what basis would the pre-
emption order be determined? Furthermore, it is clear from the proposal that young 
farmers, who need an adequate amount of land to begin pursuing business activities, 
were not taken into account. “[Y]oung and small-scale farmers face very serious dif-
ficulties in acquiring land.”61
Because of this, young people may find themselves in a difficult situation unless 
they inherit agricultural land. In addition, according to the opinion of the Chamber 
of Agriculture, a plethora of lawsuits will be triggered by placing pre-emption rights 
ahead of pre-emption contracts. The Chamber of Agriculture would also raise the land 
acquisition limit by 50 percent for those who are involved in registered animal hus-
bandry, as this would be essential for fodder production. In addition, per the proposal 
of the Chamber of Agriculture, the Slovak Land Fund could lease the land of unknown 
 57 Ptačinová, 2019.
 58 Land Act, Section 7.
 59 The bill and its annexes were uploaded to the „Slov-Lex”- Legislative and Information Portal 
of the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic. The whole package in the Slovak language 
is available at https://www.slov-lex.sk/legislativne-procesy/-/SK/dokumenty/LP-2020-504 
(Accessed: 22 January 2021).
 60 These limits would accordingly be introduced differently for natural persons as well as for 
legal persons: it would mean 300 hectares for natural persons and sole proprietors and 1200 
hectares for legal persons. However, it is important to note that if the buyer is involved in 
animal husbandry, the above-mentioned ceilings will be 50 percent higher.
 61 Dirgasová and Laziková, 2017, p. 372.
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owners only to Slovak farmers and to legal entities in cases where the final beneficiary 
is a Slovak citizen.
The topic has not been reopened as of the completion of this manuscript.62 
Therefore, the most pressing question is what direction the forthcoming regulation 
will take.
4. The Czech Republic
After joining the European Union, a five-year transitional period was permitted for 
the Czech Republic to assure the conformity of laws related to residential properties 
and a seven-year transitional period was given to harmonise laws related to acquiring 
the ownership of agricultural and forestry land.63 On 1 May 2011 the Parliament of the 
Czech Republic approved an amendment to the Foreign Exchange Act64 which formally 
removed all of the restrictions for foreigners (both for natural persons and for legal 
persons based abroad) buying any type of real property in the Czech Republic. The bill 
entered into force on 19 July 2011. From this date forward, European rules regarding 
the free movement of capital have to apply to real estate acquisitions in the country. 
This means that there is no legal obstacle for a foreign legal entity or investor to buy any type 
of real estate in the Czech Republic, including agricultural land, forestry land, or residential 
properties.65 This resulted in the Foreign Exchange Act being in line with the Accession 
Treaty, and no one was restricted in regard to buying real estate or agricultural land 
in the country.66 This change in the law provided new opportunities for foreigners to 
acquire ownership of agricultural and forestry land, which is still considered a very 
good investment because such land is still significantly cheaper in the Czech Republic 
than in Western European countries. Moreover, investors were reluctant to buy real 
estate in the Czech Republic long before the Foreign Exchange Act was revised.67
According to the Land Fund, only 7% of the agricultural land in the Czech Repub-
lic was owned by the state, and more than 90% of agricultural land was already privately 
owned at that time.68 The Foreign Exchange Act expired on 18 October 2016.69
Originally, before the problematic restrictions of the Foreign Exchange Act were 
removed in 2011, agricultural land could be acquired only by residents of the Czech 
Republic (both legal and natural persons). However, there were some exceptions. 
 62 The manuscript was finalised on 1 March 2021.
 63 Jakub and Syrovátko, 2010, p. 12.
 64 Amendment No. 206/2011 proposed to the Act No. 219/1995 Coll., Foreign Exchange Act.
 65 Jakub and Syrovátko, 2010, p. 12.
 66 Barešová, 2011, pp. I.-VII.
 67 Humlová and Ueltzhöffer, 2001, p. 2.
 68 For further information, see the article on ProfitLine’s website: The road was opened before 
buying Czech agricultural land. [Online]. Available at: https://profitline.hu/Megnyilt-az-ut-a-
cseh-termofoldek-vasarlasa-elott-252961 (Accessed: 4 March 2021).
 69 The Foreign Exchange Act was terminated by the Act No. 323/2016 Coll.
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Foreigners were able to buy agricultural land if they were married to a Czech citizen, 
and they could also acquire ownership through inheritance or exercising pre-emptive 
rights that emerged from co-ownership of the land. Foreigners were also able to exer-
cise pre-emptive rights if the land could not be separated from another asset that was 
already owned by a foreigner. Farmers with EU citizenship were able to acquire the 
ownership of agricultural land if they were pursuing agricultural business activities 
as self-employed farmers and they had been permanently staying in the country for at 
least 36 months.70 These farmers had to prove their professional knowledge of farming 
as well as their knowledge of the Czech language. This means that before the law was 
modified, natural persons who were permanently staying in the country and pursuing 
farming activities for at least 36 months, as well as Czech legal entities combining 
Czech and foreign capital, were permitted to buy private agricultural land.
In 2019, the Association of Czech Landowners71 shared up-to-date information 
on agricultural land ownership. According to this report, there was a continuous 
decrease in the number of natural landowners. In January 2019, there were 3.19 
million agricultural landowners in the Czech Republic who owned a total of 4.2 million 
hectares of agricultural land. The largest group of owners comprised natural persons. 
Natural persons, therefore, owned 75% of agricultural land in the Czech Republic 
(approximately 3.1 million hectares of agricultural land); meanwhile, the legal enti-
ties owned 21% (903 thousand hectares) of the agricultural land. The number of legal 
entities owning agricultural land is approximately 54,000. The average land area per 
legal entity was 17 hectares. Three% of all agricultural land (134,000 hectares) was 
owned by the state. Other organisations are of minor importance for agricultural land 
ownership. Compared to the previous year, the number of natural persons owning land 
decreased by almost 12,000 hectares, while the number of legal persons increased by 
approximately 700. The data were based on land registry statistics.72
In the Czech Republic, a number of domestic legal entities (also known as agri-
cultural giants) control agricultural production. As a result, these large companies have 
a strong influence on real estate sales, thus affecting market prices. They often cultivate 
agricultural land without the knowledge or consent of landowners. These organisations 
not only benefit from the crop obtained on land but also receive subsidies for cultiva-
tion. According to their own declaration, this is considered to be remuneration received 
in return for their services because if the lands were not cultivated, they would have 
been destroyed as a result of inaction. According to statistics for 2019, in the Czech 
Republic, agricultural holdings farmed a total of 3,456,646 hectares of agricultural land 
in 2017, of which 2,507 enterprises used 1,720,555 hectares.73
 70 Ciaian, Kancs, Swinnen, Van Herck and Vranken, 2012, pp. 9.
 71 In Czech: Svaz vlastníků půdy České Republiky (SVP ČR).
 72 Press release of the Association of Czech Landowners (available in Czech language). [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.svazvlastnikupudy.cz/cs/aktuality/v-ceske-republice-ubyva-
drobnych-vlastniku-pudy.html (Accessed: 6 March 2021).
 73 Damohorský and Chaloupková, 2019, pp. 8.
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The largest group of agricultural holdings was made up of small farms, which 
account for less than two-thirds of all agricultural holdings in the Czech Republic. 
The smallest group of agricultural holdings (approximately 7%) is represented by large 
agricultural units. Although this is the least represented group, much of the Czech 
agricultural production is concentrated in large farms. These farms utilise 66% of 
the total agricultural land. The opposite situation occurs in the case of small farms 
managed by individuals, for which the largest group utilised only 5% of the agricultural 
land area in the Czech Republic.74
In the Czech Republic, both domestic and foreign legal entities can acquire land 
ownership. We believe that legal non-regulation in the land market causes significant 
problems, primarily due to the market situation created by large agricultural giants.
5. Poland
 ■ 5.1. Legal framework for the transfer of agricultural real property
In its Article 23, adopted on 2 April 1997, the Constitution of Poland in force provides for 
a general principle, according to which the basis of the entire Polish agricultural system 
shall be the family farm.75 According to Polish lawmakers, agricultural real properties 
are an indispensable means of agricultural production, the primary purpose and func-
tion of which is to ensure food security in the country.76 Consequently, the transfer of 
land suitable for food production must be properly regulated, allowing for an even and 
just distribution of this ‘public good’.77
The Polish framework governing the transfer of ownership of agricultural 
land concerns two main areas, distinguishing between the rules applicable to private 
property and those applicable to state-owned property. With the adoption of the Act of 
14 April 2016 on suspension of the sale of real property from the Agricultural Property 
Stock of the State Treasury and amendment to certain acts,78 the trade of state-owned 
 74 For more information, see the website of the Czech Statistical Office. Structural survey in agri-
culture – analytical evaluation 2016 – Structure of agricultural holdings expressed in classes 
according to economic size. (Strukturální šetření v zemědělství – analytické vyhodnocení 2016. 
Struktura zemědělských podniků vyjádřená ve třídách ekonomické velikosti) [Online].
  Available at: https://www.czso.cz/documents/10180/79535242/27016818k02cz.pdf/eaf95599-
31e7-4865-9dff-2f59fcd59f02?version=1.1 (Accessed: 6 March 2021).
 75 The Constitution of the Republic of Poland adopted on 2 April 1997, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] of 
1997 No. 78, item 483 as amended. 
 76 Explanatory Memorandum of the draft bill on the suspension of the sale of real property from 
the Agricultural Property Stock of the State Treasury and amendment to certain acts, submit-
ted by the government on 4 March 2016, item nr 293 (hereinafter: Explanatory Memorandum), 
pp. 1, 12. [Online] Available at: https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm8.nsf/druk.xsp?nr=293 (Accessed: 
17 March 2021). 
 77 See Blajer and Gonet, 2020.
 78 Act of 14 April 2016 on the suspension of the sale of real property from the Agricultural Prop-
erty Stock of the State Treasury and amendment to certain acts, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] of 2016, 
item 585 as amended. 
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farmland has been withheld for a period of five years beginning 30 April 2016 and is 
not covered in this paper.79 The transfer of privately owned farmland, although not sus-
pended, is subject to various far-reaching limitations outlined in the Act of 11 April 2003 
on the Formation of the Agricultural System (hereinafter, the AAS).80 It provides for the 
rules that are lex specialis to the Polish Civil Code,81 with respect to legal transactions 
resulting in the transfer of ownership of agricultural real property. The AAS has been 
recurrently amended over the last several years. Substantial changes were introduced 
in April 2016 ( referred to as the 2016 amendment) at the end of the 12-year transitional 
period provided for by the accession treaty to the EU, with the aim of preventing land 
speculation and uncontrolled land purchases by foreigners.82 Additionally, in the case 
of the acquisition of farmland by foreign individuals or companies, the provisions of 
the Act of 24 March 1920 on the Acquisition of Real Estate by Foreigners (hereinafter, 
the AREF)83 shall also apply, providing for further trade-restrictive provisions.
 ■ 5.2. Acquisition of agricultural land under the AAS
5.2.1. The scope of application of the AAS
For the purposes of the application of the AAS, agricultural real property shall be 
understood as an agricultural real property within the meaning of the Civil Code, 
excluding the properties located in areas designated in the local zoning plan for 
purposes other than agriculture.84 The Civil Code, which the AAS refers to, defines 
agricultural real property as immovable property, which is or may be used for carrying 
out agricultural production activity within the scope of plant and animal production, 
not excluding gardening, horticulture, and fishery production.85 Not covered by the 
scope of application of the AAS are inter alia state-owned properties, agricultural real 
properties with an area of less than 0.3 hectares, or, under certain circumstances, the 
agricultural land situated within the city limits.86
The term ‘acquisition’, as defined in Article 2 of the AAS, should be understood 
broadly to include not only acquisition by sale or donation but also acquisition by virtue 
of a court ruling or an administrative decision as well as acquisition as a result of other 
events of legal significance (e.g. by prescription). The AAS also imposes restrictions on 
 79 For more on the transfer of state-owned farmland, see Suchoń, 2017, pp. 43–47; Iwaszkiewicz, 
2020, pp. 29–45. 
 80 Act of 11 April 2003 on the Formation of the Agricultural System, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] of 
2003 No. 64, item 592 as amended. 
 81 Act of 23 April 1964 Civil Code, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] of 1964 No. 16, item 93 as amended. 
 82 See Explanatory Memorandum, pp. 1–2, 12, 30.
 83 Act of 24 March 1920 on the Acquisition of Real Estate by Foreigners, Journal of Laws [Dz. U.] 
of 1920 No. 31, item 178 as amended.
 84 Article 2 point 1 of the AAS. As only 1/4 of the territory of Poland is regulated by local zoning 
plans, a question arises as to the application of the AAS with respect to agricultural real proper-
ties situated in areas with no local zoning plans; see Ilków, 2018, pp. 20–35.
 85 Article 461 of the Civil Code.
 86 See Articles 1a and 1b of the AAS.
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the transfer of shares in commercial companies only indirectly, resulting in the trans-
fer of ownership of agricultural land (via share-deal).87 The rules for the acquisition of 
ownership of land provided by the AAS apply equally to the acquisition of ownership 
and the right of perpetual usufruct.88
5.2.2. The acquisition of farmland under the AAS
The AAS embodies the constitutional principle that family farming shall constitute the 
basis of the Polish agricultural system. The preamble sets out the principal objectives 
of the AAS, which include inter alia strengthening the protection and development of 
family farms, ensuring proper management of agricultural land, ensuring the food 
security of Polish citizens, and supporting sustainable agriculture.
By virtue of the 2016 amendment, a general principle was introduced into the 
AAS, according to which agricultural real property can be acquired only by individual 
farmers, that is, natural persons who meet the statutory requirements.89 A 300-hectare 
threshold was put in place with respect to the maximum area of the arable land acquired 
by an individual farmer, which shall be calculated together with the arable land 
already owned by the acquirer.90 Although the AAS formally declares in Article 2a that 
only an individual farmer can acquire agricultural real property, it also provides for 
several exemptions, which makes it possible for natural persons other than individual 
farmers as well as various categories of legal persons to acquire agricultural land. The 
exemptions include relatives, local government units, the State Treasury, churches and 
registered religious associations, national parks, and commercial companies that carry 
out specific public objectives or those owned by the State Treasury.91 Furthermore, the 
general principle of acquisition by an individual farmer and the 300-hectare threshold 
do not apply to the acquisition of agricultural land as a result of a transformation, 
merger, or division of an existing company or that occurs in the course of restructuring 
or bankruptcy proceedings,92 nor do they apply to agricultural real properties with 
an area of less than one hectare, which can be acquired by any legal person or a non-
farmer individual.93
A legal person not covered by statutory exceptions may nevertheless acquire 
the ownership of agricultural real property upon permission issued by the National 
 87 Article 3a of the AAS.
 88 Article 2c point 1 of the AAS. 
 89 Article 2a para. 1 of the AAS. According to Article 6 para. 1 of the AAS, an individual farmer 
is a natural person who is an owner, holder of perpetual usufruct, autonomous possessor, or 
lessee of agricultural real property whose combined area of arable land does not exceed 300 
hectares, who holds agricultural qualifications and has been residing for a period of at least 
five years in the commune in whose territory at least one of the agricultural real properties 
forming part of the family farm is located, and who has been running this farm personally 
throughout that period. See Suchoń, 2017, p. 45; Kurowska, 2017.
 90 Article 2a para. 2 of the AAS.
 91 Article 2a para. 3 of the AAS.
 92 Article 2a para. 3 points 4), 9) and 11) of the AAS.
 93 Article 2a para. 3 point 1a) of the AAS.
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Support Centre for Agriculture (hereinafter, the NSCA).94 Such permission can be 
requested by the seller of the agricultural land which is to be transferred, provided that 
the conditions outlined by the AAS have been met. For permission to be granted, the 
seller is required to demonstrate that it was not possible to sell the land to an individual 
farmer, while the buyer must undertake agricultural activity on the acquired land.95 
Permission will not be issued if the acquisition leads to excessive land concentration; 
however, the AAS does not give any indication as to when land concentration is deemed 
excessive, leaving a margin of appreciation to the competent authorities.
The AAS provides several instruments allowing the state to exercise control over 
the agricultural real estate market, one of which is the right of pre-emption, regulated 
in Article 3 of the AAS. It endows the NSCA with the right of first refusal with respect 
to the agricultural land for sale, which can be exercised on behalf of the State Treasury 
on the condition that a tenant (lessee) has not exercised the right of pre-emption in first 
place.96 The sale of farmland results in invalidity if performed unconditionally, without 
the party entitled to pre-emption being notified.97 In the case of acquisition resulting from 
legal arrangements other than sale (e.g. from the transformation, merger, or division of a 
company, donation, acquisition by prescription, or court ruling), the NSCA has the right to 
acquire the land, which shall be exercised against the payment of the purchase price.98
As amended in 2016, the AAS has imposed a twofold obligation on the acquirer of 
agricultural property to ensure the active utilisation of agricultural land and to prevent 
capital investments in such agricultural land. These have the overall aim of ensuring 
food security in Poland.99 Article 2b para. 1 of the AAS outlines an obligation to run the 
agricultural holding of which the agricultural real property became a part for a period 
of at least five years, starting from the day of acquisition.100 During the same period, the 
acquirer is obliged to refrain from selling the agricultural real property or transferring 
its possession. However, neither of these restrictions are absolute in nature. The AAS 
provides several exemptions when the above-mentioned obligations are not applied. 
The exemptions refer to the acquirer himself (e.g. a relative), the type of acquisition 
(e.g. by inheritance), or the location of the agricultural real property (e.g. in the city, if 
the area of the real property is less than one hectare).101 Even if not covered by statutory 
exemptions, the acquirer may still sell the farmland or transfer its possession within 
the prescribed five-year period if allowed by the general director of the NSCA.102 Such 
 94 Krajowy Ośrodek Wsparcia Rolnictwa (KOWR) – a government agency responsible for the man-
agement and development of the Polish agricultural system. See Article 2a para. 4 of the AAS.
 95 Article 2a para. 4 point 1) of the AAS. See Kubaj, 2020, pp. 128–129.
 96 Article 3 paras. 1 and 4 of the AAS.
 97 Article 9 para. 1 of the AAS.
 98 Article 4 para. 1 of the AAS.
 99 Czech, 2020. 
 100 Article 2b para. 1 of the AAS.
 101 Article 2b para. 4 of the AAS.
 102 Article 2b para. 3 of the AAS. The exemption from the prohibition of disposal of land is not 
accompanied by a similar procedure allowing for an exemption from the obligation to carry 
out agricultural activity.
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exemptions need to be justified by the acquirer’s important interests or the public inter-
est. Otherwise, the implementation of the obligations set out under Article 2b paras. 1 
and 2 are subject to state control and scrutiny. In the case of non-compliance with the 
obligation to farm the land or with the prohibition of disposal, the NSCA, on behalf of 
the State Treasury, may request from the court the buyout of the misused land.103
5.2.3. Acquisition of agricultural land via share-deal
The AAS restricts the transfer of shares in a commercial company which owns agricul-
tural real property with an area of at least five hectares (or multiple agricultural real 
properties with a total area of at least five hectares). These apply equally to commercial 
companies which hold the right of perpetual usufruct. Pursuant to Article 3a para. 1 
of the AAS, the NSCA, acting on behalf of the State Treasury, has a pre-emption right 
to purchase shares in case of a transfer of shares. This applies even if the agricultural 
land in question constitutes only a minor portion of the company’s assets.104 The share 
purchase agreement shall be subject to the condition that the NSCA does not exercise 
the right of pre-emption; otherwise, the entire acquisition of shares performed uncon-
ditionally is null and void.105 The NSCA has the right of pre-emption only with respect 
to the shares in a company that owns agricultural real property (or holds the right 
of perpetual usufruct) directly, and the transfer of shares in a company which is an 
indirect owner of agricultural land – by holding shares in another company – remains 
beyond the scope of the NSCA’s right of pre-emption.106 In addition, the right of pre-
emption does not apply with respect to the acquisition of farmland resulting from the 
transfer, merger, or division of a company; in that case, however, the NSCA is entitled 
to the right of acquisition of the land (see above).
Changes in ownership structure in business entities other than commercial 
companies are also subject to the restrictions specified in the AAS. According to Article 
3b para. 1 of the AAS, in case of a change of partner in a partnership which owns 
agricultural real property with an area of at least five hectares (or several agricultural 
real properties with a total area of at least five hectares) or in the case of the admission 
of a new partner to such a partnership, the NSCA shall have the right to acquire the land 
against the payment of the purchase price equal to the property’s market value. For 
this reason, a partnership is required to notify the NSCA regarding changes in partner-
ship structure within one month.107 Failure to comply with this obligation leads to the 
 103 Article 9 para. 3 point 1 of the AAS. 
 104 Hełka, 2019, p. 115.
 105 Article 9 para. 1 of the AAS. To comply with the AAS, the company whose shares are to be 
transferred shall notify the NSCA about the share purchase agreement and submit all docu-
ments listed in Article 3a para. 4 of the AAS (certificate from the land registry, extract of land 
and building registration, balance sheet and profit and loss account, list of shareholders, and 
statement of the board of directors on the value of contingent liabilities).
 106 Hełka, 2019, p. 116.
 107 Article 3b para. 3 of the AAS.
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invalidity of the legal transaction, resulting in changes to the partnership structure.108 
The provisions apply equally to partnerships which hold the right of perpetual usufruct 
to agricultural land with an area of at least five hectares.
 ■ 5.3. Acquisition of real estate by foreigners under the AREF
In addition to the provisions of the AAS, the acquisition of agricultural land by foreign-
ers is also governed by the provisions of the AREF. The definition of a foreigner given in 
Article 1 para. 2 of the AREF refers equally to foreign individuals and to legal persons, 
the latter including commercial companies as well as foundations, associations, and 
churches.109 It is worth mentioning that a company or partnership with its registered 
seat in Poland and established under the laws of Poland may nevertheless be considered 
a foreign company if it is controlled, directly or indirectly, by foreign individuals or 
legal persons.
As a general rule given in Article 1, para 1. of the AREF, the acquisition of all 
types of real estate by foreigners requires permission from the Minister of Internal 
Affairs. Such permission is issued if the Minister of National Defence does not object 
to the acquisition and, in the case of agricultural land, if the minister in charge of rural 
development does not oppose the acquisition. Permission can be issued, providing that 
the acquisition of real estate by the foreigner does not pose a threat to the defence and 
security of Poland or to public order and if it is not contrary to the interests of social 
policy and social health as long as the foreigner can demonstrate circumstances that 
confirm his or her links to Poland.110
Similar to the AAS, the AREF provides for a broad definition of the acquisition 
of real property, encompassing the acquisition of ownership or perpetual usufruct of 
real estate following any legal event.111 Not only is the direct acquisition of real estate 
controlled by the state, but permission is also required for the acquisition of shares in 
a Polish commercial company being the owner or perpetual user of real estate located 
in the territory of Poland if the company becomes a controlled company as a result 
of such transactions.112 The AREF provides several exemptions to these permission 
 108 Article 9 para. 1 of the AAS. See Blajer and Gonet, 2020.
 109 Article 1 para. 2 of the AREF defines a foreigner as (1) an individual person who does not have 
Polish citizenship, (2) a legal person whose registered office is located abroad, (3) an unincor-
porated partnership of the persons referred to in point 1 or 2 whose registered office is located 
abroad, established in accordance with the legislation of a foreign country, or (4) a legal person 
and an unincorporated commercial partnership whose registered office is located in the terri-
tory of the Republic of Poland, directly or indirectly controlled by the persons or partnerships 
referred to in points 1, 2 and 3. According to Article 1 para. 3 of the AREF, a controlled company 
or partnership is a company or partnership in which a foreigner or foreigners hold more than 
50 percent of votes at the meeting of partners or the general meeting, as a pledgee or user, or 
pursuant to agreements with other persons, or are in a dominant position within the meaning 
of the provisions of the Code of Commercial Companies. For more on the personal scope of 
application of the AREF, see Wereśniak-Masri, 2019, pp. 63–64.
 110 Article 1a para.1 of the AREF.
 111 Article 4 of the AREF.
 112 Article 3e para. 1 of the AREF.
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requirements. Following the expiration of the transitional period provided for in the 
accession treaty to the EU, restrictions do not apply inter alia to the acquisition of real 
estate by individuals and legal persons from the European Economic Area (EEA) or 
Switzerland.113 As a result, any legal person from outside the EEA wishing to acquire 
agricultural real property in Poland is required to obtain two separate permissions: one 
from the Ministry of the Interior (valid for two years) and the other from the NSCA (valid 
without time limit), the latter being required for all persons who do not qualify as 
individual farmers. If the agricultural land to be acquired by a non-EEA foreigner falls 
within the scope of exemptions listed by the AAE (e.g. the area of farmland is less than 
one hectare), only a permit from the Ministry of the Interior will be required.114
The Minister of Internal Affairs maintains a register of real estate and shares 
acquired by foreigners both based on the required permit and without it.115 To ensure 
transparency and accountability, an annual report from the implementation of the 
AREF was developed by the minister and published on the official website. It comprises 
detailed statistics on the number of proceedings, granted permissions, and refusals, 
along with information on the nationality of foreigners (in case of legal persons, on 
the origin of their capital) and on the types of real estate acquired, along with their 
area and geographical location. In 2019, 108 permissions were granted to foreigners 
to acquire agricultural and forestry land, amounting to a total area of 35.32 hectares; 
however, no permission was issued to any legal persons.116 One permission was issued to 
a foreigner to acquire shares in a Polish company owning agricultural and forestry land 
(total area of 2.91 hectares).117 As for the agricultural and forestry land acquired without 
permission, a total of 703.26 hectares of such land was acquired by legal persons (365 
transactions) and 633.25 hectares by individual persons (886 transactions).118 A total 
of 3,016.62 hectares of agricultural and forestry land was involved in share transfers 
in companies owning real estate in Poland; the shares were purchased by foreigners 
(legal or individual persons) primarily from Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Bulgaria.119 These numbers are slightly higher than those reported in 2018 (41 permis-
sions issued to foreign individuals to acquire agricultural and forestry land of the total 
area of 14.19 hectares, no permission issued to a legal person, one permission was 
issued to acquire shares in a company owning agricultural and forestry land, a total 
of 310.54 hectares of such land acquired by legal persons without permission in 198 
transactions, 442.61 hectares acquired by individual persons without permission in 
 113 Article 8 para. 2 of the AREF.
 114 For the double permit requirement, see Wereśniak-Masri, 2019, pp. 59–71.
 115 Article 8 para. 4 of the AREF.
 116 Report of the Minister of the Interior and Administration on the implementation in 2019 of the 
Act of 24 March 1920 on the acquisition of real estate by foreigners [Sprawozdanie z realizacji 
w 2019 r. ustawy z dnia 24 marca 1920 r. o nabywaniu nieruchomości przez cudzoziemców], March 
2020, p. 27. [Online]. Available at: https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki9ka.nsf/0/90FE391901192530
C1258536003437B7/%24File/292.pdf (Accessed: 17 March 2021).
 117 Ibid. p. 38.
 118 Ibid. p. 53.
 119 Ibid. p. 50.
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742 transactions, and 3,132.02 hectares of agricultural and forestry land involved in 
share transfers).120
 ■ 5.4. Summarising remarks on Poland
The Constitution of Poland puts forth a cornerstone principle, according to which the 
basis of the agricultural system in Poland shall be family farms. For this reason, several 
restrictions have been imposed on the trade of agricultural land, such as the general 
rule that only individual farmers may acquire farmland ownership. However, under 
certain conditions, legal persons and foreigners may also acquire agricultural land in 
Poland upon receiving permission from competent authorities.
The Polish legal framework applicable to agricultural land transactions is 
tantamount to introducing serious restrictions on ownership rights. Questions arise 
as to whether the adopted measures (e.g. the acquisition of farmland by individual 
farmers, the ban on alienating farmland, the obligation to carry out agricultural 
activity, pre-emption rights) are not overly restrictive.121 However, it should be kept 
in mind that the overall aim of the Polish lawmakers was to ensure the citizens’ food 
security, a principle the implementation of which requires proper regulation of the 
agricultural land market. The measures adopted by the Polish legislator are designed to 
prevent excessive concentrations of land and support family holdings and small-scale 
producers.
6. Conclusions
By analysing the regulation of the acquisition of ownership of agricultural lands by 
legal persons in the Visegrád Group countries, it has become clear that despite several 
common features among these countries, such as the Soviet influence on their agri-
culture in the post-World War II era, as well as despite their geographical proximity 
and the fact that all are EU member states, their approaches to the issue are in stark 
contrast to each other.
Considering an imaginary scale, Hungary would be at one end point, and Slo-
vakia and the Czech Republic would be at another. Hungary, with its full prohibition, 
shows us an enormous difference in relation to the completely free land regimes of 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Poland falls midway to these two end points with its 
attempt to regulate in detail and handle the acquisition of ownership of agricultural 
lands by legal persons, going so far as to adopt provisions on share deals.
 120 Report of the Minister of Interior and Administration on the implementation in 2018 of the Act 
of 24 March 1920 on the acquisition of real estate by foreigners [Sprawozdanie z realizacji w 2018 
r. ustawy z dnia 24 marca 1920 r. o nabywaniu nieruchomości przez cudzoziemców], March 2019, 
pp. 27, 49, 52. [Online]. Available at: https://www.gov.pl/attachment/876e3da3-f8b5-4b32-9cd7-
ecc54c53670a (Accessed: 17 March 2021).
 121 See, for example, Maj, 2019, p. 90; Czech, 2020; Korzycka and Wojciechowski, 2019.
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With the emerging paradigm of food sovereignty as our frame of reference, 
we can see the following: (a) the Hungarian regulation aims to protect domestic agri-
cultural production at all costs, striving to keep foreign capital out of agriculture in 
the spirit of food sovereignty; (b) Poland has chosen a more moderate approach with 
its sophisticated and detailed regulation, but there are weaknesses in the system as 
a consequence of untraceable (indirect) ownership chains which are the immanent 
features of legal persons and which are beyond the scope of regulation; (c) Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic are currently offering themselves to the convenience and interests 
of foreign capital to the detriment of their own food sovereignty.
From the viewpoint of the EU, the current unregulated land regimes of Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic are prime examples of the “good cops” who follow the guide-
lines of the EU internal market, while Hungary can be considered a “bad cop” who 
acts against the principle of the free movement of capital. Poland is moderate in this 
respect.
Regulating the land market, including the acquisition of ownership of agri-
cultural lands by legal persons, in the spirit of food sovereignty is an open-ended 
process the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. If we accept Georg 
Jellinek’s attributes of sovereign statehood, one of which is territory (Staatsgebiet),122 it 
becomes crucial for each country to manage its land regime, thereby retaining one of 
the constituting elements of sovereignty. Territory includes agricultural and forestry 
lands which are essential and indispensable for providing food to another attribute 
of statehood, that is, to population (Staatsvolk).123 If the control over land regulation 
and, thus, over agricultural production escapes from the control of the third attribute 
of statehood, that is, from the state power (Staatsgwalt),124 and comes to be under the 
control of private entities, such as foreign legal persons with enormous amounts of 
capital, serious concerns may arise in connection with food sovereignty.
The future of agriculture of EU member states will be largely determined by the 
EU in regard to whether it adopts the paradigm of food sovereignty and, if so, to what 
extent. By prioritising positive integration125 over negative integration126, it may succeed 
in keeping national agriculture national and providing each member state with the 
possibility of protecting their own (food) sovereignty.
 122 Jellinek, 1905, pp. 381–393.
 123 Jellinek, 1905, pp. 393–413.
 124 Jellinek, 1905, pp. 413–420.
 125 Such as to the provision formulated in the Article 345 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, which declares that the Treaties shall in no way prejudice the rules in 
member states governing the system of property ownership.
 126 Such as the free movement of capital.
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incoming EU obligations. These inevitable adjustments should be pursued cautiously 
by candidate countries to minimise risks and maximise their bargaining power.
 ■ KEYWORDS: Plurilateral Termination Agreement, Achmea, bilateral investment 
treaties, conflict of international agreements, EU law standards, candidate 
countries.
1. Background – Changed landscape of the EU BIT policy: the CJEU 
decision in the Achmea case and the Agreement for the Termination 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the 
European Union
Much has already been said about the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
decision in the Achmea case,3 and for good reason. In its landmark decision, the CJEU 
ruled, for the first time, that arbitration clauses in intra-European Union (EU) bilat-
eral investment agreements (BITs) are incompatible with EU law. The CJEU assessed 
intra-EU BITs against standards of EU law and found that these instruments and, 
consequently, intra-EU BITs arbitral clauses, were not compatible with EU law. This 
decision laid bare the conflict between two sets of obligations for EU member states, 
the first arising under the BITs and the second arising under EU law. The question here 
is not only how the CJEU arrived at this conclusion but also how it was possible to have 
normative conflict of such magnitude broiling within the EU for so long. An additional 
question is when and why this conflict came into existence in the first place.
As is already well known, after Slovakia lost its investment case before the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitral tribunal, initi-
ated by the Dutch company Achmea B.V. (originally Eureko B.V.), on the grounds that 
the reversal of liberalisation measures in the health insurance market contravened 
Slovakian obligations under the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT,4 Slovakia moved to set aside 
the award before the High Regional Court in Frankfurt am Main in Germany. The 
action was dismissed, but Slovakia appealed on a point of law before the Federal Court, 
which decided to stay the proceedings and refer several questions to the CJEU for a pre-
liminary ruling pursuant to Art. 267 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). The 
questions referred to the CJEU were whether an arbitration clause in an intra-EU BIT 
that provides for an investor-state arbitration between the national of one member state 
and the government of another for investment disputes arising under such intra-EU 
 3 Judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) of 6 March 2018. 
Slowakische Republic v. Achmea BV (Case C-284/16). Hereinafter: CJEU Achmea decision.
 4 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), PCA Case 
No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko B.V. v. The Slovak Republic), Final Award, 7 December 2012.
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BIT was precluded by Arts. 18(1), 267, and 344 TFEU. Given that the intra-EU BIT was 
a treaty between member states, the issue of conflict was to be resolved by reference 
to the precedence of EU law over the provision of the BIT. On 6 March 2018, the CJEU 
found that the arbitration clause in the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT was incompatible 
with EU law and had an adverse effect on its autonomy.5 The consequence of this finding 
was that the operation of the BIT arbitration clause was precluded. Following the CJEU 
Achmea decision, the German Federal Court annulled the UNCITRAL arbitral award 
in the Achmea case.6 The main rationale of the CJEU Achmea decision was that the 
autonomy of EU law would necessarily be compromised by the possibility of having 
a court outside the control of the CJEU vested with jurisdiction to interpret and apply 
EU law.7
The question that was referred to the CJEU had already been heard before in 
different international forums and contexts. It had been raised as part of Slovakia’s 
argument against the jurisdiction of the UNCITRAL arbitral tribunal in the Achmea 
case. In its preliminary objections, Slovakia argued that the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (the EC Treaty) governed the same subject matter as the BIT 
such that the latter was to be considered terminated or inapplicable pursuant to rules 
of treaty law (Arts. 59 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, VCLT) 
but also that the arbitration clause could not be applied because of its incompatibility 
with the EC Treaty and the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU over the claims of the 
claimant.8 In the course of the arbitral proceedings, the European Commission joined 
the arguments that intra-EU BITs were incompatible with EU law on the basis of the 
precedence of EU law, prohibition of discrimination (given that investors from certain 
EU countries are potentially in a better position than others), and the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the CJEU.9
An important factor that coincided with the jurisdictional arguments of both 
Slovakia and the European Commission in the Achmea arbitration was the adoption 
and entry into force of the TFEU and its Art. 307, which vested the EU with exclusive 
competence with respect to foreign direct investment (FDI) as part of the common 
commercial policy.10 This was in addition to Slovakia’s argument that by its accession to 
the EU in May 2004, the BIT and its arbitration clause were terminated and/or became 
inapplicable, as they were contrary to EU law.
 5 The CJEU Achmea decision, para. 59.
 6 BGH, 31.10.2018 – I ZB 2/15. Achmea has filed a constitutional complaint before the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany against the judgement of the German Supreme Court that 
annulled the award following the ruling of the CJEU. See Adams et al., 2020.
 7 The CJEU Achmea decision, paras. 57-59.
 8 Achmea B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko B.V. v. The 
Slovak Republic), Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26 October 2010, para. 
19.
 9 Ibid., paras. 176-186.
 10 TFEU, Art. 207(1), Art. 3(1)(e)).
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However, even before the Achmea case and the Lisbon Treaty, the same issue was 
raised in Eastern Sugar v. The Czech Republic,11 the case that was initiated only one month 
after the Czech Republic had acceded to the EU.12 Together with the Czech Republic, 
the European Commission argued in 2006 that intra-EU BITs were incompatible with 
EU law. The question that was pertinent in both the Eastern Sugar and Achmea cases 
was why there was no special termination of intra-EU BITs if they were perceived as 
incompatible with EU law. In the absence of a special termination agreement or clause, 
the respondent states and the European Commission were left to pursue arguments 
based on suspension or inapplicability due to incompatibility with EU law.
Therefore, problems with intra-EU BITs became visible soon after the new 
members had entered the EU. These problems piled up and controversies intensified 
in the years that followed, coupled with additional measures adopted at the EU level. 
Once the campaign against intra-EU BITs was launched by the European Commission 
(in 2005, just after ten new members had acceded to the EU), the EU stepped up to 
curtail intra-EU BITs. Since Art. 307 TFEU made clear that FDI became the exclusive 
competence of the EU but did not specifically address intra-EU BITs, the EU adopted 
several regulatory measures to foster its newly acquired competences but also to initi-
ate the termination of the intra-EU BITs.
Shortly after the arbitral award in Achmea, the European Parliament and the 
Council of the EU adopted the Regulation on establishing transitional arrangements for 
bilateral investment agreements between member states and third countries.13 This regula-
tion was a game-changer for third countries, including candidate countries, because 
it could serve as a platform for renegotiating the existing BITs with EU member states. 
While the pre-Lisbon policy favoured the BITs of EU member states with candidate 
countries as a preparation for EU membership,14 the Lisbon Treaty, the 2012 Regulation, 
and the CJEU Achmea radically changed this perspective. From the EU perspective, 
 11 Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial 
Award of 27 March 2007.
 12 Lavranos, 2020b, p. 446.
 13 ‘Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, foreign direct investment is included 
in the list of matters falling under the common commercial policy. In accordance with Article 
3(1)(e) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), the European Union 
has exclusive competence with respect to the common commercial policy. Accordingly, only 
the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts within that area. The Member States 
are able to do so themselves only if so empowered by the Union, in accordance with Article 2(1) 
TFEU.’ – Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of 12 December 2012, Official Journal of the EU L 351/40, 
recital 1.
 14 ‘40. For a very long time, the argument of the EU institutions, including the Commission, was 
that, far from being incompatible with EU law, BITs were instruments necessary to prepare 
for the accession to the Union of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Association 
Agreements between the Union and candidate countries also contained provisions for the 
conclusion of BITs between Member States and candidate countries.’ – Opinion of Advocate 
General Wathelet delivered on 19 September 2017 in Case C-284/16 Slowakische Republik v 
Achmea BV, para. 40.
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renegotiation is required due to the change in legislative competences and the need to 
preserve uniformity in the interpretation of EU law.
With respect to the termination of intra-EU BITS, it seems that not all EU member 
states were originally in favour of this option. For example, in both the Eastern Sugar 
and Achmea cases, the Netherlands argued in favour of the validity of BITs together 
with their arbitration clauses. More importantly, in the proceedings before the CJEU 
in the Achmea case, 15 member states submitted observations with opposing views on 
the issue of the compatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU law. The dividing line was the 
general position and experience of member states with investment arbitration – as 
many as 10 EU member states argued that intra-EU BITs were incompatible with EU 
law.15 Advocate General Wathelet sided with a minority of EU member states supporting 
the intra-EU BITs. However, several member states began terminating their intra-EU 
BITs16 even before the European Commission launched its campaign that culminated 
in infringement procedures against a number of member states.17
The 2018 CJEU decision in Achmea seemed to have consolidated both the EU and 
its member states in concerted efforts to terminate intra-EU BITs and all of their effects. 
EU member states first adopted a series of declarations on the legal consequences of 
the judgement of the CJEU in Achmea on investment protection in the EU, seeking, inter 
alia, to terminate all pending arbitral proceedings, prevent enforcement of intra-EU 
BITs arbitral awards, and terminate all sunset clauses18 contained therein.19 Further, 
EU member states, acting as respondents in pending arbitral proceedings, sought to 
 15 ‘The second group is made up of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Hellenic 
Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of 
Latvia, Hungary, the Republic of Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic. Those States have 
all been respondents in a number of arbitral proceedings relating to intra-EU investments, 
the Czech Republic 26 times, the Republic of Estonia three times, the Hellenic Republic three 
times, the Kingdom of Spain 33 times, the Italian Republic nine times, the Republic of Cyprus 
three times, the Republic of Latvia twice, Hungary 11 times, the Republic of Poland 11 times, 
Romania four times and the Slovak Republic nine times.’ – Ibid., para. 35.
 16 Voon and Mitchell, 2016, pp. 428-430.
 17 Titi, 2016, p. 435.
 18 Pursuant to the Termination Agreement, Art. 1(7) ‘“Sunset Clause” means any provision in a 
Bilateral Investment Treaty which extends the protection of investments made prior to the date 
of termination of that Treaty for a further period of time.’
 19 There were three such declarations. The first was adopted on 15 January 2019 by 22 EU member 
states: Declaration of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, of 15 January 2019 
on the Legal Consequences of the Judgement of the Court Of Justice in Achmea and on Investment Protec-
tion in the European Union (https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/
banking_and_finance/documents/190117-bilateral-investment-treaties_en.pdf). The second 
was adopted on 16 January 2019 by five EU member states: Declaration of the Representatives of 
the Governments of the Member States on the Enforcement of the Judgement of the Court of Justice in 
Achmea and on Investment Protection in the European Union (https://www.regeringen.se/48ee19/
contentassets/d759689c0c804a9ea7af6b2de7320128/achmea-declaration.pdf.). The third is 
a unilateral declaration of Hungary. Despite certain differences all EU member states were 
unanimous in upholding the inapplicability of intra-EU BITs and confirming the precedence 
of EU law over intra-EU BITs. For the reasons why Hungary made a separate declaration, see 
Korom, 2020, p. 71.
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employ the Achmea decision in order to dismiss investment cases based on intra-EU 
BITs. However, all of these attempts failed.20
Following the 2019 Declarations, exchange of notes,21 and failed attempts to 
dismiss investment arbitrations, on 5 May 2020, 23 EU member states signed the Agree-
ment for the termination of bilateral investment treaties between the Member States of the 
European Union (hereinafter referred to as the Termination Agreement).22 Its purpose 
was to terminate all remaining intra-EU BITs together with the sunset clauses con-
tained therein, to assert the inapplicability of intra-EU BIT arbitration clauses because 
 20 Gavrilovic and Gavrilovic d.o.o. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/39, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Request of 4 April 2018, 30 April 2018; Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr. Michael Göde v. 
Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-01, Award, 2 May 2018; Marfin Investment Group Holdings S.A. 
and others v. Republic of Cyprus, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/27, Award, 26 July 2018; UP (formerly Le 
Chèque Déjeuner) and C.D Holding Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35, Award, 
9 October 2018; UniCredit Bank Austria AG and Zagrebačka banka d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/16/31, Decision on the Respondent’s Article 9 Objection to Jurisdiction, 
12 October 2018 (not public); I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 
2014-22, UNCITRAL, Award, 15 May 2019; Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-21, UNCITRAL, Award, 15 May 2019; Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, 
PCA Case No. 2014-20, UNCITRAL Award, 15 May 2019; WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. 
Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, UNCITRAL, Award, 15 May 2019; United Utilities (Tal-
linn) B.V. and Aktsiaselts Tallinna Vesi v. Republic of Estonia, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/24, Award, 
21 June 2019; Magyar Farming Company Ltd, Kintyre Kft and Inicia Zrt v. Hungary, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/17/27, Award, 13 November 2019; Theodoros Adamakopoulos and others v. Republic of 
Cyprus, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/49, Decision on Jurisdiction, 7 February 2020; Ioan Micula and 
others v. Romania II, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/29, Award, 5 March 2020; UniCredit Bank Austria 
AG and Zagrebačka banka d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/31, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Application for Reversal of the Article 9 Decision and Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, 24 March 2020 (not public); Addiko Bank AG and Addiko Bank d.d. v. Republic 
of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/37, Decision on Croatia’s Jurisdictional Objection Related 
to the Alleged Incompatibility of the BIT with the EU Acquis, 12 June 2020; Raiffeisen Bank 
International AG and Raiffeisenbank Austria d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/34, 
Decision on Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 30 September 2020. 
 21 In Micula v. Romania (II) Sweden and Romania submitted the exchange of notes to the effect 
that the arbitration clause was contrary to EU law and thus inapplicable. The tribunal refused 
to treat this exchange of notes as a binding agreement. – Ioan Micula and others v. Romania II, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/29, Award, 5 March 2020, para. 287-288.
 22 Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_
and_finance/documents/200505-bilateral-investment-treaties-agreement_en.pdf (Accessed 
15.01.2021.). States which did not sign the Termination Agreement are Austria, Finland, 
Ireland and Sweden (and the UK). In May 2020, shortly after the Termination Agreement was 
signed, the Commission sent the formal notice of infringement proceedings against Finland 
and the UK. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/INF_20_859 
(Accessed 15.01.2021.).
  Pursuant to Art. 16(1) of the Termination Agreement it entered into force 30 calendar days after 
the receipt of the second ratification instrument. Following the ratification by the Kingdom of 
Denmark on 6 May 2020 and the second ratification by Hungary on 30 July 2020, the Termina-
tion Agreement entered into force on 29 August 2020. On 11 January 2021, the Agreement was 
in force also in Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta and Slovakia and provisionally applicable 
in Spain. For the current status of the Agreement, see https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/documents-publications/treaties-agreements/agreement/?id=2019049&DocLanguage=en 
(Accessed 15.01.2021.).
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of their incompatibility with EU Treaties, and to exclude any new arbitral proceedings 
following the 2018 CJEU Achmea decision. With respect to proceedings initiated prior 
to the CJEU Achmea decision that are still pending, parties are expected to negotiate a 
settlement through ‘a structured dialogue’ before an independent facilitator within six 
months following the entry into force of the Termination Agreement or before national 
courts.23 However, while EU member states consider that all listed intra-EU BITs that 
are still in force are terminated by virtue of the Termination Agreement, it seems that 
their position regarding the validity of arbitral clauses remains the same as before: that 
arbitration clauses became inapplicable much earlier, immediately following a state’s 
full membership in the EU.24
The agreement prompted mixed reactions. There are voices of doubt (‘Right 
or wrong, just or unjust, it remains to be seen, but the Agreement, in its current 
form, appears to be an affront to the rule of law, which may undermine its intended 
purpose.’)25 and voices of praise (‘the Termination Treaty demonstrates a moderating 
of the European attitude toward intra-EU arbitration. Indeed, by adopting a graduated 
approach to dealing with concluded, pending, and new arbitrations, the Termination 
Treaty seeks to order the relationship between EU law and international law, without 
imposing absolute conclusions. Rather, it employs the language of moderate legal 
pluralism by providing for “transitional measures” and “structured dialogue”.’),26 but 
certainly, there is no lack of commentaries and academic literature on the Termination 
Agreement, the full effect of which is yet to be tested.
Undoubtedly, the perspective of BITs has changed in the eyes of the EU and 
its member states over about the last decade. This change was unequivocally dem-
onstrated to the world by the ECJ Achmea judgement and the conclusion of the 2020 
Termination Agreement.
Candidate countries have been somewhat slow to react to this change. The 
purpose of this article is to shed light on the messages that these two events carry for 
candidate countries such as Serbia. Is the era of Serbia-EU member state BITs soon to 
end? What actions should be taken even before accession? What are the consequences 
for existing investments and pending arbitrations? The search for answers is divided 
into several chapters. First, a brief reminder of Micula v. Romania and Magyar Farming 
Company v. Hungary is provided as these are telling examples of the experience of other 
 23 Arts. 9 and 10 of the Termination Agreement.
 24 Pursuant to Art. 7 of the Termination Agreement ‘[w]here the Contracting Parties are parties 
to Bilateral Investment Treaties on the basis of which Pending Arbitration Proceedings or New 
Arbitration Proceedings were initiated’, they shall inform the arbitral tribunal of the conse-
quences of the CJEU Achmea decision by submitting the statement envisaged in the Annex C:
  ‘The Contracting Parties hereby confirm that Arbitration Clauses are contrary to the EU Trea-
ties and thus inapplicable. As a result of this incompatibility between Arbitration Clauses and 
the EU Treaties, as of the date on which the last of the parties to a Bilateral Investment Treaty 
became a Member State of the European Union, the Arbitration Clause in such a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty cannot serve as legal basis for Arbitration Proceedings.’
 25 Bray and Kapoor, 2020. 
 26 Restrepo Amariles, Farhadi, Van Waeyenberge, 2020, p. 941.
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candidate countries confronted with conflicting BIT and EU obligations (2). This is 
followed by a chapter outlining the potential for conflicts in the future between the 
obligations arising simultaneously under the BITs with EU member states and under 
the acquis communautaire that Serbia must align its legal system with the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement (3). The following chapter offers potential answers on 
mechanisms that may be used to ensure compatibility of the Serbian BITs with EU law, 
which are partly to be found in the Termination Agreement but possibly also in the 
broader EU investment treaty practice (4). The possibility of creating a new mechanism 
that will replace investment arbitration is also briefly considered in the final chapter 
(5) preceding the Conclusion chapter (6).
2. Learn fast – experiences of other candidate countries with respect to 
conflicting treaty obligations – the case of Romania (Micula v. Romania)
State aid is one of the areas of potential conflict between multiple layers of international 
obligations of the candidate country. There were at least seven intra-EU investment 
arbitrations centred around issues of state aid27 before the sudden upsurge, starting in 
2012, that concerned state aid in the field of renewable energy, when more than 40 new 
cases were brought, mostly against Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic.28
The best paradigm of the troubles a candidate country may encounter trying 
to navigate between the requirements of investment protection and EU accession is 
provided by Micula et al. v. Romania,29 an International Centre for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) case that was pursued by two former Romanian citizens who 
had acquired Swedish nationality but then returned to invest in Romania and their 
Romanian companies.30 The case raised issues regarding the enforcement of EU 
state aid law and the enforcement of ICSID awards based on intra-EU BITs. The BIT 
in question was concluded between Sweden and Romania in 2002, five years before 
the Romanian accession to the EU. Ironically, its conclusion was part of Romania’s 
obligations under the Europe Agreement, which entered into force on 1 February 1995, 
and provided legal framework for Romania’s accession to the European Community, 
which was later transformed into the EU. Article 74 of the Europe Agreement provided 
 27 Saluka (the Netherlands) v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 17 March 2006; E.D.F. 
International v. Hungary, UNCITRAL, Award, 4 December 2014; Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of 
Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19; AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft v. 
The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22; Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European 
Food S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania (I), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, 
Final Award, 11 December 2013 (Hereinafter: Micula et al, v. Romania (I) award.).
 28 Baetens, 2019.
 29 Micula et al, v. Romania (I) Award.
 30 The ICSID arbitration against Romania was initiated in 2005 under the Sweden-Romania BIT. 
The claimants were the twin brothers, Ion and Viorel Micula and three food and soft drinks 
manufacturing companies owned and established by them in Romania: European Food, 
Starmill and Multipack. 
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for cooperation aimed at establishing a favourable climate for private investment in 
Romania. Among the aims of this cooperation, the same article listed ‘the conclusion 
by the Member States and Romania of Agreements for the promotion and protection of 
investment’. Thus, the conclusion of BITs between member states and Romania was a 
direct consequence of the Europe Agreement.31 The BITs had a European context and 
origin.32 However, it was not envisaged in the Europe Agreement what would happen 
to those BITs once the candidate country became itself a member state. This prompted 
the Tribunal to note that it ‘cannot therefore assume that by virtue of entering into the 
Accession Treaty or by virtue of Romania’s accession to the EU, either Romania, or 
Sweden, or the EU sought to amend, modify or otherwise detract from the application 
of the BIT’.33
The Europe Agreement also required Romania to harmonise its existing and 
future legislation with that of the Community. The obligation of harmonisation 
extended to the area of competition law, which included the prohibition of illegal 
state aid. That portion of the acquis was applicable in Romania well before the date of 
accession.34
During the period preceding accession, Romania adopted measures designed 
to attract and promote investment. In the Emergency Government Ordinance number 
24 adopted in 1998 (‘EGO 24’), Romania introduced a plan for the development of 
its ‘disfavoured’ regions. The plan included exemptions from customs duties and 
corporate profit taxes for investors investing in those regions. Ştei-Nucet-Drăgăneşti 
was designated as a disfavoured region for a period of ten years, beginning on 1 April 
1999. A government decision implementing EGO 24 declared that incentives offered 
under EGO 24 would be available to investors as long as that region was designated as 
disfavoured. Nevertheless, the incentives were prematurely revoked by Romania on 22 
February 2005, in response to advice from the European Commission, which made this 
a condition for closing the competition chapter in the accession negotiations. According 
to the Commission, the incentives constituted state aid that was incompatible with 
EU law, which prohibited such anticompetitive schemes. The brothers Micula and 
their companies, being the investors and recipients of such incentives, initiated ICSID 
arbitration proceedings against Romania in August 2005. They claimed that they had 
made substantial investments in the Ştei-Nucet-Drăgăneşti region in reliance on the 
incentives and on the expectation that the incentives would remain in place during the 
entire ten-year period. They argued that the premature repeal of EGO 24 and the revo-
cation of the incentives by Romania breached their legitimate expectations protected 
under the fair and equitable treatment standard of the BIT.35 The respondent argued 
that the revocation was necessary to comply with EU state aid law, which, in turn, 
 31 Micula et al, v. Romania (I) Award, para. 304.
 32 Ibid., para. 317.
 33 Ibid., para. 321.
 34 Ibid., para. 210.
 35 Ibid., para. 131.
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was necessary to complete accession to the EU in 2007.36 In 2013, the arbitral tribunal 
found for the claimants and ordered Romania to pay cca EUR 82 million in damages 
and interest compounded on a quarterly basis. One of the decisive facts was that the 
three companies owned by the Micula brothers had been issued Permanent Investor 
Certificates (PICs), which were valid for ten years. According to the tribunal, the EGO 24 
framework in conjunction with the PICs instilled in the Claimants a legitimate expecta-
tion that they would be entitled to receive the incentives until 1 April 2009.37 Analysing 
the legitimacy of the investors’ expectations in the context of Romania’s impending 
accession to the EU, the tribunal concluded that between 1998 and late 2003, when the 
investments were made, it was reasonable for the Miculas to believe that the EGO 24 
incentives were compliant with the Europe Agreement. According to the tribunal, it 
was decisive that the Romanian government had held a reasonable belief that EGO 24 
was a valid regional operating aid under EU law. It follows that Miculas’ beliefs were 
also reasonable.38 On 18 April 2014, Romania filed an application for annulment of the 
award before an ICSID ad hoc committee, which was rejected in February 2016.
Meanwhile, on 1 January 2007, while the ICSID proceedings were still pending, 
Romania became a member state of the EU. The compensation granted in the 2013 
award comprised an amount corresponding to the amount of incentives that the Micula 
companies would have received from the moment that EGO 24 was repealed until its 
scheduled expiry, on 1 April 2009, as well as lost profits resulting from the premature 
termination of the plan. By December 2013, the total sum owed by Romania to the 
claimants more than doubled due to compounded interest.39 What ensued was a legal 
battle between the European Commission and the Micula brothers fought within the 
EU territory. Romania was caught in between the two fronts, torn between its interna-
tional obligation and willingness to comply with the ICSID award and the prohibition 
to enforce the same award because it contravened the EU rules on state aid. In January 
2014, the Commission advised Romania that any implementation or execution of the 
award would constitute impermissible new state aid and would have to be notified to 
the Commission. In February 2014, Romania informed the Commission that it had 
partly implemented the award by offsetting a portion of the compensation awarded to 
the claimants by the tribunal against taxes owed by one of the Claimants.40 The Euro-
pean Commission then issued a suspension injunction in May 2014 to ensure that ‘no 
further incompatible State aid would be paid’.41 The Miculas sought annulment of this 
 36 Ibid., para. 132.
 37 Ibid., para. 675.
 38 Ibid., para. 706.
 39 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015 on state aid SA.38517 (2014/C) (ex 2014/
NN) implemented by Romania – Arbitral award Micula v Romania of 11 December 2013, OJEU 
L 232/43, para. 1.
 40 A Romanian court later declared the asserted tax set offs to be unlawful under Romanian law. 
See Micula v. Gov’t of Rom., 404 F. Supp. 3d 265, 276-80 (D.D.C. 2019), 284.
 41 European Commission, Decision C(2014) 3192 of 26 May 2014 State aid SA.38517 (2014/NN) – 
Micula v Romania (ICSID arbitration award).
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decision before the CJEU.42 Slovakia and Spain intervened in support of the European 
Commission.43 Because of the European Commission’s investigation, Romania passed 
a law that suspended all of the enforcement actions initiated by the claimants.44 Nev-
ertheless, the claimants managed to obtain partial enforcement from the Romanian 
court and seized approximately EUR 10.17 million from Romania’s Ministry of Finance. 
The Romanian authorities transferred the remaining amount of approximately EUR 
106.5 million into a blocked account in the name of the five claimants.45 On 30 March 
2015, the European Commission issued a final decision declaring that the payment 
of the compensation awarded by the arbitral tribunal constituted state aid that was 
incompatible with the internal market within the meaning of the TFEU, Art. 107(1), 
because it sought to compensate the Miculas for advantages equivalent to those that 
were considered to be unlawful state aid. The Commission ordered Romania not to 
pay any further amounts and to recover the compensation it had already paid to the 
claimants or face infringement proceedings before the CJEU.46 This decision was also 
challenged by the Micula brothers and their numerous companies in three separate 
proceedings that were joined before the General Court of the EU. Hungary and Spain 
intervened in support of the European Commission, but in an unexpected turn, the 
decision was annulled by the General Court.47 The Commission lodged an appeal of the 
General Court’s decision with the CJEU.
The Micula brothers also led an aggressive campaign for the enforcement of the 
2013 award in various national jurisdictions in addition to Romania, including the US, 
the UK, France, Belgium, and Sweden.48 Within the EU, the UK Supreme Court granted 
the Miculas’ application despite the efforts of Romania and the EC Commission to prove 
that this would be contrary to the duty of sincere cooperation, as the EU Commission’s 
investigation of the state aid in question was still ongoing.
 42 Action brought on 2 September 2014 – Micula a.o. v Commission (Case T-646/14).
 43 The case was discontinued by Order of the President of the Fourth Chamber of the General 
Court, 29 February 2016.
 44 Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and Others v. Romania, Decision on Annulment of 26 February 2016, 
ICSID Case no. ARB/05/2, para 73.
 45 Subsequently, after the State Aid Decision of the Commission in 2015, Romania withdrew the 
funds from this account. See Micula v. Gov’t of Rom., 404 F. Supp. 3d 265, 276-80 (D.D.C. 2019), 
285.
 46 European Commission, Decision 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015 on state aid SA.38517(2014/C)(ex 
2014/NN)(E) implemented by Romania – Arbitral award Micula v Romania of 11 December 
2013, OJEU L 232/43, Art. 2. On 7 December 2018 European Commission issued a Press release 
informing that it had decided to refer Romania to the CJEU for failing to fully recover illegal 
state aid worth up to €92 million from Viorel and Ioan Micula and their group of companies, 
as required by the Commission Decision 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015. Available at: https://www.
italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10147.pdf (Accessed 16.01.2021)
 47 Judgement of the CJEU (General Court) of 18 June 2019. European Food and Others v Commis-
sion (Joined Cases T-624/15, T-694/15 and T-704/15).
 48 Some decisions of national courts are accessible at https://www.italaw.com/cases/697.
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In the US, litigation over enforcement lasted over six years. The District Court 
for the District of Columbia (the US court) rejected Romania’s and the Commission’s49 
jurisdictional argument that the CJEU’s decision in Achmea rendered the arbitration 
agreement in the Sweden-Romania BIT invalid and unenforceable as of the date of 
Romania’s accession to the EU.50 The arbitration agreement was the sole basis for 
subject matter jurisdiction of the US court over Romania under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (the arbitration exception from immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)). The 
US court distinguished Micula from Achmea for three reasons. The first was the dif-
ference in the factual matrix. In Achmea, the challenged government action occurred 
and the arbitration proceedings commenced after Slovakia entered the EU, whereas 
in Micula, all key events occurred before Romania acceded to the EU. The incentives 
were repealed in 2005, and the Micula brothers invoked the arbitration clause in the 
same year. At that time, Romania remained outside the EU and, according to the US 
court, thus remained subject, ‘at least primarily, to its own domestic law’. The US court 
acknowledged in a footnote that at that time, Romania had been subject to the Europe 
Agreement, which formed part of the EU law, but in its view, the tribunal did not pass 
on questions of EU law. The treatment of EU law in the award was the second reason 
for distinguishing between the two cases. According to the US court, the Micula award 
was not related to the interpretation or application of EU law in the sense that the CJEU 
identified in the case of Achmea. Although EU law formed part of the factual matrix of 
the case, it was not the applicable law. The BITs’ substantive rules solely supplied the 
applicable law. The tribunal did not decide a question of EU law in a way that would 
implicate the concerns expressed by the CJEU in Achmea. The third reason for distin-
guishing Achmea was the judgement of the General Court of the EU that intervened in 
2019. This was, in fact, just a confirmation of the first two reasons, as the General Court 
itself distinguished Micula from Achmea on the basis of two facts: that the events giving 
rise to the Micula award occurred before the accession and that the Micula tribunal 
was not bound to apply EU law to events occurring prior to the accession.51 Therefore, 
the US court concluded that Romania’s position that the Achmea decision nullified the 
arbitration agreement in the Sweden-Romania BIT was untenable. Consequently, FSIA’s 
arbitration exception applied. The judgement was affirmed on appeal.52
In November 2020, the same US court issued a civil contempt order against 
Romania. The Miculas moved to compel Romania to answer post-judgement 
 49 The European Commission entered the proceedings before the district court of the District of 
Columbia as amicus curiae in December 2018.
 50 Micula v. Gov’t of Rom., 404 F. Supp. 3d 265, 276-80 (D.D.C. 2019), 276-283.
 51 The General Court’s suggestion that some portion of the award might be subject to EU state aid 
rules because it constituted compensation for the period after Romania’s accession to the EU, 
which was subject to EU law, was considered by the US court to be an argument that goes to 
the merits of the ICSID award and was not a valid ground on which to reject the enforcement 
of the award. Micula v. Gov’t of Rom., 404 F. Supp. 3d 265, 276-80 (D.D.C. 2019), 286.
 52 See, Judgement of the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 10 May 2020. Available 
at: https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw11504.pdf (Accessed 
16.01.2021).
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interrogatories, seeking additional information about its assets. Romania refused to 
answer those interrogatories because one of its main arguments against enforcement 
was that it had fully satisfied the award. The court granted the Miculas’ request for a 
starting sanction of US$ 25,000 per week, progressing up to an amount of US$ 100,000 
per week, ‘to coerce Romania’s adherence to the Discovery Order and to compensate 
Petitioners for the ‘losses sustained’ from Romania’s noncompliance thus far’.53 
Romania finally paid this compensation to avoid enforcement measures on American 
soil against its state-owned enterprises.54
In 2014, the Micula brothers and their companies initiated another ICSID arbitra-
tion against Romania, claiming damages of over EUR 1.8 billion. This time, their claims 
were denied,55 but the legal battle continues, as they currently seek annulment of this 
award before an ICSID ad hoc committee.56
The drama with Miculas begins in a candidate country aspiring to become a 
member of the EU and, at the same time, striving to attract foreign investment by 
granting various types of state aid. These two goals ultimately conflict and place the 
main protagonist in a hopeless situation. When finding Romania liable to pay damages, 
the tribunal did not point to any alternative means that would have allowed Romania to 
act fairly toward the claimants and avoid liability without sacrificing its policy goal of 
joining the EU in 2007. The tribunal recognised that ‘Romania was in a quandary whilst 
trying to balance two conflicting policies, i.e. first, the continuation of the facilities 
regime and the protection of the interests of PIC holders in the disfavoured regions, 
and second, EU accession’.57
When one looks back at 15 years of litigation and the costs and humiliation that 
Romania had to endure, it becomes clear that the current legal framework exposes the 
candidate countries to grave risk of being caught between the Scylla and Charybdis 
of investment treaties and EU law. Certain EU requirements might oblige candidate 
countries to renege on their previous commitments to investors when they join the 
EU.58 The Achmea judgement of the CJEU apparently offers no solution for candidate 
countries as ‘the arbitral tribunal was not bound to apply EU law to events occurring 
prior to the accession before it, unlike the situation in the case which gave rise to the 
judgement of 6 March 2018, Achmea’.59 The candidate countries will have to learn fast 
from the experience of Romania in Micula if they wish to avoid or attenuate that risk.
 53 US District Court for the District of Columbia, Memorandum, Opinion and Order, 20 November 
2020.
 54 Szilágyi and Andréka, 2020, p. 104.
 55 Micula et al. v. Romania II, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/29, Award of 5 March 2020.
 56 The Annulment proceedings were registered on 13 July 2020. https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/
case-database/case-detail?CaseNo=ARB/14/29.
 57 Micula et al, v. Romania I, Award, para. 864.
 58 Ibid., para. 595.
 59 Judgement of the CJEU (General Court) of 18 June 2019. European Food and Others v Commis-
sion (Joined Cases T-624/15, T-694/15 and T-704/15), para. 87.
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3. Potential or prospective conflict of Serbia’s treaty obligations arising 
simultaneously under BITs with EU countries and those arising under 
acquis communautaire (Agreement on Stabilisation and Association)
Serbia was granted the status of a candidate country by the European Council in 2012, 
and accession negotiations began in January 2014. Preceding its status as a candidate 
country, Serbia signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European 
Communities and their Member States (SAA) in April 2008, which entered into force 
in September 2013.60 This agreement remains the main legal framework for the acces-
sion of Serbia to the EU. The comprehensive regime of the SAA, which is concomitant 
with the pre-accession Europe Agreements of new EU member states, requires direct 
application of EU rules on competition and state aid. Apart from being directly appli-
cable, these rules became effective even before the SAA’s entry into force, based on the 
Interim Agreement on Trade and Trade-related Matters signed simultaneously with the 
SAA in April 2008, which entered into force in February 2010. In other words, pursuant 
to Art. 139 of the SAA, EU rules on state aid were among the first rules that were binding 
to Serbia in its process of accession, which is one of the common features in the acces-
sion process of any candidate country.61
The principal provision on state aid in the SAA prohibits ‘any state aid which dis-
torts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or certain 
products’, provided that it may affect trade between the EU and Serbia.62 The bench-
mark for assessing legality is set forth in Art. 73(2) of the SAA: ‘Any practices contrary 
to this Article shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from the application of 
the competition rules applicable in the Community, in particular from Articles 81, 82, 
86 and 87 of the EC Treaty and interpretative instruments adopted by the Community 
institutions.’ As several commentators noted, this is an all-encompassing provision that 
implies the direct applicability of the EU’s state aid law, even the soft law, and all EU 
law that is yet to be adopted without the possibility of participating in rule making.63 
It follows that, with respect to EU state aid law, an association country becomes a rule 
taker without being a rule maker.
Other obligations related to state aid include, inter alia, the obligation to set up 
a special institutional mechanism entrusted with authorising state aid schemes and 
individual aid grants, ordering the recovery of unlawfully granted state aid, providing 
regular information to the European Commission on individual decisions on state aid, 
and drawing up a regional aid map on the basis of the relevant Community guidelines.64 
 60 Stabilisation and association agreement between the European Communities and their mem-
ber states and the Republic of Serbia, 30 April 2008, Official Journal of the European Union, L 
278/16, 18.10.2013.
 61 Papadopoulos, 2010, p. 120.
 62 Art. 73(1) of the SAA.
 63 See Milenkovic, 2018, p. 70, also citing Cremona, 2003, p. 265.
 64 Arts. 73(4)(7)b of the SAA.
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Transition and implementation periods vary but do not exceed five years from entry 
into force of the SAA. This can explain the relatively slow harmonisation of national 
legislation on state aid in Serbia with EU law. For example, the 2009 Law on State Aid 
Control was amended, in line with the European Commission recommendations, only 
in October 2019 and entered into force on 1 January 2020. In the opinion of the European 
Commission, this law is generally aligned with EU legislation on state aid, but several 
additional requirements are still missing: implementation of secondary legislation, 
strengthening a still-novel Commission on State Aid Control, transparency, and non-
discriminatory allocation of subsidies and other forms of state aid.65 Therefore, the EU 
rules on state aid are slowly but steadily becoming incorporated into Serbian law.
On the other hand, Serbia, like many former and current pre-accession coun-
tries, relies heavily on state aid as part of its foreign investment policy. The total amount 
of state aid awarded by different governmental authorities to all beneficiaries, both 
domestic and foreign, fluctuated between EUR 319.82 million in 2005 and EUR 939.6 
million in 2019. Official data on the allocation and distribution of state aid demonstrate 
that it is awarded through different instruments such as subsidies, tax incentives (tax 
credits, cancellation of tax debts, tax write-offs), loans, and guarantees. Subsidies are 
by far the most frequently used instrument of state aid, comprising 50-70% of total 
state aid.66 However, official figures do not disclose the amount of subsidies granted as 
incentives to foreign investors, so these amounts remain within the sphere of specula-
tion, and the government is often criticised by the media and civil society for the lack 
of transparency in this domain.
The ‘invisibility’ of subsidies to foreign investors, subsidies which may be in 
contravention of Art. 73(1) SAA, can also explain the comments made by the European 
Commission in its 2020 Progress Report regarding the inventory of schemes and certain 
aid schemes, which still need to be finalised or, in certain areas, harmonised with the 
acquis.67 One of the obligations under the SAA is to establish a comprehensive inventory 
of aid schemes in line with the acquis no more than four years from the entry into force 
of the SAA.68
 65 European Commission, Serbia 2020 Report – Accompanying the Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee and the Committee of the Regions – 2020 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 
SWD(2020) 352 final, 6 October 2020, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020SC0352. (Hereinafter: 2020 Progress Report), 58, 78.
 66 E.g. 60.7% in 2016, 69.6% in 2018, and 55.4% in 2019. – Official data of the Commission on State 
Aid Control of Republic of Serbia, Report on State Aid Granted in the Republic of Serbia in 2016, 
p. 27; Report on State Aid Granted in the Republic of Serbia in 2018, p. 27; Report on State Aid 
Granted in the Republic of Serbia in 2019, p. 27. Available at: http://www.kkdp.gov.rs/izvestaji.
php (Accessed 16.01.2021).
 67 ‘The existing aid schemes, namely the fiscal state aid schemes part of the laws on corporate 
income tax, on personal income tax and on free zones, are not yet harmonised with the EU 
acquis. Some progress has been noted on creation of a new inventory of schemes.’ – 2020 
Progress Report, 78. It is to be noted that tax legislation allows for tax exemptions for large 
investments (Art. 50a of the Law on Corporate Income Tax).
 68 Art. 73(6) of the SAA.
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The general justification for state aid is to protect the market’s competitiveness 
and provide an impetus for economic development. However, the figures illustrate 
that Serbia has ‘a higher share of state aid in GDP compared to the European Union 
member states, on the one hand, and an unfavourable position from the standpoint of 
competitiveness, on the other hand, which is reflected in weaker scores in the Global 
Competitiveness Index and, consequently, ranks in the Global Competitiveness Report 
by the World Economic Forum’.69
Trends in regulating and distributing state aid in Serbia have been closely 
monitored by the European Commission. The monitoring power of the European Com-
mission was laid down in the legal framework established by the SAA. The clout of the 
European Commission also transpires from official reports of Serbian governmental 
agencies entrusted with the control of state aid. For example, the Commission on State 
Aid Control regularly reflects on comments made by the European Commission and 
marks areas in which changes were made in line with its recommendations. Addition-
ally, the general reports on the progress made by Serbia in the process of accession 
include the EU analysis and recommendations in the area of state aid. In its 2020 Prog-
ress Report, the European Commission is moderately critical of the Serbian state aid 
framework, pointing primarily to institutional and structural deficiencies as well as to 
a lack of transparency. The European Commission remarks are made in general terms 
with respect to all types of state aid. However, with respect to subsidies for foreign 
investors specifically, the 2020 Progress Report merely notes that ‘Serbia continues 
to use budgetary subsidies for newly created jobs as an incentive for foreign direct 
investments’.70
It seems that despite the large amounts of distributed state aid and lack of trans-
parency in the process of allocation, the European Commission still hesitates to demand 
the full compliance of Serbia with EU state aid requirements. There are possibly several 
reasons for this: the national institutional framework is yet to be redesigned to gain 
full structural independence so that it can, by itself, provide adequate monitoring of 
state aid in close cooperation with the European Commission; for the first five years 
of the SAA, Serbia as a whole, similar to Romania in the period from 1995 to 2000, was 
categorised as an underdeveloped region in terms of Art. 87(3) (a) of the EC Treaty, 
pursuant to Art. 73(7) of the SAA, which provided it with a wider margin of discretion 
in allocating state aid. Furthermore, there are likely other priorities on the European 
Commission’s list. Finally, given the ‘conditionality’ approach of the EU in the accession 
process71 and a larger set of requirements for Western Balkan countries to join the EU,72 
there seems to be plenty of manoeuvring space and extra time for further adjustments 
and harmonisation. However, despite the changed accession criteria and procedures, 
 69 Radukić and Vučetić, 2019, p. 34.
 70 2020 Progress Report, 98.
 71 ‘The transposition of key legislation under other chapters (e.g. acquis on environmental impact 
assessment, anti-discrimination legislation, public procurement, and state aid control) is a 
prerequisite for using European structural and investment funds.’ – 2020 Progress Report, 100.
 72 Milenkovic, 2018, p. 68.
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compared to the last three rounds of EU accession,73 one should still cautiously read the 
European Commission’s hesitant approach. Given the current state of implementation 
of the EU rules on state aid,74 together with the possibility of the change of pace in 
implementing those rules as illustrated in the case of Romania, it is not unlikely that 
Serbia will find itself between conflicting obligations arising under EU law, on the one 
hand, and international commitments to foreign investors, on the other.
4. Mechanisms for ensuring compatibility of the dispute settlement 
clauses in Serbia-EU country BITs with EU law
The structural changes of the Serbian exchange with the EU defined in the SAA have 
had an impact on the trade regime between the two economies but also on the FDI 
policies of Serbia and the inflow of FDI from the EU member states. EU countries have 
been not only Serbia’s most important trade partners but also its dominant investment 
partners. From 2010 to 2016, EU countries were among the top five major investor part-
ners by FDI inflow into Serbia. Their share was rarely below 50%, and in some years, 
it reached nearly 90%.75
Since 2005, when it encountered its first investment claim, Serbia has had to 
defend 12 arbitration cases, all of which involved investors from at least one EU member 
state.76 Given that Serbia has 22 BITs with EU member states,77 and in light of the Achmea 
decision and the Termination Agreement, on this front as well, the risks are imminent, 
and actions are required.
 73 The Europe Agreements generally required, within the pre-accession arrangements, the 
conclusion of BITs between EU member states and candidate countries. (‘Indeed, in the con-
text of the Europe Agreements, which the EU signed with the accession countries in order to 
prepare them for the EU, the EU was encouraging the Eastern and Central European countries 
to conclude BITs.’ – Lavranos, 2020b, p. 445). There is no such provision in the SAA with Ser-
bia. Nevertheless, Art. 93 of the SAA requires Serbia to ‘improve the legal frameworks which 
favours and protects investment.’ On the other hand, Art. 15 of the SAA requires Serbia to 
‘start negotiations with the countries which have already signed a Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement with a view to concluding bilateral conventions on regional cooperation, the aim of 
which shall be to enhance the scope of cooperation between the countries concerned.’ This is 
the condition for ‘the further development of the relations between Serbia and the European 
Union.’
 74 ‘SAA state aid rules effectiveness stands at the level where it was in 2009 when the Agreement 
was signed. No added value to the minimum liberalisation can be identified.’ – Sretić, 2018, p. 
162.
 75 Bjelić and Milovanović, 2018, pp. 137–138.
 76 Four of those cases are still pending. For chronology and the parties, see: https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/country/187/serbia (Accessed 
16.01.2021).
 77 Serbia has BITs with Malta, Portugal, Denmark, Cyprus, Finland, Lithuania, Belgium/Lux-
embourg, Spain, Slovenia, Netherlands, Austria, Hungary, Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, 
Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Romania, Germany, Sweden, and France. The BIT signed with Italy 
has not entered into force.
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Serbia should be prepared to take certain steps to align its treaties with EU law 
requirements even before it reaches the stage of accession. This is clear from the latest 
progress report for Serbia, which states the following:
‘For all investment and trade agreements, it is important that Serbia 
ensures compatibility with the EU acquis and includes a sunset clause 
allowing it to denounce the agreement upon accession to the EU. Serbia 
should also develop a strategy for amending or terminating existing bilat-
eral investment agreements that fail short of EU standards and expose the 
country to risks due to the broad and open language used.’78
Serbia should thus, according to the recommendation of the European Commission, 
follow the beaten path set forth by the Termination Agreement. This path entails the 
amendment of the existing BITs to ensure their compatibility with the EU acquis by 
including a termination clause that would enable the contracting parties to terminate 
those agreements once Serbia accedes to the EU. Within the scope of the termination, 
two additional situations need to be addressed and agreed upon with the EU partners: 
the treatment of any newly initiated arbitrations and the destiny of pending arbitra-
tions. Finally, Serbia should proceed to a systematic and comprehensive examination of 
the language of its existing treaties (with both EU and non-EU countries) to determine 
whether they fall short of EU standards, are incompatible with the EU acquis, or contain 
overly broad or open language that exposes Serbia to unnecessary risks.
 ■ 4.1. Amendments to Ensure Termination of Serbia-EU member state BITs Upon 
Accession
Ensuring the timely phase-out of Serbia-EU member state BITs would entail inserting 
amendments into the existing 22 BITs that would provide for the automatic termination 
of those treaties on the date of Serbia’s accession to the EU. As for the sunset clauses 
contained in those BITs, they should be terminated by these amendments.79 Their 
termination before the accession would, to a certain extent, resolve the problem of 
retroactivity, which will be further discussed in connection with the new arbitration 
proceedings. The investors who made their investments before the termination could 
still rely on sunset clauses provided that the sunset clause expired before the acces-
sion.80 However, investors who made investments after the termination could no longer 
rely on them as the sunset clauses would no longer be part of the BIT. In this manner, 
 78 2020 Progress Report, 114.
 79 ‘The Czech Republic adopted a two-step approach to the termination of its BITs with, at least, 
Denmark, Italy, Malta and Slovenia. The parties first agreed to amend the treaty by terminating 
the survival clause and then, secondly, to terminate the treaty itself.’ – Titi, 2016, p. 436.
  ‘[T]his has been the preferred solution, which the European Commission has been pushing all 
member states to adopt.’ – Lavranos, 2016.
 80 Sunset clauses commonly provide extended validity for the period of 10 to 20 years.
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at least some of the sunset clauses with EU member states would be allowed to expire 
before the accession.
The proposed amendments should be acceptable to EU countries and the Euro-
pean Commission because they are aware of the problems caused by pre-accession 
intra-EU BITs. Pursuant to Regulation 1219/2012,81 the European Commission is entitled 
to supervise any new BITs as well as amendments to existing BITs and must ultimately 
authorise them.
There is one important problem to be noted in connection with the prospective 
termination of intra-EU BITs pursuant to the 2020 Termination Agreement. There are 
predictions that the termination of intra-EU BITs may lead to the restructuring of intra-
EU investments such that they would be covered by extra-EU BITs.82 EU investors may 
migrate to more favourable destinations from which they would place their FDI inflows 
to EU countries. Some British83 and Swiss84 law firms have already sensed the potential 
for hosting such affluent migrants, distrustful toward the host EU member state courts 
as the exclusive forums for investment protection. If such restructuring is undertaken 
before any dispute is in existence or reasonably anticipated, most investment tribunals 
would likely hold that the restructured investment qualifies for the extra-EU treaty 
protection.
Therefore, the extinction of Serbia-EU member state BITs cannot work in isola-
tion from other BITs. Investors from EU member states could restructure their invest-
ments to meet the requirements of another non-EU member state BIT, such as Serbia’s 
BITs with the UK and Switzerland,85 countries that aspire to welcome the restructured 
investors fleeing from their former EU nests. To effectively avoid risks, any move to 
terminate Serbia-EU Member State BITs should be accompanied with provisions in the 
BITs addressing the issue of the restructuring of investments, shareholder claims, and 
reflective loss.86 The definitions of investors and investments should also be adjusted. 
Only investors with substantial business activities in their home state should be pro-
tected.87 Other provisions to be considered for inclusion are denial of benefits and good 
 81 Regulation (EU) No 1219/2012 of 12 December 2012, Official Journal of the EU L 351/40, Arts. 9 
and 11.
 82 Lavranos, 2020b, p. 457; Bray and Kapoor, 2020; Triantafilou and Manoli, 2020, p. 24.
 83 Storrs and Witzorek, 2020.
 84 Terrapon and Feit, 2020, pp. 2–3.
 85 https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/187/
serbia (Accessed 16.01.2021).
 86 See, UNCITRAL, Working Group III, Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS),
  Shareholder claims and reflective loss, Note by the Secretariat, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.170, avail-
able at https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.170 (Accessed 16.01.2021). For example, 
CETA (2016) provides in Art. 8.23 that a claim may be submitted to an investment arbitral 
tribunal by (a) an investor of a Party on its own behalf; or (b) on behalf of a locally established 
enterprise which it owns or controls directly or indirectly. In the latter case, Art. 8.39(2) pro-
vides that (a) an award of monetary damages and any applicable interest shall provide that the 
sum be paid to the locally established enterprise; and (b) an award of restitution of property 
shall provide that restitution be made to the locally established enterprise.
 87 See, for example, the explicative part of the definition of investor from the CETA (2016).
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faith clauses.88 In other words, the incompatibility of ISDS clauses with EU law should 
be addressed from a wider perspective of the reform of investment treaty law, which 
currently, with its broad definitions of investors and investments and protection of 
indirect shareholders, allows large-scale potential for treaty shopping.89 These defini-
tions should be in line with EU standards. Therefore, once the process of amendment is 
initiated, it should not stop at providing for the termination of the future intra-EU BITs 
or the termination of sunset clauses but should proceed to a comprehensive reform of 
BITs in line with the new generation of EU investment agreements.
 ■ 4.2. New arbitrations
If the amended Serbia-EU member state BITs provide that they are terminated upon the 
date of accession, that termination will affect the new proceedings initiated after the 
accession date, such as Achmea. Those proceedings will not be based on the consent of 
Serbia as the potential respondent, and, presumably, the tribunals will have to decline 
jurisdiction. However, some uncertainties remain regarding the legal possibility of 
terminating the sunset clauses in this manner.
The EU likely anticipates that sunset clauses apply only in cases of unilateral 
terminations, whereas they do not apply in cases of consensual terminations.90 Never-
theless, EU member state investors could claim before the arbitral tribunals that once 
they have made the investment in Serbia (prior to the accession), they have obtained a 
vested or acquired right to rely on the BIT protections that can expire only upon expiry 
of the promised term of the sunset clause. Alternatively, they could put forward an 
argument based on making the investment in reliance on the specified term of the 
sunset clause, just as the Miculas made their investments in reliance on the ten-year 
term of the incentives.91 In Magyar Farming Company,92 the tribunal addressed the 
issue of the purported termination of the sunset clause by the 2019 Declarations of the 
Member States:
‘222. The Tribunal’s finding that the 2019 Declarations were not the proper 
procedure to terminate or amend the BIT is not based on mere formalism. 
 88 CETA contains a denial of benefits clause in Art. 8.16 and a good faith clause in Art. 8.18(3).
 89 Notably, the widespread use of the Dutch BITs by non-Dutch investors in the past years has 
led the Netherlands to order an investigation by UNCTAD which found that ‘[i]n around three 
quarters of Dutch cases, the ultimate owners of the claimants are not Dutch. In two-thirds of 
those cases, the relevant foreign-owned group of companies does not appear to engage in sub-
stantial business activities in the Netherlands.’ – Treaty-based ISDS cases brought under Dutch 
IIAs: An Overview, available: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/uploaded-files/document/
treaty-based-isds-cases-brought-under-dutch-iias-an-overview.pdf. Accessed on 16 January 
2021.
 90 This argument, attributed to Anthea Roberts, is cited in Titi (2016), p. 438.
 91 Bray and Kapoor, 2020.
 92 Magyar Farming Company Ltd., Kintyre Kft, and Inícia Zrt v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/27 
Award of 13 November 2019. For the review of this case, see, Szilágyi and Andréka, 2020, pp. 
92–105.
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The BIT is an international treaty that confers rights on private parties. 
While the Contracting States remain the masters of their treaty, their 
control is limited by the general principles of legal certainty and res inter 
alios acta, aliis nec nocet nec prodest. This is evident for instance from 
Article 13(3) of the BIT, which grants a guarantee of stability to investors 
who have made investments in reliance on the BIT:
In respect of investment made whilst the Agreement is in force, its 
provisions shall continue in effect with respect to such investments 
for a period of twenty years after the date of termination and without 
prejudice to the application thereafter of the rules of general interna-
tional law.
223. This provision shows that, even where the Contracting Parties ter-
minate the treaty on mutual consent, they acknowledge that long-term 
interests of investors who have invested in the host State in reliance on 
the treaty guarantees must be respected. This is the purpose served by 
the 20-year sunset provision. If the protection of existing investments 
outlives an unambiguous termination of the Treaty, then the protection 
must continue a fortiori in respect of a decision of an adjudicatory body 
constituted under a different treaty or of declarations that purport to 
clarify the legal consequences of that decision.’ (references omitted)
Many authors have already expressed their reservations regarding the retroactive 
effect of Arts. 2(2) and 3 of the Termination Agreement, which terminate the sunset 
clauses. Some of them question whether the tribunals in the ‘New Arbitration Proceed-
ings’93 will accept that the sunset clauses contained in the terminated intra-EU BITs are 
moot and inapplicable for investments already made.94 Others qualify these clauses as 
‘a further troubling blow to basic principles of international public law, among them 
pacta sunt servanda and legal certainty’95 and wonder ‘whether the intended effects of 
the Termination Agreement actually are compatible with the VCLT’.96 Further criticism 
comes from those authors who consider that the Termination Agreement ‘also raises 
some questions concerning its conformity with fundamental principles recognised by 
the CJEU, such as legal certainty, non-retroactivity and the protection of legitimate 
expectations’.97
Considering these views, it is not unlikely that future investment tribunals would 
be inclined to interpret the termination of sunset clauses prospectively, such that the 
termination would not apply to investments that were already made before the termina-
tion in reliance on the sunset clause. Indeed, the costly testing of this controversial 
 93 Pursuant to the Termination Agreement, Art. 1(6) “New Arbitration Proceedings” means any 
Arbitration Proceedings initiated on or after 6 March 2018.
 94 Lavranos, 2020a.
 95 Adams et al., 2020.
 96 Triantafilou and Manoli, 2020, p. 24; Bray and Kapoor, 2020.
 97 Guarín Duque, 2020, p. 817.
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question only requires an investor who is willing to risk initiating new arbitration pro-
ceedings.98 For this reason, the candidate countries would be well advised to terminate 
the sunset clauses from their BITs well before their accession.
 ■ 4.3. Pending arbitrations
It is probable that there would be certain pending arbitrations with investors from EU 
member states at the time that Serbia accedes to the EU, such as the arbitration that was 
occurring between the Micula brothers and Romania.99 The Termination Agreement 
defines ‘Pending Arbitration Proceedings’ as those that were initiated prior to 6 March 
2018 and do not qualify as concluded arbitration proceedings. The solution envisaged 
for those arbitrations in the Termination Agreement is for the two state parties of the 
terminated BIT to inform the arbitral tribunal about the consequences of the Achmea 
judgement, that is, that the arbitration clause is contrary to the EU Treaties and thus 
inapplicable.100 This provision cannot be transposed into a candidate country’s BITs 
with member states of the EU as the date of the Achmea judgement is not the date of 
termination for that country. The provision that could be agreed upon would require 
the acceding state and the other member state to inform the tribunal in such pending 
arbitration that the BIT has been terminated pursuant to its own terms on the date of 
accession based on the BIT provision mentioned above that would envisage termination 
upon accession. The desired outcome would be that the arbitral tribunal, upon receiv-
ing such a notification, dismisses the claims due to lack of jurisdiction.
However, such an outcome is not certain. As the tribunal in Magyar Farming 
Company held, even if the BIT has been terminated, as argued by Hungary (in that case, 
by virtue of the 2019 Declarations), the relevant time for determining jurisdiction in an 
investment arbitration case is the date of initiation of the arbitration.101 The tribunal 
found that ‘the Claimants accepted the BIT’s offer to arbitrate prior to its purported 
termination’.102 The tribunal then quoted the ICSID Convention, Art. 25, which provides 
that ‘when the parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent 
unilaterally’.103 Following this rationale, other arbitral tribunals in the pending cases 
 98 Tropper, 2020. The author mentions a case where a tribunal implied that the member states 
parties to a treaty may denounce a sunset clause: ‘As is undisputed, neither Hungary nor 
France has made any attempt to renegotiate, modify, or shorten the relevant ‘survival’ period. 
Accordingly, […] the Tribunal would still have jurisdiction to hear this case’. – UP & CD Holding 
Internationale v. Hungary, ICSID Case ARB/13/35, Award, 9 October 2018, para. 265. 
 99 According to one source, there were at least 55 pending intra-EU arbitrations only before 
ICSID at the end of 2020. See Yanos and Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2020, p. 2. Other sources refer to 
approximately 15 pending intra-EU arbitrations based on BITs that would be terminated once 
the Termination Agreement enters into force and around 45 pending intra-EU arbitrations 
based on the ECT. See Prantl and Pettazzi, 2020.
 100 See, the Termination Agreement, Art. 7(a).
 101 Magyar Farming Company Ltd., Kintyre Kft, and Inícia Zrt v. Hungary, para. 213.
 102 Ibid.
 103 Ibid. See, also, Marfin Investment Group v The Republic of Cyprus, ICSID Case No ARB/13/27, 
Award, 26 July 2018, para. 593 and Eskosol S.p.A. in liquidazione v Italian Republic, ICSID Case 
No ARB/15/50, Decision on Termination Request and Intra-EU Objection, 7 May 2019, para 226.
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might decide to retain and confirm jurisdiction, as the ‘consent to arbitrate, in the 
sense of a meeting of the minds, which is perfected by the investor’s acceptance of the 
State’s offer to arbitrate expressed in the BIT would not be retroactively invalidated by 
a subsequent termination of the BIT’.104 According to the holding in Magyar Farming 
Company, therefore, the Parties’ agreement to terminate the BIT upon accession could 
not invalidate the consent to arbitrate, which was given and accepted prior to the 
termination.
Some authors have noted that the outcomes of the tribunals’ examination of 
this issue may differ depending on the dispute resolution mechanism chosen by the 
claimant as the ICSID Convention expressly prevents unilateral withdrawal of consent 
to arbitration.105 Other authors highlight the public international law implications of 
the Parties’ attempt to extend the effects of termination to already pending arbitra-
tors. Bray and Kapoor refer to VCLT, Art. 70(1)(b), which states that the termination of 
a treaty ‘does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created 
through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination’ and to Art. 26 pacta sunt 
servanda obligations, particularly in cases in which the promises given have been relied 
on by individuals.106
It should be noted that, pursuant to Art. 1(5) of the Termination Agreement, 
the term ‘Pending Arbitration Proceedings’ also encompasses final arbitral awards 
that were rendered before the termination of the relevant BITs (and before the Achmea 
judgement of the CJEU) but were not yet executed at the time of termination, such as the 
Micula award. In such cases, pursuant to Art. 7(b), the EU member states are obliged to 
resist enforcement, that is, ‘to ask the competent national court, including in any third 
country, as the case may be, to set the arbitral award aside, annul it or to refrain from 
recognising and enforcing it’. Again, the retroactive reneging of investors’ rights under 
a final award is dubious and may be viewed as expropriatory, especially by the courts of 
non-EU countries. Nardell and Rees-Evans argue that the attempt to undercut arbitra-
tions commenced well before the agreement came into force, including those resulting 
in awards rendered before the Achmea judgement, is incompatible with investors’ rights 
under the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU’s Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. They argue that ‘by purporting to deprive investors of the fruits of valid claims 
in this way, the Agreement infringes on Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR […] 
and may also breach the rights of access to justice and a fair hearing under Article 6(1) 
(and their equivalents in the Charter)’.107
The ICSID award in Magyar Farming Company would also fall under the definition 
of ‘Pending Arbitration Proceedings’ in terms of the Termination Agreement but for 
the fact that the UK is not a party to the Termination Agreement. Therefore, it appears 
 104 Magyar Farming Company Ltd., Kintyre Kft, and Inícia Zrt v. Hungary, para. 214.
 105 Guarín Duque, 2020, p. 822; Triantafilou and Manoli, 2020, p. 24.
 106 Bray and Kapoor, 2020.
 107 Nardell and Rees-Evans, 2020, p. 1.
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that the UK-Hungary BIT remains in force.108 However, now that the new EU-UK Trade 
and Cooperation Agreement was signed on 24 December 2020109 it remains to be seen 
whether the UK-Hungary BIT will be deemed in force or repealed. This case also ended 
up in the US courts, in the same district court for the District of Columbia in which 
enforcement was sought by the UK claimants in March 2020.110
Both Micula and the Magyar Farming Company case flag the risk of respondent 
countries being dragged to third-country courts111 by investors from members states in 
‘Pending Arbitration Proceedings’ pursuant to intra-EU BITs even after the accession. 
For these reasons, it seems that candidate countries should strive to settle all their 
pending arbitrations with investors from EU countries before the date of accession112 
to avoid protracted legal battles over the enforceability of the awards and the effects of 
the retroactive termination of the arbitration clauses.
 ■ 4.4. Other possible amendments to the existing Serbia-EU member state BITs
There are other possible avenues for tackling issues raised by the Achmea decision 
and the Termination Agreement with respect to Serbia-EU member state BITs. One 
possible option would be to renegotiate these BITs to exclude existing ISDS clauses 
and sunset clauses entirely and to replace them with different dispute settlement 
mechanisms, such as inter-state arbitration. Given that some authors caution that 
these amendments could be easily circumvented via the MFN clause,113 it follows that 
renegotiation should also include an MFN clause to exclude ISDS clauses from its scope 
of application. A more radical alternative would be to replace them all with one EU-
Serbia BIT, which would have different ISDS provisions as agreed upon by all parties. 
Recent EU treaty-making practice provides support for both propositions. For example, 
the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, adopted on 24 December 2020 contains 
provisions on substantive protection for the Contracting Parties’ investors but no ISDS 
 108 Guarín Duque, 2020, p. 821.
 109 This is a free trade agreement which also contains provisions on investment protection exclud-
ing investor-state dispute settlement clauses. It is not yet in force but has been provisionally 
applied since 1 January 2021. Available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements/treaty-files/6039/download (Accessed 16.01.2021).
 110 Information available at https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw11363.pdf (Accessed 16.01.2021). Hungary filed an annulment application against the 
ICSID award, and the annulment proceedings are currently pending. – https://investmentpolicy.
unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/cases/839/magyar-farming-and-others-v-hungary 
(Accessed: 16.01.2021).
 111 There are currently enforcement actions concerning intra-EU investor-state awards of approxi-
mately US$600 million in value that are pending before United States federal district courts. 
Yanos and Ramos-Mrosovsky, 2020, p. 2.
 112 Such settlement is also envisaged in the Termination Agreement, Art. 6(2): ‘[…] this Agreement 
shall not affect any agreement to settle amicably a dispute being the subject of Arbitration 
Proceedings initiated prior to 6 March 2018.’
 113 Titi, 2016, p. 440.
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mechanism, which is replaced by interstate arbitration.114 Further, certain EU member 
states have substantially changed their investment-treaty policies not only regarding 
other EU member states but also regarding non-EU states. The Netherlands terminated 
several of its non-EU BITs115 and, in 2018 (revised in March 2019), substantially revised 
its Model Investment Agreement.116 These two trends combined provide a platform for 
renegotiating the Serbia-EU member state BITs.
Another option for amending the existing Serbia-EU member state BITs is to 
insert a clause that would provide for the supremacy of obligations stemming from EU 
membership. Similar provisions have already been in place for former pre-accession 
countries, such as Croatia. The 1991 BIT between Austria and Croatia, for example, 
provides the following in Art. 11(2): ‘The Contracting Parties are not bound by the 
present Agreement insofar as it is incompatible with the legal acquis of the European 
Union (EU) in force at any given time.’ Although Croatia’s challenges to the jurisdic-
tion of investment tribunals based on this provision were unsuccessful,117 the obiter 
dictum of the Addiko tribunal provides support for inserting such provisions in BITs 
with pre-accession countries because they may prospectively invalidate the consent to 
arbitration, following the Achmea decision:
‘The Tribunal thus finds that as a matter of international law, any invalida-
tion of Article 9(2)’s stated “irrevocabl[e] consent[] in advance” to arbitra-
tion, by virtue of an incompatibility with the EU acquis pursuant to Article 
11(2) of the BIT, could not be applied to invalidate a consent to arbitration 
that was given before the Achmea Judgement, but only prospectively for 
investors who had not yet initiated a BIT arbitration. In the Tribunal’s 
view, this conclusion holds whether the Achmea Judgement itself is con-
sidered under EU law to be applied ex nunc or alternatively ex tunc.’118
 114 Trade and Cooperation Agreement Between the European Union and the European Atomic 
Energy Community, of the One Part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, of the Other Part, Official Journal of the European Union, L 444/14, 30 December 2020. 
 115 With South Africa (as of 1 May 2014), Indonesia (as of 1 July 2015), India (as of 1 December 2016), 
and Tanzania (as of 1 April 2019). – Lavranos, 2020b, p. 444.
 116 Available at: https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2019/03/22/nieuwe-
modeltekst-investeringsakkoorden (Accessed: 16.01.2021).
 117 Gavrilovic and Gavrilovic d.o.o. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/39, Decision on the 
Respondent’s Request of 4 April 2018, 30 April 2018; UniCredit Bank Austria AG and Zagrebačka 
banka d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/31, Decision on the Respondent’s Article 
9 Objection to Jurisdiction, 12 October 2018; UniCredit Bank Austria AG and Zagrebačka banka d.d. 
v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/31, Decision on the Respondent’s Application for 
Reversal of the Article 9 Decision and Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 24 March 2020 
(UniCredit decisions are not public – information gathered from the awards that are publicly 
available); Addiko Bank AG and Addiko Bank d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/37, 
Decision on Croatia’s Jurisdictional Objection Related to the Alleged Incompatibility of the BIT 
with the EU Acquis, 12 June 2020; Raiffeisen Bank International AG and Raiffeisenbank Austria 
d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/17/34, Decision on Respondent’s Jurisdictional 
Objections, 30 September 2020.
 118 Addiko Bank AG and Addiko Bank d.d. v. Republic of Croatia, para. 280.
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There are EU member states that have recently concluded BITs with third countries, 
including clauses that provide for priority of obligations arising under EU membership 
while at the same time excluding EU law as applicable under the BIT. For example, 
Hungary signed a BIT with Kyrgyzstan in 2020 that contains the following provision:
‘This Agreement shall apply without prejudice to the obligations deriving 
from Hungary’s membership in the European Union, and subject to those 
obligations. Consequently, the provisions of this Agreement may not be 
invoked or interpreted neither in whole nor in part in such a way as to 
invalidate, amend or otherwise affect the obligations of Hungary arising 
from the Treaties on which the European Union is founded.’119
The same BIT excludes the applicability of EU law by a prospective arbitral tribunal in 
the following manner:
‘When rendering its decision, the tribunal shall apply this Agreement 
as interpreted in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, and other rules and principles of international law applicable 
between the Parties. For greater certainty the national law of the Parties 
shall not constitute part of the applicable law. In case of Hungary the term 
“national law” comprises the law of the European Union.’120
Similar provisions are to be found in the Hungary-Belarus BIT121 and the Lithuania-
Turkey BIT122 as well as in the Dutch Model Investment Agreement.123 The recent EU-
Singapore BIT, which replaces all existing Singapore-EU member state BITs, sets forth 
a specific dispute settlement mechanism and excludes the applicability of the parties’ 
domestic law.124
 119 Art. 16(1) of the Agreement between the Government of Hungary and the Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 29 
September 2020. Not in force.
 120 Art. 9(7) of the Hungary-Kyrgyzstan BIT.
 121 Arts. 9(8), 16(4) and 17(1) of the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Belarus 
and the Government of Hungary for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 
signed on 14 January 2019, entered into force on 28 September 2019.
 122 Art. 2(3) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Turkey on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
signed on 28 August 2018. Not in force.
 123 Art. 2(5) of the Dutch Model Investment Agreement.
 124 Art. 3.31(2) of the Investment Protection Agreement between the European Union and its 
Member States, of the One Part, and the Republic of Singapore, of the Other Part, signed on 19 
October 2018, not yet in force. OJ L 279 (09/11/2018).
Available at: https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treaty-
files/5714/download (Accessed: 16.01.2021).
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5. Creating a new mechanism for efficient dispute settlement
The candidate countries should also bear in mind that the European Union has firmly 
stood by the position that the best protection against all concerns raised by investment 
arbitration would be its replacement with a multilateral investment court (MIC).125 Since 
November 2015, when it publicly announced the establishment of an international 
investment court as its policy goal,126 the EU has actively worked on the realisation of 
the MIC project, including in the UNCITRAL Working Group III.127
For seamless implementation of this idea, states are advised to introduce buckle 
clauses into current BITs that would enable transition from the current ISDS mecha-
nisms to MIC once it comes into place. For example, the EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) contains the following provisions:
‘The Parties shall pursue with other trading partners the establishment 
of a multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism for the 
resolution of investment disputes. Upon establishment of such a mul-
tilateral mechanism, the CETA Joint Committee shall adopt a decision 
providing that investment disputes under this Section will be decided pur-
suant to the multilateral mechanism and make appropriate transitional 
arrangements.’
Some EU model BITs already include provisions by which the state parties automati-
cally accept the jurisdiction of the MIC once it becomes operational.128 These provisions 
could serve as a model for the amendment of the Serbia-EU member state BITs.
6. Conclusion
There are several messages for candidate countries such as Serbia regarding their 
investment treaty making and policy to be taken from the recent conflicts between the 
EU and international investment arbitrations. Recent events have exposed the potential 
for conflicts between existing BITs and EU law on both procedural and substantive 
levels. The landscape of the intra-EU BIT policy has drastically changed following the 
CJEU Achmea decision and the 2020 Plurilateral Termination Agreement. The EU set 
 125 Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) – Submission from the European 
Union, 12 December 2017, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.145. For a comprehensive analysis of this idea, 
see Bungenberg and Reinisch, 2018.
 126 Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1396 (Accessed: 16.01.2021).
 127 See, submissions of the European Union in documents A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.145 and A/CN.9/
WG.III/WP.159/Add.1.
 128 For example, the 2019 Dutch Model Investment Agreement, Art. 15 – Multilateral investment 
court. See also Lavranos, 2020b, p. 453. 
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new red lines that are on the opposite side from the EU accession procedure, compared 
to the last wave of accessions – while, originally, BITs with EU member states were 
trendy and desirable, they are now a no-fly zone. However, this is not the only problem 
with BITs signed between candidate countries and EU member states. As illustrated 
by the experiences of Romania and Hungary, newly-EU-weds can run into conflicting 
obligations and find themselves torn between BITs and EU law to such an extent that no 
reconciliation seems possible. Therefore, candidate countries such as Serbia should be 
advised to adjust their pre-accession commitments, both procedural and substantive, 
with incoming EU obligations within their new setting in a timely manner. These inevi-
table adjustments should be conducted cautiously to minimise the countries’ potential 
conflicting treaty obligations and maximise their bargaining power.
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 ■ ABSTRACT: The article discusses the current state of the ongoing process of private 
law recodification in the Slovak Republic. Despite the efforts promised by every new 
government, to this day, none of them have achieved a recodification of civil law that 
would ultimately result in unambiguous treatment of, in particular, the so-called ques-
tions of values, nor have any of them seen through the creation of a codex, which has 
long been required. The need for recodification first became apparent even before the 
November 1989 Revolution. The focus of the expert public post-revolution was on filling 
the legal vacuum that came about through the abolition of the Economic Code and the 
Code of International Trade and on substituting them with a new and equivalent legal 
regulation. Due to time constraints and the urgent need for a solution to the given 
situation, the country failed to adopt a single universal regulation for private law; 
instead, the so-called major amendment of the previous Civil Code was adopted. This 
state has since prevailed; thus, Slovakia’s legal system is still subject to a Civil Code 
from 1964, amended on several occasions, as well as the Commercial Code from 1991. 
This is despite the numerous attempts to recodify private law, the last attempt having 
been introduced to the public at the end of 2018. The form of this reform was, however, 
surprising. Slovakia saw a change in governments in 2020, and the new government 
has, to date, declared other priorities in the domain of justice. It is, therefore, difficult 
to say whether the new government will adopt the ambition to recodify private law and, 
if so, to what extent it will succeed in completing this goal.
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1. Introduction
Since March 2020, Slovakia has had a new government, which, like all previous govern-
ments, in its declared program for 2020–2024, cites the need to recodify Slovak private 
law and simultaneously recommends that the authors of the new Slovak Civil Code 
should be inspired by the experiences of their foreign colleagues, namely those from 
the Czech Republic2 (‘why create something that has already been created’). The current 
declared program explicitly states, ‘The Government of the Slovak Republic is committing to 
creating a new Civil Code and law on commercial entities, following a rigorous participative 
discussion about its basic legal institutions, on the basis of a common agreement; while taking 
into consideration the practical experience related to introducing the new Czech Civil Code 
into practice.’3
The need to recodify private law, however, extends, in terms of timeframe, 
beyond the existence of the Slovak Republic, since the first efforts to create a new 
modern civil code date back to the common Czechoslovak state and even to the pre-
November 1989 era when Czechoslovakia witnessed a momentous change in societal 
and political affairs.4
Despite many attempts and specific activities within the Slovak Republic, and 
in contrast with the Czech Republic as well as with Hungary, Romania, Estonia, and 
Russia, this recodification process has not yet been completed. The Slovak Republic 
thus remains one of the last countries to adopt recodification of private law out of all 
the previously socialist states of Eastern Europe.5
2. The current state of the Civil Code
Since 1964, private law in the Slovak Republic has been governed by the basic and 
general regulation of the Civil Code of 1964, that is, Art. No. 40/1964 Cc and its later 
regulations (henceforth referred to as the ‘Civil Code’).
Throughout its existence, it has been amended more than 60 times, while it is 
worth noting that out of the total amount, only four amendments were adopted prior 
to 1989 (before the so-called Velvet Revolution). The Amendment of the Civil Code, Art. 
No 509/1991 Cc, is considered to be of specific importance, as it essentially changed, or 
 2 The Czech Republic shared the contents of its Civil Code from 1964 with the Slovak Republic 
up until 2012, while after the separation of Czechoslovakia (i.e. since 1.1.1993), each country 
made its own edits of their respective Civil Codes. Unlike Slovakia, though, the Czech Republic 
managed to add a new private legal codex in 2012 (art. No. 89/2012 Cc), which came into force 
in 2014. 
 3 Declared program of the Slovak Republic’s government for the period 2020–2024, available at: 
http://www.culture.gov.sk/programove-vyhlasenie-vlady-180.html.
 4 Eliáš, 2008, pp. 1–7.
 5 Another of these countries that have yet to recodify their civil law is Poland. 
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amended, approximately 80% of the original text of the Civil Code.6 Despite its essential 
nature, the amendment did not manage to effectively address the ambiguity caused by 
the previous forty years of development of the so-called socialist private law.7 Latter 
amendments may have, in part, resolved these shortcomings; however, the amended 
changes lacked a set of unifying concept criteria. This was reflected in the applications 
of novelties and modern elements, which were introduced due to a current need to react 
to the external conditions rather than a need to make the law an organic unit (this was 
especially apparent at the time of transposition of directives dedicated to customer 
protection.)8
3. The progression of previous recodification work
Discussions about the conceptual questions, functionality, and effectiveness of the Civil 
Code and its relation to separate legal regulations began prior to the socio-political 
changes brought about by 1989, that is, when the Civil Code was restricted to a very 
narrow material scope, defined by the conditions and requirements of the current 
material and cultural needs of the citizens. Further aspects of material and personal 
relations were regulated by individual regulations, in particular the Economic Code 
(Art. No 109/1964 Cc), International Trade Code (Art. No 65/1965 Cc), Labour Code (Art. 
No 65/1965 Cc) and Family Code (Art. No 94/1963 Cc). The aforementioned laws, with 
the exception of the Family Code,9 were not explicitly linked to the Civil Code, and as a 
result, a significant separation between the individual material and personal relation-
ships as well as an atomisation of the whole private law system ensued.
It was, therefore, logical that among the primary considerations of the recodi-
fication of private law, which were inevitable after 1989, the main aim of all involved 
experts was filling the legal void created by the abolition of the Economic Code and 
the Labour Code, rather than on removing the conceptual shortcomings of private 
law as a whole, or on the adoption of a brand new Civil Code (this particular solution 
was not popular because of the time strain the experts experienced in their work). As 
a result, the aforementioned major amendment of the Civil Code (Art. No 509/1991 Cc) 
and a new Commercial Code (Art. No 513/1991 Cc) were adopted, which, on one hand, 
signified a positive and necessary step in transforming private law based on the needs 
 6 Lazar et al., 2010, p. 96, as well as the approved Legislative Intent of the Civil Code; see at: 
https://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/Nase-sluzby/Nase-projekty/Obciansky-zakonnik/
Obciansky-zakonnik.aspx.
 7 Jurčová, 2007, p. 498.
 8 Consumer contract, which was incorporated into the Civil Code via amendment no. 150/2004 
Cc, found its place in the first (general) part of the Civil Code, in § 52f Cc, rather than in the 
general part on contractual law; for more information, see: Dulaková Jakúbeková, 2004, pp. 
907–913; Dulaková Jakúbeková, 2008, p. 936–946.
 9 Which explicitly contained a reference to the Civil Code; see § 104: ‘The provisions of the Civil 
Code are to be used in instances when the law does not explicitly state differently.’
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of the new market economy, yet, from a long-term perspective, was not viewed as a 
conceptual solution.
In the subsequent years, academic discussions were held among legal theorists 
and practitioners alike. These discussions had the advantages—in contrast with the 
years immediately following 1989—of incorporating experience that resulted from the 
creation, implementation, and application of law within the framework of a market 
economy, which, in turn, resulted in a more developed degree of critical thinking.
The ‘real recodification’ of the Civil Code in the Slovak Republic began in 1996, 
when a commission, led by Professor Karol Plank (1927–1997), was established to 
prepare the new Civil Code. This commission worked under extraordinary time pres-
sure caused by the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic itself, which expected 
a new draft of the Civil Code to be delivered by the commission in paragraph form in 
the same calendar year; the expected deadline was set for October. ‘It was an unrealistic 
expectation that put the head of the commission in an unenviable position. There was no 
time for a discussion or deeper analyses. After delivering the first draft in 1997, the members 
of the recodification committee never gathered again.’10 After his death, Prof. Plank was 
replaced as head of the committee by Prof. Ján Lazar.11 Under his leadership, the com-
mittee created a second draft of the Civil Code in 1998, but this version only amended 
or completed the previous draft. Despite the fact that this draft had also not been 
subjected to a wider expert discussion,12 it was approved by the Government of the 
Slovak Republic that same year. The expert public raised serious objections against 
the draft,13 which, combined with political and personal changes at the corresponding 
ministries,14 resulted in the draft not being picked up again, and it was withdrawn from 
the legislative process.
This effort as well as those that followed can be well captured by the following 
quote: ‘Unfortunately […] the recodification of private law is influenced by politics to the 
extent that they not only affect the start and speed of work on the codex, but its evaluation as 
well.’ 15
 10 Vojčík, P., in: http://wwwold.justice.sk/kop/inf-rek.htm.
 11 Prof. Lazar is a personal friend of the influential Hungarian civil lawyer, Prof. Lajos Vékás. 
Prof. Lazar and Prof. Vékás regularly attended academic conferences dedicated to private law 
(especially to recodification of private law) together. As a sign of their friendship, Prof. Vékás 
contributed to Prof. Lazar’s collection of articles Liber amicorum Ján Lazar, Pocta profesorovi 
Jánovi Lazarovi k 80. narodeninám with an article on this topic titled Der Schutz der menschli-
chen Persőnlichkeit in dem neuen ungarischen Ziviligesetzbuch / Ochrana ľudskej osobnosti v novom 
maďarskom Občianskom zákonníku, 2014, p. 715.
 12 However, to say that the draft had not been discussed at all would be false; the V. Luby’s 
Laeyer Days, which took place in September 1998 at the law faculty of Comenius University in 
Bratislava, were dedicated to it, for example—’On the draft of the new Slovak Civil Code’; see: 
http://iuridica.truni.sk/lubyho-pravnicke-dni-0. However, the conference took place only after 
the draft had been approved by the government of the Slovak Republic. 
 13 See the conference report: Dies Luby Iurisprudentiae, Nr. 5, 1999.
 14 Parliamentary elections took place on 25 and 26 September, 1998. 
 15 Dulak, 2009, p. 5.
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Legislative work began again in 1999 under the expert guidance of Professor 
Peter Vojčík,16 yet the recodification efforts had to begin from scratch. Although this 
committee completed its role and in 2002, the government of the Slovak Republic 
approved17 the legislative intent of the Civil Code that the committee developed, the 
political will to continue further works on a paragraph version of the codex had not 
been found again.
After the next election, legislative works ceased for an entire electoral period18 
(no minister of justice at the time considered the recodification of private law to be a 
priority).
In November 2006 (again, shortly after a new parliamentary election),19 the Min-
ister of Justice of the Slovak Republic at the time, Štefan Harabin, named the previous 
head of the recodification committee, Prof. Lazar, to lead the body again. Subsequently, 
in January 2007, a new recodification committee was established and was tasked—as 
expressed in the coalition plan of the government at the time for the period 2006–2010—
with developing a draft of the law on material private law (Civil Code) by the first 
quarter of 2010, with the ultimate goal being recodification of private law in the Slovak 
Republic. The commission worked within work groups focused on particular sections 
of private law. Only a year and a half later, this commission delivered a document titled 
‘The Legislative Intent of Codification of Private Law, which was then approved by the 
government in its amended form in January 2009. Despite the relatively intense efforts, 
the commission did not manage to develop a first discussion version in paragraph form 
in the originally defined framework, that is, before the end of calendar year 2009.
Another general election was held in 2010,20 after which Lucia Žitňanská became 
the new Minister of Justice, and the matter of recodification of private law unfortu-
nately entered a latent state.
This only changed after the next (early) election,21 after which Tomáš Borec, an 
attorney, became the Minister of Justice. Recodification work again found political 
support, and a new recodification committee was established. In 2013, Prof. Lazar was 
replaced by the committee’s previous member, Anton Dulak,22 who was suggested for 
the position by Prof. Lazar himself.23 After a deal with the Minister of Justice and the 
General Director of the Civil Law Section at the time, Marek Števček, the committee was 
tasked with delivering the first working draft in paragraph form by September 2015.
 16 See: https://www.osobnosti.sk/osobnost/peter-vojcik-1754.
 17 Resolution of the Government of the Slovak Republic No 827 of 7 August 2002. 
 18 Parliamentary election took place in the Slovak Republic on 20 and 21 September.
 19 Parliamentary election took place in the Slovak Republic on 17 June 2006.
 20 Parliamentary election took part on 10 June 2010.
 21 Early parliamentary election took place on 10 March 2012.
 22 Prof. JUDr. Anton Dulak, PhD., currently in function as the Head of the Private Law Depart-
ment at Pan-European University, Faculty of Law. 
 23 Prof. Lazar lost his position as head of the recodification committee but remained its ‘expert 
sponsor’ within the Ministry of Justice.
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Under the leadership of Prof. Dulak, the committee completed its duty and 
delivered the first unified working version of the new Civil Code under preparation on 16 
September, 201524. This was achieved particularly because of the dedicated determina-
tion of the committee’s members and other enthusiastic colleagues. The work the com-
mittee delivered consisted of 1756 paragraphs,25 while the members of the committee 
supported their work with numerous commentary materials, both expert and scientific 
articles, suggestions received from applied practice, and reports from both domestic 
and international conferences—all meant to serve as an argumentative contribution to 
the expected expert discussions.
To their surprise,26 and in violation of the previous agreements with the repre-
sentatives of the Ministry of Justice, the members of the committee discovered, via 
‘unofficial sources,’ that the ministry intended to establish an entirely new recodifi-
cation committee27 (tasked with the ‘dynamisation’ of the efforts to prepare the new 
Civil Code’).28 This happened in November 2015, with the new head of the appointed 
committee being the General Director of the Civil Law Section, Marek Števček.
4. A brief comment on the overall concept of the Draft Law of 2018 
amending the Civil Code
In October 2018, the Minister of Justice of the Slovak Republic introduced their vision 
of reform of Slovak private law. Despite the fact that changes in the field of civil law 
have been eagerly anticipated for a long period of time, the appearance of the ministry’s 
representatives greatly surprised the expert public.29 Instead of rebuilding private law, 
a step meant, with its significance and essential character, to signify its recodification, 
the ministry (without a broader expert discussion and without changing the legislative 
purpose of a new Civil Code) announced a proposal for an amendment to the existing 
Civil Code,30 primarily focused on ‘reforming’ the law of obligation. This was labelled 
 24 Dulak, 2016. See: https://www.digitalmag.sk/k-novej-kodifikacii-sukromneho-prava- cast/ 
as well as: Dulak, A. (2016) In: https://www.digitalmag.sk/k-novej-kodifikacii-sukromneho- 
prava-cast-ii-hladanie-inspiracii/
 25 The delivered draft consisted of the following six parts: 1. General, 2. Family Law, 3. Rights in 
rem, 4. Inheritance law, 5. Contractual law, 6. Concurrent, close and repeal provisions – the 
first five in paragraph form. The final (sixth) part was to be edited into a paragraph version in 
sequence and with regard to the results of the interinstitutional reflection and the approved 
version of the draft. See the delivered draft IN: https://www.najpravo.sk/clanky/paragrafove-
znenie-prvej-pracovnej-verzie-navrhu-noveho-obcianskeho-zakonnika.html.
 26 Dulaková, 2015. See: http://www.lexforum.sk/565.
 27 See https://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/Nase-sluzby/Nase-projekty/Obciansky-zakonnik/
Zoznam-clenov.aspx. 
 28 See https://www.najpravo.sk/clanky/minister-spravodlivosti-menoval-novych-clenov-komisie-
pre-pripravu-obcianskeho-zakonnika.html.
 29 Ovečková, 2018, p. 607.
 30 https://www.justice.gov.sk/…/OZ/Legislativny%20zamer%20OZ.pdf.
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by its authors as the first stage of recodification of the Civil Code and was published, along 
with a justificatory announcement, on their official websites.31
As stated above, the conceptual change in the approach to civil law reform sur-
prised the expert public, which accepted the new objective with hesitation. Without 
the need to look up the term in a specialised dictionary, recodification is generally 
understood as a ‘new codification’ of the corresponding legal sector. In the case of private 
law in a post-socialist country, this legal sector should not merely be revised, modified, 
or subjected to so-called horizontal reform. ‘At times, the difference between revision and 
recodification is emphasized. While a revision is based on the old legal regulation and its 
derivatives, a recodification is an implementation of a modern legal regulation with the aim to 
capture a current reality. Recodification means a reconstruction of a systematic, synthetic and 
syncretic approach to law; it is a reformation of the initial principles of codification (currently 
abolished or undervalued) for the purposes of a new order. A recodification, similarly to a 
codification, is expected to have its own central motive.’ 32
The vision of the latest Recodification Committee thus seems to have lost the 
path set forth by the government in the Legislative Objective of the new Civil Code in 
2009 (which, naturally, expected the whole of private law to be recodified en block) and 
instead presented a novel intention: to recodify private law per partes, beginning with 
the law of obligation, since, according to the Minister of Justice, who is a proponent of 
this concept, ‘the area of private legal obligations is least socially sensitive area; hence, 
we expect a consensus of the whole society in this matter.’
In April 2019, information was published that suggested the Ministry of Justice 
concluded the informal reflection process for the recodification of the law of obliga-
tion.33 This was, however, shortly before the election, which meant that the political 
parties involved shifted their focus to their electoral campaign rather than the issue of 
reforming the Civil Code.
5. Conclusion
As stated in the beginning, since March 2020, Slovakia has had a new government, 
which, at least according to its declared program, plans to devote some focus to the 
reforming of private law. Using the text from this document (declared program), ‘The 
Government of the Slovak Republic is committing to creating a new Civil Code and law on 
commercial entities’, it seems that the Ministry of Justice will likely focus on a complex 
reform of private law, that is, to creating a code en block rather than separate changes 
for specific areas. However, as is the case in politics, major legislative changes need 
to be carried out within the first two years of governing as the next two are dedicated 
to preparing for the new election, which is reflected in the political decisions made 
 31 http://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/Ministerstvo/Aktuality-obcianskeho-zakonnika.aspx. 
 32 McAuley, 2003, p. 274; Dulak, 2019, pp. 76–95.
 33 http://www.justice.gov.sk/Stranky/aktualitadetail.aspx?announcementID=2522.
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throughout that latter period. Hopefully, the claim cited above from a previous Recodi-
fication Committee chair, Anton Dulak,34 on politics and political influence exerted on 
private law can be applied during this political period (2020–2024) in a positive light.35
 34 ‘Unfortunately, […] the recodification of private law is under the influence of politics to the 
extent that not only does politics affect the beginning and speed of the project, but also its 
evaluation.’ See Dulak, 2009, p. 5.
 35 Lazar, 2020, p. 355.
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 ■ ABSTRACT: The BVerfG’s judgment on the PSPP marks another important part of 
the EU constitutional mosaic. It was the first time that the court declared an EU act 
ultra vires. Intense academic commentary ensued, mostly adopting a critical attitude 
towards the judgment. However, a summary rejection of the underlying idea of an 
exceptional national constitutional review of EU acts does not seem warranted. 
Unconditional primacy has been disputed by different national courts for some time 
now, and on two occasions, national apex courts already declared EU acts ultra vires. 
Considering its inherent diversity, the EU should be able to accommodate legitimate 
national constitutional concerns. A common frame of reference, possibly provided by 
Art. 4(2) TEU, could facilitate such accommodation if very high standards of violation 
were adopted by national courts, which would also respect the principle of loyal coop-
eration. In this regard, EU law also marks red lines when it comes to its fundamental 
principles, limiting the possibility of abuse. The Slovenian Constitution introduces 
EU law through Art. 3a, adopted for the purpose of accession to the EU. The Slovenian 
Constitutional Court’s case law is generally very EU-friendly, and it could be marked 
by cooperative vagueness, echoing the doctrines of the CJEU. A clear answer regarding 
the relationship between national (constitutional) law and EU law is lacking in its 
jurisprudence. The court explicitly left the question of absolute primacy open. The 
substantive preconditions for the transfer of sovereign rights in Art. 3a, namely, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the principles of the rule 
of law, have been interpreted in different ways in academia. However, considering the 
inalienable right to self-determination, in exceptional cases of serious encroachment 
on fundamental constitutional values, the SCC would probably adopt its version of the 
BVerfG’s doctrines.
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1. Introduction2
It seems that Eric Stein’s words about the CJEU being blessed with ‘benign neglect from 
the powers that be’ in the fairyland Dutchy of Luxembourg3 faded into the past in May 
2020, if not before, due to the BVerfG’s PSPP judgment. National (constitutional) courts 
are now more vigilant of any attempts at progressive interpretation of EU law, and are 
not particularly uneasy or hesitant even to dismiss them.
The impetus for this article was provided by this most recent judgment of the 
BVerfG related to European integration. The primary aim is to discuss the judgment 
briefly, analyse its underlying proposition, and consider the possibility of applying it 
to the Slovenian constitutional system. With this in mind, I first address the judgments 
of the CJEU and the BVerfG in the Weiss case. I mostly focus on the underlying idea 
of constitutional exceptionalism, which means that national constitutional standards 
may function as standards of review of EU law, materialised forcefully by the BVerfG’s 
judgment. This provides the basis for the second part of the article, dealing with the 
elucidation of the case from the perspective of Slovenian constitutional law. In this 
section, I present the constitutional bedrock of EU law in the Slovenian Constitution, 
the relevant (relatively vague) case law of the Slovenian Constitutional Court on the 
subject, and conclude with theoretical discussions related to the issue.
2. The PSPP and the ultra vires problem
At the beginning of May, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) delivered a judgment on 
the public sector purchase programme (PSPP) of the European Central Bank (ECB).4 It 
was delivered after the CJEU had issued its judgment regarding the PSPP in C-493/17 
Weiss, responding to the BVerfG’s preliminary reference.5
The PSPP is a programme enabling the ECB and the national central banks to buy 
(inter alia) government bonds on the secondary market. The scope of the programme 
extended to over 2 trillion EUR in August 2020.6 The main legal issue brought up before 
the BVerfG7 was that the Decisions8 of the ECB, which formed the legal basis for the 
 2 The manuscript was closed on 14 December 2020, therefore it reflects the legal situation of that 
date.
 3 Stein, 1981, p. 1.
 4 For an overview of the programme, see: BVerfG Judgment 2 BvR 859/15 of 5 May 2020.
 5 C-493/17 Weiss of 11 December 2018.
 6 European Central Bank, 2020a.
 7 Among the complainants was Peter Gauweiler, one of the applicants behind the BVerfG’s first 
preliminary reference in BVerfG 2 BvR 2728/13 of 21 June 2016. Also see: C-62/14 Gauweiler and 
Others of 16 June 2015.
 8 The ECB Governing Council’s Decision (EU) 2015/774 OJ EU L 121, p. 20 and the subsequent 
Decisions (EU) 2015/2101 OJ EU L 303, p. 106, (EU) 2015/2464 OJ EU L 344, p. 1, (EU) 2016/702 OJ 
EU L 121, p. 24, and (EU) 2017/100 OJ EU L 16, p. 51. Hereinafter: the Decisions.
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enactment of the Programme, amounted to ultra vires acts. The complainants argued 
that the ECB disregarded the distribution of competences between the Member States 
(MS) and the EU (in violation of the principle of conferral)9 and acted outside Art. 119 
TFEU,10 exceeding its competences under Art. 127 TFEU and Arts. 17 to 24 of Protocol 
no. 4 on the Statute of the ECB.11 They also claimed that it infringed the prohibition of 
monetary financing in Art. 123 TFEU as well as the principle of democracy, and that it 
undermined German constitutional identity by infringing the budgetary powers of the 
Bundestag12 due to possible sharing of losses.13
In Weiss, the CJEU sustained the validity of the Decisions. It adopted the position 
that by implementing the PSPP, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) did not 
exceed its mandate. The distinction between monetary and economic policy was one 
of the crucial points because if the Decisions corresponded to measures of economic 
policy, they would represent an overreach of the ESCB’s competences.14 The CJEU 
found that the main objective of the ESCB was tied to monetary policy,15 that there is 
no absolute separation between monetary and economic policy in the Treaties,16 and 
that indirect effects on economic policy do not make the PSPP an economic policy 
measure.17 Considering the broad discretion afforded to the ESCB in the field, the Deci-
sions were also held proportionate to the objectives pursued.18 The CJEU further found 
that the purchasing of state-issued bonds on the secondary market did not amount to 
monetary financing contrary to Art. 123(1) TFEU.19 The issue of a potential violation of 
Art. 4(2) TEU was dismissed as hypothetical, as no provisions laid down an obligatory 
sharing of losses.20
The response is already (in)famous21 in European constitutional academia as 
another stepping-stone in the series of the BVerfG’s expositions on the possibility of 
reviewing EU legal acts and its implicit limits to the European integration project. 
 9 Art. 5(1) Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326 (TEU).
 10 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326 (TFEU).
 11 OJ C 202, p. 230.
 12 C-493/17 Weiss, para. 14.
 13 Ibid., para. 15. For an overview of the arguments, also see: BVerfG 2 BvR 859/15, para. 1.
 14 The EU enjoys exclusive competence with regard to monetary policy (Art. 3(1)(c) TFEU), but 
only coordinating competences with respect to economic policy. On this issue, see: Watson and 
Downing-Ide, 2020.
  The issue was addressed before by the CJEU in C-62/14 Gauweiler and C-370/12 Pringle of 27 
November 2012.
 15 C-493/17 Weiss, para. 57.
 16 Ibid., para. 60.
 17 Ibid., para. 61.
 18 Ibid., para. 73 et. seq.
 19 Ibid., para. 101 et. seq.
 20 Ibid., para. 159 et. seq.
 21 Labelled as ‘an unprecedented act of legal vandalism’ in: Eleftheriadis, 2020.
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Considering the vast amount of commentary and research already published,22 a very 
short overlook of the judgment should suffice.
In its judgment, the BVerfG found the Decisions23 as well as the judgment of the 
CJEU ultra vires.24 Generally, the BVerfG, in line with its established jurisprudence, may 
find an act ultra vires when ‘the European Union [has] exceeded the limits of [its] competences 
in a manner that specifically runs counter to the principle of conferral’.25 The overreach of 
competences has to be manifest, meaning that the exercise of such competence would 
require a Treaty amendment or an evolutionary clause, requiring the involvement of 
the legislator.26
In particular, the BVerfG first found that the CJEU manifestly failed in its 
consideration of whether the ECB exceeded its monetary policy mandate, not paying 
sufficient attention to the actual effects of the PSPP, effectively not applying the prin-
ciple of proportionality in an acceptable manner, rendering the principle of conferral 
meaningless.27 While recognising in principle the primary competence to interpret 
EU law to the CJEU in line with Art. 19(1) TEU,28 it considered the judgment ‘not com-
prehensible’ and ‘objectively arbitrary ’.29 Since it ‘[could] not rely on the Weiss judgment of 
the CJEU ’ concerning the validity of the Decisions,30 it performed its own review. It 
found that the Decisions neither contained, nor were based on, the required balancing 
of economic policy effects, violating Arts. 5(1) and (4) TEU, namely the principle of 
proportionality.31
The consequence of finding an act ultra vires is that German constitutional 
organs ‘may participate neither in the development nor in the implementation, execution, or 
operationalisation’ of these acts, making them inapplicable in Germany.32 The Bundes-
bank was ordered not to participate in the PSPP subject for a transitional period of three 
months, during which the ECB would adopt a new Decision, implementing the court’s 
expectations.33 The BVerfG also charged the Federal Government and the Bundestag 
to take steps to ensure that the ECB conduct a suitable proportionality assessment in 
relation to the PSPP.34
 22 See, for example, the German Law Journal Special Collection on European Constitutional 
Pluralism and the PSPP Judgment (Volume 21, Issue 5 of July 2020). Also see publications 
referenced in this article, esp. n. 34.
 23 BVerfG 2 BvR 859/15, paras. 164–178.
 24 Ibid., para. 117 et. seq.
 25 Ibid., para. 110.
 26 Ibid., para. 110. Despite this clear reference to the exceptionality of such review, Eleftheriadis 
notes that this standard was in fact not reached in Weiss. Eleftheriadis, 2020.
 27 BVerfG 2 BvR 859/15, para. 123 et. seq.
 28 Ibid., para. 111.
 29 Ibid., para. 118 et. seq.
 30 Ibid., para. 164.
 31 Ibid., para. 167 et. seq.
 32 However, it should be noted that this is therefore not a ruling on the validity of the Decisions.
 33 BVerfG 2 BvR 859/15, para. 235. For a follow-up during the following months, see: Utrilla, 2020.
 34 BVerfG 2 BvR 859/15, para. 232.
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3. Exceptional constitutional exceptionalism?
A distinction between two issues concerning the judgment should be made. The first is 
its persuasiveness. In the present case, this covers the issues related to the distinction 
between monetary and economic policy, the ECB’s mandate, and the application of 
the principles of proportionality and conferral. The second issue is the viability of the 
underlying premise of the judgment, which is that national (constitutional) courts have 
the competence to perform a review of an EU act exceptionally – which I refer to as 
constitutional exceptionalism.
Regarding the first issue,35 it is hard to add much to the very poignant analyses 
already provided elsewhere.36 The response of the EU institutions, somewhat uncon-
ventionally, followed the German judgment as well.37 Further discussion of these points 
would be a digression from the aim of this article.
The overwhelming criticism of the BVerfG’s reasoning on proportionality meant 
that the second issue was also rejected more or less summarily by academia. The most 
open dismissal was the joint statement signed by more than thirty well-renowned aca-
demics in May 2020, also arguing against the idea of constitutional pluralism,38 which 
supposedly brought about this type of reasoning, as inherently prone to such abuse.39 
While the overall circumstances surrounding the judgment, especially concerning 
possible ramifications for the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme,40 beg for 
its refusal, I argue that a complete rejection of its underlying approach based solely on 
this BVerfG judgment is unwarranted.
The argument behind the ultra vires review is that the constitutional court should 
review EU acts in cases of manifest and structurally significant exceeding of compe-
tences.41 As stated by the BVerfG:
‘[…] if the Member States were to completely refrain from conducting any kind of ultra 
vires review, they would grant EU organs exclusive authority over the Treaties even in cases 
where the EU adopts a legal interpretation that would essentially amount to a treaty amend-
ment or an expansion of its competences’.42
This means that the national authorities are bound by EU law; however, if the 
act exceeds the EU’s competences, contradicting the national constitution, the national 
authorities (courts) may be authorised to depart from it.
 35 Is the CJEU’s judgment really ‘not comprehensible’? The question was craftily reversed by: 
Marzal, 2020.
 36 See, for example: Fabbrini, 2020; Galetta, 2020; Marzal, 2020; Meier-Beck, 2020; Nowag, 2020; 
Viterbo, 2020, p. 679 n. 45; Ziller, 2020. 
 37 Court of Justice of the European Union, 2020; European Central Bank, 2020b; European Com-
mission, 2020.
 38 Kelemen and Pech, 2018. For a response, see: Avbelj, 2020.
 39 Kelemen et al., 2020. For a response, see: Baranski, Brito Bastos, and van den Brink, 2020.
 40 Maduro, 2020a; Viterbo, 2020.
 41 BVerfG 2 BvR 859/15, para. 105, 110. See: Calliess, 2019, pp. 170–171. Also see below, n. 45.
 42 BVerfG 2 BvR 859/15, para. 118.
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The broader idea behind the national review of EU legal acts stems from the 
well-known line of BVerfG judgments dealing with European integration, referring to 
the BVerfG’s residual competence to review EU acts.43 The BVerfG developed human 
rights review (Solange I44 and Solange II45),46 ultra vires review (Maastricht47), and 
identity review (Lisbon48).49 In these cases, albeit in a more EU-friendly manner, the 
BVerfG established the doctrines, which first came to life in Weiss. As any European 
constitutional law scholar is aware, the BVerfG is not alone in retaining competence 
for scrutiny of EU acts in exceptional circumstances.50 From the very beginning of 
European integration, nods in the German direction emerged from Italy.51 Similar doc-
trines were later developed for example, in Spain,52 France,53 Poland,54 and the Czech 
Republic,55 among others.56
Furthermore, despite the fact that the terminology utilised by the BVerfG in the 
PSPP case is unprecedented,57 this is not the first time a decision like this has been made 
by a national court either. The first to declare an act of EU law ultra vires was the Czech 
Constitutional Court.58 Recently, the Danish Supreme Court also refused to recognise 
 43 Tomuschat, 2013; de Abreu Duarte and Delgado, 2020; Nowag, 2020, p. 12.
 44 BVerfG 37, 271 of 29 May 1974.
 45 BVerfG 73, 339 of 22 October 1986.
 46 Hassemer, 2004, pp. 35–37; Denham and Burke, 2009, pp. 114–115.
 47 BVerfG 89, 155 of 12 October 1993. In this regard, see: Hassemer, 2004, pp. 37–40; MacCormick, 
2010, pp. 259–260. In this regard, the Honeywell judgment BVerfG 2 BvR 2661/06 of 6 July 2010 
is also relevant.
 48 BVerfG 2 BvE, 2/08 of 30 June 2009. See, for example: Denham and Burke, 2009, pp. 120–125; 
Reestman, 2009; Zwingmann, 2012; López Bofill, 2013.
 49 For an overview of the development and meaning of the doctrines, see: Calliess, 2019, p. 158 
et. seq.
 50 For an overview by a Slovenian author, see: Accetto, 2013, pp. 426–451. Also see: Hoffmeister, 
2007; Dobbs, 2014, pp. 303–305. For an in-depth study on the national constitutional limitations 
to EU law and integration, see: Besselink et al., 2014.
 51 Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze, Judgment No. 183 of 18 December 1973; SpA Granital v. 
Amministrazione delle Finanze, Dec. 170 of 8 June 1984; SpA Fragd v Amministrazione delle 
finanze dello Stato, Dec. 232 of 21 April 1989. More recently, see: Judgment No. 115 of 10 April 
2018.
 52 DTC 1/2004 of 13 December 2004; DTC 26/2014 of 13 February 2014. See, for example: Torres 
Pérez, 2012, pp. 119–121.
 53 For example: 2004-496 DC of 10 June 2004; 2004-498 DC of 29 July 2004. See: Reestman, 2009, p. 
386 et. seq.
 54 Judgment K 18/04 of 11 May 2005.
 55 Judgment Pl. ÚS 50/04 (re Sugar Quota Case II) of 8 March 2008; Judgment Pl. ÚS 19/08 (Lisbon 
I) of 26 November 2008; Judgment Pl. ÚS 29/09 (Lisbon II) of 3 November 2009; Judgment Pl. 
ÚS 5/12 of 31 January 2012. For an overview of the Czech judgments regarding the Treaty of 
Lisbon, see: Denham and Burke, 2009, pp. 126–129. For an overview of early jurisprudence of 
new member states from the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, see: Łazowski, 2010, esp. Albi, 2010. 
Also: Rideau, 2013.
 56 Joined by Hungary as well in Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB. of 30 November 2016. See: Halmai, 
2018.
 57 Maduro, 2020b.
 58 In relation to C-399/09 Marie Landtová of 22 June 2011. Judgment Pl. ÚS 5/12 of 31 January 2012. 
See: Komárek, 2012.
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the horizontal application of the prohibition of discrimination as a general principle of 
EU law in the Ajos case.59 A similar incident was narrowly avoided in the Taricco saga60 
by the Italian Constitutional Court.61 This brief overview should suffice to show that 
absolute primacy is only one side of the coin – dissenting voices endure on the MS side.62 
Unconditional supremacy proclaimed by the CJEU in Costa63 has been disputed from 
the outset,64 and after the failed attempt of the Treaty in establishing a Constitution for 
Europe,65 which included the primacy clause in Art. I-6, it has not been included in the 
text of the ensuing Treaty of Lisbon.66
Two key problems are usually put forward as arguments against such constitu-
tional exceptionalism: (1) it runs counter to the principle of effet utile of EU law67 and 
(2) the danger of its abuse (uncovered in the present political situation in the EU).68
Regarding the first point, it should be noted that constitutional exceptional-
ism is not exceptional in the EU’s constitutional structure. A whole field of research 
dealing with the different types of differentiation, including judicial,69 is devoted to 
differentiation in the EU.70 Differentiation is considered a systemic feature71 of the 
EU, and important adaptations are granted to MS at all levels of EU law. Catastrophic 
projections are, in my view, overstated, and some negative effects on uniformity do not 
necessitate (or even facilitate) disintegration.72 We should also keep in mind that this 
debate, however consequential it may seem to European constitutional law scholars, is 
taking place at the margins of EU law. This is demonstrated by the fact that the ECB and 
German authorities are moving on with the PSPP more or less unaffected. Similarly, no 
Armageddon followed the Czech and Danish judgments.73
 59 Danish Supreme Court, judgment no. 15/2014 of 6 December 2016. See: Krunke and Klinge, 2018.
 60 For an overview of the case, see: Kos, 2019, pp. 51–53.
 61 Weiler and Sarmiento, 2020.
 62 For an overview of the main arguments in the debate between supremacy of state constitutions 
and EU law, as well as the pluralist account, see, for example: Torres Pérez, 2009, p. 41 ff.
 63 C-6/64 Flamino Costa v E.N.E.L. of 15 July 1964. Recently most problematically applied in 
C-399/11 Melloni of 26 February 2013. On primacy in general, see, for example: Denham and 
Burke, 2009, pp. 109–113.
 64 Baranski, Brito Bastos, and van den Brink, 2020. For a historic overview, see, for example: 
De Witte, 2011.
 65 OJ C 310, p. 1–474.
 66 It was relegated to a declaration, namely, 17. Declaration Concerning Primacy. See: von Bog-
dandy and Schill, 2011, p. 1417 nos. 2 and 3 and references therein.
 67 C-314/85 Foto-Frost of 22 October 1987, para. 15. Ironically, this was acknowledged in the 
BVerfG’s judgment: BVerfG 2 BvR 859/15, para. 111. Also see: Weiler and Sarmiento, 2020.
 68 Maduro, 2020b, 2020a; Ziller, 2020.
 69 Avbelj, 2013, pp. 192–193.
 70 See, for example: de Witte, 2018. For one of the most comprehensive accounts, see: Tuytschae-
ver, 1999.
 71 Schimmelfennig, Leuffen, and Rittberger, 2015, p. 765.
 72 In that sense, see: Baranski, Brito Bastos, and van den Brink, 2020.
 73 Arguments to the point that these courts are minor players, to me, seem somewhat 
condescending.
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On the other hand, important arguments can be made in favour of this form of 
exceptionalism.74 The argument from national law is certainly endowed with legitimacy 
because one cannot expect national constitutional courts to act in violation of what they 
perceive to be national constitutional law.75
Indeed, therein lies the ‘structural dilemma of a jurisdictional conflict ’.76 However, 
it could be addressed by mutual accommodation that leaves margin for dissent, respect-
ing some common set of principles.77 If a common frame of reference (rules of engage-
ment) were established, these types of disputes would be much less likely. In my view, 
Art. 4(2) TEU78 could function as a hub for these types of disputes.79 While this approach 
would offer an opportunity to express national constitutional concerns, it would also 
maintain the possibility of uniform applicability of EU law.80 Exceptionally, if a certain 
(part) act of EU law infringed national constitutional identity, that (part) act would be 
(if possible)81 inapplicable in the present case,82 while retaining its full application in 
all other cases. This would only be accepted if, in line with the CJEU’s practice, there 
existed a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to the fundamental interest of society.83 
Both parties’ decisions would be based on valid EU law. Both courts should also proceed 
with respect for the principle of loyal cooperation in mind. For this approach to work, 
very high levels of violation of the principle of conferral or national constitutional 
identity would be necessary to validate a departure by a national constitutional court.84 
This approach could be possible under Art. 4(2) TEU, even considering the existing, 
albeit scarce, case law.85 This option would even be possible regarding the BVerfG’s judg-
ment in Weiss, since ultra vires review is, as its subcategory,86 inherently tied to identity 
 74 On this issue, see: Jakab and Sonnevend, 2020.
 75 Kos, 2019, p. 49.
 76 Weiler and Sarmiento, 2020.
 77 Maduro, 2020a.
 78 ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their 
national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, 
inclusive of regional and local self-government. […]’. It should be noted that the reference to 
fundamental constitutional structures makes the identity clause a constitutional, rather than a 
cultural concept. See: Besselink, 2010, pp. 44, 47; von Bogdandy and Schill, 2011, pp. 1427–1429.
 79 Lately, similar proposals have been made by: Garner, 2020; Jóźwicki, 2020. For the substantive 
and functional aspect of Art. 4(2) TEU, important for its operationalisation, see: Kos, 2019, 
pp. 44–51. It is noteworthy in the context of the Weiss case that Article 4(2) TEU was initially 
intended to prevent overreach of competences. See: Guastaferro, 2012, pp. 271–284.
 80 Garner, 2020.
 81 As concisely explained by Jóźwicki, if that was not possible, the act could be overturned by the 
CEJU, or upheld despite the constitutional conflict. In the latter case, political solutions (as put 
forward by the Polish Constitutional Court in its jurisprudence) would apply: amending EU 
law, amending the national constitution, or the MS leaving the EU. Jóźwicki, 2020.
 82 Jóźwicki, 2020.
 83 C-438/14 Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff of 2 June 2016, para. 67 and C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein 
of 22 December 2010, para. 86.
 84 Eleftheriadis speaks of ‘important constitutional transformations’. Eleftheriadis, 2020.
 85 Kos, 2019, pp. 48–51.
 86 Calliess, 2019, pp. 174–175.
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review and the corresponding concept of German constitutional identity, which fits 
well with Art. 4(2) TEU.87
It must be stressed that, by now, the almost paradigmatic loyal and sincere 
cooperation must permeate judicial dialogue at the highest level for the approach to 
be viable. The highest national courts must reserve such a contestation for only the 
most problematic encroachments on national constitutional values, simultaneously 
informing the CJEU of their concerns via the preliminary reference procedure. They 
also have to adopt a deferential approach to the CJEU’s approach to the problem. The 
latter has to take strong consideration of national constitutional concerns, voiced in a 
coherent and legitimate matter, and engage in dialogue.88 Only in exceptional cases, 
where these would not be possible to accommodate within EU law, may the CJEU reject 
them. Only judicial dialogue, by and of itself inherent to Art. 4(2) TEU, performed in 
this spirit may enhance the legitimacy of the EU and preserve the trust vested in it.
The problem with the present BVerfG judgment is that it was mostly considered 
an example of how constitutional problem-solving among EU courts should not be 
conducted.89 I would nevertheless argue that this approach does not entail an inherent 
possibility of abuse – at least no more than any other approach.90
Under this proposal, national identity could, in line with Art. 4(2) TEU, be used 
to express national constitutional concerns pertaining to core national constitutional 
values. In this way, it is essentially an argument for disapplication of a deviation from 
EU law, which supposedly encroaches on core national constitutional values. There 
are different possible operationalisations with respect to the type of EU act deemed 
problematic.91 However, in all of these, it has to be kept in mind that the endeavour 
occurs within the realm of EU law: since this argument essentially pertains to the inter-
pretation, validity, or application of EU law, it can only be accepted if accommodation of 
national constitutional concerns is legally possible within EU law. The invoked national 
constitutional value must be compatible with EU law to be deemed legitimate.92 In that 
sense, it must be noted that EU law itself marks red lines in this regard: the departure 
 87 For a different view on the relationship between ultra vires and identity review, see: Jóźwicki, 
2020.
 88 See, for example: von Bogdandy and Schill, 2011, pp. 1449–1451; Torres Pérez, 2013, pp. 155–156.
 89 As noted by Strumia, it marks a betrayal of the long-upheld spirit of cooperation among courts. 
See: Strumia, 2020.
 90 Even if we accept the idea of a supranational body, as proposed by Sarmiento and Weiler, 
national courts could still declare the decisions of this body in violation of national constitu-
tional law – if the latter was not changed accordingly. Weiler and Sarmiento, 2020. Similarly 
(regarding possible abuse), see: Baranski, Brito Bastos, and van den Brink, 2020.
 91 Due to space constraints, these cannot be fully addressed here. See, however: von Bogdandy 
and Schill, 2011, p. 1442 ff; Kos, 2019, pp. 48–49.
 92 Kos, 2019, p. 50. For a practical application of this requirement, related to Art. 4(2) TEU, see: 
C-438/14 Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff, para. 71 and C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, para. 89.
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from fundamental values in Art. 2 TEU93 and (at the very least)94 human rights as they 
result from constitutional traditions common to the MS (Art. 6(3) TEU).
If an MS wanted to use the identity argument to the detriment of a certain EU 
law provision, when such a deviation also meant going against (or even endorsing the 
violation of) the core principles of integration, this could not be accepted.95 National 
constitutional arguments for a deviation from EU law, which would, if accepted, lead 
to lower standards of fundamental rights protection following from Art. 6(3) TEU,96 or 
infringe the fundamental EU values in Art. 2 TEU,97 cannot be justifiably accommodated 
under EU law, since such acceptance would constitute a violation of EU law. In this sense, 
Arts. 2 and 6(3) TEU function as safeguards regarding which national constitutional 
arguments can be validly invoked under Art. 4(2) TEU. Flexibility under EU law can 
only be accommodated within these parameters. If a case arose where accommodation 
of national constitutional concerns was not possible, the proposed method would not 
offer a solution; such a solution would have to be found within the realm of politics.98
Despite there being different approaches to national constitutional exceptional-
ism, it would generally be apposite to argue that when invoking the respect of national 
constitutional essentials under the identity clause, it must be kept in mind that the 
goal of this endeavour should be to maintain and develop legal safeguards, protecting 
the individual from disproportionate exercise or abuse of public authority99 – or, at 
the very least, such arguments may not deteriorate those safeguards. If anything, the 
 93 Esp. the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, 
and human rights. Also see: Hillion, 2016, p. 63.
 94 Despite the fact that the EU Charter is reaching beyond that, it is (also) an emanation of the core 
constitutional principle of the EU: respect for fundamental rights as stemming from common 
constitutional traditions of MS (see Art. 52(4) EU Charter). Therefore, it could also be argued 
that any arguments of national identity should respect the standards of fundamental rights 
protection developed in the EU Charter, especially since all MS agreed to adopt these common 
standards. It should also be noted here that the application of the EU Charter in such cases 
should generally not be questioned under Art. 51 EU Charter. If an MS wishes to invoke national 
identity against the application of an act of EU law, since it is also acting within the field of 
application of EU law, the EU Charter applies. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, OJ C 326, p. 391–407.
 95 Kos, 2019, pp. 44, 50, 56. Similarly, see: Avbelj, 2020, pp. 1029–1031.
 96 See above, n. 92.
 97 It should be noted that this also raises the question of whether a conflict of EU and MS fun-
damental values is even possible, since EU values were derived from national values. While 
addressing this issue would go beyond the scope of this paper, I would argue that such a conflict 
is indeed possible. In practical terms, this has already been happening in some instances, while 
theoretically, fundamental EU values from Art. 2 TEU can be seen to have decoupled, meaning 
that they have gained an independent normative foundation. Namely, it should be understood 
that the values enshrined in Art. 2 TEU are not merely the sum of its parts, gathered from MS, 
but also contain separate and collective normative foundation. A change in the understanding 
of the fundamental values in an MS does not therefore also mean a change in its understanding 
at the EU level. For a more extensive argument, see: Zagorc and Kos (forthcoming).
 98 The possible solutions are: (1) changing EU law, (2) changing national constitutional law, or (3) 
the MS leaving the EU due to an insurmountable incompatibility in fundamental values.
 99 Bardutzky, 2007, p. 23.
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protection of the individual from (ab)use of state power can be considered a consti-
tutional principle common to all EU MS.100 Attempts to (ab)use the method described 
above to erode the rule of law, democracy, or human rights standards in the EU cannot 
be validly acknowledged.
4. EU law in the Slovenian constitutional system
 ■ 4.1. What is the place provided for EU law in the Slovenian Constitution?
To consider the possibility of adopting similar doctrines in the Slovenian constitutional 
system, EU law’s place within the system must first be established.
Constitutional foundations for accession to the EU were mostly created in 2004.101 
The main provision is Art. 3a of the Slovenian Constitution (SC), the so-called ‘Europe 
Clause’. Art. 3a, para. 1 provides that ‘Slovenia may transfer the exercise of part of its sovereign 
rights to international organisations which are based on respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, democracy, and the principles of the rule of law’. Further, para. 3 states that 
‘[L]egal acts and decisions adopted within international organisations [ from para. 1] shall be 
applied in Slovenia in accordance with the legal regulation of these organisations’.102
A constitutional amendment was considered necessary as the transfer of 
sovereign rights would otherwise be unconstitutional, and collision rules had to be 
established as well due to the symbolic and constitutive value of sovereignty.103 The 
insertion of a new article into the SC is a testament to the refusal to treat the EU as 
a regular international organisation, international law being governed by Art. 8 of 
the SC.104 During the discussions, the key issue was whether to adopt an abstract or 
a casuistic approach.105 The final version adopted the former, which was considered 
more suitable given the changing nature of the EU, the existing tradition of relatively 
general and abstract constitutional regulation, and the uncertainty of accession due to 
a pre-accession referendum and the possible eventual rejection by the EU.106 Although 
the text does not mention the EU, it was drafted precisely for the purpose of accession 
(partly also for accession to NATO). In theory, the article is marked as out-dated, as 
most EU MS since the ’70s include an explicit EU-related constitutional provision.107
 100 One example of this was the Melloni case, where the concern of the Spanish Constitutional 
Court (which did not however form part of the state’s constitutional identity) was the level of 
protection of the individual’s right to a fair trial, the Spanish standard being higher than the 
EU standard.
 101 See: Bardutzky, 2019, pp. 690–692. In Slovene, see: Avbelj, 2012a, pp. 344–346.
 102 Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No. 33/91-I, 
42/97, 66/2000, 24/03, 69/04, 68/06, 47/13, and 75/16.
 103 Cerar, 2003a, pp. 6–7, 2011, pp. 83–84. Also see: Bardutzky, 2019, pp. 692, 697–699.
 104 Cerar, 2011, pp. 83–84. For a general overview on the role of international law in the SC, see: 
Bardutzky, 2019, pp. 730–732.
 105 Cerar, 2003b, p. 1463 et. seq.
 106 Cerar, 2011, pp. 76–77; Bardutzky, 2019, p. 692.
 107 Avbelj, 2012a, p. 350, referencing Claes, 2005.
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 ■ 4.2. What is the stance of the Slovenian Constitutional Court on its competence to 
review acts of the EU?
The Slovenian Constitutional Court (SCC) has so far failed to provide a clear answer 
regarding the interpretation of Art. 3a, paras. 1 and 3 of the SC, which means that the 
constitutional relationship with the EU is not yet completely apparent. An estimate of 
restraint in the formulation of a clear understanding of the relationship between EU 
law and national law108 seems to be still accurate. Additionally, initial post-accession 
observations, that the case law shows no substantial deviations from the jurisprudence 
of the CJEU,109 still hold true today.
In general, the SCC seems to be taking an ‘EU-friendly’ approach.110 The SCC 
interpreted Art. 3a, para. 3 as binding all state institutions, including the national 
courts, to act in line with EU law when exercising their jurisdiction.111 This position is 
exemplified by the view that ‘all state authorities, including the Constitutional Court, must 
apply EU law in accordance with the legal order of this [international] organisation’.112
Regarding its powers to review EU acts, the SCC also seems to be clear and 
equally in line with the general doctrines of the CJEU. It considers that (1) it is not 
competent to review the compatibility of national legislation with secondary EU law,113 
(2) it is competent to review the compatibility of national legislation with EU primary 
law,114 (3) it does not have the power to review EU acts from the point of view of national 
(constitutional) law, (4) while retaining the power to review the compatibility of the 
national implementing measures,115 (5) and the competence to interpret and review the 
legality of secondary law is the exclusive competence of the CJEU.116
The SCC also considers itself competent to initiate a preliminary ruling proce-
dure. It was first put on the spot in U-I-113/04,117 where it avoided posing a preliminary 
 108 Avbelj, 2012a, p. 346.
 109 Zagorc and Bardutzky, 2010, p. 421 et. seq.
 110 Similarly: Zagorc and Bardutzky, 2010, p. 421 et. seq. Avbelj, 2012a, p. 348.
 111 Up-105/13-17 of 23 January 2014, para. 8.
 112 U-I-146/12 of 14 November 2013, para. 32.
 113 This position was criticised as formalistic in: Accetto, 2013, pp. 454–461. Nerad proposed that 
such a review could be possible with the upper premise being Art. 3a of the SC. See: Nerad, 
2012, p. 389.
  The SCC’s jurisprudence concerning directives: U-I-32/04 of 9 February 2006, para. 19; U-I-
116/07 of 25 May 2007, para. 6; U-I-44/05 of 11 September 2007, para. 6; U-I-17/11 of 18 October 
2012, para. 6; U-I-146/12, para. 31. For regulations, see: U-I-186/04, Up-328/04 of 8 July 2004, 
para. 10.
 114 U-I-17/11-7, paras. 7–9.
 115 U-I-113/04-33 of 7 February 2007, para. 12. Also see: U-I-411/06 of 19 June 2008, esp. para. 12; 
U-I-37/10 of 18 April 2013, esp. para. 11; U-I-146/12, paras. 30–31; U-I-65/13-16 of 26 September 
2013, para. 7; U-I-295/13-260 of 19 October 2016, para. 76.
 116 U-I-113/04-33, para. 12; U-I-280/05 of 18 January 2007, para. 14; Up-1056/11 of 21 November 2013, 
para. 6; U-I-155/11 of 18 December 2013, para. 18; U-I-65/13-16, para. 8; Also see: U-I-295/13-260, 
para. 68. The SCC also understands issues regarding the interpretation and validity of EU law 
as a question of division of competence between national courts and the CJEU. See: Up-1056/11, 
para. 11; Up-561/15 of 16 November 2017, para. 10.
 117 For an overview of the facts of the case, see: Ribičič, 2005, pp. 11–14.
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question118 because the procedures were already in motion before the CJEU.119 The 
SCC stayed the procedure and waited for the CJEU’s judgment.120 Similarly, in U-I-
65/13, the SCC waited for the CJEU’s judgment in the already pending cases.121 This 
approach can be considered a reflection of the internalisation of the principle of loyal 
interpretation.122 The SCC first used the preliminary reference procedure in U-I-295/13, 
in which the issue was the validity of the Commission’s banking communication.123 
Only recently, the SCC decided to issue a second preliminary reference in U-I-152/17, 
related to the validity of Directive (EU) 2016/681,124 despite the fact that preliminary 
references with the same substance are already pending before the CJEU.125 In all cases 
so far, including in Kotnik, where the standards of the Slovenian rule of law appear to 
be higher than those adopted by the CJEU,126 the SCC fully complied with the CJEU’s 
judgments.
In this context, a recent peculiar case127 should be noted, in which the ECB and 
the Bank of Slovenia (BS) brought a constitutional complaint as well as challenged the 
Criminal Procedure Act concerning the search of premises, electronic devices, and 
seizure of documents performed on the premises of the BS connected to a suspected 
criminal offence of abuse of office or official authority. They argued that the orders 
of the District Court, inter alia, violated Protocols No. 7128 and No. 4, concerning the 
inviolability of archives, proposing a reference for a preliminary ruling as well. The 
SCC rejected the complaints based on the lack of standing of public law entities when 
acting ex iure imperii, without engaging with substantive submissions. The epilogue 
 118 Accetto, 2013, pp. 453–454.
 119 C-453/03 ABNA and Others of 6 December 2003.
 120 For a summary of the case, see: Zagorc and Bardutzky, 2010, pp. 426–428.
 121 C-293/12 Digital Rights Ireland of 8 April 2014.
 122 Zagorc and Fajdiga, 2018, p. 417.
 123 C-526/14 Kotnik and Others of 30 September 2016. As a follow-up to the violations established 
by the SCC in U-I-295/13, the National Assembly adopted a statute (Act on Judicial Protection 
Procedure for Former Holders of Eligible Liabilities of Banks) establishing a compensation 
scheme for subordinate creditors. This statute produced further issues regarding the indepen-
dence of the Bank of Slovenia under Art. 130 TFEU and the prohibition of monetary financing 
in Art. 123 TFEU, prompting another proposal for a preliminary reference. An interim measure 
was issued by the SCC without engaging with EU-related substantive arguments. The case is 
currently pending. See: U-I-4/20-19 of 5 March 2020 (not currently available in English).
 124 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation, and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, OJ L 119, pp. 132–149. The Ombudsman 
challenged the validity of the Police Tasks and Powers Act implementing the directive, specifi-
cally points 8 and 12 of Annex I of the directive on the ground that it violates the provision on 
the protection of personal data (Art. 38) of the SC and Arts. 7 and 8 of the EU Charter due to its 
indeterminate character. Case reference before the CJEU: C-486/20 (pending).
 125 U-I-152/17-53 of 3 September 2020.
 126 Bardutzky, 2007, p. 30.
 127 U-I-157/16-12, Up-729/16-15, Up-55/17-20 of 19 April 2018.
 128 Protocol (No. 7) on the privileges and immunities of the European Union, OJ C 326, p. 266–272.
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will regardless ensue before the CJEU since the European Commission initiated an 
infringement procedure against Slovenia concerning the said matter.129
On the issue of the role of fundamental principles that govern the relationship 
between national and EU law, the SCC ruled, in line with Art. 3a, para. 3, that they 
are also national constitutional principles, binding with the same effect as the Consti-
tution.130 The principles of primacy,131 consistent interpretation,132 direct application, 
direct effect, transfer of competences, subsidiarity, and proportionality are, ‘as national 
constitutional principles, […] also binding on the Constitutional Court when carrying out its 
competences in the framework of the legal relations concerning EU law’.133 The principle of the 
effectiveness of EU law is also categorised as a national constitutional principle.134
Regardless, the answer on absolute supremacy, a key point when comparing the 
SCC with the BVerfG, has explicitly been left open:
‘[The decision of the court] is true regardless whether we interpret this provision 
of the Constitution and the law of the European Union […] to entail that due 
to the principle of the supremacy of the law of the European Union such law 
unconditionally also prevails over the provisions of the Constitution, […] or 
in a manner such that in certain exceptional cases the law of the European 
Union has to give way to the Constitution. In the case at issue, it is namely not 
necessary for the Constitutional Court to take a position on this […]’.135
Considering the above, the case law of the SCC on EU matters can be marked 
by cooperative vagueness. The SCC echoes the positions of the CJEU; however, a final 
decision on the interpretation of Art. 3a, para. 1 has yet to be made. Furthermore, as 
quoted above, the issue of primacy over the constitution has explicitly been left open, 
showing that the option of constitutional exceptionalism is not off the table. There-
fore, the question of the relationship between national constitutional law and EU law 
 129 C-316/19 Commission v Slovenia (pending).
 130 U-I-155/11, para. 14; U-I-146/12, para. 32; U-I-295/13, para. 66.
 131 Also labelled the most important fundamental principle. See: U-I-146/12, para. 33; U-I-295/13, 
para. 67.
 132 The SC confirmed the principle of loyal interpretation very early on in U-I-321/02 of 27 May 
2004, para. 23. When exercising a judicial review of national legislation, the SCC has to, when 
interpreting national law, consider EU law following form EU acts and the CJEU’s decisions. 
U-I-146/12, paras. 32, 34; U-I-129/13-16, Up-429/13-18 and U-I-138/13-16, Up-456/13-17 of 4 June 
2015, para. 12; U-I-194/17-21 of 15 November 2018, para. 16; U-I-189/14-13, Up-663/14 of 15 Octo-
ber 2015, para. 20; Up-951/15-27 of 18 May 2017, para. 15; U-I-59/17-27 of 18 September 2019, 
para. 23.
  For a general overview of the principle of loyal cooperation in Slovenia, see: Zagorc and Fajdiga, 
2018.
 133 U-I-295/13, para. 67. Also see: U-I-155/11, para. 14; U-I-146/12, para. 34.
 134 U-II-1/12, U-II-2/12 of 17 December 2012, para. 53. The SCC could therefore in the future declare 
itself competent to review national legislation from the perspective of these principles.
 135 U-II-1/12, U-II-2/12, para. 53. References omitted.
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remains open.136 While the constitutional text may allow it, no clear answer regarding 
whether the BVerfG’s models of review of EU acts can be adopted within the Slovenian 
constitutional context follows from the jurisprudence of the SCC.137 Nevertheless, if 
a situation of direct and insurmountable conflict between the SC and EU law arises, 
it would be safe to assume that the SCC would first initiate a preliminary reference 
procedure.138
 ■ 4.3. Are there constitutional limits to EU law under the Slovenian Constitution?
Considering the lack of clear guidance from the SCC on the subject, the exact meaning 
and consequences of Art. 3a of the SC are subject to debate in academia.
The third paragraph of Art. 3a provides that legal acts adopted within the EU shall 
be applied in Slovenia in accordance with the legal regulation of these organisations, 
taking into account that it is all but in explicit wording directed at the EU. This is very 
broad authorisation,139 which provides, among other things, for a complete acceptance 
of all the doctrines, especially those of primacy140 and direct effect,141 developed by the 
CJEU with regard to the relationship between national (constitutional) and EU law.142 
It covers both the validity and legal effects of EU law in the internal legal order, and 
it directs towards primary and secondary EU law as well as the CJEU’s case law.143 As 
already accepted by the SCC, it also makes these fundamental principles domestic con-
stitutional principles.144 All of this significantly affects and supplements other constitu-
tional provisions.145 However, it has to be read in conjunction with the first paragraph 
of Article 3a.146 This is the key part of Art. 3a of the SC for the purpose of this paper, as 
it entails substantive preconditions for the transfer of sovereign rights, namely respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the principles of the 
rule of law.147 These are understood as the fundamental constitutional principles of the 
Slovenian constitutional system.148 This provision was inspired by Art. 23, para. 1 of the 
 136 Avbelj and Trstenjak, 2019, p. 70; Bardutzky, 2019, p. 695.
 137 Avbelj, 2019, p. 72.
 138 Even before the first preliminary reference by the SCC, this was suggested by Nerad, who 
highlighted that in such a conflict, the SCC is primarily bound by the constitution. Nerad, 2012, 
pp. 386, 391–392. Also see: Zagorc and Fajdiga, 2018, p. 416.
 139 Also marked as a ‘crack in the constitution’. Testen, 2003.
 140 Trstenjak, 2012, p. 275.
 141 Bardutzky, 2019, pp. 693, 725.
 142 In Testen’s view, the effects of EU law on national constitutional provisions (primacy and direct 
effect) were the main reason Art. 3a, para. 3 had to be adopted in the first place. Testen, 2011, 
p. 91.
 143 Nerad, 2012, p. 382.
 144 Nerad, 2012, p. 383.
 145 Namely, Arts. 125, 120, and 153 of the Slovenian Constitution. See: Nerad, 2012, p. 383.
 146 The two provisions were marked as being in a ‘dialectic opposition’. See: Ribičič, 2006, p. 22 et. 
seq.
 147 These reflect a general perception of what the essential constitutional principles of the Slove-
nian constitutional system are. Bardutzky, 2019, p. 694.
 148 Cerar, 2011, p. 78.
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German Basic Law.149 The values listed in Art. 3a of the SC are considered substantive 
conditions, which have to be fulfilled for Art. 3a, para. 3 to take effect and for the legal 
acts and decisions adopted by the EU to be applied in Slovenia in accordance with the 
legal regulations of the EU, as described above.150 In fact, this provision could function 
as a source of rights for individuals, even in relation to the EU.151
At the time of the constitutional amendment, at least in theory, it seems that 
the supranational view of EU law, according to which EU law may enjoy a supra-
constitutional rank,152 had been dominant in Slovenia.153 In line with this view, echoing 
the Solange doctrine,154 the substantive safeguards described above do not warrant 
the rejection of the EU acts in violation of the constitution, as long as the EU, in its 
fundamentals, continues to be governed by the values described therein.155 Only then 
can the SCC reject the application of EU acts,156 which could, as a last resort, lead to a 
withdrawal from the EU.157 This approach seems to conform with the textual interpreta-
tion of the provision since it authorises the transfer of sovereign rights to international 
organisations, which are based on the values listed therein. In other words, under this 
interpretation, sporadic divergences from these standards would not be constitution-
ally relevant, as long as they do not amount to a fundamental change in the value base 
of the EU.158
Approaches that are more recent, advocated most notably by Avbelj,159 promote 
pluralistic interpretation, which treats the primacy of EU law as a relational princi-
ple.160 In this sense, the issue is not which legal acts enjoy a hierarchical advantage 
because there should be a harmonious coexistence of the systems, in which primacy 
would depend on the circumstances of the case.161 Accordingly, the SCC should remain 
open to a possible review of EU acts from the perspective of fundamental rights, in 
 149 Cerar, 2003b, n. 9.
 150 Avbelj and Trstenjak, 2019, p. 67.
 151 Avbelj, 2019, p. 68.
 152 Cerar, 2011, p. 74.
 153 Avbelj, 2011, p. 755, 2012b, p. 6.
 154 Ribičič, 2006, p. 22 et. seq.
 155 Cerar, 2011, p. 78.
 156 This view is supported by Novak, who argues that such exceptional cases would entail a major 
decline in the protection of the democratic setup or fundamental rights protection. See: Novak, 
2004, pp. 100, 105.
 157 Cerar, 2011, p. 78.
 158 A similar position, which argues against the competence of the SCC to review EU acts unless 
a serious and continual breach of constitutional principles would occur, also follows from 
Zagorc and Bardutzky (2010), pp. 432-433. Similarly, as Zagorc and Fajdiga argue, only continu-
ous violations of human rights could justify an intervention by the SCC. However, they do leave 
the door open in extreme situations, if fundamental values of the Slovenian legal order were 
at stake. See: Zagorc and Fajdiga, 2018, pp. 415–416.
 159 Avbelj, 2012a, pp. 349–351.
 160 Avbelj and Trstenjak, 2019, p. 68.
 161 In that sense, Zalar argues that a constitutional provision establishing primacy over the 
constitution is not appropriate. Art. 3a of the SC, enabling such an understanding, is hence 
not optimal. See: Zalar, 2005, p. 14 et. seq.
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line with the BVerfG’s doctrine.162 In the view of the commentators, the substantive 
limits defined above were intended to create a sort of emergency brake on the broad 
concession of Art. 3a, para. 3, and they could be understood as a possibility for the 
SCC to review EU acts,163 especially in cases of violations of fundamental rights.164 In 
this sense, Avbelj notes that Art. 3a could also be interpreted as an anchoring point for 
inalienable fundamental rights and constitutional identity, adopting the doctrines of 
the BVerfG, since the article is inspired by the German model,165 as was the case with 
many other constitutional courts.166 Jambrek takes a similar view, arguing that despite 
differences in the constitutional text,167 the SCC could adopt both human rights reviews 
as well as the identity review developed in the BVerfG’s Lisbon judgment. He bases his 
argument not only on Art. 3a, but also on the right to self-determination168 in Art. 3 of 
the SC, suggesting that the said article could be used to substantiate the adoption of 
the German doctrines within the Slovenian constitutional system.169 Starting from the 
understanding that national constitutional courts, as guardians of the constitution and 
fundamental rights, should not be underestimated and degraded,170 Ribičič argued that 
in line with Art. 3a, the SCC has three possible approaches to the review of an EU (or 
national implementing) act: (1) negative or passive – the SCC strictly follows the CJEU 
and EU law, (2) neutral – the SCC decides on the (in)compatibility of implementing the 
act with the SC, without solving the conflict, and (3) positive or active – where the SCC 
reviews the constitutionality of an EU act.171 The latter would be exceptional and, in his 
view, could be based on Art. 3a of the SC.172 As noted above, the negative approach was 
followed in nearly all cases.173
We can see that by going beyond the textual interpretation of Art. 3a of the SC 
and acknowledging historical and systemic considerations, arguments can be proposed 
in favour of granting substantive limits more power than initially advocated by some 
 162 Zalar, 2010, p. 183.
 163 Testen, 2011, pp. 91, 92.
 164 Ribičič, 2006, p. 22 et. seq.
 165 Testen, 2011, pp. 91, 93. Testen explicitly states that with regard to human rights, Art. 3a, para. 
3 interpretations should take into consideration the judgments of the BVerfG on the issue.
 166 Avbelj, 2019, pp. 71–72.
 167 The main doubt was whether identity review could be adopted, since based on the text, there 
are no unamendable provisions (no ‘eternity clause’) in the SC. Jambrek, 2011, p. 55.
 168 He asserts that the right to self-determination entails the republican form of government (Art. 
1 of the SC), democratic legitimacy of state power (Arts. 1 and 3 of the SC), principles of rule 
of law and social state (Art. 1 of the SC), the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
(Art. 5 of the SC), and local self-government (Art. 9 of the SC). These would form an inalienable 
constitutional identity of the Slovenian nation. Jambrek, 2011, pp. 56–57.
The right to self-determination is closely related to the principle of sovereignty. For the most compre-
hensive elaboration on the principle of sovereignty by the SCC, see: Rm-1/02 of 19 November 
2003, esp. paras. 22–25.
 169 Jambrek, 2011, pp. 52–57.
 170 Ribičič, 2006, p. 22 et. seq.
 171 Ribičič, 2005, p. 14.
 172 Ribičič, 2005, pp. 5–6.
 173 Zagorc and Fajdiga, 2018, p. 416.
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commentators. Although the constitution does not empower the SCC to reject the 
application of individual EU acts that would be incompatible with the SC,174 in cases of 
serious encroachment on fundamental constitutional values, this could be possible.
Without too much speculation, although here too, the SCC lacks a clear stance, 
critical areas that prompt the SCC to be more inclined to resort to constitutional excep-
tionalism can preliminarily be determined. Regarding the substance of the constitu-
tional core of the SC, Avbelj argues that the SCC has already joined other constitutional 
courts in establishing the irreducible epistemic core of the SC, identified mainly in 
the Basic Constitutional Charter,175 although it has not used it in relation to the EU.176 
The case was, however, singular, as it dealt with the determination of the border with 
Croatia. Jambrek more broadly argues that human dignity,177 freedom and equality, 
the right to self-determination, independent statehood, and the guarantee of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the principles of democracy, rule of law, 
and social state can be considered the core of Slovenian constitutional identity. Both 
historical legitimacy and the current constitutional setup grant these values the status 
of permanence and inviolability. In that sense, the SC shares many parallels with other 
states born of totalitarian regimes, based on the ‘never again’ principle.178 Similarly, 
Novak argues that Art. 3a has to be read in conjunction with Art. 3, para. 1, according to 
which any transfer of sovereignty cannot entail an infringement upon the permanent 
and inviolable right to self-determination.179 A partial transfer of sovereignty should 
also not legalise a (substantial) diminishing in the standards of fundamental rights 
protection.180 The latter in particular might find some indirect support in the SCC’s case 
law because in U-I-113/04, the court rejected the review of an EU act, among others, 
because the standard of human rights under the SC was identical to that of the EU.181 
With regard to human rights review, the SC in general would preclude any decrease in 
the existing standards of human rights protection. In cases of contradictions between 
national constitutional law and EU law, the SCC would probably maintain a higher 
standard, or at least attach a Solange-type condition to the EU act’s validity within the 
national legal system.182
 174 Cerar, 2003b; Bardutzky, 2019, p. 694.
 175 Basic Constitutional Charter on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia, 
Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia Nos. 1/91-I and 19/91 – corr. He builds on the Opin-
ion of the Constitutional court on the Arbitration Agreement between Slovenia and Croatia in 
Rm-1/09 of 18 March 2010. See: Avbelj, 2010, pp. 141–142.
 176 Also see: Zagorc and Fajdiga, 2018, p. 418.
 177 In a famous case, the SCC already held that human dignity is at the centre of the Slovenian 
constitutional order, directly following from Art. 1 of the SC, which provides that Slovenia is a 
democratic republic. See: U-I-109/10 of 26 September 2011, paras. 7, 10.
 178 Jambrek, 2012, p. 32. Also see above, n. 166.
 179 See the SC, Art. 3, para 1: ‘Slovenia is a state of all its citizens and is founded on the permanent 
and inalienable right of the Slovene nation to self-determination’. See: Novak, 2004, p. 96.
 180 Novak, 2004, p. 105.
 181 U-I-113/04, para. 17.
 182 Bardutzky, 2019, pp. 722–723 and references included therein.
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In line with all of the above, we see that some rudimentary elements, which 
could be taken up to introduce the German doctrines discussed above, especially 
those of human rights and identity review, into the Slovenian constitutional system 
are already scattered throughout the SCC’s jurisprudence and are discussed in the 
academia, including in connection with EU law. It is very likely that the SCC would 
take up all of the abovementioned constitutional values, which, looking at the text of 
the SC, especially considering the above-discussed Art. 3a, para. 1, can definitely be 
seen as enjoying special protection, into its understanding of Slovenian constitutional 
identity, should such a case arise.
Asking more concretely what the decision of the SCC would be with regard to the 
PSPP, should the case be submitted to it, would amount to pure speculation, consider-
ing the inconclusive stance of the SCC. Parallels to the interpretations of the right to 
vote (entailing the ‘right to democracy’),183 budgetary powers of the Parliament,184 and 
corresponding duties of constitutional organs,185 which form the base of the BVerfG’s 
judgment, could hardly be traced in the SCC’s case law. Nevertheless, a thorough 
comparison would require a separate paper devoted to each of these issues. The only 
general rule that is directly relevant to the PSPP judgment which can be inferred from 
the SCC’s case law for certain is that it will adopt a deferential attitude when reviewing 
monetary and economic measures (including in connection with the EU), meaning that 
a wide margin of appreciation will be accorded.186 In addition, only a general outline, 
which has been provided above, can be established.
In conclusion, it can be argued that should a case that raises doubts regarding 
EU law’s compatibility with the fundamental constitutional values of the SC identified 
above come before the SCC, the constitutional text (esp. Art. 3, para. 1 and Art. 3a, 
para. 1) and its current case law enable it to adopt doctrines similar to those of human 
rights, ultra vires, and identity review. In line with what has already been said, the SCC 
would probably follow the German approach, adapted to the text of the SC. In doing so, 
it should be stressed that this could only be an ultima ratio measure. Only clear viola-
tions of the core constitutional values could trigger such a review, and the SCC should, 
considering its EU-friendly attitude, which is discernible from its case law, act in line 
with the principle of loyal cooperation. This means that it would first have to initiate a 
preliminary ruling procedure, and then, considering the provided interpretation of EU 
law by the CJEU, recognise the latter’s interpretation of EU law. Only if the CJEU failed 
to address the SCC’s concerns could the national court reserve for itself the option of 
giving precedence to the SC, as the BVerfG did in Weiss. Considering all the safeguards 
– if respected by the parties involved – this is more or less a hypothetical possibility.
 183 BVerfG 2 BvR 859/15, para. 99. See: Calliess, 2019, pp. 172–173.
 184 Ibid., para. 104.
 185 Ibid., para 106.
 186 U-II-1/12, U-II-2/12, para. 47. Also see: U-I-178/10 of 3 February 2011, para. 9; U-I-129/19 of 1 July 
2020, paras. 64–65, 83.
Central European Journal of Comparative Law | Volume II ■ 2021 ■ 1 112
5. Conclusion
The BVerfG’s PSPP judgment spurred intensive debates regarding possible constitutional 
repercussions for the EU. Admittedly, there is the possibility that the court’s unco-
operativeness might sprout illiberal mimicry from some of the constitutional courts 
in the continent. However, as far as national constitutional courts are concerned, 
exceptional constitutional exceptionalism has never been completely off the table, 
and, without catastrophic consequences, has already materialised before the BVerfG’s 
judgment in May. I believe that national constitutional exceptionalism in the context of 
EU law should not be disregarded as categorically unacceptable, as inevitably damag-
ing European integration, and as being inherently prone to abuse. National restraints 
stemming from genuine concern about maintaining and developing legal safeguards 
against disproportionate exercise or abuse of public authority are certainly endowed 
with legitimacy. However, when arguing for exceptions under EU law due to national 
constitutional concerns in line with Art. 4(2) TEU, these can only be accommodated if 
possible within the general framework of EU law. Red lines should always be drawn 
when attempts at breaking down the fundamental values in Art. 2 TEU and the stan-
dards of fundamental rights as stipulated in Art. 6(3) TEU emerge before the CJEU in 
the guise of genuine national constitutional concerns. Regardless, in a system of such 
prevalent diversity, the EU should be able to accommodate inherent fundamental dif-
ferences if it wishes to integrate sustainably. Ab initio rejecting national constitutional 
concerns would be counterproductive.
Although the SCC has not yet expressed a clear view on the issue, some limits 
to EU integration already follow from the text of the constitution. The SCC’s approach 
can be marked by cooperative vagueness, echoing the doctrines of the CJEU. However, 
the answer to absolute primacy has explicitly been left open by the court. Considering 
its existing case law as well as its doctrinal affinity to German constitutional law, I 
would argue that when a clear case arises, the SCC would probably frame the rules of 
engagement in similar terms as the BVerfG. Viewed from the perspective of its general 
EU-friendly attitude, it would be safe to assume that any departure from established 
EU law doctrines would only be undertaken in exceptional cases of encroachment on 
core constitutional values and it would be exercised in the spirit of loyal cooperation 
with the CJEU.
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 ■ ABSTRACT: Family-run enterprises are business organisations in which the reins of 
control are concentrated in the hands of a single family or an individual who for the 
enterprise aims to continue operation through successive generations of the family. 
In Serbia, family-run companies usually begin as an individual entrepreneurship, 
a form of closed company (general and limited partnership) or relatively closed company 
(limited liability company). The legal difficulties that arise following the death of an 
individual entrepreneur (natural person) differ from those following the death of a 
member in a company (legal entity). Companies are imbued with rights and responsi-
bilities separate from the personal rights and responsibilities of their members. Members 
of a company, including the head, are not considered owners of the company’s property 
in legal terms. Instead, they have shares in the company, and those shares entitle them 
to membership (management and proprietary) rights. Thus, when a member dies, the 
company’s property, in whole or in part, is not subject to inheritance (although that 
deceased member’s share is). This differs from the situation following an individual 
entrepreneur’s death. The law does not recognise a natural person conducting business 
as an individual entrepreneur as having two legal personalities (personal and busi-
ness); everything is treated as personal. Therefore, all the assets and debts of a deceased 
individual entrepreneur are subject to inheritance, regardless of whether or not they 
were accrued in the course of business. The succession of a share following a member’s 
death is regulated separately for each company form, and all issues not governed by 
the Companies Act or a company’s incorporation document are subject to the rules of 
Serbia’s Law of Inheritance. Inheritance rules differ greatly for a share in a personal 
company (general or limited partnership) and a share in a capital company (limited 
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liability or joint-stock company). In principle, whether or not a deceased member’s 
rights and responsibilities can be passed through inheritance depends on the company’s 
form, its incorporation document, and the relevance of the heirs’ connection to the 
deceased and the company. The less complicated these are, the fewer the legal obstacles 
to inheritance.
 ■ KEYWORDS: family-run enterprises, inheriting company shares, indi-
vidual entrepreneurships, general and limited partnership, limited liability 
companies.
1. Introductory remarks
Family-run enterprises in Serbia, similar to other countries in the region, usually hold 
the legal form of an individual entrepreneurship or a closed-type company (general or 
limited partnership)4 or a relatively closed-type company (limited liability company).5 
Only rarely are family-run companies established as joint-stock companies because 
that form is more suitable for enterprises with greater business volume.6 Thus, this 
paper focuses only on the succession (intergenerational transfer) of the assets gained 
and debts arising from individual entrepreneurs’ activity and the succession of shares 
in partnerships and limited liability companies. The Serbian Companies Act regulates 
the legal status of entrepreneurs and recognises four forms of companies: general 
partnerships (Serb. ortačko društvo or O.D.), limited partnerships (Serb. komanditno 
društvo or K.D.), limited liability companies (Serb. društvo s ograničenom odgovornošću 
or D.O.O.), and joint-stock companies (Serb. akcionarsko društvo or A.D.). However, the 
statutory regulation does not have special rules for the inheritance of entrepreneurs’ 
assets and shares in family-run companies; thus, it does not recognise the special nature 
of family-run enterprises. The rules for the succession of shares in companies differ by 
 4 Partnerships, either general or limited, are imbued with the personal relationships of their 
members. They are considered a closed company form since their ownership structure rarely 
changes, if ever. This is primarily attributable to the rule that a share of a general or limited 
partner can be transferred to a third party only with the other partners’ consent. Likewise, 
when a partner dies, that person’s share is not generally subject to succession but is added 
proportionately to the other partners’ shares.
 5 A limited liability company is usually considered a relatively closed company because the 
other members have a right of pre-emption if one member intends to transfer his or her share 
to a third party. Similarly, if a member dies, his or her share is regularly subject to succession. 
However, the incorporation document might call for the compulsory sale of the share by the 
heir on behalf of the other members or the company, allowing them to prevent the heir from 
gaining part ownership in the company. See Marjanski and Dudás, 2020, p. 131–146.
 6 Banks, insurance companies, and similar major enterprises are usually established as joint-
stock companies.
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company form. However, the same rules apply to all companies of the form, regardless 
of whether their ownership is intertwined with family relationships or not.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first covers the succession of shares 
in companies. The second covers succession of the assets and debts arising from the 
activities of individual entrepreneurs.
2. Succession of shares in companies
 ■ 2.1. General remarks
Under Serbian law, companies are legal entities established to generate profit.7 They 
gain legal/corporative personality through incorporation at a registry in accordance 
with the statute pertaining to the registration of business organisations.8 The Agency 
administers the registry for commercial registries (Serb. Agen ci ja za pri vred ne re gi stre), 
following the Agency for Commercial Registries’ rules on registration procedures.
All companies are considered independent legal entities under Serbian law. 
This means that they have their own juridical and contractual capacity; acquire 
rights, assets, and obligations in legal transactions independently; can be a claimant 
or respondent in litigation; and can be a party in administrative, tax, and similar 
procedures. Likewise, they have their own property, separate from the property of 
their members. The members are not considered owners (or joint or co-owners) of 
the company’s assets. They merely have specific membership rights based on their 
shares (managing9 and rights related to the property of the company10). Thus, when a 
member dies, the company’s property is not subject to inheritance; only the decedent’s 
share—that is, the membership rights—is subject to inheritance.
Therefore, the members of a general or limited partnership or a limited liability 
company are the owners of shares (expressed as a percentage)11, registered by the 
Agency that administers commercial registries. Since the members are the owners 
of their company shares, they have the right to dispose of their shares as they see 
fit. Furthermore, as part of their separate property, the shares might be subject to 
inheritance according to the rules of the Companies Act, the enterprise’s incorporation 
document, and the general rules prescribed by Serbia’s Law of Inheritance.
General and limited partnerships and limited liability companies are predomi-
nantly family-run companies. The Companies Act does not define the notion of family-
run companies; however, the Code of Corporate Governance adopted by the Serbian 
Chamber of Commerce does. The Code defines a family-run company as follows: ‘the 
 7 Companies Act, Art. 2.
 8 Companies Act, Art. 3.
 9 Management rights include the right to participate in an assembly, vote at an assembly, obtain 
information, and challenge the decisions of an assembly, among others.
 10 Members’ proprietary rights include the right to participate in the distribution of profits and 
liquidation surplus, among others. 
 11 The share is a membership relationship in the company. 
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majority of voting rights belong to the family controlling the company, including the 
company founder intending to transfer the company to his or her descendants and 
make company operation sustainable down through the generations of this family’.12 
Family-run companies represent a large portion of the total number of companies 
and contribute significantly to the national economy and employment. Therefore, the 
emergence, growth, and sustainability of these companies are of major importance to 
the prosperity of the national economy. Nevertheless, in contrast to public joint-stock 
companies, they have not attracted special attention from the legislature or other 
regulatory bodies.13 
When a member of a family-run company dies, the decedent’s share can be 
subject to succession. This implies that the management and property rights can be 
transmitted—that is, the company’s controlling mechanisms can be passed down from 
one generation to another.14 The Companies Act does not have special rules that apply 
to the death of an owner–operator of a family-run company; hence, the rules that apply 
are those applicable to all companies. However, the Act allows family-run companies 
to include their own succession plans in the incorporation document to specify what 
happens to shares following an owner–operator family member’s death. Similarly, the 
Code of Corporate Governance adopted by the Serbian Chamber of Commerce also con-
tains principles and recommendations that are not mandatory; instead, they represent 
a form of soft law on the best practices of corporate governance recommended to all 
members of the Chamber of Commerce.15 These soft-law rules are partially related to 
the transfer of management from one generation to another. The following are some 
of the most important recommendations from the Code: A family must have a general 
plan of inheritance, including one for extraordinary situations, outlining the course of 
action to be taken when the members are hindered in managing the company and its 
business. Deferring succession-planning for executive members until the latest possible 
moment can create crises and is one of the most common reasons why most family-run 
companies cease to exist before they reach the hands of the family’s third generation. 
First and foremost, the succession plan should regulate the criteria and procedure for 
the successor’s election and financial, tax, and other implications. The family protocol16 
should define the criteria for choosing a successor when multiple family members lay 
claim to the position.17 Family-member candidates should be subject to the same condi-
tions in a free competition that other professionals would apply to the positions. The 
contracts on managerial position concluded by family members should be the same as 
 12 Code of Corporate Governance, Glossary, Sec. 6.
 13 For the economic aspects of inheritance in family-run enterprises, see Đulić, Kuzman & 
Radosavljević, 2012, pp. 123–140.
 14 Code of Corporate Governance, Glossary, Sec. 7.
 15 Code of Corporate Governance, Scope of Application, Sec. 1.
 16 For the best practices in family protocols, see Koeberle-Schmid, Kenyon-Rouvinez & Poza, 
2014, pp. 222–243.
 17 For a content analysis of documents on managing family-run companies, see Đurić-Kuzmanović 
& Ljubojević, 2016, pp. 95–110.
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those concluded with the company’s non-family executives. The transfer of knowledge 
and preparation of the heir requires careful planning and time. The plan of succession 
is only complete when it includes policies on employing family members.18
As indicated earlier, the Code is not a binding source of law. The transfer of a 
deceased family member’s share to an heir is regulated specifically for each company form 
in the Companies Act; however, for all legal questions not regulated by the Companies 
Act or incorporation document, the general rules of Serbia’s Law of Inheritance apply.
Considering that general and limited partnerships and limited liability com-
panies are considered closed or relatively closed, the Companies Act prescribe some 
limitations regarding the share succession following a member’s death. However, the 
Act enables members to develop company-specific rules on share succession in the 
incorporation document.
Generally speaking, the succession rules for shares in partnerships differ sig-
nificantly from those in limited liability and joint-stock companies. In principle, the 
possibility of inheriting a share depends on the relationships of the members to the 
decedent and their liability for the company’s debts. Usually, the closer the relation-
ship, the easier the inheritance.19
 ■ 2.2. Inheritance of a member’s share in a general partnership
2.2.1. General remarks
A general partnership is a company organised by two or more legal entities or natural 
persons who are jointly and severally liable for all obligations.20 It bears all the traits 
of personal companies (e.g., the unlimited liability of members for company debts, 
all partners conducting actions in the course of regular company business and 
representation,21 decision-making based on the principle of ‘one partner, one vote’22 
rather than representation based on share percentage, etc.). A general partnership is 
a closed company. The membership structure rarely changes; the founding members 
usually remain the only members until the company’s dissolution. This general part-
nership feature is also supported by the rules restricting transferring shares to third 
parties23 and restricting the inheritance of shares.24
2.2.2. The share of a deceased general partner usually not subject to inheritance
The share of a partner who dies is not subject to inheritance. It shall be distributed to 
other partners in proportion to the shares they possessed on the day the partner died 
 18 Code of Corporate Governance, Glossary, Second Part: Additional principles and recommenda-
tions for family-run limited liability companies and joint-stock corporations.
 19 Vukotić, 2018, p. 167.
 20 Companies Act, Art. 93, Sec. 1.
 21 Companies Act, Art. 101–114.
 22 Companies Act, Art. 110.
 23 Companies Act, Art. 99.
 24 Companies Act, Art. 119.
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unless the incorporation document mandates that the company continue carrying out 
its activity with the decedent’s heirs.25 Therefore, the general rule is that the deceased 
partner’s share is not subject to inheritance unless the incorporation document speci-
fies another course of action. This rule is in line with the nature of general partnerships 
and their requirement for deep mutual trust among the partners in the closed-form 
company.26 Thus, the Act departs from the presumption that the partners will not want 
another person to take over the late partner’s position and enables the partners to 
establish a different set of rules in the incorporation document.27
The heirs who did not take over the position of the deceased partner (either 
because the incorporation document precluded this or they did not agree to do so; 
the latter case will be discussed in detail later) are entitled to compensation for the 
proportionate value of the share they inherited, according to the rules applicable to 
a withdrawal from the partnership.28 Death, along with withdrawal, is one form of 
termination of a partner’s membership;29 thus, the heirs’ rights and duties are regulated 
by referring to the article of the Companies Act on the consequences of a partner’s 
withdrawal. The effects are the same: the share of the partner who withdraws from a 
partnership or dies shall be distributed to other partners proportionately unless the 
incorporation document provides otherwise. However, the partnership is obliged to 
compensate the withdrawing partner or the deceased partner’s heirs for the share’s 
value within six months from the day the partner withdrew or died, unless the incor-
poration document specified a different deadline. The payment obligation amounts to 
the sum the partner would have been entitled to if the partnership had been liquidated 
without considering the ongoing and unfinished business transactions.30
The legislature seems to have made a mistake with the aforementioned rule 
concerning heirs who do not take over a deceased partner’s membership position. 
According to the rules of universal succession, the right to compensation belongs to 
the estate until its division of all the heirs’ joint ownership. This means that the alloca-
tion of the right to compensation depends on the heirs’ decision on the division of the 
estate. Thus, when a partner dies, the right to compensation for the share’s so-called 
liquidation value belongs to the decedent’s assets. Therefore, the heirs could decide that 
it belongs to only one or divide it in some proportion other than that of their shares in 
the inheritance.31
 25 Companies Act, Art. 119, Sec. 1.
 26 The same arguments for this rule can be found at Babić, 2019, pp. 97–111.
 27 Vukotić, 2018, p. 179.
 28 Companies Act, Art. 119, Sec. 4, and Art. 122. The former Companies Act from 2004, in force until 
1 February 2012, did not clarify the heirs’ rights following the death of a partner in a general part-
nership. For a critique of the regulatory framework, see especially Jovanović, 2012, pp. 23–44.
 29 There are different grounds for terminating a partner’s membership status: withdrawal, exclu-
sion, death (of a natural person), deletion (of a legal entity from the competent registry), or 
share transfer to another partner or a third party. The incorporation document could add other 
grounds. Companies Act, Art. 117, Sec. 2.
 30 Companies Act, Art. 122, Sec. 2.
 31 Vukotić, 2018, p. 187.
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Conversely, suppose the value of the partnership’s assets on the day of a partner’s 
withdrawal or death is not enough to meet its debts. In that case, the withdrawing partner 
or deceased partner’s heirs are obliged to make sufficient contributions to the company 
to cover the debts. Their contributions must be proportionate to the value of the share 
of the withdrawing or deceased partner and are payable in six months unless otherwise 
specified by the incorporation document. In other words, the deceased partner’s heirs 
need to make up the difference between the company’s debts and the companies’ assets. 
As a matter of course, the heirs’ liability is limited to the estate’s value, according to 
Serbian inheritance law’s general rules.32 Thus, the heirs can be held liable for the dece-
dent’s debts only up to the value of the estate inherited.33 This rule is supported by the 
general rule on partners’ joint and several liability for the partnership’s debts.34 After five 
years from the day of the partner’s withdrawal or death, the liability for the partnership’s 
current debts ceases unless the incorporation document specifies a longer period.35
Finally, the withdrawing partner or the deceased partner’s heirs participate 
in the profit and losses from business transactions that were not yet finished at the 
time of the partner’s withdrawal or death unless the incorporation document specifies 
otherwise.36
2.2.3. The continuation of business with the deceased partner’s heirs when the incorporation 
document so provides
The incorporation document can allow the company to continue to perform its business 
further with the deceased partner’s heirs. This can happen in one of two legal situa-
tions, depending on which the heirs have agreed to.
First, suppose the incorporation document specifies that the company will 
continue its business with the deceased partner’s heirs, but the heirs disagree. In that 
case, the deceased partner’s share is distributed to the other partners in proportion to 
the value of the shares they held when the partner died.37 Additionally, the heirs are 
entitled to compensation for the share’s value in proportion to their share in the estate, 
according to the rules on a partner’s withdrawal.38
Second, suppose the incorporation document specifies that the company will 
continue its business with the deceased partner’s heirs, and the heirs agree. In that 
case, there are two legal alternatives: (a) the heirs can take over the deceased partner’s 
membership position, or (b) they can request that the form of the company be changed 
legally to a limited partnership and register as limited partners.39
 32 Vukotić, 2018, p. 180.
 33 Law of Inheritance, Art. 222, Sec. 1.
 34 Companies Act, Art. 93, Sec. 1.
 35 Companies Act, Art. 122, Sec. 4.
 36 Companies Act, Art. 123, Sec. 1. For more on the attribution of profit and loss to a partner in 
general partnership, see Šogorov, 2000, pp. 1–10.
 37 Companies Act, Art. 119, Sec. 2.
 38 Companies Act, Art. 119, Sec. 4, and Art. 122.
 39 Companies Act, Art. 119, Sec. 5. 
Central European Journal of Comparative Law | Volume II ■ 2021 ■ 1 126
In variant (a), the heirs have 30 days from the probate procedure’s conclusive 
ending to ask the company to declare them partners. The regulation’s wording implies 
that the deceased partner’s share is not subject to inheritance.40 However, the heirs 
have the right to exercise the option granted by the incorporation document (that is, 
to request to step into the deceased partner’s position) within the 30-day deadline.
In variant (b), the deceased partner’s heirs can request that the company’s legal 
form be changed to a limited partnership and register as limited partners. This rule 
enables the heirs to become limited partners in the company, protecting them from 
being personally liable for the company’s debts. (They would be liable if they became 
general partners.) However, the other partners can refuse to transform the enterprise 
into a limited partnership. In that case, the heirs become general partners in the 
general partnership, but they can withdraw according to the rules on the withdrawal 
of a partner from a general partnership.41 In the case of a withdrawal caused by the 
refusal of the surviving partners to transform the enterprise from a general to a limited 
partnership, the heirs remain liable for the company’s existing debts up to the value 
of the estate received, according to the general inheritance rules on the heirs’ liability 
for the decedent’s debts.42 Changing the company’s form can occur if all the surviving 
partners agree; it cannot be the deceased partner’s heirs’ exclusive decision.
Finally, the incorporation document can specify a ratio in which the heirs can 
participate as limited partners in the company’s profits should the surviving partners 
agree to transform the enterprise into a limited partnership. This ratio depends on 
the degree to which the deceased partner participated in the profit distribution as a 
general partner.43
 ■ 2.3. Inheritance of a share in a limited partnership
2.3.1. General remarks
According to the Companies Act, a limited partnership is a company organised by two 
or more legal entities to conduct business under a common name. At least one of the 
partners must accept unlimited liability for the company’s debts (general partner), 
and at least one partner’s liability will be limited to the value of that partner’s agreed 
contribution (financial or otherwise) to the company’s capital (limited partner).44 Thus, 
a limited partnership presupposes at least two founding members who are in different 
legal positions: at least one is a general partner, and at least one is a limited partner.
The general partner is the ‘active member’ of the company who conducts the 
business and represents the company45 46 and has unlimited liability for the company’s 
 40 Similarly, Vukotić, 2018, pp. 186–187.
 41 Companies Act, Art. 119, Sec. 6.
 42 Companies Act, Art. 119, Sec. 7, and Law of Inheritance, Art. 222, Sec. 1.
 43 Companies Act, Art. 119, Sec. 8.
 44 Companies Act, Art. 125.
 45 Companies Act, Art. 119, Sec. 8.
 46 Companies Act, Art. 131, Sec. 1.
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debts. The legal position of a general partner in a limited partnership is the same as 
the legal position of a partner in a general partnership in terms of liability for the 
company’s debts, authority to conduct business and represent the company, different 
company roles that partner can assume, and the shares and transfers of shares, includ-
ing through inheritance.47
A limited partner is a ‘passive member’ of the company who is not entitled to 
conduct business or represent the company.48 Limited partners’ rights are restricted to 
participation in the profit distribution and the right to exert control over the company’s 
business activities. Limited partners are only liable for the company’s debts up to the 
amount of their agreed contribution (financial or otherwise). Once they have fulfilled 
their obligations to pay or enter contributions to the company’s capital, their personal 
liability for the company’s debts ceases.
The inheritance rules for the shares of general and limited partners also differ.
2.3.2. The continuation of company activity with the heirs of a general partner in a limited 
partnership
If a limited partnership has two or more general partners, and one of them dies, the 
rules on the legal consequences of a partner’s death in a general partnership apply. 
A deceased general partner’s share shall be distributed among the surviving partners 
unless the incorporation document specifies that the company will continue to conduct 
business with the heirs in place of the deceased partner. Thus, if a limited partnership 
has two or more general partners, and one of them dies, the deceased partner’s share 
will not be subject to inheritance; instead, the share will be distributed among the 
surviving general partners (unless the incorporation document specifies otherwise). 
In such cases, the same rules apply as those in the case of a continuation of business 
with the heirs of a deceased partner in a general partnership.49
However, if a limited partnership has only one general partner (the usual case), 
and that general partner dies, different rules apply. When a sole general partner dies, 
the company continues to conduct business with the deceased partner’s heirs, provid-
ing that the heirs file claims with the registry to be recognised as general partners; they 
must do so within three months of the probatory procedure’s conclusive ending.50 This 
rule is quite unusual since the legislature departed from its presumption that a general 
partner’s personal standing is relevant only as it relates to other general partners, not 
limited partners, which is certainly not the case.51 Since general partners conduct the 
business and represent the company, the company’s success depends on their personal 
efforts and facilities.52 Thus, the general partner’s personality is relevant to all partners 
in a limited partnership. Limited partners, who provide some or all of the limited 
 47 Companies Act, Art. 126, Sec. 2.
 48 Companies Act, Art. 131, Sec. 2.
 49 Companies Act, Art. 119.
 50 Companies Act, Art. 137, Sec. 4.
 51 Vukotić, 2018, p. 191.
 52 Ibid.
Central European Journal of Comparative Law | Volume II ■ 2021 ■ 1 128
partnership’s capital, have a practical interest in the business being conducted well 
and represented by reliable and skilled persons. The rule prescribed by the Serbian 
legislature puts limited partners in a delicate situation by requiring them to accept that 
the company will continue to conduct business with the heirs in place of the deceased 
general partner—whether or not they believed those heirs possess the required knowl-
edge, skills, and facilities.53
Furthermore, the heirs who decide not to take over the deceased general part-
ner’s position are entitled to reimbursement of a part of their share in proportion to 
their share in the estate. However, the Companies Act does not regulate what happens 
with the share of a deceased general partner when none of the heirs submits a request 
to the registry within 30 days requesting recognition as a general partner. In this 
respect, the rules of the Companies Act need amending.
The Companies Act rules only cover the situation in which a company loses 
all its general or limited partners, regardless of the cause (e.g., withdrawal, transfer, 
or death). In such cases, the partnership needs to do one of three things: register a 
new partner (limited or general, depending on which position is vacant) within three 
months, change from a limited to a general partnership in compliance with the Com-
panies Act or initiate voluntary liquidation. Otherwise, a compulsory liquidation will 
be initiated; the Companies Act prescribes a six-month deadline for this decision.54 If 
the decision is to change the legal form, there must be a unanimous agreement by all 
the remaining limited partners (if the company is left without general partners) or all 
the remaining general partners (if the company is left without limited partners). If the 
limited partnership is left without general partners, the limited partner(s) can decide to 
re-form the enterprise as a limited liability company or joint-stock company. Similarly, 
if the company loses all its limited partners, the general partners can decide to re-form 
the enterprise as a general partnership, or, if only one general partner remains, that 
person can choose to continue the business as an individual entrepreneur.55
2.3.3. Inheritance of the share of a deceased limited partner
If a limited partner who is a natural person dies, that partner’s heirs can take over the 
decedent’s position in the limited partnership. If a limited partner is a legal entity that 
ceases to exist, that entity’s legal successors can take over its position in the company.56 
This rule is mandatory; the incorporation document cannot specify a different regime 
of legal succession. It could be inferred from this rule that a limited partner’s position 
in a limited partnership is subject to inheritance. That would be in line with the nature 
of the legal position of a limited partner. As indicated earlier, limited partners cannot 
conduct business in the name of the company nor represent it; they are not personally 
liable for the company’s debts, so their skills, knowledge, and facilities are not crucial 
 53 Ibid.
 54 Companies Act, Art. 546, Sec. 1, Subsection 3
 55 Companies Act, Art. 137, Secs. 3–7.
 56 Companies Act, Art. 137, Sec. 2.
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for the business success of the limited partnership. Therefore, there is no reason to deny 
the heirs the right to inherit the limited partner position in a limited partnership.
 ■ 2.4. Inheritance of the share of a member in a limited liability company
2.4.1. General remarks
According to the Companies Act, in a limited liability company, one or more members 
must have shares in the company’s share capital, and none of them can be held person-
ally liable for the company’s debts except in the cases described in Article 18 (cases of 
piercing the corporate veil).57 However, the company is fully liable for all its debts with 
all its assets.
Limited liability companies belong to the group of capital companies. Since 
there is a mandatory share capital, specific organs of the company must be nominated, 
members cannot be held personally liable for company debts, and the enterprise can be 
established as a uni-personal company. However, limited liability companies also share 
some of the features of personal companies. For instance, the membership structure is 
relatively stable since there are restrictions on the transfer of shares to third parties. 
They also usually have a small number of members.
Limited liability companies can have only one member (uni-personal LLC) or 
multiple members.58 Membership in an LLC is acquired when the applicant (natural 
person or legal entity) has been duly recorded in the registry.59 The members are 
the owners of their shares in the LLC, and every member can have only one share,60 
although the shares need not be equal. The shares are expressed as a percentage and 
represent the member’s participation in the share capital of the company. This means 
that if one member acquires another’s share, that new share will be added to his or her 
existing share, which will lead to an increase in percentage.61 The members’ percentage 
of share ownership in an LLC gives them different rights (proprietary and management 
rights) in proportion to the shares’ value.62
2.4.2. Inheritance of a member’s share in an LLC
The Companies Act prescribes that if a member of an LLC dies, that partner’s heirs 
acquire his or her share according to the statute governing inheritance.63 Thus, a share 
of the LLC is regularly subject to inheritance. If there are multiple heirs, they become 
co-owners of the deceased partner’s share. Nonetheless, there is only one share; they 
own a percentage of the share. This means that the heirs are considered to be one 
member of the LLC, and they all share joint and several liability for the company’s 
 57 Companies Act, Art. 139.
 58 Companies Act, Art. 139.
 59 Companies Act, Art. 143, Sec. 1.
 60 Companies Act, Art. 151, Sec. 2.
 61 Companies Act, Art. 151, Sec. 3.
 62 Companies Act, Art. 152, Secs. 1–2.
 63 Companies Act, Art. 172, Sec. 1. 
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obligations.64 However, the Companies Act requires co-owners to regulate their mutual 
relationship in relation to the share by a special agreement.65 They exert their voting 
rights via a common representative whose identity they must report to the company.66 
Until they have notified the company of their representative’s identity, their shares 
cannot be taken into account at the assembly. At the same time, legal acts taken against 
one of the co-owners will have a legal effect on all of them.67 Once the legal co-owners 
(multiple heirs) have nominated a common representative and notified the company 
thereof, any legal acts and notifications effected to the common representative will 
have a legal effect on all the co-owners.68 The individual shares held by the co-owners 
in the LLC do not have to be equal. The situation of unequal shares usually occurs 
when the co-owners obtain the percentage of a deceased partner’s share under Serbia’s 
Law of Inheritance, which recognises orders of inheritance as defined by the heirs 
relationships with the decedent. In any case, the co-owners are always free to dis-
solve the co-ownership by agreement. The Companies Act forbids adding a clause 
in the incorporation document that would restrict the co-owners’ dissolution of the 
co-ownership of a share.69
For the sake of protecting the company’s and heirs’ interests while the probate 
procedure is ongoing, the Companies Act allows the company or any of the heirs to ask 
the court to nominate a temporary guardian who will act in the name and on behalf 
of the deceased member’s heirs and exert membership rights.70 The guardian has 
the mandate to exert the membership rights until the probate procedure has ended 
conclusively, at which point the heirs legally acquire the share in the LLC; from that 
moment, the heirs can exert their membership rights in relation to the inherited share 
without a proxy.
2.4.3. Compulsory purchase of the share from the heirs
LLCs are relatively closed companies, so the Companies Act enables members to devise 
different succession regimes. The incorporation document can specify the right of the 
company or one or more members to exert the right of compulsory purchase and buy a 
deceased member’s share from the heir(s). This must happen within six months from 
the day of the member’s death and within three months of the day when the heir(s) 
registered their membership status in the registry (the Companies Act uses the wording 
‘decide on the compulsory purchase of the share’).71 Suppose a company institutes the 
compulsory purchase of the share. In that case, it must express its intention to exert 
the right in the form of a decision adopted by the majority of all members, unless 
 64 Companies Act, Art. 153, Sec. 4
 65 Companies Act, Art. 153, Sec. 2.
 66 Companies Act, Art. 153, Sec. 3.
 67 Companies Act, Art. 153, Sec. 6.
 68 Companies Act, Art. 153, Sec. 5.
 69 Companies Act, Art. 176, Sec. 2.
 70 Companies Act, Art. 172, Sec. 2.
 71 Companies Act, Art. 173, Sec. 1. See Marjanski, 2015, pp. 679–680.
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another majority is prescribed by the incorporation document (note: the deceased 
member’s share is not considered when determining whether there is a quorum for 
the decision).72 This would be the case of the company acquiring an own share by an 
onerous contract—that is, by paying compensation equal to the value of the share.73 
The company’s decision to exercise the right of compulsory purchase is a decision on 
acquiring an own share. Nonetheless, no qualified majority of 2/3 is prescribed for 
this decision. On the other hand, such a majority is required for the decision to acquire 
an own share by an onerous contract, that is, by paying compensation to a member.74 
Since this would be a case of compulsory purchase, the deceased member’s heirs’ 
consent is not required. Thus, the change of a member in the registry will be effected 
based solely on the company’s decision to exercise the right of compulsory purchase 
(acquisition of an own share), and there is no need to conclude a contract on the share 
transfer.75 However, the company’s acquisition of an own share through compulsory 
purchase is subject to certain restrictions. First, if the incorporation document allows 
the compulsory purchase of a share, it must also prescribe a means for determining 
the amount of compensation and the deadline for payment to the heir(s); otherwise, 
the incorporation document’s clause on compulsory purchase must be considered 
non-existent.76 If the company, a member, or multiple members decide to exercise 
the right to compulsory purchase, the deceased member’s heirs have the right to a 
compensation determined by the incorporation document, payable in the same Act’s 
specified deadline.77 Unless the incorporation document (or a decision of the assembly 
on the exercise of the compulsory purchase) provides otherwise, the deadline for 
the payment of compensation starts from the delivery date of a conclusive decision 
declaring the heirs the legal successors of the deceased member’s share.78 These rules 
have been instituted to protect the heirs’ interests. However, they remain incomplete 
since the Companies Act does not prescribe further rules on the means of effecting 
compensation payments. Furthermore, by enabling the members to determine the 
compensation payment deadline in the incorporation document—there is no definitive 
mandatory statutory deadline—it is possible for companies to delay the payment to the 
heirs endlessly.
Of course, the company might not decide to exercise its right to compulsory 
purchase if doing so would be contrary to the Companies Act’s rules on restricted pay-
ments.79 Finally, the Companies Act does not require that the share must be entirely 
paid for or entered into the company’s capital when it is obtained from the deceased 
member’s heirs unless it is an own share (or part of one) purchased from an existing 
 72 Companies Act, Art. 173, Sec. 2.
 73 Companies Act, Art. 157, Sec. 2, Subsection 4.
 74 Companies Act, Art. 211, Sec. 2.
 75 Marjanski, 2015, p. 679.
 76 Companies Act, Art. 174, Sec. 1.
 77 Companies Act, Art. 174, Sec. 2.
 78 Companies Act, Art. 174, Sec. 4.
 79 Companies Act, Art. 174, Sec. 3.
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member.80 Similarly, the Companies Act does not specify mandatory reserves81 to 
secure the payments to the heirs in case the compulsory purchase is effected on behalf 
of the company, regardless of whether it concerns an own share acquired by an onerous 
contract (by purchasing a share or part of it from a living member).82
3. Inheritance of an individual entrepreneur’s assets
 ■ 3.1. General remarks
Family-run enterprises in Serbia most often begin as individual entrepreneurship. 
Individual entrepreneurs are natural persons who conduct business to generate profit 
and are registered according to the statute pertaining to business organisations’ 
registration.83 Individual entrepreneurs have unlimited liability for debt accrued in 
relation to their entrepreneurial activity. Their liability extends to all assets, regardless 
of whether they were obtained in the course of conducting business.84 Entrepreneurs’ 
unlimited liability for their companies’ debts does not end with their removal as private 
entrepreneurs from the registry.85
The individual entrepreneurship enterprise form does not create separate 
legal and corporate personalities. Individual entrepreneurs are not considered legal 
entities, as companies are. When they obtain rights, accrue obligations, act as parties 
in litigation or administrative procedure, or obtain assets, they do so as individuals, 
not legal entities—that is, they are people, not companies.86 There are no shares in 
enterprises formed through individual entrepreneurship; the property, rights, and 
debts are intertwined with the owner personally, the one natural person. Therefore, 
the inheritance of shares does not apply, but the inheritance of the owner–operator’s 
(the natural person) rights and assets do apply.
 ■ 3.2. Inheritance of an individual entrepreneur’s assets and debts
Since individual entrepreneurs do not have separate legal–corporate personalities, 
when they die, all their assets and debts are transmitted to their heirs through Serbia’s 
Law of Inheritance, including those attained or accrued in the course of business. Legal 
succession comprises the assets and debts related to the decedent’s activity as indi-
vidual entrepreneurs in addition to those that are not. For individual entrepreneurs, in 
 80 Companies Act, Art. 157, Sec. 3.
 81 For information on the relationship between payments from the non-allocated profit account 
and those from the reserves, see Marjanski, 2020, pp. 218–221. 
 82 When the company acquires an own share by purchasing all or part of the share, the com-
pensation payment to the heir must be effected from the reserves allocated for this purpose. 
Companies Act, Art. 157, Sec. 4.
 83 Companies Act, Art. 83, Sec. 1.
 84 Companies Act, Art. 85, Sec. 1.
 85 Companies Act, Art. 85, Sec. 2.
 86 Arsić & Marjanski, 2018, p. 26.
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principle, there is no difference between the assets obtained in the course of conduct-
ing business and those obtained as private persons.87 For instance, if an entrepreneur 
owned a vehicle used for business purposes and another used for personal purposes, 
both vehicles pass to the heirs under the same inheritance rules.88
If there is only one heir, the fate of the enterprise depends on that person’s deci-
sion of whether to continue the decedent’s business. However, the situation becomes 
more perplexing if there are multiple first-order heirs (spouse and children, whether 
natural or adopted). In this case, the estate belongs to all the first-order heirs in undi-
vided joint ownership.89 Before the estate’s division, the heirs manage and dispose 
of it unanimously.90 Thus, the fate of the enterprise depends on the heirs’ decisions. 
There are no restrictions on the heirs’ decision. They could nominate one of the heirs 
to continue the family-run enterprise.91 They could agree that the right to use the name 
of the enterprise and the assets needed for conducting business also belonged to one 
of the heirs. If such an agreement is reached in the probate procedure, the court will 
include it in the probate decision; thus, the nominated heir can register to continue the 
business on the grounds of the court’s decision.92 However, after the probate decree 
becomes conclusive, there is no requirement for the heirs to agree on the division of 
the estate. Resolution after the conclusion of probate would necessitate an out-of-court 
settlement concluded in written form and signed by all heirs to enable the designated 
heir to register as the a member continue operations.93 If the settlement involves real 
estate, the agreement must be confirmed by a notary public. If the heirs cannot reach 
a common understanding, the court decides how the inheritance will be divided, and 
that procedure can be initiated by any heir, not just a first-order heir. When deliberating 
on the division of the inheritance, the court must consider the ‘legitimate claims and 
interest of joint owners’.94 If a joint owner requests sole ownership of a certain asset, 
the court must examine the ‘special reasons’ on which the request is based. These 
broadly defined legal standards have major significance in the division of deceased 
entrepreneurs’ estates. Weighing these standards appropriately, the court could decide 
to allocate an enterprise’s assets to one heir whom the court considers the most suitable 
to continue the business.95 In any case, it seems undisputable that the regulations allow 
outcomes in which one of the heirs takes over decedent’s enterprise, either through 
 87 Vukotić, 2018, p. 168.
 88 Ibid.
 89 Vukotić, 2018, p. 173.
 90 Law of Inheritance, Art. 229.
 91 Vukotić, 2018, p. 174.
 92 Law on Non-Contentious Procedure, Art. 122, Sec. 3.
 93 Companies Act, Art. 91, Sec. 7.
 94 Law on Non-Contentious Procedure, Art. 153, Sec. 1.
 95 For instance, suppose one of the heirs has training, experience, and qualifications relating 
to the decedent’s trade or profession, but the others do not. The court would likely assign the 
enterprise-specific assets to that heir. Such a solution would be advantageous not only for the 
heir who wants to continue the deceased entrepreneur’s business but also for the public since 
it would allow the enterprise to outlive the entrepreneur who developed it. 
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unanimous agreement among the first-order heirs or through a court’s decision on 
the division of the inheritance.96 It is also possible for a prospective heir to take over 
a family enterprise before the death of the original individual entrepreneur if the two 
parties sign a contract to that effect specifying the division of the future estate, accord-
ing to the Law of Inheritance.97
Concerning the heirs’ liability for the deceased individual entrepreneur’s debts 
accrued in relation to business activities, Serbian law does not have special regulations 
that apply if an heir continues the decedent’s enterprise. Thus, the general rules of 
inheritance apply: all the heirs are liable for all of the debts accrued as of the decedent’s 
death, but each is only liable for a portion of the debt up to the value of the estate that 
person inherited.98 That is, no one owes more than they inherit.
4. Conclusions
Family-run enterprises in Serbia usually begin their legal form as individual entre-
preneurship, a form of closed (general and limited partnership) or relatively closed 
company (limited liability company). Thus, this has focused on the inheritance (inter-
generational transmission) of assets and debts arising from conducting business in the 
form of general and limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and individual 
entrepreneurship.
Different legal difficulties arise following the death of an individual entrepre-
neur and the death of a member of a company. Company forms establish a separation 
between personal and business property. Company members, even the titular heads, 
are not considered legal owners of the company’s property. Instead, they are owners of 
shares in the company, and those shares entitle them to specific membership (manage-
ment and proprietary) rights. Thus, when a company member dies, its property (or 
even a part of it) is not subject to inheritance, but the deceased member’s share is. In 
contrast, there is no such personal–business separation in individual entrepreneurship. 
Natural persons conducting businesses as individual entrepreneurs do not have two 
separate legal identities. Therefore, when they die, all their assets and debts are subject 
to inheritance, including those accrued in the course of conducting business.
Serbia’s statutory framework does not offer specific rules pertaining to the 
inheritance of assets and debts of individual entrepreneurs or shares in family-run 
companies. Thus, Serbia’s company and inheritance statutes fail to address some 
circumstances and their social implications. The specific rules that have been devised 
are currently applied only according to the enterprises’ form (i.e., general partner-
ship, limited partnership, limited liability company, or joint-stock company), with no 
distinction of whether they are family-run or not.
 96 Vukotić, 2018, p. 174.
 97 Companies Act, Art. 91, Sec. 9.
 98 Law of Inheritance, Art. 222, Sec. 1.
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A company is considered family-run if most of the voting rights belong to a 
single family that exerts control over the enterprise, including its founding member 
who intends to transfer the company to his or her descendants to continue operations 
throughout generations within the same family.99 The death of the owner–operator of a 
family-run company triggers succession by inheritance, which comprises the transfer 
of management and proprietary rights (control) from one generation to another.100 The 
Companies Act does not establish a special legal regime for the death of a family-run 
company’s head. Thus, any rule that applies to all companies of the same form must 
also apply to family-run companies. However, the Companies Act does provide some 
freedom for the members to set up different succession schemes in their incorporation 
documents, the scope of which varies depending on the company’s form.
The succession of a decedent’s share is regulated separately for each form of 
company. For all issues not governed by the Companies Act or an incorporation docu-
ment, the rules of Serbia’s Law of Inheritance apply. General and limited partnerships 
are closed companies, and limited liability companies are relatively closed; therefore, 
in these cases, the succession of decedent’s share to one or more heirs is subject to 
certain limitations specified in the Companies Act. In addition, the Act allows members 
include int the company’s incorporation document a different succession scheme for a 
deceased member’s share.
Furthermore, the Serbian Chamber of Commerce adopted a Code of Corporate 
Governance, a set of voluntary principles and recommendations for its members to 
follow. The Code contains soft-law rules on the best practices of corporate governance, 
including those relating to the intergenerational transfer of companies’ management. 
The gist of these principles and recommendations is that a family-run company ought 
to have a general succession plan and a special succession plan for extraordinary 
situations.
In conclusion, Serbia’s company and inheritance laws do not distinguish 
between family-run and other companies. This lack of distinction can lead to difficul-
ties when a member dies because of the difference between inheriting a share in a 
general or limited partnership and share in a capital company such as a limited liability 
or joint-stock company. In principle, whether or not a deceased member’s rights and 
responsibilities can be passed through inheritance depends on the company’s form, 
its incorporation document, and the relevance of the heirs’ connection to the deceased 
and the company. The less complicated these are, the fewer the legal obstacles to 
inheritance.101
 99 Code of Corporate Governance, Glossary, Sec. 6.
 100 Code of Corporate Governance, Glossary, Sec. 7.
 101 M. Vukotić, 167.
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Redefining the Relationship Between National Law and 
European Law
 ■ ABSTRACT: Relations between European legal orders and national legal orders present 
specificities that call into question the principles dictating how states are governed. As 
the scope of European activities expands, whether it is the European Union or Council 
of Europe, the potential for conflict is created. In this context, it is important to redefine 
these relationships and create regulatory mechanisms. This article aims to suggest 
avenues in this direction.
 ■ KEYWORDS: national law, European law, relationship between national law and 
European law.
Relations between legal orders, more specifically, between national legal orders and 
European legal orders – the Council of Europe and European Union – have upset legal 
mechanisms (the connection between legal norms no longer follow Kelsen’s pyramid) 
and political systems – the creation of polities that are neither unitary States, federa-
tions, nor empires – while borrowing from each of those categories.2
1. Impact of developments in European construction on state structures
Without calling into question the necessity and fruitfulness of European construction, 
it should be noted that the developments and directions taken by this construction 
affect the states’ institutional systems. Thus, the notion of democracy is at stake, the 
organisation of powers is affected by the rise of the judge, and the decision-making 
ability of national politicians is diminished.
 1 Full Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France; Vice-presi-
dent, The International Association of Constitutional Law, bertrand.mathieu@univ-paris1.fr.
 2 Cf. Bonnet, 2013.
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 ■ 1.1. Democracy affected by the evolution of European construction
Liberal democracy has been considerably affected by the evolution of legal orders. 
First, democracy was born within the framework of state structures to the extent that 
it can be considered consubstantial with the state.
For its part, the European Union has its own particular characteristics. Origi-
nally organised around an essentially economic system, it has gradually extended its 
competence to issues that traditionally fell within the main core of state sovereignty 
and constitutional identity, and which are linked to the broad concept of the rule of 
law of which democracy is but a component. This applies not only to the concept of 
fundamental rights, but also to the organisation of state power.
The will – and from this viewpoint it does not matter that it has not succeeded 
– to draw up a Constitution of the European Union; the adoption of a Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and from another perspective, considerable broadening of the 
scope of rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; and ongoing 
process of ideological integration have profoundly modified the nature of the European 
project.
This has resulted in both a gradual submission of States to these logics as well 
as reactions of defence or closure in the face of encroachments on what constitutes the 
identity of certain States.
Brexit, the inclusion in the Russian Constitution of the primacy of constitu-
tional rules over those stemming from the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, resistance of certain States to the European Union’s migration policy, and use 
of measures aimed at regulating the power of judges bear witness to this resistance. 
Regarding national judges, the recourse to the functional notion of national identity as 
a (often theoretical) limit to European supremacy, and more firmly the recent decision 
of the German Constitutional Court (5 June 2020) resisting a form of financial integra-
tion also testifies to the difficulties in reconciling national sovereignty and European 
construction. From this perspective, trying to reconcile national sovereignty with 
European sovereignty is a deadlock, because while competences that touch on matters 
of sovereignty can be shared, sovereignty itself, by its very nature, cannot.
As a result of these developments, the requirements of the rule of law tend to take 
precedence over those imposed by the democratic principle.3
 ■ 1.2. The judge as an essential actor in the evolution of European construction
Apart from the substantial implications of this evolution, which explain many of the 
tensions, the result is a profound change in the mechanisms of the separation of powers. 
Indeed, democracy implies the primacy of politics, corrected in its liberal version by 
the judge’s control of the conditions in which power is exercised. In reality, the rule of 
law tends to transfer power from the politician to the judge. There are many reasons 
for this: fundamental rights law is essentially created by the judge, and this law tends to 
 3 Cf. Mathieu, 2017.
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prevail over any other requirement in all areas of social life and hence, in all branches 
of law. This development is generally regarded as positive, and overall, it is positive. 
However, behind this generic term of fundamental rights lies ideological issues that 
may call into question core elements of certain national identities. Moreover, the 
upholding of fundamental rights is achieved by balancing different or even opposing 
rights, which the judge controls using the powerful but sometimes arbitrary tool of 
the principle of proportionality. What interests us here in particular is the judge who 
is gradually gaining control of the system’s relationships. In the absence of hierarchy 
or faced with multiple hierarchies, which amounts to the same thing, between norms 
belonging to several legal systems, the judges regulate system relationships, thereby 
directly intervening in the field of politics.
Realistically, and briefly, European integration in the system of the European 
Union and European Convention on Human Rights is the work of courts. These courts 
have taken upon themselves not only the task of settling disputes, but also effectively 
legislative and even constitutional work. In this sense, it has been described as juris-
dictional federalism.
Judges regulate the relationship between legal systems. This is largely a factor in 
strengthening judicial power versus political power. The wide range of legal standards, 
particularly European ones, themselves fairly widely formulated by European courts, 
provides the national judge with more freedom than constraint. It provides him with 
the tools to assert his power in the face of political power. In this regard, it is interesting 
that the conflict between Germany and the European Union over the economic recov-
ery plan is a conflict between the German Constitutional Court and Court of Justice of 
the European Union, not between political authorities.
Ultimately, only the national judge grants itself the ability to limit the expan-
sion of European power beyond what he considers to exceed its limits, either because 
the contested decision contradicts requirements that fall within the core of national 
identity, or because it is seen as exceeding European competences.
The formulation or resolution of conflicts is essentially in the hands of judges, 
and these are decisions in which political power is largely supplanted by a technocratic 
power, a form of epistemocracy, that is, power based on the legitimacy of the expert.
 ■ 1.3. The structural weakness of national political powers
Faced with this construction, national political powers are weak and the protection of 
national identities, which is part of their mission, is difficult to ensure.
The crisis affecting national identities and their relationship with the European 
identity is first a crisis of political power. In this sense, the lack of citizens’ confidence 
in their political leaders stems from the fact that the reality of power largely escapes 
those. Financial powers, economic powers, GAFA (which are as much economic powers 
as they are instruments for the standardisation of values), NGOs, and European struc-
tures tend to curb national political powers, which enjoy only marginal action or are 
given free rein in increasingly few areas (e.g. think of family law or bioethics).
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In fact, in many countries, one key factor in the crisis of democracy is the discon-
nection between a citizen’s vote and political decision-making. The real power lies 
elsewhere.
2. A potentially conflictual situation that calls for the search for solutions
The state of relations between European structures and their constituent nations is at 
once ill defined, evolving, and a source of conflict.
Beyond attempts to re-establish a pre-established and rigid hierarchy between 
systems that would lead either to the break-up of European structures or to the submis-
sion of States, it is a matter of reflecting on ways of regulating conflicts.
 ■ 2.1. An observation: the development of conflicts
Between the power of European institutions on one hand and exponential extension 
of their field of competence and normative system they produce on the other, the 
weakening of state power, which remains the theoretical framework of democratic 
political will, gives rise to the significant potential for conflict. From these conflicts, 
which are not assumed and are poorly resolved by jurisdictional procedures, nothing 
good can come. Either we will move towards a de facto federalism, which in the long 
term will give rise to revolts by citizens who will become mere spectators, or towards 
a breakdown of European structures due to the refusal of certain nations to submit 
and abdicate their sovereignty. In my opinion, the failure of Europe would bring with 
it many dangers; thus, we more than ever need an economic Europe, a social Europe, 
a financial Europe, a geopolitical Europe.
It is then necessary to reflect on a transformation of the European formula, 
which avoids both the negation of national identities and destructive inward-looking 
attitudes. One fruitful path in my viewpoint is that of the Europe of Nations. However, 
it is important not to stick to a slogan or cover with this formula some unacknowledged 
identity-based insularity. We probably need both Europe and Europe, and above all, 
a different Europe.
 ■ 2.2. Finding mechanisms of regulation
Within the very limited framework of this intervention, I would like to outline a few 
leads, which are both partial and too schematic.
2.2.1. Redefining the link between national and European competences
This definition must be the work of politicians. From this viewpoint and to the judges’ 
credit, note that the development of judicial power takes place in the context of a refusal 
by politicians to exercise their power or inability to reach agreement.
This is a question of clearly determining what competences should be entrusted 
to European structures and which competences and powers should remain in the 
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hands of the States. To do this, what belongs to a European identity, which justifies 
the association of a number of States, and what belongs to national identity must be 
distinguished.
Reflection must face two directions, namely mapping out both national and 
European competences more precisely. This is a matter of reflecting on what the 
Member States intend to pool together. Europe is endowed with an economic and 
geopolitical purpose; it is less about regulating the daily life of citizens or interfering 
in the organisation of national powers. Similarly, the European Convention on Human 
Rights is a common heritage of essential fundamental rights that State Parties have 
undertaken to respect. It must not be used to impose on States the adoption of rules, 
values, or principles to which they have not subscribed and which result from the 
judges’ conception of an evolution, suitable in their view, of a society without frontiers 
and roots.
2.2.2. Enforcing the principle of subsidiarity
In addition to this division by areas of competence, the principle of subsidiarity, 
which is affirmed in particular by the Treaty of Lisbon but also recognised in the 
framework of the European Convention on Human Rights, must be more rigorously 
implemented. This principle provides support to States that wish to defend their ‘own 
corner’. However, the division of competences cannot be left solely to the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union and European Court of Human Rights. Within 
the latter framework, this implies that an issue must be dealt with at the European 
level only if constitutional protection proves insufficient. Today, the European Court of 
Human Rights seems to be moving towards recognising the principle of subsidiarity on 
certain so-called societal issues,4 leaving them to the discretion of the national legisla-
tor. However, the assessment of the scope of this principle remains in its hands.
2.2.3. Shifting from an obligation of submission to an obligation of constructive dialogue
A conflict of the kind that has pitted the German Constitutional Court against the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (see above) is evidence both of the impasse that the 
requirement of a single vertical relationship between European and national courts 
constitutes and of the need to find a way to resolve conflicts. Thus, it is conceivable 
that in terms of the relationship between courts, national courts could re-interrogate 
European courts when a conflict occurs or is likely to occur. One could also imagine 
the creation of a kind of Tribunal des Conflits, composed—for problematic cases—of 
national and European judges to arbitrate conflicts of jurisdiction. This exists in France 
for conflicts of jurisdiction between the judicial and administrative judge. Some forma-
tions would be composed of European judges and judges from the country concerned to 
adjudicate conflicts regarding a specific State. Other formations could arbitrate conflicts 
 4 For example, in relation to parentage, see the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights in the case of Ahrens v. Germany (Application no. 45071/09) and in the case of Kautzor 
v. Germany (Application no. 23338/09).
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involving European and national competences in general. This ‘court’ should not con-
stitute a new structure of the Union, but a place for debate, dialogue, and even conflict 
resolution between judges. This obligation of dialogue would be institutionalised. This 
form of dialogue is particularly important at a time when the European Union is led 
to impose on States the respect of criteria related to the rule of law, although these 
criteria are not predefined except in a general manner. This procedure would also be 
necessary in the framework of the Council of Europe to avoid or try to avoid conflicts 
linked to the sometimes very constructive case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. However, political authorities should be given the power of the last word in 
this matter.
These are mere lines of approach to open a debate necessary for a lack of evi-
dence of solutions.
2.2.4. Strengthening the democratic function of the European Parliament
This proposal may seem marginal in view of the issues raised here. However, it appears 
crucial to create a democratic debate at the European level in the field of competences, 
which will have been previously redrawn.
Recognising that the Parliament is the democratic body of the European Union, 
the conditions for a genuine European political debate should be created, not on all 
subjects, but on matters falling within the competence of the Union. The election of 
Members of the European Parliament by proportional representation in the national 
context on issues of national policy falls short of this requirement. The identity of 
MEPs, their political distribution, and their ‘playing field’ are largely beyond citizens’ 
understanding. True democratisation of the European Union implies the existence of a 
political life at the Union level on European issues. If the European Union fails to mate-
rialise as a genuine competitive political area, democracy cannot exist within it.
To encourage this political and democratic emergence outcome, the lists of 
candidates for the European elections should be transnational to avoid being based 
solely on national political frameworks. However, to maintain the link between States 
and the European Parliament, a significant number of members (e.g. half) should also 
be elected by the national parliaments. One could logically fear that this reform could 
be part of federalism, which is at odds with the aforementioned Europe of the Nations. 
This would be the case if it were part of the design of a parliament composed of two 
chambers, one representing the People and the other the States. In contrast, combining 
deputies elected by the European people and those elected by national parliaments in 
a single chamber seems to me to be apt to avoid such a development.
Furthermore, the role of the European Parliament, like that of the national 
parliaments, must refocus on monitoring the action of European bodies, particularly 
the Commission, emphasising the role of the Council in determining the Union’s policy 
and that of the Commission in an executive function in the true sense of the word.
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3. Closing thought
Nevertheless, these changes require the agreement of all States. In this area, as in 
others, before launching a debate on the institutional mechanisms, it is necessary to 
reflect on what we want the Europe of tomorrow to be.
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Foreign Subsidies, Distortions and Acquisitions: 
Can the Playing Field Be Levelled?
 ■ ABSTRACT: The world trade system’s bedrock was laid more than seventy years ago 
and its architecture and structural principles were shaped by the societal paradigm 
of western democracies. The last two decades have seen the admission of various 
government-dominated economies to the WTO. This raised serious paradigmatic chal-
lenges. The system tailored to the needs and characteristics of western democracies 
proved to be inadequately equipped to frame government-dominated economies. This 
paper addresses one of these new challenges: government subsidies. First, it gives an 
overview of the status and treatment of product and service subsidies in WTO law 
and the gaps and shortcomings that result in the system’s failure to address trade-
distortive state aids. Second, it examines the European Commission’s White Paper on 
Levelling the Playing Field as Regards Foreign Subsidies (“White Paper”), which ushers 
a comprehensive European response to the problems raised by subsidization in interna-
tional trade. Third, the paper analyzes the WTO framework that governs and confines 
unilateral actions targeting foreign subsidies. Fourth, the paper makes a proposal for a 
complementary way to address the world trade system’s “subsidies problem”.
 ■ KEYWORDS: Countervailing duties, fair trade, GATS, GATT, subsidies, WTO.
1. Introduction
It is no exaggeration to say that the last few years have seen the paralyzation of the 
world trade system. Even though the Trump administration has been reprimanded 
for being the culprit, the root cause has been a set of real and genuine institutional 
 1 Full Professor, Head of the Department of Private International Law, Faculty of Law, University 
of Szeged, Hungary; Fernand Braudel Senior Fellow, European University Institute, Florence; 
Research Chair, Centre for Social Sciences of the Eötvös Loránd Research Network (Federal 
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problems and, hence, the WTO’s “constitutional” crisis is expected to linger on after 
the expiry of President Trump’s term of office. The world trade system’s bedrock was 
laid more than seventy years ago (with the adoption of GATT 1947) and reached its 
full-blown institutional architecture three decades ago (with the establishment of the 
WTO in 1994). Its architecture and structural principles were shaped by the societal 
paradigm of western democracies, featured by a democratic political system based on 
democratic sovereignty, free market, autonomy of economic operators and a clear sepa-
ration between the private and the public sector, which implied that private enterprises 
cannot be aligned to serve foreign policy aims.
This paradigm has lately come into conflict with the realities of the world trade 
club. The last two decades have seen the WTO’s large-scale enlargement, with China 
joining in 2001, Saudi Arabia in 2005, Viet Nam in 2007 and Russia in 2012. While this 
was a very welcome development, which enhanced the strength of the world trade 
systems and turned the club of western democracies into a truly universal global trade 
system,2 it raised serious paradigmatical challenges. The system tailored to the needs 
and characteristics of western democracies proved to be inadequately equipped to 
handle the problems raised by government-dominated economies.
This enlargement process not only brought some of the world’s biggest economies 
into the club, it also extended the WTO to countries where the state has a central role in 
the economy. These polities have a different view on the relationship between the state 
and the market, the autonomy of state-owned enterprises and their (in)dependence 
from political governance, the relationship between rule of law and political hierarchy. 
“Government-dominated economies”, as coined by this paper, are not planned econo-
mies but market-based economic systems where the government has a decisive formal 
and informal influence over market operators and informal governmental rules play a 
central role. Furthermore, these systems have a higher tendency to subsidize economic 
activities3 and quite often this occurs via state-owned enterprises. Finally, intellectual 
property rights benefit from a lower level of protection and the legally recognized intel-
lectual property rights are quite often not enforced via effective means. These traits 
challenge the system of WTO in various way. Some of these issues are simply not caught 
in the net of WTO law at all, while other, although covered by WTO rules, emerge with 
such a high intensity that the WTO cannot handle effectively.
This paper addresses one of these new challenges of the world trade system: 
government subsidies. It distinguishes among three categories of subsidies. Domestic 
subsidies, the most traditional category, are financial contributions granted to recipi-
ents who are located in the territory of the granting state. Foreign and transnational 
subsidies are extraterritorial state aids. Foreign subsidies are financial contributions 
provided to recipients located in a foreign country concerning activities to be pursued in 
that country. For instance, if the Chinese government grants a favorable (non-market-
based) loan to a company established in the EU (a subsidiary of a Chinese company) 
 2 See Nagy, 2019.
 3 Lim, Wang and (Colin) Zeng, 2018; Hancock and Jia, 2019.
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to submit a bid to a European public tender or to carry out an infrastructure project 
in one of the Member States, this will be a foreign subsidy. The term “transnational 
subsidy” refers to three-country scenarios where the granting authority, the recipient 
company and the economic impact are in different states: country “A” grants a financial 
contribution to a company located in country “B”, which, in turn, sells its products or 
services in country “C”.4
WTO law encompasses rather week disciplines when it gets to subsidies. First, 
although product subsidies are regulated, these rules are incapable of handling lavish 
subsidization policies. The GATT and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (“SCM Agreement”) address subsidies in relation to goods. In essence, these 
rules prohibit trade-restrictive subsidies and give member states a powerful tool to 
unilaterally offset the competitive advantage of subsidized products: they may impose 
countervailing duties. Nonetheless, the prohibition on subsidies is rather ineffective 
and hidden state aid (provided by state-owned enterprises via favorable contractual 
terms) remain largely under the radar. Furthermore, it is doubtful if extra-territorial 
subsidies5 are covered by this regime at all. Second, service subsidies are not subject 
to any discipline. They are, in themselves, not prohibited and member states need to 
identify a GATS-conform legal basis to impose countervailing measures in the service 
sector. It has to be stressed that in WTO law “services” encompass a wide range of 
activities and the definition goes way beyond the meaning in EU law.6 Notably, services, 
in addition to cross-border provision and consumption, also include the commercial 
and physical presence of foreign undertakings.7 In EU internal market law, some of 
these scenarios may come under the rules of freedom of establishment8 and free move-
ment of capital.
This paper addresses the issue of subsidies in international trade against the 
above context. First, it gives an overview of the status and treatment of product and 
service subsidies in WTO law and the gaps and shortcomings that result in the sys-
tem’s failure to address trade-distortive state aids. Second, it examines the European 
 4 Cf. White Paper, p. 47 (“a foreign subsidy is a financial contribution benefitting directly or 
indirectly an undertaking in the EU, offering goods or services, or engaging in investments”).
 5 Benitah, 2019.
 6 Article 57 TFEU (“Services shall be considered to be “services” within the meaning of the 
Treaties where they are normally provided for remuneration, in so far as they are not governed 
by the provisions relating to freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons.”).
 7 Article I(2) GATS (“For the purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply 
of a service: (a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member; (b) 
in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member; (c) by a service 
supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member; 
(d) by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in 
the territory of any other Member.”) & XXVIII GATS.
 8 Article 49 TFEU (“Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activi-
ties as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies 
or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions laid 
down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, 
subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital.”).
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Commission’s White Paper on Levelling the Playing Field as Regards Foreign Subsidies 
(“White Paper”), which ushers a comprehensive European response to the problems 
raised by subsidization in international trade. Third, the paper analyzes the WTO 
framework that governs and confines unilateral actions targeting foreign subsidies. 
Fourth, the paper makes a proposal for a complementary way to address the world trade 
system’s “subsidies problem.”
2. Subsidies in WTO law
WTO law contains a comprehensive regime on subsidies in respect to trade in goods. 
Article VI GATT confines member states possibilities to provide product subsidies and 
empowers members that are hit negatively by such subsidies to adopt countervailing 
measures. The SCM Agreement contains a specification of these provisions. Nonethe-
less, these rules apply only to product subsidies, that is, aid provided to manufacturers. 
Furthermore, it is questionable if they apply to extra-territorial subsidies. The ben-
eficiary of an extra-territorial subsidy may be located in the country where the goods 
are sold or in a third country where the goods are produced and from where they are 
exported. It is uncertain, if the GATT’s regime and the accompanied SCM Agreement 
applies merely to subsidies provided to manufacturers located in the territory of the 
providing state.
No disciplines are in place concerning services (at least as to the export-oriented 
aspects of service subsidies, as the national treatment obligation may apply to subsidies 
and, hence, require member states to treat foreign and domestic enterprises located in 
their territory alike). While Article XV GATS contains an inbuilt mandate to negotiate 
and work out a regime on service subsidies, it establishes no discipline, aside from the 
duty of consultation with the members adversely affected.
The GATT prohibits only export subsidies for non-primary products, in Article 
XVI(4), and authorizes member states, in Article VI, to impose countervailing duties. 
Article XVI GATT, although confirming that export subsidies “may have harmful effects 
for other contracting parties”, confines itself to obliging member states who engage 
in subsidization to notify other members and be ready to enter into discussion with 
the affected ones. Special rules are set out for agricultural subsidies (Agreement on 
Agriculture).9
The general prohibition of trade-restrictive product subsidies was introduced 
by a special WTO treaty, the SCM Agreement, which provides special rules on counter-
vailing duties. The SCM Agreement defines three categories of subsidies: export and 
local content subsidies are per se prohibited (prohibited subsidies), other subsidies are 
prohibited only if they have proven adverse effects on the interests of another member. 
Some subsidies are pronounced per se lawful (non-actionable subsidies).
 9 See Bartels, 2016.
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The SCM Agreement has a broad scope of application owing to its wide definition 
of subsidies; still, it is doubtful if it applies to extraterritorial subsidies.
Article 1
Definition of a Subsidy
1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body 
within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “govern-
ment”), i.e. where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, 
and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan 
guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. 
fiscal incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, 
or purchases goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or 
directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illus-
trated in
(i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the 
practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by govern-
ments; or
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of 
GATT 1994; and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
1.2 A subsidy as defined in paragraph 1 shall be subject to the provisions of Part 
II or shall be subject to the provisions of Part III or V only if such a subsidy is 
specific in accordance with the provisions of Article 2.
(…)
2.3 Any subsidy falling under the provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed to be 
specific.
In principle, every specific financial contribution provided by the government or any 
public body that confers a benefit is considered to be a subsidy. State aids of general 
application are not caught in the net of the above disciplines: for a financial contribu-
tion to be covered by the SCM Agreement, it needs to be specific, that is, it needs to 
apply to particular enterprises, a particular sector or region (enterprise-specificity, 
industry-specificity, regional specificity). Prohibited subsidies (export and local content 
subsidies) are regarded specific per se. The term “financial contribution” is conceived 
broadly to encompass (at least theoretically) all benefits not available under free market 
circumstances.
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The SCM Agreement’s definition contains, however, two important loopholes that 
make the regime wanting in relation to government-dominated economies: the status 
of benefits provided by state-owned enterprises10 and extra-territorial subsidies.
First, the application of the SCM Agreement to benefits provided by state-owned 
enterprises is not straightforward. Although a state-owned enterprise may be regarded 
as a “public body”, this can be established only on a case-by-case basis. In United States 
— Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, the 
Appellate Body11 held that a public body is “an entity that possesses, exercises or is 
vested with governmental authority”12 and “control of an entity by a government, in 
itself, is not sufficient to establish that an entity is a public body”,13 hence, the determi-
nation is subject to a rather demanding case-by-case analysis.
Evidence that an entity is, in fact, exercising governmental functions may serve 
as evidence that it possesses or has been vested with governmental authority, 
particularly where such evidence points to a sustained and systematic practice. 
It follows, in our view, that evidence that a government exercises meaningful 
control over an entity and its conduct may serve, in certain circumstances, as 
evidence that the relevant entity possesses governmental authority and exer-
cises such authority in the performance of governmental functions. We stress, 
however, that, apart from an express delegation of authority in a legal instru-
ment, the existence of mere formal links between an entity and government in 
the narrow sense is unlikely to suffice to establish the necessary possession of 
governmental authority. Thus, for example, the mere fact that a government is 
the majority shareholder of an entity does not demonstrate that the government 
exercises meaningful control over the conduct of that entity, much less that the 
government has bestowed it with governmental authority. In some instances, 
however, where the evidence shows that the formal indicia of government control 
are manifold, and there is also evidence that such control has been exercised in 
a meaningful way, then such evidence may permit an inference that the entity 
concerned is exercising governmental authority.14
The status and autonomy of state-owned enterprises is obviously not uniform in the 
member states, which feature extremely huge differences. The Appellate Body intro-
duced a presumption in favor of independence. This may be a realistic assumption in 
some member states but, in others, it may appear to be credulous and repugnant to the 
reality. This presumption is apparently based on the WTO’s original paradigm (western 
 10 See Chiang, 2018. 
 11 Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted Mar. 11, 2011).
 12 Para. 317.
 13 Para. 320.
 14 Para. 318.
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constitutional democracies) and turns a blind eye to the realities of government-
dominated economies.
Second, there is some uncertainty as to whether the WTO regime applies to 
subsidies provided by a member state to a recipient located in the territory of another 
member state (extra-territorial subsidies). The depth of the problem is revealed by a 
recent decision of the European Commission, where the EU adopted countervailing 
duties on imports from certain Chinese enterprises located in Egypt for their receiv-
ing subsidies from the Chinese government. Lead by the desire to ensure a firm legal 
basis, the Commission argued that the Chinese subsidies granted to Chines enter-
prises located in Egypt could, on the basis of general international law, be regarded 
as subsidies provided by Egypt itself, hence, the regime on countervailing measures 
applied.15
Article 1 of the SCM Agreement defines “subsidy” as “a financial contribution 
by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in 
this Agreement as ‘government’).”16 Furthermore, Article 2.1. of the SCM Agreement 
makes a similar implicit reference: “[i]n order to determine whether a subsidy, as 
defined in paragraph 1 of Article 1, is specific to an enterprise or industry or group of 
enterprises or industries (referred to in this Agreement as ‘certain enterprises’) within 
the jurisdiction of the granting authority, the following principles shall apply…”.17 As to 
Article 1 one may forcefully argue that the phrase “within the territory of a Member” is 
related to the term “public body” and not the term “subsidy”, that is, this phrase simply 
confirms that solely subsidies provided by public bodies located “within the territory 
of a Member” are relevant. This is reinforced by the fact that in the brackets the text 
provides a shorthand for “a government or any public body.” If the phrase “within the 
territory of a Member” were aimed to provide a territorial confinement for the payment 
of the subsidy, it would be after the brackets. Furthermore, less convincingly, but one 
may still argue in respect to Article 2 that the phrase “within the jurisdiction of the 
granting authority” may embrace not only territorial but also personal jurisdiction, 
thus extending the scope of this provision to recipients located outside the territory 
of the member state concerned. Finally, Article 2.1. inserts the phrase “within the 
jurisdiction” into the definition of specificity but, at the same time, Article 2.3. provides 
that per se prohibited subsidies (that is, export and local content subsidies) are legally 
presumed to be specific, hence, they do not come under the definition set out in Article 
 15 Commission Regulation 2020/776 imposing definitive countervailing duties on imports of cer-
tain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originating in the People’s Republic of China and 
Egypt and amending Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/492 imposing definitive 
anti-dumping duties on imports of certain woven and/or stitched glass fibre fabrics originat-
ing in the People’s Republic of China and Egypt. OJ L 189/1, 15.6.2020. para 699.; Commission 
Regulation 2020/870 imposing a definitive countervailing duty and definitively collecting 
the provisional countervailing duty imposed on imports of continuous filament glass fibre 
products originating in Egypt, and levying the definitive countervailing duty on the registered 
imports of continuous filament glass fibre products originating in Egypt. OJ L 201/10, 25.6.2020.
 16 Emphasis added.
 17 Crochet and Hegde, 2020.
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2.1.18 So it can be safely argued that at least transnational export and local content 
subsidies are caught in the net of the SCM Agreement, in addition to the prohibition of 
Article XVI(4) GATT on export subsidies for non-primary products.
All in all, the WTO’s legal architecture appears to have various shortcomings, 
which make it incapable of confronting mass subsidization. The status of benefits 
provided by state-owned enterprises and the burden of proof faced by member states 
who want to have state-owned enterprises acts attributed to their home state open a 
wide playing field for government-dominated economies. The status of transnational 
subsidies is uncertain, while service subsidies are subject to no explicit WTO law 
discipline.
3. The EU’s response to extra-territorial subsidies
On June 17, 2020, the European Commission adopted the White Paper on Levelling the 
Playing Field as Regards Foreign Subsidies. The White Paper responds to the danger 
posed by “state sponsored unfair trading practices, which disregard market forces and 
abuse existing international rules, with a view to building up dominance across various 
sectors of economic activity.”19 Non-EU Subsidies may promote foreign undertakings’ 
existing activities in the EU, enable them to underbid their non-subsidized competitors 
at public tenders and help them to acquire EU companies. The White Paper identifies 
the major gaps in the international disciplines (and EU law mechanisms) on subsidies 
and proposes a set of rules to neutralize unfair trade practices and to ensure a level 
playing field in international trade and in the EU internal market.
Interestingly, the White Paper addresses merely extra-territorial subsidies 
and envisages no special rules as to product subsidies, even though, as noted above, 
subsidies provided by state-owned enterprises may raise serious issues in government 
dominated systems.
The White Paper confirms the Commission’s position that EU (and international) 
anti-subsidy rules do apply to transnational subsidies (presumably because they are 
attributable to the state where the recipient enterprise is located). However, “trade 
in services, investment or other financial flows in relation to the establishment and 
operation of undertakings in the EU” are not covered by anti-subsidy disciplines.20 
“On the international level, the EU can bring litigation against a WTO Member for 
breaches of the SCM Agreement, in particular when a WTO Member grants subsidies, 
prohibited under that Agreement, or subsidies that cause adverse effects to its interests, 
and have the matter adjudicated by a WTO panel. However, the scope of application of 
the SCM Agreement is also limited to trade in goods. The WTO GATS contains an inbuilt 
 18 Crochet and Hegde, 2020.
 19 Crochet and Hegde, 2020, p. 4..
 20 Crochet and Hegde, 2020, p. 10.
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mandate to develop rules for subsidies in the area of trade in services, but thus far, no 
such rules have been developed.”21
The proposed measures are made up of three layers. A set of measures of general 
application is proposed to cover all foreign subsidies granted to economic operators 
established or active in the EU market (Module 1), which are meant to offset both 
product and service subsidies, and two special regimes governing foreign subsidies 
provided in the context of acquisitions of EU targets (Module 2) and bids in public 
procurement in the EU (Module 3). The term “acquisition” covers not only take-overs 
(where decisive control is obtained) but also to the acquisition of non-controlling 
minority rights or shareholdings and other transactions that result in “material influ-
ence” being acquired in an EU undertaking. As noted above, in the parlance of GATS, 
commercial presence is a mode of service supply, hence, subsidies granted in the 
context of acquisitions may qualify as service subsidies. The decisive trigger in all 
three modules is that the subsidy is foreign, that is, it is provided by a third country. 
The proposed measures are modelled after EU state aid rules, which apply solely to 
state aids granted by Member States22 and, hence, do not cover subsidies provided by 
foreign governments. The term “subsidy” has to be conceived broadly; in the context 
of acquisitions, in addition to the benefits explicitly linked to the transaction, it also 
covers indirectly related aids (e.g. measures that enhance the acquirer’s financial 
strength and, thus, facilitate the acquisition).
The operation of Module 1 is based on ex post investigations, while Modules 2 
and 3 create an ex ante system and a duty of notification. Hence, the measures to be 
adopted as a result of the investigation slightly differ as to the three modules. None-
theless, they are all “redressive measures” aimed to obviate the repercussions of the 
foreign subsidy and could range from structural remedies and behavioral measures 
to re-payment.
The investigation extends to three core issues: existence of a subsidy, distortion 
in the internal market and the subsidy’s redeeming virtue, that is, “the positive impact 
that the supported economic activity or investment might have within the EU or on a 
public policy interest recognised by the EU.”23 If a distortive subsidy has a redeeming 
virtue, the distortion and the positive effects have to be balanced. The EU’s public 
policy objectives include, for instance, the creation of jobs, climate neutrality goals, 
environmental protection, digital transformation, security, public order, public safety 
and resilience.
 21 Crochet and Hegde, 2020, p. 10.
 22 According to Article 107(1) TFEU: “1. Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted 
by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens 
to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods 
shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
market.” (emphasis added)
 23 Crochet and Hegde, 2020, p. 14.
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4. WTO law concerns
The White Paper is a novel and unprecedented attempt to address extra-territorial 
subsidies and may call for the interpretation of various aspects of WTO law, which so 
far have simply not been tested in practice.
As to trade in goods, there are two important WTO law restraints that need to be 
considered. First, Article VI GATT permits countervailing duties only up-to the amount 
of the subsidy. Second, Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement rules out unilateral measures 
against subsidies beyond the ones allowed by the Agreement itself.
Article VI GATT authorizes member states to adopt anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duties. Absent this provision, members would not be allowed to adopt such 
measures, as these may go counter to their tariff-bindings24 and the MFN principle.25 
As a corollary, they may adopt countervailing (and anti-dumping) measures only to the 
extent enabled by Article VI, which, in turn, caps countervailing duties at the amount 
of the subsidy.
3. No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of another contracting party in 
excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have 
been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export 
of such product in the country of origin or exportation, including any special 
subsidy to the transportation of a particular product. The term “countervail-
ing duty” shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose 
of offsetting any bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the 
manufacture, production or export of any merchandise.
Second, Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement rules out unilateral measures against sub-
sidies that are not compliant with the Agreement.
No specific action against a subsidy of another Member can be taken except 
in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this 
Agreement.
This may raise problems of interpretation. Arguably, the above provision might prevent 
members from adopting unilateral measures in response to transnational subsidies 
(except they can attribute the subsidy, on the basis of international law, to the state 
where the recipient is located), if the meaning of “subsidy” in Article 32.1 is not equated 
with the definition in Article 1. According to this line of interpretation, Article 1 defines 
the subsidies that may be potentially prohibited under the SCM Agreement, implying 
 24 Article II GATT.
 25 Article I GATT.
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that subsidies not coming under this definition qualify as permitted subsidies. This 
is corroborated by Article 32.1’s reference to the SCM Agreement as an interpretation 
of the GATT (“in accordance with the provisions of GATT 1994, as interpreted by this 
Agreement.”). This suggests that the SCM Agreement is an authoritative and binding 
interpretation of Article VI GATT and, hence, subsidies not covered by the Agreement 
are not covered by Article VI GATT either.
On the other hand, the exhaustive nature of the SCM Agreement is falsified by 
the fact that the Agreement contains a detailed list of expressly permitted subsidies 
(in Part IV), labelled as “non-actionable.” Why did member states permit transna-
tional subsidies by means of a narrow definition of “subsidy” and not by a specific 
rule, if they really wanted to exempt them? The language and structure of the SCM 
Agreement suggests that transnational subsidies were left out because they did not 
exist (or at least they were not widespread) at the time and the drafters’ imagination 
did not extend to them. This is reinforced by the footnote attached to Article 32.1 of 
the SCM Agreement (footnote 56), confirming the intention that the Agreement was 
not meant to be the exhaustive regulation of countervailing measures adopted in 
response to subsidies.
This paragraph is not intended to preclude action under other relevant provi-
sions of GATT 1994, where appropriate.
Taking the above into account, it seems to be more plausible that by adopting the SCM 
Agreement, member states did not give up the authorization conferred on them by 
Article VI, which applies to subsidized products at large, irrespective of whether the 
source is a domestic or an extraterritorial subsidy. It would be contradictory to argue 
that Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement uses the term “subsidy” in a wider sense than 
the definition of Article 1 that sets out the very scope of the Agreement. If the scope of 
the Agreement does not extend to a subsidy, none of its provisions should apply to it, 
including Article 32.1.
While WTO law contains no disciplines on service subsidies, it sets out limi-
tations on unilateral measures adopted in response to them. The most important 
question is whether these countervailing measures may go counter to National 
Treatment as provided in Article XVII GATS and the Agreement on Government 
Procurement.
Because extraterritorial subsidies very likely target foreign or foreign-owned 
companies, countervailing measures adopted in response to them may amount to de 
facto discrimination or a restriction on market access. Of course, these provisions of 
the GATS are relevant only if a member state made the corresponding commitments 
under its schedule. However, the EU would have a good case in this regard. First, in 
the decisional practice of the DSB, asymmetric impact does not equal discrimina-
tion and, hence, in itself, does not violate the requirement of National Treatment. To 
prove such a violation, the complainant needs to prove that the distinction is based 
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on national origin and asymmetric impact, in itself, does not prove that. For instance, 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s decision in Dominican Republic – Measures Affect-
ing the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes suggests that asymmetric impact, at 
least in itself, may not be sufficient to establish discrimination: it needs to accrue 
from national origin.26 Furthermore, legitimate regulatory distinctions do not violate 
National Treatment. As to both of these arguments it is decisive that the EU has a very 
comprehensive and rigorous state aid regime in place and the treatment of foreign 
subsidies is modelled after this regime. In fact, in the EU there is an inverse discrimi-
nation in place: EU member states are prohibited from granting subsidies restrictive 
of competition in the internal market, while foreign states are not. The White Paper 
merely envisages extending to foreign governments the rules that, for the time being, 
apply solely to EU Member States. This circumstance also justifies a reference to the 
GATS’ General Exceptions. Article XIV(c) GATS exempts measures aimed to comply 
with internal regulations. EU state aid law, which is part of EU competition law, may 
be regarded as such a regulation. As EU state aid law applies to intra-EU transac-
tions, no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on trade 
may emerge.
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on 
trade in services, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures:
(…)
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
The Agreement on Government Procurement contains no general exceptions, however, 
a “legitimate regulatory distinction” test may be reasonably applied here.
Of course, in terms of WTO law assessment, the devil will lie in the details. 
The validity of the claim that the extension of EU state aid rules to extra-territorial 
subsidies is not discriminatory will ultimately depend on how this regime is shaped. 
There are some points that should be mentioned here. One the one hand, EU state 
aid rules will not be applied in their entirety but will serve only as a model for the 
treatment of foreign subsidies. There may be some minor differences, for instance, the 
block exemption regulations may not apply. On the other hand, although it could be 
argued that this is due to the different characteristics of domestic and extra-territorial 
subsidies, the application and enforcement of these rules will be different, the same 
as the remedies available.
 26 See e.g. Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic – Measures Affecting the Importation and 
Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS302/AB/R (adopted Apr. 25, 2005), para 96.
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5. Alternative means to address excessive subsidization: proposal for an 
offensive strategy
In the wake of the emergence of government-dominated economies, most trading 
nations reacted to the increasing level of subsidization via defensive measures. Some 
of these were traditional regulatory measures well-known for the world trade system, 
such as adopting countervailing duties on subsidized import products. As seen above, 
this policy, framed by the SCM Agreements, was extended to transnational subsidies, 
where the recipient of the aid is located outside the providing country and ships the 
subsidized products to a third country. Some other measures tried to use novel, creative 
ways to react. An example of these is the US tariffs on aluminum and steel, which hit 
a major blow to WTO law.27 Nonetheless, one aspect of the subject has been largely 
overlooked: subsidies are reprehensible not only because they distort competition in 
the targeted markets, but also because they should be made equally available to foreign 
enterprises settled in the territory of the granting member state. National treatment 
is a central principle of both trade in goods and services. Even though GATS National 
Treatment is conditional in the sense that it is subject to the member’s schedule of 
commitments, if a commitment was entered and state aid was not excluded from it, the 
requirement of national treatment extends to subsidies as well.
Although the GATS contains no explicit disciplines on subsidies, it does apply 
to them.28 Article I(1) provides that the GATS applies to “measures by Members affect-
ing trade in services” and, as confirmed by the travaux préparatoires, subsidies are just 
that.29 This also follows from the fact that the GATS contains rules on subsidies in 
Article XV: although this provision has no practical significance, as it provides merely 
for consultation, it corroborates that the GATS itself applies to subsidies. As a corollary, 
GATS provisions, if not specifically excluded, apply to service subsidies. These include 
Article II on Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment, Article III on Transparency, Article VIII 
on Monopolies and Exclusive Service Suppliers and last but not least Article XVII on 
 27 Nagy, 2019.
 28 Note that “services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority” (“any service which 
is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service sup-
pliers.”), as provided in Article I(3)(b)(c) GATS, we well as, traffic rights and services directly 
related to the exercise of traffic rights, as provided in Article 2 of the Annex on Air Transport 
Services, are not covered by the GATS.
 29 GATT Document MTN.GNS/W/164, 3 Sep. 1993 “Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in 
Services: Explanatory Note”, para 9-10 (“9. Article XVII applies to subsidy-type measures in the 
same way that it applies to all other measures. Article XV (Subsidies) merely obliges Members 
to “enter into negotiations with a view to developing the necessary multilateral disciplines” to 
counter the distortive effects caused by subsidies. Therefore, any subsidy which is a discrimi-
natory measure within the meaning of Article XVII would have to be either scheduled as a 
limitation on national treatment or brought into conformity with that
  Article. Subsidy-type measures are also not excluded from the scope of Article II (M.f.n.). An 
exclusion of such measures would require a legal definition of subsidies which is currently not 
provided for under the GATS.”)
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National Treatment. The language of the GATS also suggests such a conclusion, as the 
GATT excludes subsidies from the scope of national treatment in Article III:8(b) and 
there is no such exclusion in the GATS. This implies that without such an exclusion 
subsidies are covered by the principle of National Treatment.
All in all, once a subsidy, let it be a favorable loan or a bailout, affects trade 
in services, it is covered by the GATS, including the principle of National Treatment. 
Consequently, WTO members are, in principle, expected to treat domestic and foreign 
services and service providers even-handedly concerning subsidies, subject to the 
terms of their respective schedules of commitments.
Article XVII GATS
1. In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and 
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service 
suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of 
services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services 
and service suppliers.
2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according to services 
and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment 
or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like services and 
service suppliers.
3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be 
less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of services 
or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers 
of any other Member.
Member states are not obliged to take measures outside their territorial jurisdiction,30 
however, within their territory they are subject to National Treatment. This implies 
that there is no legal basis to extend subsidies provided to an enterprise in a foreign 
market. On the other hand, contrary to extra-territorial subsidies, domestic subsidies 
are governed by the principle of National Treatment. For instance, if China subsidizes 
a Chinese company located in the EU, Article XVII GATS does not apply; however, if 
China subsidizes companies located in China, this benefits has to be extended to the 
enterprises of other WTO members which are located there. Commercial and physi-
cal presence are two of the four modes of supply of services, hence, investments are 
covered by the GATS. Commercial presence is defined by Article XXVIII(d) GATS as “any 
type of business or professional establishment, including through (i) the constitution, 
acquisition or maintenance of a juridical person, or (ii) the creation or maintenance of 
 30 GATT Document MTN.GNS/W/164, 3 Sep. 1993 “Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in 
Services: Explanatory Note”, para 9-10 (“10. There is no obligation in the GATS which requires 
a Member to take measures outside its territorial jurisdiction. It therefore follows that the 
national treatment obligation in Article XVII does not require a Member to extend such treat-
ment to a service supplier located in the territory of another Member.”)
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a branch or a representative office, within the territory of a Member for the purpose 
of supplying a service.”
Of course, the GATS’ National Treatment obligations are conditioned on the 
provisions of the individual member’s schedule of commitments, which may contain 
horizontal limitations or exclude or confine national treatment in individual sectors. 
Hence, the effectiveness and practical relevance of the above constructions is condi-
tional. Nonetheless, absent exclusions and limitations, National Treatment fully applies 
to subsidies and may be a useful tool to counteract excessive subsidization policies.
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Constitutional Issues of the Judicial Career in Western 
Balkan States (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, North Macedonia)
 ■ ABSTRACT: In all four states analysed in this study, the judiciary and judicial career 
have been undergoing years-long legislative changes, with this ‘reform’, however, still 
pending finalisation. Another common feature is the effort to take judicial career 
decision-making away from political factors and entrust it to independent authorities 
wherein judges have the final word. It is considered the attainment of the principles 
of independence and autonomy of the judicial branch of power. However, the adop-
tion of legal acts over the past decade was not sufficient to achieve entirely objective 
elections and decisions on the promotion of judges. The reality in these states reveals 
that there are strong and, in numerous cases, decisive informal (political and interest) 
influences on judicial career development decisions. The author’s basic assumption is 
that for the full effect of the adopted regulations to occur, it will take more time for the 
constitutional institutions to be strengthened, and the political awareness of citizens 
will increase.
 ■ KEYWORDS: judicial power, judicial career, Constitution, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia.
1. Introduction
The system of government of present-day states is, in the significant majority, based on 
the division of power. Amongst the highest branches of power lies, besides the legisla-
tive and the executive, judicial power. It is, organisationally and functionally, separated 
from political powers, legislative, and executive. This means that courts are organised 
separately from the government, parliament, and public administration, and that their 
operations cannot be influenced externally. The basis of this status of courts is in the 
 1 Full Professor, Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Novi Sad, Serbia, 
s.orlovic@pf.uns.ac.rs.
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constitutional principles of independence and autonomy, which guarantee that courts 
are functionally independent and organisationally autonomous.2 Every legal state 
presumes the functioning of an independent judiciary, which excludes any influence 
and pressure from the political branch.3
Besides the principles of independence and autonomy, constitutions also 
usually provide for other guarantees for the independent operation of courts and 
judges, such as the legal basis for trial (constitution, law, international treaty…), the 
publicity of trial, two-instance procedure, permanency of courts and of the judicial 
function, non-transferability and immunity of judges, and material security. Constitu-
tions make no provisions for the organisation (network) of courts – except for the 
Supreme Court; rather, they provide a constitutional-legal basis upon which to build 
(institutionalise) the judiciary, which includes the prosecution. Apart from the said 
principles and provisions governing the highest court, there are provisions on the 
manner of election and dismissal of judges, on authorities electing and dismissing 
judges, the prohibition of courts-martial, and others. Other issues in the judicial 
branch are a matter of law.
Legal regulation of the judicial career involves more than a few issues: election 
and term of office of judges, eligibility requirements and criteria for the promotion of 
judges to higher instance courts, and termination of judicial office. While key aspects 
of the judicial career, such as election and termination of office, are regulated by the 
constitution and elaborated by law, professional advancement requirements for judges 
are enshrined in the law, and standards and criteria of career development made a 
matter of by-laws (usually the rulebooks).
The study addresses a few issues related to the status of the judge, namely, the 
manner of election of judges and the role of autonomous judicial bodies in the election 
and dismissal procedures, as well as the composition of those judicial bodies, which 
can be crucial.4 Furthermore, it outlines the methods of evaluating the quality and effi-
 2 Judicial independence comprises: the essential (substantive) independence of the judge, which 
means that judges rule based on their knowledge, bound by law, and beyond external influ-
ence; and personal independence of the judge; thus, judges have a permanent and protected 
position and they rule objectively and free from bias. Ljubanović, 2013, p. 127.
 3 Pejić, 2013, p. 113. 
 4 According to comparative experience, judicial council can comprise three types of members: 
representatives of the judiciary – judges, representatives of the legislative and/or executive 
branch, and representatives of the legal profession, in some states even of the unions. Ibid, 
p. 118. For autonomous decision-making by that body, it is crucial who comprises it and who 
elects its members, but there is no uniform model. Different solutions are offered: judicial 
council solely comprising judges elected by judges (excellent solution, existed in France 
under the law from 1883); Judicial Council of mixed composition with three variants: Council 
comprising a majority of judges and a minority of non-judges (In Italy, the minority is made up 
of law professors and law practitioners; in Poland, they are members of Parliament), Council 
comprising a minority of judges (France, under 1946 Constitution), or one with equal number 
of judges and non-judges (Belgium, under 1999 Constitution); judicial council comprising solely 
judges elected by the Parliament (in Spain, under the Organic law of 1985); council composition 
is political, members are elected by the Parliament or the Government. Petrov, 2013, p. 44. 
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ciency of judges and their impact on career advancement, the possibilities for electing 
as judges legal professionals from outside the judiciary, and the possible participation 
in trials by persons being legal professionals but not elected as judges.
The comparative study includes four states of the ‘Western Balkans’: Serbia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. From the analysis of the 
constitutional and other provisions regulating the above issues, accompanied by a 
presentation of the theoretical basis of positive law solutions, a picture will be grasped 
of whether the constitutional-legal status of judges and their professional development 
in the respective states are appropriate. Moreover, whether they form part of the ‘Euro-
pean standards’ regarding the judicial branch of power.
2. Judicial career in Serbia
The parliamentary system in the Republic of Serbia is based on the separation of 
powers into the legislative, executive, and judicial, where judicial power is indepen-
dent (Art. 4 of the Constitution).5 The Constitution, regarding the judicial career, 
makes provisions only for the election and term of office of judges and for their legal 
status (immunity, non-transferability) that protect them against external influences. 
The questions of who can become a judge and what criteria they must satisfy for 
the first and higher instance courts are regulated by law. By-laws lay down the cri-
teria for the professional advancement of judges and the manner of assessing their 
performance.
 ■ 2.1. Judicial election procedure and role of autonomous bodies in judicial career
In Serbia, judges are elected in two ways. The first concerns the election of a novice 
judge to a term of office for three years, following the end of which they can be elected 
to a permanent function.6 Formal eligibility requirements for applying for the position 
of a judge at any court include that the candidate must be a citizen of the country, 
meet general conditions for employment in public authorities,7 have graduated from 
the Faculty of Law, have passed the bar exam, and have law-related work experi-
ence. Experience in the judiciary means that the candidate has passed the training 
 5 The constitutional provision of the same Article that ‘the relationship among the three 
branches of power shall be based on balance and mutual control’ is not acceptable in view of 
the nature and manner of operation of the judicial branch, nor is it consistent with another 
constitutional provision that ‘court decisions may not be a subject of extrajudicial control’ (Art. 
145, para. 3).
 6 This solution is not alone in the comparative constitutionalism. France, Greece, the Nether-
lands, Germany, and Austria are some of the states with probationary period for judges that 
makes it possible ‘to eliminate from the judiciary the persons unworthy of the judicial calling’. 
Simović, 2013, pp. 96-97.
 7 Not having been convicted to a prison sentence of at least six months and other requirements 
from Art. 45 of the Civil Servants Act (2005).
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programme, the so-called mentoring training system.8 In addition to these criteria, the 
candidate must also meet the requirements of expertise, competence, and worthiness. 
The required experience is that of law (potentially also from outside the judiciary) 
gained upon passing the bar exam. It varies depending on the court applied for – from 
two years for a judge of the Misdemeanour Court to 12 years for a judge of the Supreme 
Court of Cassation. A judge of the Court of Appeal must have at least 10 years of post-bar 
exam experience.
The requirement for expertise and competence means possessing theoretical 
and practical knowledge, which is verified by the quality of passed judgements for 
judges applying for a higher court or for a permanent judicial function. For novice 
judges, the proof of expertise refers to the passed professional exam organised by an 
independent authority (autonomous body), the High Judicial Council, or the final mark 
from the Judicial Academy training assigned to its trainee. The requirement for worthi-
ness concerns the moral traits of the judge, such as honesty, conscientiousness, dignity, 
and others, and is evaluated by the High Judicial Council.
The High Judicial Council is a body of constitutional category, independent and 
autonomous, with its major responsibility being to elect all judges, except for those to 
be elected for the first time. Its composition, members’ status, and powers are regulated 
by the Constitution, with more specific provisions being enshrined in the High Judicial 
Council Act (2008). Judges comprise the majority of this body, with a total of seven 
members (besides the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation, SCC), while other 
elected members include law professors and law practitioners (solicitors). Members by 
function, besides the SCC President, are the Minister of Justice9 and the Chairperson 
of the Parliamentary Judiciary Committee. All eight elected members were selected 
by the National Assembly for a five-year term. Apart from deciding on the election and 
dismissal of judges, the SCC makes proposals to the National Assembly for judges for 
the first election and presidents of courts, participates in the procedure for the termina-
tion of office of court presidents, and performs other duties as required by law. These 
powers of the Council allow it to act as a guarantor of the independence and autonomy 
of courts and judges. However, for it to be so, there are views, it must be granted full 
power over the process of election and dismissal of all court presidents and judges, and 
particularly those elected for the first time, but for no fixed term of office.10
 8 “The European continental system generally features three models of lawyers’ training for the 
exercise of judicial duties: mentoring training system (Austria, Germany, Serbia), training sys-
tem within a training institution – academy (France, Spain, Portugal) and a combined system 
(the Netherlands, Italy) where training is a combination of the mentoring system and seminars 
held within training centres”. Boljević et al, 2019, p. 40. In the process of formation of a judge, 
there must be a uniform training programme wherein stakeholder institutions (Faculty of Law, 
courts, Judicial Academy, High Judicial Council) will cooperate with one another. Ibid., p. 63.
 9 The experience with previous ‘reform’ (cited by S.O) of judiciary in Serbia (2008-12) implies that 
the Minister’s membership in this body should be discontinued. Marković, 2017, p. 211.
 10 Petrović Škero, 2020, p. 37.
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A candidate who is elected to the judicial office for the first time is finally decided 
by the National Assembly, by a majority vote of the total number of members (absolute 
majority). The public vacancy announcement is followed by the verification and evalua-
tion of election eligibility requirements. It involves a judicial entrance exam – a testing 
of theoretical and practical knowledge (expertise) and skills of applying the acquired 
knowledge (competence), for which an appropriate mark is assigned.11 The examination 
is not required for candidates who have graduated from the Judicial Academy, and this 
practice has been subject to criticism by professional circles.12 Although the Academy 
no longer holds a monopoly over the election of new judges, as a ‘recruitment centre’, it 
has still been under the considerable influence of politics.13 The High Judicial Council 
will, for each judicial post, propose one candidate for the National Assembly. The 
Assembly can only choose those specific candidates rather than other, non-proposed 
and qualifying candidates. The election of the first-time judge on a limited-term basis 
is, in fact, a kind of probation.
Judges with permanent tenure are elected from among the candidates respond-
ing to public vacancy announcements. The High Judicial Council verifies and assesses 
their fulfilment of general and specific election requirements, conducts interviews 
(through its Committee), and makes a final decision on the election of a judge. The 
High Judicial Council decides on the termination of the judicial function, particularly 
on the dismissal that may be subject to the right of appeal.14
Performance assessment is a key step for the promotion of judges. The aspects 
evaluated were quality and quantity of work.15 A regulation passed by the High Judi-
 11 „Правилник о програму и начину полагања испита на коме се оцењује стручност и 
оспособљеност кандидата за судију који се први пут бира“, 2018. (‘Rulebook on the pro-
gramme and manner of taking the exam assessing the expertise and competence of judicial candidates 
being elected for the first time’)
 12 Its trainees take the final exam at the Academy. ‘(…) by no means can we speak of autonomy 
of the Public Prosecutorial Council and High Judicial Council with respect to determining 
candidates for the first election to the judicial function, given that the said legislative solu-
tions prevent them from testing the expertise and competence of candidates coming from the 
Judicial Academy, that is, when, as autonomous and independent bodies, they have one more 
time been bound by the final grade from the initial training at the Judicial Academy, having to 
accept it as a pre-determined one’. Lazović, 2018, p. 10.
 13 What gives rise to concern is the fact that the Ministry of Justice has a substantial influence on 
the Academy’s composition: three of nine members of the Managing Board are nominated by 
Government directly, including one officer from the respective Ministry. The Ministry is also 
responsible for supervising the Academy’s overall performance. Fagan and Dimitrova, 2019, 
p. 229.
 14 On the procedure for the dismissal of judges, see Spasojević, 2016, pp. 44-61. Importantly, the 
protection of judges’ rights in the decision-making on the termination of the judicial office, or 
the dismissal of the judge, has retained the status of a constitutional matter, namely through 
the institution of appeal to the Constitutional Court. Pajvančić, 2011, p. 19.
 15 Spasojević, 2015, pp. 49-56
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cial Council sets out the means for judicial performance assessment.16 This rulebook 
should establish objective criteria and standards for the assessment of eligibility for the 
election and promotion of judges with permanent tenure: expertise, competence, and 
worthiness (the latter is assumed). It is crucial for the promotion requirements not to 
be such as to make judges feel the internal pressure to focus their work on deciding as 
many cases as possible in a short time, which, eventually, makes it impossible to make 
quality decisions.17
The judicial branch is not closed for lawyers who have gained experience in other 
social fields. Although most of the novice judges are elected from the judiciary, from among 
former trainees and expert associates, a person from another social field, the economy 
or finance, for example, can be elected as a judge if he/she meets general and specific 
requirements for election. Candidates from the judiciary are not formally preferred to 
other candidates, although at the interview, they can be valued as an advantage.
There are no obstacles to choosing a lawyer from outside the judiciary even as 
a judge in a higher court, all to the Supreme Court of Cassation, provided that, career-
wise, he/she had already performed the judicial function (left the court once and now 
reapplies for a judge). If this requirement is not satisfied, then in a higher court as 
well, the candidate must first be elected to a three-year term of office (as a person who 
is being elected for the first time), and only after that to a permanent tenure. While 
legally possible, there have been no cases in practice, since the formation of the judicial 
council of electing novice judges to higher courts; instead, the judicial career com-
menced with election to the first-instance courts.
Judicial vocation is performed professionally, and the Constitution forbids per-
forming, along with the judicial, of any other functions and duties as an occupation or 
those incompatible with judicial ones. What functions, activities, or private interests 
are incompatible with judicial duties regulated by law? The Constitution explicitly 
prohibits ‘political activity of judges’ (Art. 152). What in a trial represents the ‘citizens’ 
voice’ – final judgements are passed ‘in the name of the people’ is the participation 
therein of lay judges. In the jury system of Serbia, lay judges form the majority in the 
trial court panel (sometimes, cases are tried by a single judge, a professional one), 
and this practice, as explained, prevents the seclusion of courts as public authorities 
that would comprise professional judges alone (as some kind of ‘coterie’). Lay judges 
constitute a layman element of the trial panel and one that influences the passing of 
not only lawful but also fair judgements. Participation in a trial is not made possible for 
other legal professionals, such as professors of law, who concurrently exercise judicial 
function (it is only possible within the Constitutional Court).
 16 „Правилник о критеријумима и мерилима за оцену стручности, оспособљености и 
достојности за избор судије на сталној судијској функцији у други или виши суд и о 
критеријумима за предлагање кандидата за председника суда“, 2016. (‘The Rulebook on the 
criteria and standards for the evaluation of expertise, competence, and worthiness for the election of 
judges with permanent tenure to another or higher court and on the criteria for proposing candidates 
for court presidents)
 17 Boljević, 2017, p. 90.
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3. Judicial career in Montenegro
In Montenegro, the basis of the parliamentary system is the division of power into 
three branches: legislative (parliament), executive (government), and judicial. There 
is the exact same provision as in the Serbian Constitution that ‘the relationship of 
powers shall be based on balance and mutual control’ (Art. 11, para. 3). Therefore, 
the same criticism stands that the judiciary cannot be independent and, at the same 
time, controlled by the parliament and the government. A rule of a legal state resulting 
from the division of power is that court decisions can be reviewed solely by a higher 
court directly. The Constitution contains principles on the judiciary (independence 
and autonomy, collective trial, publicity, permanence, immunity, and incompatibility 
of functions), several provisions on the election and dismissal of judges, the Supreme 
Court, and, thoroughly, on an autonomous body responsible for electing judges, the 
Judicial Council.18 The issues of eligibility and evaluation of candidates for judges and 
the election procedure itself are a matter of law.19 Sub-legal level norms also exist: the 
Judicial Council adopted a regulation concerning the standards for the development of 
the career of a judge, ‘Rules for the Assessment of Judges and Court Presidents’ (2015).20 
The fact that the Constitution fails to proclaim that the establishment, organisation, 
powers, and composition of the judiciary be regulated by law made it possible to regu-
late all these issues by by-laws, which increases the influence of the executive branch 
on the independence of the judiciary.21
 ■ 3.1. Judicial election procedure and role of autonomous bodies in the judicial career
The manner of election of judges (and presidents of courts) is determined by the 
Constitution and the election procedure, more precisely, by the Act on the Judicial 
Council and Judges (2015). Unlike in Serbia, there is no mention of a time-limited 
judicial term of office in Montenegro; rather, the judicial function is permanent. All 
judges are elected by an autonomous body, the Judicial Council, as an ‘independent and 
autonomous body that ensures the independence and autonomy of courts and judges 
’(Art. 126 of the Constitution). Under the Act, the Judicial Council is ‘perceived as a key 
actor of the judiciary expected to exercise its powers entirely transparently, responsi-
bly, and efficiently’.22 It also decides on the termination of the judicial office, including 
the dismissal. The Judicial Council conducts a procedure wherein the qualification 
 18 A special body in charge of human resources in the judiciary was introduced already by the 
Act on Courts of 1991, since the point of which, its composition and powers have been subject 
to continual revisions. Vukčević and Bošković, 2016, p. 22.
 19 For details on the judicial election body, criteria, performance evaluation, and accountability 
of judges, see. ibid., pp. 18-25.
 20 The new matter of measuring the productivity of judges was considered a basis for the judicial 
system in Montenegro to take a step closer to the standards of EU members. Ibid., p. 18.
 21 Čupić, 2011, p. 7. 
 22 Vukčević and Bošković, 2016, p. 19.
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of judges for promotion is evaluated (performance assessment, interview) and passes 
decisions on judicial promotions, i.e., election to a higher instance court. Therefore, 
the entire judicial career, from the first election to office, through promotion, up to the 
termination of office is ‘covered’ and decided by the Judicial Council.
While the Judicial Council is constitutionally proclaimed as an independent and 
autonomous body entrusted with all essential authorities within the judicial system, 
its composition reveals that it is not immune to the influence of political power. This 
influence can even become dominant in decision-making because representatives of 
judicial power can potentially remain in the minority. Despite recommendations for 
making judges comprise a majority in this body and for revoking the Justice Minister’s 
membership by function, these constitutional changes have never become a reality.23 
In the composition of 10 members, the judiciary is represented by the President of the 
Supreme Court and four judges elected by the Conference of Judges. They suspend 
exercising their judicial duties during this mandate, which is what the theory in fact 
required.24 ‘Representatives’ of the political power are four ‘prominent lawyers’ elected 
by the Parliament, and as the fifth, the Minister responsible for the judiciary.25 The 
President of the Judicial Council comes from among the ‘prominent lawyers’ and has 
a casting vote if the vote is tied, five to five (‘a golden vote’). This arrangement signifi-
cantly undermines the autonomy of the Judicial Council from the viewpoint of judicial 
independence and autonomy.
Upon the public vacancy announcement, a judge is elected from persons who 
meet general requirements for employment in public authorities (citizenship, fitness 
for work, non-conviction, etc.), who have graduated from the Faculty of Law and passed 
the bar exam. Specific requirements concern the law-related experience gained before 
and after the bar exam. The required experience ranges from at least two years of 
post-bar exam experience for a judge of the Misdemeanour Court to at least 15 years, 
as needed for a judge of the Supreme Court.
Notably, for the process of election of judges of first-instance courts (Misdemean-
our, Basic, Agricultural, Administrative), the Act distinguishes between candidates who 
have been gaining experience in the judiciary and those engaging in other law-related 
activities. The latter need to have twice as long working experience. The respective 
institutions provided opinions on candidates from both groups. As judges at higher 
 23 In 2015, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption Groupe d’Etats contre la 
corruption – GRECO) recommended that Montenegro take additional measures to strengthen 
the independence of the Judicial Council against undue political influence. It was also recom-
mended to abolish the membership by function held by the Minister of Justice in the Council, 
that half of the members be judges, and that the function of the President of the Council be 
entrusted to a member from the ranks of judges, as well as to establish the objective and mea-
surable criteria for the election of non judicial Council members. Gorjanc Prelević, 2019, p. 8.
 24 Bogićević, 2014, p. 83. 
 25 In practice, with the criteria being political and non-legal, it is difficult to elect ‘prominent 
lawyers’ for members of the Judicial Council. Even the Act on the Judicial Council and Judges 
was changed in a way that allows the extension of the expired mandate of the existing members 
until new members are elected (virtually for an indefinite period). Beharović, 2021. 
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courts (Higher Misdemeanour, High, Appellate, and the Supreme Court), only those 
candidates who have previously served as judges or public prosecutors. As an excep-
tion, candidates for judges at the Supreme Court can also be lawyers from outside the 
judiciary, with at least 20 years of working experience.
Additional requirements for candidates for judges at the Basic Court include 
grades from the written test and the interview,26 Also, all candidates must pass the 
‘initial training’ (18 months) at the Basic Court in Podgorica.27 The written test, inter-
view, and initial training (of varied duration) also apply to the election of judges of 
the Misdemeanour Court, the Administrative Court, and the Agricultural Court. The 
law makes separate provisions for the requirements (criteria) for the election of the 
Supreme Court judges and judicial promotion requirements. A candidate for a judge of 
the Supreme Court, besides knowledge and skills, needs to meet a range of ‘sub-crite-
ria’: professional development, scientific and professional work, working experience, 
performance quantity and quality, motivation, communication skills, competence, and 
understanding of the role of a judge in society (Arts. 66-71 of the Act).
The prevalence of ‘non judicial’ members in the decision-making in the Judicial 
Council is mitigated by the fact that the Commission for compliance assessment with 
judicial promotion requirements comprises, among Council members, four judges 
(including the President of the Supreme Court) and one prominent lawyer. The Com-
mission assesses candidates on a proposal of the judicial deciding panel (president of 
the court from which the respective candidate comes from and four judges from higher 
instance courts). Besides performance, a contributing factor to the candidate’s overall 
assessment necessary for election to a higher instance court is the interview.
The assessment of judges is regulated by law (Arts. 87-101), and more precisely 
defined in a regulation (‘The Rules for Evaluating Judges and Presidents of Courts’ 
2015). The law governs the following issues: grades (excellent, good, and unsatisfac-
tory), assessment criteria (professional knowledge and general competence), and 
many sub-criteria for measuring professional knowledge and general competence. In 
the procedure, a judge undergoing assessment is also making his/her case. Material 
sources for the assessment of professional knowledge and general competence of a 
judge include a selection of cases adjudicated by the given judge, statistical reports, 
supervision records, and judicial training reports. The ratings ‘excellent’ and ‘good’ 
mean a possibility for advancement, while the ratings ‘satisfactory’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ 
indicate that it is not possible to advance and a referral of a judge for (continuous) 
judicial training.28
 26 The interview is led by the President of the Judicial Council and conducted following the 
Interview Guidelines, adopted by the Council in 2016. Gorjanc Prelević, 2019, p. 25.
 27 In 2017 and 2018, cumulatively, a total of four candidates completed the initial training and 
were subsequently elected as judges. Ibid., p. 29. 
 28 This Montenegrin system of assessment (still in the draft form) was seen by the Venice Com-
mission as detailed and of good technical quality. However, it was also stressed that such a 
system properly implemented will take a lot of time, personal and economic resources to 
produce long-term results. Hirschfeldt, 2014, p. 13.
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4. Judicial career in North Macedonia
One of the fundamental values of the parliamentary system of the Republic of North 
Macedonia (RNM) is the division of state power into legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers (Art. 8 of the Constitution of 1991). This Constitution makes no provision, to 
which we agree, for the mutual control of powers (in contrast to Serbia and Montene-
gro) – one that would relate to all three branches of power and made even the courts 
subject to the control of the political powers (legislative and judicial). Other constitu-
tional provisions on the judiciary are grouped under a special chapter (‘Judiciary’, Arts. 
98-105) and revised by amendments XX-XXX (2005).
The Constitution regulates the grounds for the independence and autonomy of 
the judicial branch, while more specific provisions are found in the law. The Consti-
tution provides for the manner of election and the conditions for termination of the 
judicial function, judicial immunity, the principles of publicity of trial and adjudication 
by a panel of judges, and the incompatibility and permanency of the function. The 
Constitution proclaims that the Supreme Court is the highest court in North Macedo-
nia, while the organisation (network) of courts is regulated by law. The most prevalent 
constitutional provisions are those concerning the Judicial Council of the RNM, namely 
the legal status of its members and their powers.
The amendments to the 2005 Constitution brought numerous changes in 
the organisation of the judicial system, aimed at increasing its independence and 
autonomy. Judges have no longer been elected by the Parliament (Собрање), but by an 
autonomous judicial body, the Judicial Council. Dismissal was separated from other 
forms of termination of the judicial office. The composition of the Judicial Council and 
the manner of election of its members were completely changed and its powers defined 
in greater detail.
More specific provisions on the judicial branch and certain issues relevant to 
the judicial career are found in the Act on Courts (Закон за судовите, 2006),29 Act on 
the Judicial Council of RNM (Закон за Судскиот совет на РСМ, 2019), and Act on the 
Academy for Judges and Public Prosecutors (Закон за Академијата за обука на судии 
и јавни обвинители, 2015). Regulations applicable to the judicial career include the 
Rulebook on the ranking of candidates for election as judges at higher instance courts 
(Правилник за начинот на рангирање на кандидатите за избор на судија во 
повисок суд, 2020) adopted by the Judicial Council, while of relevance to novice judges 
are those passed by the Academy for Judges and Public Prosecutors on the entrance 
exam and initial training.
The years-long reform of judiciary in the RNM30 was only in the EU Progress 
Report of 2018 assessed as ‘good progress (…) towards the beginning of the restoration 
 29 Apasijev, 2019, pp. 1-43.
 30 See Lance, 2000, pp. 34-36, Radovanovik, 2012, pp. 1-10. 
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of independence of the judiciary’, and one noted indicator of its independence and 
impartiality is the permanent tenure of judges.31
 ■ 4.1. Judicial election procedure and role of autonomous bodies in the judicial career
The manner of election of judges and termination of judicial office are defined by the 
Constitution and, more specifically, by the Act on the Judicial Council of RNM (Arts. 
38-64).32 RNM is another state without a probationary period for judges of a specified 
length; instead, all judges are elected to a permanent function. Judges are no longer 
elected by the Parliament but, since the amendments in 2006, by an autonomous 
authority, the Judicial Council of RNM, ‘an independent and autonomous body of the 
judiciary’ (Amendment XXVIII), from among the candidates who meet general and 
specific requirements for judges (Arts. 45-46 of the Act on Courts). The Council also 
elects court presidents and lay judges. The Judicial Council ‘ensures and guarantees 
the autonomy and independence of the judicial authority by exercising its compe-
tences in accordance with the Constitution and law’ (Art. 2 of the Judicial Council 
Act). The Council is responsible for deciding on the termination of judicial office, and 
the dismissal of judges – if a judge is unworthy, incompetent, or neglectful in the 
exercise of duties or commits a serious disciplinary offence (Arts. 74-76 of the Act 
on Courts). It is thoroughly described what is considered a neglectful and unprofes-
sional exercise of function. According to the Constitution, the Council monitors and 
assesses the performance of judges, and the laws stipulate that the election to the basic 
and courts of higher instance requires a positive assessment of the candidate by the 
Judicial Council.
It follows that all steps in the judicial career – election, promotion, and termi-
nation of function fall within the remit of the Judicial Council, which, if that body 
is genuinely autonomous, truly is a guarantee of independence and autonomy of the 
judge and the entire judicial branch. Nevertheless, in its operation to date, the Judicial 
Council has on several occasions confirmed that ‘the focus of political influence is 
on the judiciary’.33 It is still considered that the Judicial Council is only formally an 
independent and autonomous authority, failing de facto to free itself from political influ-
ence.34 On the other hand, the mere insisting on the strong Judicial Council being the 
key to the independence of judges is not a thorough approach to the problem because 
even the judicial ‘self-isolation’ can make way to informal influences by the legislative 
 31 Veljanoska and Dukoski, 2020, p. 213.
 32 Thus, there is a ‘dual’ legal regulation, overlapping in one part. Nevertheless, the provisions 
of the Judicial Council Act are more ‘procedural’ in nature, determining the Council’s conduct 
in electing and dismissing judges, while there are also ones ‘substantive’ in nature, like those 
in the Act on Courts.
 33 Preshova, 2020, p. 76. 
 34 Veljanoska and Dukoski, 2020, 210. Judicial Council has constantly been in the focus of the 
reports of international organisations, including the EU, where RNM is assessed in a negative 
context. Ibid. 
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and executive branches on the judiciary (example of a ‘notepad’ in RNM as a path to 
judicial appointment).35
Whether the Judicial Council of the RNM will manage its staff-related authorities 
within the judiciary as an independent and autonomous body largely depends on its 
composition.36 A crucial question is the extent to which its 15 members stand free from 
the influence of the political arm of the government? To provide an effective response 
, one should be aware of the politically sensitive nature of the moment of election of 
Council members, or the fact that they select them and how. The majority of this body 
consists of judges (eight) elected by judges themselves. If we add the President of the 
Supreme Court of RNM, this majority becomes overwhelming (three-fifths) and clear 
compared to other members elected by the political authorities. These five members 
of the Judicial Council are prominent lawyers – professors, solicitors, and others 
elected by the Parliament, with two of them being proposed by the President of the 
Republic (one from the minority community). The remaining member is the Minister 
of Justice.
Upon the public announcement of the vacant post, a person to be elected as a 
judge must meet numerous general requirements (under the Act on Courts): the pos-
session of citizenship, knowledge of the Macedonian language, fitness for work and 
health, a law school degree and a passed bar exam, knowledge of a foreign language 
(English, French, or German), proof of not having been convicted of a crime, computer 
knowledge, and integrity and social skills (tested by exams). ‘Specific requirements’ 
for elections differ in the required years of service for a particular type and level of 
the court being applied for (Basic, Appellate, Supreme Court, Administrative, and 
Higher Administrative Court). The higher the court, the longer the service required. 
A common requirement for all, except for Basic Court candidates with a completed 
Academy training, is the positive assessment of their previous performance by the 
Judicial Council.
As for the Supreme Court, election to the post of a judge is not necessarily made 
solely from the ranks of career judges; it is also possible to elect a full or associate 
university professor with more than 10 years of experience teaching a subject related 
to judicial practice. This is the only way that makes it possible to elect to the court of 
higher or the highest instance a candidate without previous professional experience 
as a judge (the same applies in Montenegro).
Both laws (on the Judicial Council and on courts) stipulate ‘specific’ eligibility 
requirements for election to a higher instance court for the promotion of a judge. Promo-
tion criteria are set out in a regulation, the Rulebook on the Ranking of Candidates for 
Election as Judges at Higher Courts – Appellate, Administrative, Higher Administrative, 
and Supreme Court (Art. 3 and further). The Candidate Ranking Committee (comprised 
 35 Preshova, 2018, p. 17.
 36 Already in 2016, in a public survey asking the citizens whether they consider the Judicial 
Council as an independent and autonomous body, they almost unanimously, over 90 % of them, 
answered ‘no’. See. Caca Nikolovska, Koco, Aleksijevski, 2016, p. 35. 
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of three members of the Judicial Council), in compiling the ranking list, uses six crite-
ria on the basis of which it assigns points, following detailed formulas (the maximum 
score is 100 points): professional knowledge and specialisation (maximum 40 points) 
and training (maximum five points); positive performance assessment (maximum 20 
points); written and oral expression skills (maximum five points); additional work on 
resolving case backlogs (maximum five points); additional work through mentorship, 
education, and other activities (maximum five points), and years of service (maximum 
20 points). Based on the ranking list and upon completion of the process of deciding 
complaints against the (preliminary) ranking list, the Judicial Council determines the 
final list for election to the court of a higher instance.
5. Judicial career in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is distinctive because the BiH 
Constitution (1995, Annex to the Dayton Agreement) makes no provisions on the judicial 
branch of government. This omission is not typical of the political systems founded on 
the principle of separation of powers, nor the states with the federal system of govern-
ment to which that of BiH is closest.37 Nevertheless, BiH has a special constitutional-
legal order, based on the equality of the three constituent peoples and two entities (plus 
the District of Brčko), which means that the government operates on the principle of 
parity of nations and entities. The same applies to judicial institutions.
Judicial power at the state level was established subsequently (formerly exer-
cised by the entities: Republic of Srpska, Federation of BiH, and the District of Brčko), 
namely, in an unusual way, first with the decision of the High Representative for BiH, 
and then with laws of the Parliament (parliamentary assembly).
Despite the absence of the constitutional principle of the separation of powers 
that would contain the first and foremost characteristic of the judiciary – independence, 
the existence of a guarantee of independence is implied by other principles, including 
the election and dismissal of judges by an independent (autonomous) authority, which 
is also responsible for determining judicial promotion requirements, the permanency 
of the judicial function, and the immunity of judges.
The first step in the formation of judicial power at the state level was the passing 
of the Act on the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the High Representative for BiH in 
2000, which the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH adopted as its own law in 2002 (the new 
law was enacted in 2009). The Court of BiH (in operation since 2007) exercises criminal 
jurisdiction over certain criminal offences (first and second instance), administrative, 
appellate, and jurisdiction of an electoral court.38 The constitutional matter on the 
 37 Мarković, 2012, p. 253.
 38 Initially, it included foreigners, only to subsequently be composed solely of judges who were 
domestic citizens, leaving thus the Constitutional Court of BiH as the only judicial institution 
to retain a ‘foreign dimension’. Schwartz, 2019, p. 7. 
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judiciary is also enshrined in the Act on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, 
passed by the Parliament in 2004 (amended in 2005 and 2007).
The condition of entities retaining their own court organisation systems created 
dual regulation of the judiciary: courts and judges belong to the entities, while their 
election requirements and other status-related issues are subject to regulation by 
the state. The state has thus assumed the regulation of fundamental issues of the 
judiciary and set up a council that, by way of its powers, should establish an efficient 
justice system throughout the state. It is this ‘court fragmentation’ as viewed by some 
authors, which impedes the judiciary from developing strong power over the political 
branches.39
However, even after the establishment of the Council, a conflict continued 
between the judicial and the executive branch due to misunderstanding by both 
sides of the principle of independence, which also means non-interference in specific 
court cases. It has been disregarded that independence is the citizen’s right to an 
independent court rather than a privilege of the courts.40 Concurrently with establish-
ing judicial power at the state level, measures were taken to strengthen the courts, 
whereas the appointment of judicial office holders was one of the systemic problems.41 
The situation improved with the establishment of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Council (HJPC).
 ■ 5.1. Judicial election procedure and role of autonomous bodies in the judicial career
Although the organisation of courts was regulated at the substate, entity level (courts, 
except the Court of BiH, are bodies of the entities rather than of the state), BiH has a 
uniform procedure for the election of judges, laid down by the Act on the High Judicial 
and Prosecutorial Council. This law also uniformly regulates disciplinary liability, 
promotion criteria, and the supervision of judges.
The manner of election (the Act states ‘appointment’) of judges, as well as the 
presidents of courts, prosecutors, and lay judges, is regulated by the Act on the High 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Council. All judges, upon the announced vacancy, are elected 
by the HJPC to a permanent term of office. This practice, given the non-political compo-
sition of the Council, attests to judicial independence on the one hand, but on the other 
hand, can be criticised for being exclusive of the connection with popular sovereignty. 
The latter is evident from the fact that directly elected bodies of the legislative and 
executive (the BiH Presidency) branches take no part, not even formally, in the election 
of judges.
The powers of the Council to autonomously elect judges, decide on their promo-
tion, accountability, and dismissal, shows that this body has the greatest influence 
on the judicial branch. However, whether the HJPC is up to the task of establishing 
an independent and well-functioning judiciary depends in many respects on its 
 39 Bonifati, p. 11. ‘Judicialisation of politics’ like in other democratic states is impossible. Ibid.
 40 Perić, 2019, p. 26
 41 Murret, 2008, p. 305.
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members. The HJPC consists of 15 members, elected for four years, with a significant 
majority being members of the judiciary (in the broadest sense). Only two members 
are elected by the political authorities – one is elected by the House of Representa-
tives (lower house) of the Parliament and another by the Council of Ministers of BiH 
(the Government). Judges at courts of different levels elect five or six members of the 
Council (depending on whether the Brčko District chooses a judge or a prosecutor), 
prosecutors from different prosecutorial offices also choose five or six members, one 
member (a judge or a prosecutor) is elected by the Judicial Committee of the Brčko 
District, and one member – a solicitor, each by the Bar Association of Republika Srpska 
and that of the Federation of BiH (Art. 4 of the Act on HJPC). Membership requirements 
concerning personal qualities are contained in a general (unquantifiable) formulation 
to be ‘persons of high moral standing and professional impartiality, with a reputation 
for efficiency, competence, and professional impartiality’ (Art. 4, para. 2 of the Act).
Although there are 13 ‘non-political’ of the 15 members of the Council, we cannot 
safely claim that this body is a guarantor of judicial independence. Judges are always 
the least represented group (five or six) in the Council, and only when joined together 
with prosecutors or solicitors can they make up the majority. However, courts and 
prosecutors’ offices are separate authorities, differing in their status and responsibili-
ties, let alone that law practice represents something completely different within the 
judiciary. Hence, the only solution would be to split this body into two separate ones 
– one for judges and another for prosecutors (like in Serbia, Montenegro, and North 
Macedonia).42 In such a judicial council that elects and dismisses judges and decides on 
their promotion, judges could or would have to constitute a majority.
Within the Council, there are four sub-councils (formed by the Council members) 
that propose judges to the four tiers of government (BiH, the entities, and the District of 
Brčko), whereby Council members from the Republic of Srpska and those from the Fed-
eration of BiH are at the same time members of two sub-councils that propose judges in 
those (‘own’) entities. On proposals from the sub-councils, the Council decides if it has 
a quorum of at least 11 members, by the majority vote of members present and voting 
(double criterion, Art. 14 of the Act).
To qualify for election or promotion, judges must meet the following general 
requirements: citizenship of BiH, intellectual and physical capacity to perform the 
judicial function, a degree from the Faculty of Law in BiH (or in SFR Yugoslavia, or 
abroad, with diploma being lawfully validated), a passed bar exam in BiH (or in SFR 
Yugoslavia or, exceptionally, in the former Yugoslav republics). Besides these, there 
are special election requirements, also common in other legal systems, and they refer 
to the working experience in courts, prosecutors’ offices, law-practicing firms, or in 
other relevant fields after passing the bar exam. The required experience varies from 
three years (for judges at basic courts in the Republic of Srpska, municipal courts in 
 42 From 2001 to 2006, Serbia had a similar body in operation, the High Council of the Judiciary, as 
a predecessor of today’s High Judicial Council, which was responsible for the election of both 
judges and public prosecutors.
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the Federation of BiH, and those at the Basic Court of the Brčko District), five years 
(for judges at district courts in the Republic of Srpska and those at cantonal courts in 
the Federation of BiH), to a minimum of eight years (for judges at the Court of BiH, the 
entities’ Supreme Court, and those at the Appellate Court of the Brčko District).
If candidates meet these requirements, they can be elected under legal criteria 
that measure the following: professional knowledge, experience, and performance; 
published scientific works and other professional activities; professional competence 
and development training; ability to analyse legal problems; impartiality, conscien-
tiousness, diligence, determination, responsibility, communication skills, collegiality, 
conduct outside the office, and reputation (Art. 43 of the HJPC Act).43 In the selection of 
candidates, the account is taken of national representation and gender equality. Inter-
views with candidates are mandatory, with the possibility of conducting a qualifying 
exam to test the knowledge of positive law.
The procedure for the election and promotion of judges is more specifically regu-
lated by the Rules of Procedure of the HJPC (2013) and the Rulebook on the Qualification 
and Written Testing Candidates. The Rules of Procedure govern issues related to public 
vacancy announcements, candidate interview committees, ranking criteria, testing, 
interviews, candidate interview scoring, competence scoring, ranking, nomination, 
and appointment. The competence of candidates entering the judiciary’ for the first 
time is determined based on qualification and written testing. As for candidates from 
the judiciary, the criteria44 for the promotion were verified based on their performance 
rating in the past three years.45 The performance assessment has been thus criticised 
that, as ‘a statistical cult, it turned into absurd that made the assessment pointless’.46
Improvement in the way in which judges are elected still seems insufficient for 
the judicial branch to be considered independent and efficient. There are many reasons 
for these ideals continuing to be unfulfilled, including lengthy proceedings, high case 
backlogs, lack of judges, underpaid judges, low information technology level, poor 
communication between the media and the judiciary, and rarely invoked disciplin-
ary proceedings.47 What is noted as a systemic shortcoming is a discrepancy between 
formal (written) and informal rules (influences) in the recruitment of judges, where the 
 43 However, standards that fall under personal integrity, morality, and professionalism are dif-
ficult to recognise, and even more difficult to compare and measure. Muhamerović, 2013, p. 5. 
 44 In 2018, the HJPC adopted the existing Criteria for assessing the performance of judges in BiH. 
One professional criticism is that this by-law unconstitutionally and unlawfully establishes 
the obligation on judges of higher courts to assess and monitor the operation of judges of lower 
courts. It can be imposed only by a law. Blagojević, 2019.  
 45 In 2019, there were four public announcements for a total of 117 vacant posts in the judiciary 
(courts and prosecutor’s offices); there were 1191 applications, 779 applicants, 154 candidates 
were invited for qualification testing, while the written test was taken by 79 candidates. 
Tegeltija, 2020, pp. 35-36.
 46 Perić, 2019, p. 16. Monitoring and assessing the performance of judges (and prosecutors) has 
adverse effects on the justice system because the primary motivation is focused on meeting 
the monthly caseload quota rather than on quality and most complex cases. Ibid. 
 47 Purić and Savić Božić, 2016, p. 89.
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informal rules can virtually annul the written. The institutionalisation of the election 
and promotion of judges in terms of the procedure itself is still inadequate, which is 
evident from the conduct (decision-making) of members of the HJPC.48
6. Conclusion
Legal frameworks governing the status of judges and the development of the judicial 
career in the analysed states of the Western Balkans, including Serbia, Montenegro, 
BiH, and N. Macedonia, show significant similarities. In some respects, there are even 
identical legal solutions, but we also find legal differences. One notable characteristic 
that these legal systems have in common is the intent to ensure the independence and 
autonomy of courts and judges through constitutional, legislative, and regulatory rules. 
They did so by setting out objective and measurable criteria for the election and career 
advancement of judges. The presented overview of the judicial careers in the respective 
four states makes it possible to draw certain conclusions.
Judges in Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia are 
elected to a permanent term of office regardless of the court they are applying to and 
whether it concerns the first or another election to office. In Serbia, the first election 
to the judicial office is of limited tenure; the term of office is three years. This solution 
has positive sides but is also deficient, which makes the opinions on the probationary 
term of office divided. On a positive note, during the probation, judges demonstrate 
their actual possession of the required judicial knowledge. If a judge, however, fails to 
demonstrate that knowledge – many repealed decisions–for example, his/her term of 
office ceases after three years. Thus, the judiciary will be freed from low-quality judges 
in a simple way. The negative side of the probation is its potential to make a judge more 
susceptible to external (political, interest) influences and therefore non-independent 
in the exercise of his/her duties. A judge with a limited term of office is aware that 
election to a permanent tenure is yet to come and that this election can be affected by 
various lobbying. To this lobbying, they can simply adapt through their judgements. 
By contrast, in Serbia, the post-probation election to a permanent term of office was 
reduced to a mere form – all judges, upon expiration of three years, are, by automation, 
elected to a permanent term of office. Another distinct feature of Serbia is the solution 
by which the first term of office judges is elected by the National Assembly. Although 
the Assembly acts on proposals of an autonomous authority, the High Judicial Council, 
it has been criticised because of the general consideration that a political body should 
not elect non-political government officials, as judges are.
In all four states, an autonomous body, the Judicial Council, plays a central role 
in decision-making regarding judicial careers. It makes decisions on the election and 
promotion of judges and the termination of judicial function. The Judicial Council is 
 48 Fagan and Dimitrova, 2019, pp. 232-233.
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in those states empowered with decisions with respect to judges alone, except in BiH, 
where there exists a Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, which is also responsible for 
the prosecutorial office holders. Since the functions of judges and prosecutors are sepa-
rated, we find it a better solution to have two co-existing authorities – one in charge of 
judges and the other for prosecutors.
We believe that the composition of this body contributes in many respects to the 
possibility that it is both a guarantor of judges’ independence and impartial in making 
decisions on the election, promotion, or termination of the judicial office. A crucial 
question, therefore, is who has the required majority – judges or other members? In 
all councils, members from the judiciary constitute the majority, and virtually, they 
alone can make decisions, except in Montenegro. In Montenegro, half of the Council 
members come from the ranks of judges, and they may be in the minority in the case 
of a split vote, five to five. Then, a casting vote is that of the Council President, who is 
not from the ranks of judges. Justification for this solution lies in the apprehension that 
the judicial branch, if judges had a majority in the Council, could, in time, alienate itself 
from the popular sovereignty, retreat into isolation, and lose its legitimacy. Neverthe-
less, lawmakers in the other three states do not share this opinion, as the composition 
of the autonomous body shows that its presently being dominated by judges is con-
sidered a guarantor of independence and impartial decision-making. The exceptional 
situation with the composition is in BiH, where judges are always in the minority, and 
it is so because a single body is responsible for both judges and prosecutors. Joined with 
prosecutors, judges in the Council of BiH have the majority (11 out of 15 members).
The analysis of the status of judges across these states has also shown that higher 
instance courts are virtually inaccessible to lawyers not coming from the judiciary. 
Although no formal prohibition exists for nonjudicial lawyers to be elected, the Appel-
late Court in Serbia, for example, it has not become a practice. In the courts of higher 
instance, all to the Supreme Court, the election is virtually made exclusive to previ-
ous judges, possibly also for prosecutors. This practice speaks that judges in higher 
instance courts are, in fact, always career judges who have advanced within the judicial 
branch. It can be criticised as a form of closure of the judiciary within itself, which may 
lead to the judicial branch being distanced from the surrounding reality. The practice 
of not electing as judge lawyers from other fields undoubtedly contributes to this.
Also observable in all four states is that criteria for the election of judges, and 
particularly those for career advancement, are sought to be objectivised as much as 
possible. Different standards, credit accumulation, and the assessment, specified 
in regulations, not only serve the purpose of visibility (‘transparency’) with respect 
to career advancement, but also bring some degree of certainty. If a judge achieves 
successful results capable of being measured precisely, he or she will advance in his/
her career. However, it also entails some disadvantages if a judge focuses solely on 
achieving as many statistically solved cases as possible to gain better prospects for 
promotion. It is of general interest for a judge to make a greater and more sustained 
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effort in high-quality decision-making on the most complex cases, even if doing so 
means deferring the final decision.
While statutory standards and criteria for progression in the judicial career, 
as well as the evaluation of compliance with the requirements for the first election to 
office, can be assessed as legally good, the influence of non-legal factors is still present. 
In the previous practice of election and promotion of judges across all four states, inter-
vention by informal factors has not always been negligible. These factors may come 
from the political sphere, the government, or the ministry, which is most often the case, 
or from other centres of unwritten power. To fully eliminate them, it is not adequate to 
have just quality laws in place; also, there is a higher political culture in that society in 
general. It is only then that progress in the career of the judge will be entirely fair.
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Constitutional Identity and Ultra Vires Review 
in Germany2
 ■ ABSTRACT: This article aims to provide insight into the relationship between con-
stitutional identity and ultra vires review in Germany. First, a brief introduction is 
provided on the issue of the relationship between EU law and national law, then the 
diverging grounds for validity are presented concerning the interpretation of the CJEU 
and of the German Federal Constitutional Court. After the detailed analysis of the 
German case law, limits of a national reservation are scrutinised. In the end, a conclu-
sion is drawn up.
 ■ KEYWORDS: constitutional identity, ultra vires review, Germany, EU law, 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, CJEU.
1. The relationship between Union and national law
Unlike regular international treaties, Union law has a direct effect on the national legal 
systems of Member States, raising the question of hierarchy between the two legal 
orders. Although the doctrines differ as to why, there is a consensus on the essence 
of the relationship between the two levels: national courts and the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) have gradually come to agree that Union law should, as a 
matter of principle, have primacy over any conflicting national law. This was enshrined 
 1 Full Professor of Public International Law and European Law, Philipps-Universität Marburg, 
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in Declaration 173 of the Lisbon Treaty. This primacy also extends to national consti-
tutional law.4 There is also a broad consensus that Union law not only has primacy of 
validity but also primacy of application over every level of national law.
2. Diverging grounds for validity
There are considerable differences of opinion regarding the basis for the validity 
of Union law. The CJEU and Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; 
BVerG) have a different basic understanding of Union law as either separate or derived 
from national law and, consequently, on the extent of the primacy of Union law.
 ■ 2.1. The grounds for validity put forward by the CJEU
Since its landmark decision in the Costa v ENEL case, the CJEU has held that Union 
law has primacy over national legal provisions by virtue of its autonomy.5 The CJEU 
emphasises the autonomous nature of Union law and maintains that it takes prece-
dence over any provision of national law, including constitutional law;6 otherwise, the 
requirement that Union law should apply in the same way throughout the European 
Union could not be guaranteed. The CJEU maintains that the contracting parties to the 
EU Treaties have, unlike the signatories to regular international treaties, established 
an autonomous legal order. On the relationship between the law of this autonomous 
legal order and national law, it argues
‘that the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of 
its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, 
 3 Declaration 17 of the Lisbon Treaty reads: ‘The Conference recalls that, in accordance with 
well settled case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law 
adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member States, 
under the conditions laid down by the said case law. The Conference has also decided to attach 
as an Annex to this Final Act the Opinion of the Council Legal Service on the primacy of EC law 
as set out in 11197/07 (JUR 260): Opinion of the Council Legal Service of 22 June 2007: It results 
from the case-law of the Court of Justice that primacy of EC law is a cornerstone principle of 
Community law. According to the Court, this principle is inherent to the specific nature of the 
European Community. At the time of the first judgment of this established case law (Costa/
ENEL, 15 July 1964, Case 6/64) there was no mention of primacy in the treaty. It is still the case 
today. The fact that the principle of primacy will not be included in the future treaty shall not in 
any way change the existence of the principle and the existing case-law of the Court of Justice.’
 4 CJEU, Case 6/64, Costa/E.N.E.L., ECR 1964, 1251/1269: Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsge-
sellschaft, ECR 1970, 1125, paragraph 3. Case 106/77, Simmenthal, ECR 1978, 629, paragraph 17 
et seq.
 5 CJEU, Case 6/64, Costa/E.N.E.L., ECR 964, 1251/1269 et seq.; settled case-law: see also CJEU, 
Case 106/77, Simmenthal, ECR 1978, 629/644; Case 190/87, Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Borken 
et al./Moormann, ECR 1988, 4689/4722; Haack, 2007, pp. 165 et seq.
 6 CJEU, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ECR 1970, 1125, paragraph 3.
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without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question’.7
In the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case, the Court of Justice clarified that the 
primacy of Community law over national law also extended to the constitutional law 
of Member States. The judgement reads thus:
‘Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the valid-
ity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have an adverse 
effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The validity of such measures 
can only be judged in light of Community law. […] Therefore, the validity of a Com-
munity measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by allegations 
that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of 
that State or the principles of a national constitutional structure.’
The CJEU therefore justifies Union law taking uniform, direct effect in the 
Member States and precedence over all levels of national provisions on the grounds 
that this is necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the Union, the uniform application 
of laws across Member States,8 and the autonomy of the supranational legal order. It 
understands an autonomous sui generis legal order to be one that exists in and of itself 
rather than one derived from the Member States. Its rationale is based on a teleological 
interpretation of the Treaties, in particular Article 189(2) TEEC, Article 14(2) ECSC, 
and Article 161(2) TFEU.9 In the CJEU’s view, the Union can only carry out the duties 
conferred upon it if there is a guarantee that Union law will take full effect in the same 
way in all Member States, regardless of their respective constitutions.
If, then, Union law has, as a matter of principle, a primacy of application over 
national law which stems directly from the Treaties, it follows that the powers of the 
EU institutions also arise from the Treaties and, necessarily, so too do the boundaries 
of these conferred powers. This model casts the CJEU as the guardian of the division 
of powers under Union law. Its rulings are therefore predicated on the assumption that 
it alone has jurisdiction to decide on the validity of legal acts of the European Union 
and, thus, to determine whether there has been a transgression of powers.10 In the 
Foto-Frost case, the CJEU held that national courts may consider the validity of Union 
acts and may conclude that a legal act is completely valid because, in so doing, ‘they 
are not calling into question the existence of the Community measure’.11 However, the 
CJEU went on to rule that national courts do not have the power to declare acts of 
EU institutions invalid.12 This reading finds confirmation in the history of the CJEU’s 
creation, as Germany’s call for the primacy of national constitutions to be codified 
 7 CJEU, Case 6/64, Costa/E.N.E.L., ECR 1964, 1270.
 8 CJEU, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ECR 1970, 1125.
 9 These are the provisions in each treaty which provide for the direct application of regulations 
under that treaty in the Member States.
 10 See CJEU, Case 314/85, Foto-Frost, ECR 1987, 4199.
 11 CJEU, Case 314/85, Foto-Frost, ECR 1987, 4199, paragraph 14.
 12 CJEU, Case 314/85, Foto-Frost, ECR 1987, 4199, paragraph 15; see Bast, 2014, p. 171.
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was flatly rejected.13 This does not mean, however, that Union law is of a higher order 
than national law. A national law that infringes on Union law is not automatically nul-
lified. Union law does not override national law; it must simply be granted primacy of 
application.
 ■ 2.2. The grounds for validity put forward by the Federal Constitutional Court
The Federal Constitutional Court accepted the primacy of the application of Union law. 
However, in its view, primacy is not absolute or intrinsic to Union law but is enshrined 
in, and therefore also circumscribed by, constitutional law.14 According to the case-law 
of the Federal Constitutional Court, Union law has primacy of application by virtue of 
the constitutional mandate, or, more specifically, by virtue of German act of approval, 
which acts as a bridge between the two legal systems.15 The national order of applica-
tion contained in the act of approval is the basis for the integration programme, but at 
the same time it imposes a limit on the validity of Union law in Germany.
3. Limits on integration under the third sentence of Article 23(1) of the 
Basic Law
In 1992,16 Article 23 was added to the Basic Law (GG). Paragraph 1 provides special 
constitutional consent for the transfer of sovereign powers in the context of the Euro-
pean integration process. The first sentence of Article 23(1) of the Basic Law binds 
the Federal Republic of Germany to participation in the development of the European 
Union, which, according to the ‘structure safeguard clause’ in the second half of the 
sentence, ‘is committed to democratic, social, and federal principles, to the rule of 
law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of 
basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law’. The second 
sentence authorises the federal authorities to transfer sovereign powers by law with 
the consent of the German government. Finally, the third sentence explains that any 
regulations that establish or amend the foundations of the Union, as established in the 
Treaties, will be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79 of the Basic Law. This 
provision is the yardstick against which the legality of Germany’s European policies 
is measured.
A provision of this type is relatively unusual. While national constitutions often 
lay down provisions governing participation in the creation of European law, it is rare 
for them to comment on the form that European democracy is to take. In this respect, 
Article 23(1) makes the German Basic Law an exception.17 Should the European Union 
 13 Huber, 1991, p. 216 citing Friauf, 1990, p. 19.
 14 Voßkuhle, 2007, pp. 158 et seq.
 15 See, in particular, BVerfGE 73, p. 339 (374 et seq.) – Solange II; 123, 267 (396 et seq.) – Lisbon.
 16 Federal Law Gazette, 1992 I, p. 2086.
 17 Grimm, 2014, p. 27.
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fail or cease to satisfy the structural requirements laid down in the first sentence of 
Article 23(1) of the Basic Law, then the mandate under the act of approval for Union law 
to take effect and have primacy in Germany either does not or ceases to exist. Accord-
ing to the third sentence of Article 23(1) of the Basic Law, the structural requirements 
therein should be read in light of Article 79(3) of the Basic Law. A reading of the first and 
third sentences of Article 23(1) in conjunction with Article 79(3) of the Basic Law there-
fore makes the transfer of sovereign rights to the Union conditional on the observance 
of the State structural characteristics safeguarded by Article 79(3) of the Basic Law. 
Conversely, Union law applicable by virtue of the transfer of sovereign power can only 
take precedence over national law in Germany if it is without prejudice to the constitu-
tional identity within the meaning of Article 79(3) of the Basic Law. The act of approval, 
the substantive legal content of which is derived primarily from the EU Treaties,18 may 
therefore later become unconstitutional, (in part) as a result of CJEU interpretations of 
the EU Treaties that are also binding on the Federal Constitutional Court.19
4. Development of the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court
The Federal Constitutional Court was one of the first European constitutional courts 
to expressly confirm the basic primacy of Union law.20 On 18 October 1967, the First 
Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court held that Regulations of the Council and 
Commission of the European Communities could not be directly challenged by consti-
tutional complaints because they had been issued by a new public power, which was 
autonomous and independent with respect to the State power of the individual Member 
States. As such, its acts neither needed to be confirmed (‘ratified’) by the Member States, 
nor could they be abrogated by them.21
 ■ 4.1. Reservations of the Federal Constitutional Court
It became clear with the Solange I judgement,22 however, that vital questions remained 
unanswered. The Federal Constitutional Court certainly recognised that the process 
of European ‘supranational’ integration was a new type of inter-state cooperation, 
which, conceptually, defied classification under the current system. It spoke of a ‘sui 
generis’ legal order, or even an ‘autonomous’ source of law.23 In its decision of 29 May 
1974, however, it also clearly established the limits within which the transfer of sov-
ereign rights was acceptable. Contrary to the wording of Article 24 of the Basic Law, 
the First Senate of the Court argued that absolutely no sovereign rights were ceded 
in the context of European integration. The applicable provision at the time, Article 
 18 See BVerfGE 12, 281 (288) – Devisenbewirtschaftungsgesetze.
 19 See Dederer, 2014, p. 315.
 20 BVerfGE 31, 145 (175) – Milk powder; see, in that connection, Alter, 2001, pp. 80 et seq.
 21 BVerfGE 22, 293 (296) – EEC Regulations.
 22 BVerfGE 37, 271 – Solange I.
 23 BVerfGE 37, 271 (277) – Solange I.
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24 of the Basic Law, did not offer a carte blanche to change the basic structure of the 
constitution on which its identity was based without a constitutional amendment.24 
The decision reads:
‘Article 24 of the Basic Law deals with the transfer of sovereign rights to inter-
state institutions. This cannot be taken literally. […] That is, it does not open the way 
to amending the basic structure of the Basic Law, which forms the basis of its identity. 
[…] Certainly, the competent Community organs can make laws that the competent 
German constitutional organs could not make under the law of the Basic Law and that 
are nonetheless valid and to be applied directly in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
However, Article 24 of the Basic Law circumscribes this possibility, as it precludes 
any Treaty change that would be incompatible with the constitutional identity of the 
Federal Republic of Germany insofar as it would encroach on its constituent structures. 
[…] Article 24 of the Basic Law does not authorise the transfer of sovereign rights; 
rather, it opens up the national legal order (as appropriate) by retracting the claim to 
regulatory exclusivity staked by the Federal Republic of Germany in an area within the 
scope of the Basic Law, and by making way for the direct validity and applicability of 
a law from another source within the national territory. […] The part of the Basic Law 
dealing with fundamental rights is an inalienable, essential feature of the valid Basic 
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and one that forms part of the constitutional 
structure of the Basic Law.’25
The Court thus draws attention to the limits of Article 24 of the Basic Law: Article 
79(3) of the Basic Law rules out any measure that entails the forfeiture of core constitu-
tional identity. On this point, the dissenting opinion26 was also in complete agreement. 
As a result, the headnote to the decision states that the Federal Constitutional Court 
may continue reviewing European law until such time as (solange in German) a Euro-
pean catalogue of basic rights exists that ensures a comparable level of protection. The 
minority opinion was that, looking at CJEU case-law, these requirements had already 
been met at that time.
In contrast to the ‘Solange I’ decision, the ‘Vielleicht’ (or ‘Perhaps’) decision of the 
Second Senate, on 25 July 1979,27 concerned the compatibility of provisions of primary 
Community law with the Basic Law. After the CJEU handed down its interpretation of 
Articles 92-94 TEEC in a preliminary ruling procedure, the administrative court, seised 
of the matter, referred to the Federal Constitutional Court, pursuant to Article 100(1) 
of the Basic Law, the question of whether these Treaty provisions were inapplicable in 
the Federal Republic of Germany since, according to the CJEU’s interpretation, they 
violated the Basic Law (in particular, the guarantee of legal recourse under Article 19(4) 
thereof). The Court made clear that, bound by the CJEU’s preliminary ruling, it did not 
 24 BVerfGE 37, 271 (279) – Solange I.
 25 BVerfGE 37, 271 (279 et seq.) – Solange I.
 26 See BVerfGE 37, 271 (291 et seq.) — Solange I, dissenting opinion of judges Rupp, Hirsch and 
Wand.
 27 BVerfGE 52, 187 – Perhaps decision.
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have the authority to decide, within the framework of the judicial review procedure, on 
the applicability in the German jurisdiction of provisions of primary Community law 
that, according to the CJEU’s interpretation, were incompatible with the Basic Law.
‘Article 177 TEEC [now Article 267 TFEU] assigns the Court of Justice, rather than 
the national courts, ultimate authority to rule on the interpretation of the Treaty and 
the validity and interpretation of Community acts derived therefrom.’28
The Solange II decision of 22 October 198629 upheld the basic prohibition on 
violating the ‘identity of the applicable constitutional order of the Federal Republic of 
Germany’.30 At the same time, it was deemed that a measure of protection of fundamen-
tal rights has been established […] within the sovereign jurisdiction of the European 
Communities which, in its conception, substance and manner of implementation, is 
essentially comparable with the standard of fundamental rights provided for in the 
Basic Law’.31 Provided that the Court of Justice of the European Community ensured 
effective protection of fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court would, it 
said, refrain from conducting its own review. Legal protection under the Basic Law 
would then cease once the validity of fundamental rights at the European level was 
essentially equivalent, in substance and effectiveness, to the protection of inalienable 
rights under the Basic Law.32 It should be noted that the Solange II decision is based on 
the same doctrine as its predecessor. The Federal Constitutional Court also assumes 
in this decision that it is, in principle, within its jurisdiction to review secondary 
Community law for compatibility with the structures and values that underpin the 
Basic Law.
 ■ 4.2. Principle of democracy
After the Solange decisions essentially laid down the constitution’s red lines in terms of 
the inalienable rights not to be violated during integration, with the Maastricht judge-
ment, the principle of democracy moved to centre stage. The judgement imposed limits 
on the transfer of sovereign rights. Articles 38(1) and (2) of the Basic Law guarantee 
that a citizen has the right to vote for the German Federal Parliament and that the 
constitutional principles of the right to vote are observed in an election. In addition, 
this guarantee is extended to the fundamental democratic content of this right: ‘Should 
the German Federal Parliament relinquish its duties and responsibilities, particularly 
concerning legislation and the election and control of other holders of State power, then 
this affects the area to which the democratic content of Article 38 of the GG relates. […] 
Article 38 of the GG forbids the weakening, within the scope of Article 23 of the GG, 
of the legitimation of State power gained through an election, and of the influence on 
the exercise of such power, by means of a transfer of duties and responsibilities of the 
 28 BVerfGE 52, 187 (202) – Perhaps decision.
 29 BVerfGE 73, 339 – Solange II.
 30 BVerfGE 73, 339 (378) – Solange II.
 31 Ibid.
 32 Ibid., 376.
Central European Journal of Comparative Law | Volume II ■ 2021 ■ 1 192
Federal Parliament, to the extent that the principle of democracy, declared as inviolable 
in Article 79, paragraph 3, in conjunction with Article 20, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the GG, 
is violated.’33
From Article 38 of the Basic Law, the Court thus construed a subjective claim 
for compliance with the requirements of democratic legitimation. At the same time, 
it laid claim, on this basis, to the authority to declare European legal acts not binding 
in Germany if ‘European institutions or governmental entities were to implement 
or to develop the Maastricht Treaty in a manner no longer covered by the Treaty in 
the form of it upon which the German Act of Consent is based […].’ Thus, the Federal 
Constitutional Court considers, within the context of its ‘cooperative relationship’ with 
the CJEU, whether legal acts passed by European institutions and bodies are within 
the limits of the sovereign rights conferred on them or whether they transgress such 
limits.34 The Court continues thus: ‘If, for example, European institutions or govern-
mental entities were to implement or to develop the Maastricht Treaty in a manner no 
longer covered by the Treaty in the form of it upon which the German Act of Consent 
is based, any legal instrument arising from such activity would not be binding within 
German territory.’35
Heavily criticised by experts,36 the Lisbon judgement of 30 June 2009 further 
delimited the boundaries of constitutional commitment. The Federal Constitutional 
Court considered the constitutional complaints lodged against the act approving the 
Treaty of Lisbon to be admissible ‘to the extent that they challenge a violation of the 
principle of democracy, the loss of statehood of the Federal Republic of Germany, and a 
violation of the principle of the social state on the basis of Article 38.1, the first sentence 
of the Basic Law’.37 At the heart of this wide-ranging judgement is the Federal Consti-
tutional Court’s intention to hold the European Union to its identity as a treaty-based 
association of sovereign states that possesses no statehood itself, thereby preventing a 
sovereignty grab or any encroachment on Member States’ powers.38 First, the Constitu-
tional Court cites specific areas where powers must not be transferred to the European 
level as doing so would mean ‘that insufficient space is left to the Member States for the 
political formation of economic, cultural, and social living conditions’.39
Quite remarkably, the Court then substantiated five domains that would have 
‘always’ been ‘[p]articularly sensitive for the ability of a constitutional state to demo-
cratically shape itself’. It listed ‘decisions on substantive and formal criminal law (1), 
on the disposition of the monopoly on the use of force by the police within the state and 
by the military towards the exterior (2), fundamental fiscal decisions on public revenue 
 33 Ibid., 171 et seq.
 34 Both citations are from BVerfGE 89, 155 (188) – Maastricht.
 35 Ibid.
 36 See, for example, Grimm, 2009, pp. 475–496; Halberstamm and Möllers, 2009, pp. 1241 et seq.; 
Jestaedt, 2009, p. 503; Schönberger, 2009, pp. 535–559.
 37 BVerfGE 123, 267 (328) – Lisbon.
 38 Grimm, 2009, p. 486.
 39 BVerfGE 123, 267 (357) – Lisbon.
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and public expenditure (3), decisions on the shaping of living conditions in a social 
state (4), and decisions of particular cultural importance, for example on family law, 
the school and education system and on dealing with religious communities (5)’. The 
constitution would not completely bar a transfer of powers in this ‘democratic primary 
area’, but such a transfer would be particularly sensitive.
In all its case-law on the euro rescue, the Court used the example of parliament’s 
right to decide on the budget to highlight the real crux of the matter: ‘For adherence to 
the principles of democracy’, the question is ‘whether the German Bundestag remains 
the place in which autonomous decisions on revenue and expenditure’ should be made, 
even with regard to international and European commitments. ‘If decisions were made 
on essential budgetary questions of revenue and expenditure without the requirement 
of the Bundestag’s consent, or if supranational legal obligations were created without 
a corresponding decision by free will of the Bundestag, Parliament would find itself 
in the role of merely re-enacting and could no longer exercise overall budgetary 
responsibility as part of its right to decide on the budget.’40 ‘Against this background, 
the German Bundestag may not transfer its budgetary responsibility to other actors 
by means of imprecise budgetary authorisations. In particular, it may not, even by 
statute, deliver itself up to any mechanisms with financial effect which – whether by 
reason of their overall conception or by reason of an overall evaluation of the individual 
measures – may result in incalculable burdens with budget relevance without prior 
mandatory consent, whether these are expenses or losses of revenue.’41
The prohibition on relinquishing budgetary responsibility does not inadmissibly 
curtail the legislature’s budgetary powers, but rather aims to act as a safeguard. For 
this reason, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that no permanent mechanisms 
may be created under international treaties ‘that are tantamount to accepting liability 
for decisions by free will of other states, above all if they entail consequences that are 
hard to calculate […] [I]n addition, it must be ensured that sufficient parliamentary 
influence will continue in existence on the manner in which the funds made available 
are dealt with.’42
 ■ 4.3. Qualifying the case-law on reservations
In its Honeywell/Mangold decision of 6 July 2010, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled 
that there had been no transgression of powers and qualified certain statements in the 
Lisbon judgement. The claimed right to perform an ultra vires review means ‘that the 
act of the authority of the European Union must be manifestly in violation of compe-
tences and that the impugned act is highly significant in the structure of competences 
between the Member States and the Union with regard to the principle of conferral and 
to the binding nature of the statute under the rule of law.’43 The decision reads: ‘If the 
 40 BVerfGE 129, 124 (179) – EFSF.
 41 Ibid.
 42 BVerfGE 129, 124 (180 f.) – EFSF.
 43 BVerfGE 126, 286 (303) – Honeywell.
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supranational integration principle is not to be endangered, ultra vires review must be 
exercised reservedly by the Federal Constitutional Court. Since it also has to find on a 
legal view of the Court of Justice in each case of an ultra vires complaint, the task and 
status of the independent suprastate case-law must be safeguarded. This means, on the 
one hand, respect for the Union’s own methods of justice to which the Court of Justice 
considers itself to be bound and which do justice to the “uniqueness” of the Treaties 
and goals that are inherent to them […]. Secondly, the Court of Justice has a right to 
tolerance of error. It is hence not a matter for the Federal Constitutional Court, in ques-
tions of the interpretation of Union law that, with a methodical interpretation of the 
statute, can lead to different outcomes in the usual legal science discussion framework, 
to supplant the interpretation of the Court of Justice with an interpretation of its own. 
Interpretations of the bases of the Treaties are also to be tolerated which, without a 
considerable shift in the structure of competences, constitute a restriction to individual 
cases and either do not permit impacts on fundamental rights to arise that constitute a 
burden or do not oppose domestic compensation for such burdens.’44
The Federal Constitutional Court thus claims to have the authority to perform 
an ultra vires review, but grants the CJEU wide discretion in interpreting the Treaties 
within the confines of a ‘methodical interpretation of the statute […] in the usual legal 
science discussion framework’. In its ultra vires review, the Court therefore simply 
wants to examine whether the action of an EU institution constitutes an act of trans-
gression that encroaches on Member States’ powers ‘manifestly’ and in a ‘structurally 
significant’ way.45 The rationale applied here is that the European Union can only invoke 
the primacy of Union law if the measures it takes fall within the mandate conferred on 
it by the Member States.
 ■ 4.4. Conclusion
Since handing down its Maastricht decision on 12 October 1993, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court has maintained that the legal acts of EU institutions must not overstep the 
sovereign powers conferred on them. Should such a transgression occur, the Federal 
Constitution Court has the right to instruct the German authorities not to implement 
the impugned legal acts. Against this background, the Federal Constitutional Court 
issues constitutional review reservations in the form of an ultra vires review,46 an 
identity review,47 or a fundamental rights review,48 and considers such a remedy to be 
an integral part of the German constitution.
 44 BVerfGE 126, 286 (307) – Honeywell (author’s emphasis).
 45 See BVerfGE 89, 155 (187 et seq.) – Maastricht; BVerfGE 123, 267 (357 et seq.) – Lisbon; BVer-
fGE 126, 286 (303 et seq.) – Honeywell.
 46 BVerfGE 75, 223 (240 et seq.) – Kloppenburg decision; 89, 155 (188, 209 et seq.) – Maastricht; 123, 
267 (353 et seq.) – Lisbon.
 47 BVerfGE 123, 267 (353 et seq.) – Lisbon having regard to BVerfGE 75, 223 (235, 242) – Klop-
penburg decision; 89, 155 (188) – Maastricht; 113, 273 (296) – European arrest warrant.
 48 See, in particular, BVerfGE 37, 271 (280 et seq., 285) – Solange I; 73, 339 (376, 387) – Solange II.
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5. Limits of a national reservation
It is obvious that the solution proposed by the Federal Constitutional Court, derived 
from the Basic Law, may conflict with the unconditional primacy claim developed by 
the CJEU on the basis of Union law. Advocate General Pedro Cruz Villalón put it quite 
plainly in his opinion concerning the referral for a preliminary ruling in the OMT case: 
‘It seems to me an all but impossible task to preserve this Union, as we know it today, 
if it is to be made subject to an absolute reservation, ill-defined and virtually at the 
discretion of each of the Member States, which takes the form of a category described 
as “constitutional identity”. That is particularly the case if that “constitutional identity” 
is stated to be different from the “national identity” referred to in Article 4(2) TEU.’49
 ■ 5.1. No blanket constitutional power of review
Legal problems arise, then, if the CJEU comes to a different interpretation of the law to 
that of the Federal Constitutional Court. It is also clear in such a case that the Federal 
Constitutional Court cannot rule on the validity or invalidity of Union action. It can, at 
most, conclude that the provision in question cannot be applied by the authorities or 
courts of the Federal Republic of Germany. In such a case, however, the question arises 
as to the scope of the Federal Constitutional Court’s power of review. First, in principle, 
the German legal system makes way only for the application of Union acts covered by 
competences conferred on the Union. Union law stems from an autonomous, but not 
original, source, and its scope, therefore, extends only as far as provided for in the 
Treaties. If the Union asserts vis-à-vis Member States a competence that has not been 
conferred on it under primary law, that is, by the Treaties, this action is not covered by 
the Treaty Act by means of which the competent German institutions have approved 
the TFEU in its applicable form. In principle, the German legal system makes way only 
for the application of Union acts covered by competences conferred on the Union.
However, this does not mean that the Federal Constitutional Court also has the 
authority to consider whether the European Union is acting ultra vires. The question 
of the power of procedural constitutional review must be distinguished from the 
substantive-law question of the scope of Union competences. The Member States have 
conferred on the CJEU the power to interpret Union law. Under the second sentence 
of Article 19(1) TEU, the Court of Justice is to ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties, the law is observed. It follows from Article 263(1) and (2) 
TFEU that this also encompasses the power to review the EU institutions’ competence 
to act. There may be times when the European public authorities exceed their powers 
under Union law, but it is for the CJEU to rule whether they have acted ultra vires. That 
is also the thrust of Article 344 TFEU, under which Member States undertake not to 
 49 AG Villalón, Opinion of 14.1.2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al., paragraph 59.
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submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to any 
method of settlement other than those ‘provided for therein’.50
Safeguarding the unity of the law is the task of the CJEU, which has the funda-
mental power to make the final decisions in this respect.51 This is to be guaranteed 
through the use of the instrument of judicial dialogue codified in Article 267 TFEU, by 
means of the rights and obligations of national courts to make referrals for preliminary 
rulings.52 In the context of an ultra vires complaint, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, each 
national constitutional court must therefore not only give the CJEU the opportunity to 
rectify, by means of the cassation of the Union legal act, a breach of the limits to the 
integration programme as identified [by national courts], but the Federal Constitutional 
Court also has no choice but to accept the judgement of the CJEU. It is true that the 
Federal Constitutional Court may make the constitutional conformity of Union legal 
acts conditional on their conformity with Union law. However, the binding final ruling 
as to whether a particular action on the part of the Union institutions is in conformity 
with Union law must be handed down by the CJEU.
 ■ 5.2. Power of review in the event of a breach of constitutional identity
Restrictions can only be imposed on this construct if the ultra vires action by the 
Union, as identified by the Federal Constitutional Court, also results in a breach of 
constitutional identity.
5.2.1. Protection of constitutional identity
Before we get to the stage where a dispute is referred to the courts, it is primarily the 
responsibility of the political authorities to ensure that the constitutional identity of 
the Member State concerned is protected.
5.2.1.1. Identity protection by the political authorities
Decision-making procedures in the European Union, in particular in the Council, make 
it possible for any government and, indirectly, national parliament to lodge objections 
citing the need to protect constitutional identity. Although national parliaments have 
thus far made little use of this means of exerting influence, the legal basis for it has 
been established. In that connection, the identity clause in Article 4(2) TEU, which is 
addressed to the Member States in the context of the Council’s legislative procedure, 
comes into play. The Council must respect ‘the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties, as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government’. The 
Council is thus the primary locus of the political debate on identity.
 50 See, in that connection, CJEU, Case C-459/03, MOX Plant (Commission v Ireland), ECR 2006, 
pp. I-4635 et seq.
 51 See Skouris, 2008, pp. 343 et seq.; see also Bast, 2014, pp. 167 et seq.; Kumm, 2014, pp. 203 et seq.
 52 Sauer, 2008, p. 463.
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5.2.2.2. Identity protection in dialogue between courts
Despite the availability of this means of exerting influence, conflicts may arise once 
the political process is complete. In such cases, it is primarily for the CJEU to enforce 
the identity clause in Article 4(2) TEU. In these cases, too, under Article 19(1) TEU in 
conjunction with Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU is required to decide on its interpretation 
and, if necessary, give effect to it in the proceedings for annulment under Article 263 
TFEU. Since it is not possible to determine whether national identity is at stake without 
the involvement of the national courts, however, national constitutional courts have a 
crucial role to play in this regard.
5.2.2. Emergency mechanism under Union law (Article 4(2) TEU)
Of course, the CJEU’s power of interpretation leaves room for conflict if the ‘constitu-
tional identity’ issue identified by the national court cannot be squared with the CJEU’s 
interpretation of the concept of ‘national identity’ under Union law. Given the general 
interest in the uniform interpretation and application of the law, there is a need to 
discuss how to settle what for many years has been seen as an insurmountable differ-
ence of opinion between those who regard provisions of Union law as having absolute 
primacy and those who accept restrictions in order to protect constitutional identity.
The first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU holds the key. It provides that the Union 
must respect the national identities of its Member States, as reflected in their fun-
damental political and constitutional structures. Article 4 TEU establishes, for the 
Member States of the European Union, an emergency right under Union law in the 
event of failure to observe the constitutional principles of a Member State that are 
fundamental to its identity. It is therefore necessary to weigh up the issue of whether 
Member States have a right, as a last resort, to suspend the implementation of Union 
acts under certain circumstances.
5.2.2.1. Background
The beginnings of this approach predate the establishment of the European Union. In 
1992, at the request of Ireland, a protocol53 was annexed to the Maastricht Treaty and 
the idea of preserving the inviolability of national constitutional provisions of par-
ticular importance for the country in question was first conceived. The Irish Protocol 
concerned provisions on the banning of abortion. Possibly inspired by this protocol, 
even prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, national courts began to cite 
constitutional identity as a criterion justifying restrictions on the application of Union 
law. The Conseil Constitutionnel implied in 2004 and 200654 that national constitutional 
 53 See Protocol No 17 to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities, which states the following: ‘Nothing in the Treaty establishing a Constitution 
for Europe or in the Treaties or Acts modifying or supplementing it shall affect the application 
in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.’
 54 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1; Loi 2006-961 du 3 août 2006 
relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l’information (1).
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identity could constitute a limit to the primacy of Union law.55 A similar approach can 
be found in a 2004 ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court.56 The CJEU57 itself took 
this on board and began in 2010 to recognise the concept of constitutional identity as a 
limit to the primacy of Union law.
The first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU-Lisbon defines the concept of national 
identity more clearly than its predecessor did. It takes over the identity clause con-
tained in Article 6(3)-Amsterdam and the first clause of Article F(1) TEU-Maastricht 
and formulates it in a more nuanced way. Previously, the provision in question 
merely stated the following: ‘The Union shall respect the national identities of its 
Member States.’ Now, the concept of national identity is linked to ‘fundamental 
political and constitutional structures’. The provision thus inserted in the Treaty 
of Lisbon can be seen as recognition under primary law of the possibility of consti-
tutional objections to the absolute primacy of provisions of Union law, a possibility 
that is simultaneously circumscribed under Union law. Seen in this way, the concept 
of ‘national identity’ is an ‘opening clause in respect of the constitutional law of the 
Member States’.
According to the wording of Article 4(2) TEU, national identity does not encom-
pass every particularity of the constitution of a Member State, only ‘fundamental 
political and constitutional structures’. However, this provision of Union law opens 
up the possibility of taking account of Member State constitutional structures that 
are part of a country’s national identity when justifying exceptions to the primacy of 
application of Union law. The legal interests protected under Article 79(3) of the Basic 
Law represent – at least in relation to the basic elements removed from the purview of 
the legislature with the power to amend the constitution58 – just such a constitutional 
structure and may therefore be regarded as forming part of the ‘national (constitu-
tional) identity’.
Although criticised in dissenting opinions,59 at an early stage, and at the time still 
taking Article 24 of the Basic Law as the point of reference, the Federal Constitutional 
Court cited the protection of that identity and stated in the Solange I ruling that the 
transfer of sovereign rights should not lead to any change to ‘the basic structure of 
the Basic Law, which forms the basis of its identity, without a formal amendment to 
the Basic Law; that is, it does not open any such way through the legislation of the 
inter-state institution’.60 In any event, this applies to the inviolable core identity of the 
 55 See, in that connection, Mayer, 2011, p. 782.
 56 Tribunal Constitucional, DTC 1/2004 (Dec. 13, 2004).
 57 CJEU, Case C-36/02, Omega, ECR 2004, I-9609, paragraph 39; Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein 
v Landeshauptmann von Wien, ECR 2010, I-13693, paragraphs 25 et seq., 92 et seq.
 58 Similar provisions can also be found in the constitutions of other Member States. See Art. 
197 of the Belgian Constitution, Art. 89(5) of the French Constitution, Art. 9(2) of the Czech 
Constitution.
 59 See BVerfGE 37, 271 (296) – Solange I, dissenting opinion of judges Rupp, Hirsch and Wand.
 60 BVerfGE 37, 271 (279) – Solange I.
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Constitution, such as the federal state principle,61 the substance of fundamental rights,62 
the ban on retroactivity,63 and other fundamental constitutional principles.64
5.2.2.2. Prevention of conflicts
Conflicts can naturally arise if the interpretations of the Union law concept of national 
identity laid down in the first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU, handed down by the CJEU 
by virtue of the sole power conferred on it by the second sentence of Article 19(1) TEU, 
differ from the views held by national constitutional and supreme courts. The question 
therefore arises as to how Article 4 TEU can be used to prevent conflicts as much as pos-
sible. In abstract terms, there must be interaction between the national constitutional 
court and the CJEU. This is in line with the concept of a ‘cooperative relationship’,65 
developed by the Federal Constitutional Court and the CJEU, and the ‘cooperation 
instrument’66 for dealings between the Court of Justice and national courts in connec-
tion with the interpretation and application of Union law. The concept of a ‘cooperative 
relationship’ is apt here. It would also make sense to talk about dialogue or, even better, 
‘direct interaction’67 between the Court of Justice and the Member State courts, the term 
used by the CJEU in its OMT ruling. On that basis, the Federal Constitutional Court 
must, in principle, accept that legal protection against EU measures by means of an 
action before the CJEU has priority, and must limit its own task to verifying whether 
acts of the European institutions and bodies encroach on national identity. Since the 
CJEU also has a margin for discretion, which it can exercise in favour of the Member 
States and their constitutional and supreme courts in order to safeguard the concept 
of national identity, this should remain the absolute exception.
‘While the Court of Justice has the sole power to interpret the concept of national 
identity under Union law laid down in the first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU, its interpre-
tation must leave room for the power of national constitutional courts to determine the 
constitutionally based national identity. The jurisdiction of the constitutional courts 
of the Member States must, in turn, be exercised in the light of European interests. 
The question of an overarching power of final decision, which cannot be resolved in 
a pluralistic constitutional association, is thus circumscribed procedurally to a very 
large extent by the mutual obligation of the CJEU and the constitutional courts to have 
regard to each other’s rulings.’68
 61 BVerfGE 92, 203 (237) – EC Television Directive. 
 62 BVerfGE 37, 271 (280) – Solange I; 58, 1 (40) – Eurocontrol I; 73, 339 (376) – Solange II; Polish 
Constitutional Court, ref. K 18/04 of 11.5.2005, EuR 2006, 236 (239 et seq.); Danish Supreme 
Court, ref. I 361/1997 of 6.4.1998, EuGRZ 1999, 49 (50); Spanish Constitutional Court, Case 1/2004 
of 13.12.2004, EuR 2005, 339 (343); Czech Constitutional Court, ref. Pl ÚS 19/08 of 22.11.2008, 
paragraph 110, 196.
 63 BVerfGE 73, 339 (381) – Solange II.
 64 von Bogdandy and Schill, 2010, pp. 720.
 65 BVerfGE 89, 155 (188, 209 et seq.) – Maastricht.
 66 CJEU, Cases C-297/88 and C-197/89, Dzodzi, ECR 1990, I-3763, paragraph 33.
 67 CJEU, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al., ECR 2015, I-0000, paragraph 15.
 68 von Bogdandy and Schill, 2010, pp. 733 et seq.
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In this respect, the first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU can be described as a built-in 
weak point, similar to that forming part of the design of a mechanism, to be used in 
interpreting the law. In the event of damage or overload, this element will fail, as it is 
supposed to do, in order to minimise the potential damage – for example, in the form 
of a withdrawal from the Union (Article 50 TEU) – in an overall system.
5.2.3. Concept of ‘national identity’
It is clear that the concept of national identity is a Union law concept. However, the 
first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU does not define the national identity of each Member 
State. The provision in the first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU does not provide for a 
uniform concept of national identity under European law, but refers the matter back 
to the Member States. Accordingly, the CJEU cannot interpret the ‘core substance of 
national identity’ with binding effect on the Member States; rather, it is for the national 
constitutional or higher courts to formalise the substance of the identity recognised 
under EU law, but at the same time protected by constitutional law. The Treaty allows 
for national ‘particularities’, which form part of national identity. Determining the 
boundaries of that identity is a task that needs to be carried out by means of cooperation 
between national constitutional courts and the CJEU in a context of mutual respect.
5.2.3.1. Union law framework
Under Union law, the protected core area of national identity can only encompass 
what is ‘reflected in the fundamental political and constitutional structures, includ-
ing regional and local self-government’ (first sentence of Article 4(2) TEU). Hints as to 
how the CJEU intends to deal with the issue can be found in its case-law. In a dispute 
concerning the admissibility of a constitutional reservation of nationality for public 
education in Luxembourg, the Court of Justice determined in 1996 that, in connection 
with the restriction of fundamental freedoms, ‘the preservation of the Member States’ 
national identities is a legitimate aim respected by the Community legal order’.69 Fol-
lowing the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the CJEU recognised that, in order 
to protect the constitutionally guaranteed republican state form of a Member State, 
a proportionate interference in the right to free movement is possible in the form of 
non-recognition of a noble title acquired abroad by adoption.70 It also subsumed the 
protection of official national language(s) under the concept of national identity.71 In 
opinions of the advocates general, the concept of national identity has been linked to 
the protection of local self-government,72 the regulatory sovereignty of the Member 
 69 CJEU, Case C-473/93, Commission v Luxembourg, ECR 1996, I-3207, paragraph 35.
 70 CJEU, Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, ECR 2010, I-13693, paragraphs 81 et seq.;
 71 CJEU, Case C-391/09, Runevic-Vardyn and Wardyn, ECR 2011, I-3787, paragraphs 84 et seq.; Case 
C-202/11, Anton Las, ECR 2013, I-0000, paragraphs 23 et seq.
 72 AG Trstenjak, Opinion in Case C-324/07, Coditel Brabant, ECR 2008, I-8457, paragraphs 85 et 
seq.
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States in the field of nationality law,73 and the competence of the Member States for the 
composition and division of powers.74
5.2.3.2. Shaping by national constitutional law
By virtue of its purpose as a protective mechanism, the concept of national identity 
must be interpreted in the light of national identity as defined by Member State con-
stitutions. In that connection, provisions that shape the constitutional identities of the 
Member States, such as Article 79(3) of the Basic Law, are of particular importance. In 
most other Member States, similar provisions are in force that remove certain deci-
sions from the purview of the legislature with the power to amend the constitution, or 
make those decisions subject to a particularly burdensome legislative procedure. In 
terms of substance, the provisions concern, for example, the protection of fundamental 
principles of state organisation, state objectives, state symbols, the rule of law, the 
principle of democracy, human dignity, or the essence of fundamental rights.75 For 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the question of the scope of the opening-up of the 
German constitutional area is synonymous with that of the substantive-law limits to 
integration. With regard to the review powers of the Federal Constitutional Court, it is 
therefore clear that breaches of competences of the EU institutions that are not chal-
lenged by the CJEU must have an import that corresponds, in substance, to a breach of 
core areas of the State structure principles protected in Article 79(3) in conjunction with 
Article 20(1) and (2) of the Basic Law.76 In each individual case, it must be considered 
whether a legal act of the EU institutions systematically and seriously infringes the 
limits to integration laid down in the third sentence of Article 23(1) in conjunction with 
Article 79(3) of the Basic Law. The question of whether CJEU rulings should be taken 
into account and whether it is ‘permissible to stand in opposition to them and thereby 
generate systemic conflicts’77 must be answered in light of the reciprocal obligations 
of respect.
5.2.4. Obligation to make a referral for a preliminary ruling
A satisfactory solution certainly cannot be achieved unless the two courts are in direct 
contact with each other. It is therefore necessary to enter into dialogue with the CJEU 
in order to enter reservations concerning the primacy of Union law. In so doing, due 
 73 See AG Maduro, Opinion of 30.9.2009 in Case C-135/08, Rottmann, ECR 2010, I-1449, paragraphs 
23 et seq.
 74 AG Colomer, Opinion of 26.6.2009 in Case C-205/08, Umweltanwalt von Kärnten, ECR 2009, 
I-11525, paragraphs 47 et seq. See also AG Kokott, Opinion of 8.5.2008 in Joined Cases C-428/06 
to C-434/06, UGT-Rioja, ECR 2008, I-6747, paragraph 54.
 75 See Armin von Bogdandy/Stephan Schill, in: Grabitz/Hilf/Nettesheim (eds), Das Recht der 
Europäischen Union, Loseblattsammlung, 55. Ergänzungslieferung 2015, EL 51 September 
2013, Art. 4 TEU, paragraph 22: Art. 162 of the Estonian Constitution, Art. 77 of the Latvian 
Constitution, Art. 148(1) of the Lithuanian Constitution, Art. 235(6) of the Polish Constitution, 
Art. 168 of the Spanish Constitution or Art. 44(3) of the Austrian Constitution.
 76 Proelß, 2011, p. 249.
 77 Sauer, 2011, p. 95.
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account must be taken, in procedural terms, of the obligation under Union law to make 
a referral for a preliminary ruling, from which Article 267 TFEU allows no exception 
for constitutional courts. It follows that the referral to the Court of Justice under Article 
267 TFEU to clarify the compatibility of the act in question with Article 4(2) TEU is 
mandatory before a Member State court or tribunal can begin the task of determining 
autonomously whether domestic application is to be refused on the grounds of incom-
patibility with national identity. Therefore, in proceedings under Article 267 TFEU, 
a national court must first give the CJEU the opportunity to correct the act that is held 
to be contrary to Union law. In that regard, the referral for a preliminary ruling serves 
as a remedial procedure. If the national constitutional or supreme court wishes to reject 
an EU measure on the basis of Article 4(2) TEU, it must formulate its concerns regarding 
respect for national identity in the context of the referral to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling and thus submit it to the European public at the same time.78 The national court 
may not make a declaration of inapplicability until the CJEU has spoken its ‘last word’ 
on the matter, ‘because, by virtue of the ex ante open nature of the judicial interpreta-
tion, the subject matter of the ultra vires review will only then have been established’.79 
In that connection, the ‘principle of sincere cooperation’ must, in accordance with 
Article 4(3) TEU, be ‘mutually’ upheld by the Member States and the Union in carrying 
out the tasks required under the Treaties.
 ■ 5.3. Outcome
In this respect, Article 79(3) of the Basic Law does not constitute a systematic review 
reservation available to the Federal Constitutional Court, but rather a safeguard clause 
to be used to deal with extreme cases of transgressions of power; it thus corresponds 
to Article 4(2) TEU. In such extreme cases, the Federal Constitutional Court is empow-
ered to review conformity with the core constitutional identity of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, as set out in Article 79(3) of the Basic Law, in the context of European 
integration as well. The subject matter of an identity review of this kind is conformity 
with extreme boundaries that cannot be shifted even by means of constitutional 
amendment.
6. Conclusion
Ultimately, the dispute stems from differing views on the legal basis for the application 
of Union law. While the CJEU assumes that Union law emanating from an ‘autonomous 
source of law’ has absolute primacy over any domestic legal provision by force of 
autonomy,80 in the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court, the primacy of Union 
 78 von Bogdandy and Schill, 2010, p. 730.
 79 Klement, 2014, p. 192.
 80 Landmark CJEU decision, Case 6/64, Costa/E.N.E.L., ECR 1964, 1251/1269; CJEU, Case 106/77, 
Simmenthal, ECR 1978, 629, paragraphs 17/18.
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law exists by force of constitutional authority mandate and is therefore constitutionally 
limited.81 In our view, the validity of an ultra vires review in the event of a breach of 
national identity can, in principle, be derived from both legal texts (the Basic Law and 
the TEU). The supranational legal order of the Union is established by the Member 
States under international treaty law; it is autonomous, but not original. The Member 
States have transferred to the Union, on the basis of the principle of conferral (Article 5 
TEU), individual sovereign rights, but not the power to extend the Union’s competences 
by means other than those provided for in the Treaties. Under the second sentence of 
Article 19(1) TEU, the CJEU’s task is to ensure that in the interpretation and application 
of the Treaties, the law is observed. In principle, this also applies to the question of 
whether the Union has a specific competence under the Treaties. The true interpreta-
tion of Union law is a matter for the CJEU. The act of approval limited national jurisdic-
tion accordingly. The CJEU alone decides whether Union law has been infringed by 
means of an ultra vires act (second sentence of Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction with 
Article 263(2) TFEU). This decision is to be accepted as a matter of principle by the 
Federal Constitutional Court, and on that basis, there is no scope for a ‘cooperative 
relationship’. That is also the thrust of Article 344 TFEU, under which Member States 
undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaties to any method of settlement other than those ‘provided for therein’. If the CJEU 
has already ruled on a question, a referral for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible, and 
a constitutional complaint must also be dismissed as inadmissible.
On the other hand, questions of identity review cannot, a priori, be excluded 
from the scope of a final review by the Federal Constitutional Court, since the issue is 
not the interpretation of Union law, but the interpretation of national law. The power 
to determine whether there has been an infringement of Article 79(3) of the Basic Law 
has not been transferred to the CJEU because the first sentence of Article 23(1) of the 
Basic Law does not allow the legislature to disregard the so-called eternity clause. If, 
in its referral, the Federal Constitutional Court informs the CJEU accordingly of the 
extent to which the constitutional identity of the Federal Republic of Germany could be 
affected, the Court of Justice must, in a dialogue with the national constitutional and 
higher courts, verify whether the Union has encroached on national identity (Article 
4(2) TEU). Only if the Federal Constitutional Court reaches a different conclusion, on 
the basis of the interpretation of Article 79(3) of the Basic Law, can it, as a last resort, 
declare the relevant legal act inapplicable in Germany or declare that a breach of the 
constitution has arisen that the federal authorities must strive to remedy.
 81 In particular, BVerfGE 73, 339 (374 et seq.) – Solange II; 123, 267 (396 et seq.) – Lisbon.
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Compromise(d)? – Perspectives of Rule of Law in the 
European Union
 ■ ABSTRACT: This paper introduces different perspectives of rule of law in the European 
Union starting out of the assumption that fear and (common) economic interests con-
tinue to be the primary motivator of European integration as to the European Union. 
The analysis touches upon the problematic tension between national specificities of 
the rule of law developed organically inside state frameworks of constitutionalism, 
through the practice of national constitutional courts and the practice and standards 
of international organizations and institutions in this matter. Starting out of problems 
brought about by open statehood and the “dialogical” development of rule of lawin 
the European Union, the paper also describes the institutions, concepts and processes 
relevant to the enforcement of the value of rule of law in the EU.
 ■ KEYWORDS: Rule of law, TEU, Article 2, Article 7, constitutional courts, Euro-
pean integration, European Union, principles, values, national competences, 
conferral, statehood, international standard, compromise, dialogue.
1. When We All Have Our RoL(e) to Play. On the importance of crisis and 
compromise
The concept of European integration was born in a crisis: after World War II, the nations 
of Europe had no choice but to create a viable peace project as they could not risk the 
possibility of continued animosity. At the same time, there was no common European 
identity that would have allowed the construction of a federal system for Europe despite 
initial ideas to that effect. There were, however, common economic interests that were 
strong enough to serve as the focal points of integration spilling over from the field of 
economy to other areas of cooperation.
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For the EU, the integration process was thus brought to life by fear of crises (thereby 
fashioning a unique identity) and by common (economic) interests. We know this today 
as the European Union, and having undergone significant political, social and economic 
crises, having achieved great goals, we could argue that to some extent the core motivators 
supplying the life force of the integration still remain fear and economic interest.
In the conclusion of this paper, it will be argued that these days we see processes 
of integration working in a „reverse spill-over” mode, especially in the context of the 
rule of law. When all else fails in the eyes of the EU, mechanisms to enforce the funda-
mental value of the rule of law fall back on (common?) economic and financial consid-
erations, trying to tighten the grip where it hurts the most. The question is, however, 
who will suffer most: the fist or the fingers, i.e. the Union or its constituents.
Economic interest as a motivator for integration is now apparent in the very real 
fear that Europe’s nations can only become a unified competitive actor in the globalized 
market. This remains a key element of the future of the European Union as well as 
fears regarding the national economic interests of each Member State as part of the 
single market. This dynamic of fear is only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and 
the legal, constitutional and political challenges it brings about in the Member States 
who all struggle with upholding the rule of law in the face of social, political and legal 
challenges.
When we want to look at the European Union background of something as 
powerful as the rule of law, we need to keep all this in mind, because only then can 
we understand the interests and aspirations behind European integration. We need to 
be able to put into perspective the processes that brought the integration to life and 
those it went through during its seventy years of existence. This is both a temporal and 
a structural enterprise, it requires looking at the chronology of its evolution and the 
actors involved (in Part II).
We need to see that in the development of integration, nothing has ever been black 
or white: the last seventy years have been lined with regular cycles of conflict, crisis and 
compromise. We encountered conflicting interests that seemed to exclude each other 
already very early on, but the parties realized they could not exist without each other, 
so in the end, the necessary compromise was reached ending many deadlocks in several 
disputes. It is enough only to think of the Luxembourg compromise, when De Gaulle’s 
France eventually abandoned its policy of “empty chairs” and returned to the Council 
after seven months, on the condition that the unanimity principle2 should continue to 
apply if fundamental interests of a Member State were at stake.3 Today, whenever we 
talk about Council decision-making (also in terms of the rule of law4), this rule is still a 
 2 Cf. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/unanimity/. 
 3 Legal historical research is directed at this approach, e.g. Philip Bajon: The Legacy of the Lux-
embourg Compromise, 1966–1986 (online), Available: https://www.rg.mpg.de/research-project/
the-legacy-of-the-luxembourg-compromise 
 4 Cf. Article 7 (1)-(2) TEU, whereunder the Council can determine – by unanimous vote – if a 
Member State infringes upon the values of the Union, separating this from para. (3), whereby 
the Council can only vote via QMV. (This will be discussed in Part II in more detail.). 
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fundamental element of the process, and few may question its validity on legal grounds, 
while fundamental interests of Member States remain at stake many times. Another 
example is the Constitutional Treaty, which had undoubtedly met a premature demise,5 
but its core structures were included in the Lisbon Treaty. If nothing else, this indeed bore 
the hallmark of a successful compromise at the time of its creation.
Are we on the road towards a necessary compromise again, or had we perhaps 
passed by it already, leaving it unnoticed as a result of the deafening and unending 
noise of contempt and dissatisfaction with the European status quo.
RoL (rule of law) is a key issue for the European Union today, regarding which 
many conflicting (economic) interests and fears project themselves onto contemporary 
legal, constitutional and political processes. It is just as much a fundamental inter-
est, a value and a principle of the Member States as it is one for the EU, and there is 
disagreement in how to grasp its essence due to diverging approaches. Regardless, the 
results achieved in efforts to try and define its place and content on a national and on an 
international and European level can still be looked at as compromises and evaluated as 
such.6 However, in order to find solutions that are acceptable to all Member States, this 
time, too, we need what has always taken the European Union forward: a compromise. 
In this, we all have our RoL(e) to play, as the title of this introduction also suggests. 
This play on words intends to impress upon the fact that Member States’ (and their 
constitutional structures’) roles in defining what the rule of law means in and for their 
national contexts cannot and should not be disregarded as part of the next necessary 
and successful compromise.
The integration, in this sense, develops as language normally would. Certain 
words are used to mean certain things in the different regions, cultures, and in order for 
everyone to understand each other, a compromise is attempted requiring certain words 
to be understood with the same meaning everywhere, developing a usage. However, is 
such a thing at all possible if we talk not about language but about legal concepts and 
notions? Can there be unity in diversity in this sense?
On the way toward the next compromise, politics, law and academia all strive 
to accommodate the constitutional law concept of the rule of law to fit the current, 
exigent circumstances of the integration. As such, it is more often than not used as 
“both a carrot and a stick”, a political slogan to resolve conflicts of political nature. 
Ascribing political content to inherently legal notions, however, has never before lead 
to successful compromises but more often gave birth to oppressive regimes.7
 5 E.g. Hofmeister, 2008; Klabbers – Leino, 2013. 
 6 E.g. Uitz, 2020; Scheppele – Pech – Platon, 2020; Gros, 2020. 
 7 A photo of a local celebratory event in Szeged, a Southern town in Hungary, contained 
the following inscription above the podium of an event celebrating the Constitution in a 
Rákosist-Stalinist style (cca. 1950s): “The constitution shall be a weapon in the hands of the work-
ing people”. Constitutions, however, just as the legal foundations of European construction, 
are all “peace projects” not weapons, and can thus steer Europe towards compromises. (The 
photo can be found in the following digital archives: https://www.delmagyar.hu/galeria/
eletkepek-1948-es-1989-kozott-2104909/222).
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This is especially the case, if – according to many – there is no universal con-
sensus on the exact meaning of this legal notion. Conceptualizing and condensing the 
constitutional content of the rule of law and then measuring how the concept performs 
in terms of political and legal processes is a tough nut, but some nonetheless have 
recently taken a few cracks at it in Hungarian academia.8 While in the current political 
climate, Hungarian stances on the concept of the rule of law might not be welcomed 
with open arms, we consider it important to shed light on some key arguments made 
in recent years by Hungarian scholars.
(i) Tóth sees that the sole purpose of any academic endeavor in this respect can only 
to try and define its core as the notion inflates due to criticism that comes from an 
academic assessment of the elements of this concept over time. Therefore, he 
sees this inflation in the rule of law “shedding its skin”, taking on new attributes 
while letting old ones go.9
(ii) Beyond this core, Pócza – in reference to Waldron – mentions a “minimalist 
definition”10 referring thereby to the rule of men being substituted by the rule 
of law. This wording seems a touch unfortunate given the complexity of current 
European political debates regarding the rule of “certain men” and how they, 
and their rule of law, perform on the European scales of accountability. Also, 
logically, if we accept that the (political) rule of men is substituted by the rule of 
law, then not politics but law should dominate this discourse. Simply because if it 
lacks or circumvents legal considerations, this will erode the relevant discourse 
and dialogue itself, not the rule of law.
(iii) Varga sees another “dual factor” that erodes rule of law itself, and he calls it 
arbitrariness in terms of
(a) the interpretation of the principle by the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
as a form of activism before and after the entry into force of the Fundamental 
Law11; and
(b) the contemporary invocation and application of the principle of rule of law 
in terms of ‘open statehood’ (to be discussed below). In his view, the rule of law 
“does not safeguard by itself the actual limitation of power, the liberty of legal subjects 
or primacy of law. In other words: the rule of law can also be interpreted (such exercise 
of power can be established in the name of the rule of law) as a form in which legal 
subjects benefit from less and less liberty, and where law dedicated in principle to defend 
their rights and liberties will ultimately lead to their comprehensive vulnerability. In 
other words, an application of the principle of the rule of law can start wearing marks 
indicating tyranny, and, in extreme cases, marks of totalitarianism.”12
 8 E.g. Varga, 2019; Pócza, 2019 or Tóth, 2019. 
 9 Cf. Tóth, 2019, pp. 197-199. 
 10 Cf. Pócza, 2019, p. 143.
 11 Varga, 2019, pp. 14-16.
 12 Cf. Varga, 2019, p. 10. 
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Positioning this argument into the debate about the power relations (and competence 
limitations) between the EU and the Member States (as a form of ‘open statehood’), 
Varga argues that an eventually erroneous interpretation of the value of the rule of 
law under Article 2 TEU by the CJEU would bind the Member States to be held liable 
under proceedings arising out of Article 7 TEU (in a domain of sovereignty that “had 
not been formally yielded by the member states to the Union”), without the actual possibility 
of holding the CJEU liable for erroneous interpretation, which fact he attributes to 
the absence of the statehood of the EU – as in a rule of law state, these mechanisms 
would be implicit in the rule of law operation of a state. That is why he is of the opinion 
that in Member States’ relations with the European Union, the rule of law becomes an 
“arbitrary means of discipline due to its vague content”.13
In this regard, we will soon elaborate on the problems of “dialogical develop-
ment” of the rule of law debate between Member State constitutional courts and the 
CJEU in another perspective.
As a legal notion, shaping the bedrocks of the legal, constitutional and political 
structures of the different Member States, rule of law has organically matured over the 
decades in the different case laws of national supreme and constitutional (apex) courts, 
maintaining some commonalities.
In a seemingly simplistic approach to this, allow me to use another reference to 
language and what it represents, hidden in translation. The Hungarian constitutional 
law term used to describe the rule of law is very revealing in this respect. “Jogállamiság” 
(wherein ‘jog ’ corresponds ‘law’ and ‘államiság ’ literally means ‘statehood’) describes 
a condition where the law primarily and primordially originates from the state, law 
defines statehood, and due to this fact, the state is submitted to these laws. Pócza refers 
exactly to this when describing the notion in a formal sense to mean the preservation 
and maintenance of law and order through state means, contrary to the broader view 
specifying the importance of the necessary to limit (state) power.14
If we accept that the rule of law is primordially tied to states and state-made 
laws, then we could address the issue of statehood in the European Union as well and its 
effect on the rule of law. Rainer Arnold conceptualizes that the external aspect of rule 
of law appearing in the EU represents what he calls ‘open statehood’, existing in parallel 
with the internal (state-bound) aspect of the rule of law (both embodied simultane-
ously by a national constitution). Arnold also makes the argument that establishing 
the rule of law is what is basically understood under ‘constitutionalization’, and under 
its external aspect
(i) concepts originally anchored in national constitutional law start to appear in 
international, European contexts as
(ii) states regulate their relationship with the international community.
 13 Varga, 2019, p. 18. 
 14 Pócza, 2019, pp. 148-149. 
Central European Journal of Comparative Law | Volume II ■ 2021 ■ 1 212
That is why we need to talk about rule of law in Europe, he posits.15 Elsewhere, he 
is of the opinion that the ultra vires debates between the Member States’ Constitu-
tional Courts and the CJEU are manifestations of a balance sought between closed 
and open statehood, i.e. what falls within Member State competences and what falls 
within EU ones) and one of its central tenets is that the integration rests on rule of law 
foundations.16
Summing up: each Member State has its own constitutional rules on the concept 
of the rule of law and its relevant constitutional and court jurisprudence filling it with 
elements of meaning and interpretation. These are first and foremost the results of 
national compromises between national actors, with the ultimate role of constitutional 
courts being the authoritative interpreters of the constitution. Based on these, chan-
nels have opened up over time to engage with other states, forming cooperation and 
mark these alliances by a common commitment to the rule of law as established in the 
acquis of the resulting international organizations (such as Council of Europe and the 
European Union) and their institutions.
Kochenov and van Wolferen address this problematic in the form of what 
they describe as “dialogical rule of law”, reflecting on the relationship of the CJEU 
and Member States’ supreme or constitutional (apex) courts. As they argue, there is a 
tension between positive law (gubernaculum) and “principles of law beyond the sovereign’s 
reach” (jurisdictio) supported by a variety of inherently dialogical means suitable “for 
analysing the adherence to that essentially contested concept, regardless of the precise list of 
terms that fall within it”. They see the EU as “a problematic example of a legal system where 
the Rule of Law defined in such a way is under constant attack. Even though there are clear 
sources from which it could derive jurisdictio, international law, the constitutional values of 
its members and its own constitutional principles, the Union places primacy in the value of 
its gubernaculum – the acquis, in combination with three deeply anti-dialogical principles: 
supremacy, autonomy, and direct effect, which threaten the substance of the core values and 
principles guiding the law in any liberal democracy.”17
The cited authors also argue that dialogical rule-of-law-enforcement becomes 
problematic if national constitutional courts are put in a position where they would 
need to abandon their task of “protecting inherent constitutional values and rights […] in 
favour of vague euro-speak.” What they identify as an authoritarian monologue by the 
CJEU, impedes – in their view – the flourishing of rule of law conditions, thus prevent-
ing the EU from “turning into a much richer constitutional system.”18
While effective dialogue not only shapes identity but also contributes to enrich-
ing consensus on the content of the rule of law, epistemological problems persist. Some 
legal scholars concede that there is some kind of mainstream approach regarding the 
meaning of the concept presupposing some sort of an academic compromise on certain 
 15 Arnold, 2020.
 16 Arnold, 2016, pp. 6-7. 
 17 Kochenov, van Wolferen, 2018, p. 15. 
 18 Ibid. 
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definitional elements. If nothing else, some others argue that there is – at least – a Euro-
pean consensus embodied by the following statement: “Final answers to debate are given 
by law and socially significant relations in life are regulated by law.”19 However, judging by 
the current landscape of debates and process in the European Union (described above 
and below), such compromise is not at all apparent, not even at a cursory look. Let us 
now nonetheless traces the origins of a European compromise, as represented by the 
work of the Council of Europe.
Based on the above, it is no coincidence that the Venice Commission of the 
Council of Europe, in its 10-year-old report on a comprehensive interpretation of the 
rule of law,20 described it by three words taken from three different languages (English, 
German and French). Thereby, the Commission explicitly acknowledged that there are 
in fact at least three different (mainstream?) national origins in a historical, cultural, 
etc. context, and proposed their reconciliation.
With regard to the post-Soviet states of Europe, the report also raises doubts as to 
whether the rule of law should be used as a fundamental concept of public law in those 
systems, due to the many different state approaches (all burdened with the memory 
of Socialism and the ensuing discontinuity of the previously organic rule-of-law tradi-
tion). In relation to the emergence of the concept at the level of national constitutions, 
the Commission’s report states that it is “one of the principal characteristics of States”, 
thereby cutting back to my previous linguistic remark on the contextual meaning of 
the notion. (Although, recently it is “in fashion” to deny certain aspects of our collective 
past not comfortable to face in the current climate, such impressions on the European 
constitutional landscape as the ones left by the Venice Commission, should always be 
borne in mind.)
If we compare these different state approaches and the resulting European, inter-
national compromise created by the Venice Commission as to the “form and content” 
of the rule of law, we are faced with another obstacle of language ascribing certain 
meaning to certain words. How can the rule of law be best defined as a legal notion? Is 
it a principle or a value, is it an objective? Is it something that can only be interpreted 
(and assessed) as a result or consequence in itself or rather as a point of origin?
Stepping outside of national frames, and inserting this concept essentially 
developed in national constitutional law (and its interpretation) into political processes 
on the EU-level has its own challenges as well. The eventual question is whether such 
mechanisms serve the stability of the integration, the “master” of which is the supra-
national political machinery of the Union and whose interpretation of the rule of law 
may differ from that which can be deduced from the practice of the apex courts of the 
respective Member States. The interpretation of the concept of the rule of law must not 
be based on political considerations but on legal grounds and must remain in line and 
harmony with national approaches.
 19 Pócza, 2019, p. 145.
 20 CDL-AD(2011)003rev, Report on the Rule of Law.
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2011)003rev-e. 
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Against all this, it is undoubted that the European Union’s interpretation of the 
rule of law is based on the provisions of the Treaties and as such an independent domain 
of legal interpretation can be established within the framework of EU law, taken care 
of by the Court of Justice.21 However, the pitfalls of this “dialogical rule of law” have 
been presented above. Before moving on, we shall bear in mind that extra-judicial 
interpretations of the rule of law also have taken hold of European institutions, and – in 
light of the above – the circumstances and content of the establishment of the EU “rule 
of law mechanism” (and its successors and alternatives) will be presented below.
2. On how actors play their RoL(e). Toward an EU Compromise?
 ■ 2.1. Setting the Scene: The Framework
The EU dimension of the value (and/or principle) of the rule of law – subject to this 
paper – was first christened “the EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law”, devel-
oped and communicated by the European Commission.22 According to the Commission, 
“the rule of law is the backbone of any modern constitutional democracy. It is one of the 
founding principles stemming from the common constitutional traditions of all the Member 
States of the EU and, as such, one of the main values upon which the Union is based. This is 
recalled by Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as well as by the Preambles to the 
Treaty and to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. This is also why, under Article 49 
TEU, respect for the rule of law is a precondition for EU membership.23 Along with democracy 
and human rights, the rule of law is also one of the three pillars of the Council of Europe and 
is endorsed in the Preamble to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR.”24
In 2014, the Commission stated that the constitutions and judicial systems of the 
Member States are well designed and equipped to protect citizens against any threat 
to the rule of law. However, according to the Commission, “in some Member States25 
[it was] demonstrated that a lack of respect for the rule of law and, as a consequence, also 
 21 See e.g. von Danwitz, 2014. Danwitz, then a judge at the CJEU, identifies the context of the 
debate as resulting from the „public perception that the political evolution in a Member State might 
be in contradiction with the values of the Union”. (p. 1336.). 
 22 COM/2014/0158 final: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council: A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law. Available: https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0158&from=HU. 
 23 For more on this subject, see e.g. Stephanie Ricarda Roos: The “Rule of Law” as a 
Requirement for Accession to the European Union. Lecture presented at a Summer 
School on “The Importance of the Rule of Law in the Context of Accession to EU and 
NATO” August 2007, Bucharest (online) https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/
get_file?uuid=8279dfa9-5d97-fb5e-1015-d5b82483170c&groupId=252038. 
 24 COM/2014/0158 final, 1.
 25 Ever since the beginning of this debate, the issue is mostly only focused on Hungary and 
Poland as being the “sole perpetrators”, but EU concerns have been also raised in terms of 
Romania (together with Bulgaria as two “law-governed states”) or Malta, to mention the most 
characteristic examples. (On Romania, see: Carp, 2014; on Malta, see: Borg, 2020). 
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for the fundamental values which the rule of law aims to protect, can become a matter of 
serious concern.”26 In developing the rule of law framework, the Commission stated 
that it is the Guardian of the Treaties and thus has the responsibility of ensuring the 
respect of the values on which the EU is founded and of protecting the general interest 
of the Union.27 In April 2013, the General Affairs Council discussed the topic28, then 
thereafter the European Parliament requested that “Member States be regularly assessed 
on their continued compliance with the fundamental values of the Union and the requirement 
of democracy and the rule of law.”29
Against this background, the Commission has established the rule of law Frame-
work to address and resolve a situation in that Member States where there is a systemic 
threat30 to the rule of law.31 According to the Commission, the aim of the framework is to 
resolve potential future threats to the rule of law in Member States before the conditions 
for activating the mechanisms foreseen in Article 7 TEU – considered by some as “only 
theoretically attractive procedures”32 – would be met. The Commission emphasized 
that the framework is not an alternative to already existing Article 7 mechanisms and 
infringement procedures, it has a much more preventive / complementary nature,33 
which – however – both lexically confer the meaning that they are thus designed to lead 
to alternate paths of EU enforcement of European values.
In justifying the need for a 2014 rule of law framework, the Commission explained 
that the principle of the rule of law „has progressively become a dominant organisational 
model of modern constitutional law and international organisations (including the United 
Nations and the Council of Europe) to regulate the exercise of public powers. It makes sure 
that all public powers act within the constraints set out by law, in accordance with the values 
of democracy and fundamental rights, and under the control of independent and impartial 
courts.”34
The EU Commission – in line with similar conclusions drawn by the Venice 
Commission – acknowledged that the precise content of the principles and standards 
 26 COM/2014/0158, 1.
 27 President Barroso played a major role in shaping the framework, who in September 2012, in 
his annual State of the Union speech to the European Parliament, spoke about the need for a 
more effective system of the protection rule of law. Cf.: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-12-596_en.htm and http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-684_en.htm. 
 28 Cf. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/136915.pdf. 
 29 Cf. COM/2014/0158, 1.
 30 Many in legal academia have called on European institutions to define this concept to no avail, 
while the events surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal in Poland have been characterized 
by others as a systemic threat. (On the lack of a definition of systemic threat and relevant 
issues: Kochenov, Pech, 2015; on the Polish situation as a systemic threat: Pech, 2016). 
 31 This came – through Article 1 of the Nice Treaty – as a direct reaction or response to the 
Austrian events of 1999 leading up the rule of law procedure not being triggered due to lack 
of actual violations, but the adoption of the so-called “Wise Men Report” on the country’s 
commitment to European values, by Martii Ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein and Marcelino Oreja 
(online) https://www.jstor.org/stable/20694076?seq=1.
 32 Fekete – Czina, 2015; Orbán, 2016. 
 33 Cf. COM/2014/0158, 1.
 34 COM/2014/0158, 2.
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stemming from the rule of law may vary at the national level, depending on the respec-
tive Member States’ own constitutional arrangements, however the Commission con-
sidered this much less significant than its CoE counterpart. In 2014, the EU Commission 
essentially adopted the interpretation of international judicial forums and bodies as the 
sole guideline, which approach, as we will see later, will form the basis of the 2020 rule 
of law Mechanism. According to the EU Commission, the case law of the CJEU and the 
ECHR, as well as documents drawn up by the Council of Europe, „building notably on 
the expertise of the Venice Commission, provide a non-exhaustive list of these principles and 
hence define the core meaning of the rule of law as a common value of the EU in accordance 
with Article 2 TEU.”35
On the basis of these sources, the Commission defined the content of the rule 
of law as
(i) legality „which implies a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic 
process for enacting laws”36,
(ii) legal certainty,
(iii) prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive power,
(iv) independent and impartial courts,
(v) effective judicial review including respect for fundamental rights, and
(vi) equality before the law.
However, the Commission did not define the content of the above, but referred to the 
case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR, according to which these are not purely formal 
and procedural requirements but vehicles “for ensuring compliance with and respect for 
democracy and human rights”. It is then stated that the rule of law is a „constitutional 
principle with both formal and substantive components”, but the Commission no longer 
ponders upon substantive difficulties of content. In essence, they developed the Frame-
work circumventing the consequences of their finding that the elements of rule of law 
may have a different content in the respective national legal systems. The Commission 
resolved the problem by relying on the absolute supremacy of the CJEU’s and ECHR’s 
practice over the jurisprudence of the Member States. Frankly, in so deciding, the 
Commission may have assumed that these courts have already taken into account the 
practices of the Member States, but the fact remains that they did not wish to include 
these circumstances, such as national specificities, into the rule of law framework. 
This is, in part, understandable, given their mandate to promote European interests. 
Regardless, the resulting rule of law mechanism was (and is) based on this approach.
The Commission stated that respect for the rule of law is intrinsically linked to 
respect for democracy and for fundamental rights: „there can be no democracy and respect 
for fundamental rights without respect for the rule of law and vice versa” and „fundamental 
rights are effective only if they are justiciable”. It is also stated that „democracy is protected if 
the fundamental role of the judiciary, including constitutional courts, can ensure freedom of 
 35 COM/2014/0158, 2.
 36 COM/2014/0158, 2.
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expression, freedom of assembly and respect of the rules governing the political and electoral 
process.”37
The processes identified by the Commission, which are to be protected by them 
and the EU at large are consequences in themselves: they are based on the national 
legal systems of the Member States, which includes, inter alia, not just the regulation 
of the MSs, but the case law of the national judicial systems and constitutional courts. 
They encompass legislation that has evolved organically over decades and that has 
contributed to the creation of a set of rules correlating a set of criteria referred to as the 
“rule of law”. The Commission’s approach is feared for its destabilizing effect regarding 
these foundations, trying to mold the rule of law into (and based on) the case law of our 
international (judicial) forums. It is not, of course, a question of these bodies playing a 
decisive role in determining the rule of law requirements, however, we must not forget 
the role of these bodies.
The ECHR is a complementary forum for the protection of human rights, while 
the CJEU is the forum for the protection of EU law. The practice of these bodies can 
therefore only be taken into account in determining the content of the rule of law in so 
far as the issue under consideration falls within the remit of these forums. Otherwise, 
we will disregard the requirements of the founding treaties regarding the division of 
powers when defining the content of the rule of law, whereas, in matters falling within 
the scope of national sovereignty, instead of the case law of national constitutional 
courts and judicial bodies, we establish a system of requirements based on general 
principles relying on the practice of supranational judicial forums, which may not have 
the power to decide on these questions. Consequently, the system of requirements thus 
established bears the risk of an ultra vires act. The Commission itself stated that the 
“action taken by the Commission to launch infringement procedures, based on Article 258 
TFEU, has proven to be an important instrument in addressing certain rule of law concerns. 
But infringement procedures can be launched by the Commission only where these concerns 
constitute, at the same time, a breach of a specific provision of EU law.”38
The question is whether a measure complies with the ideal of the rule of law, 
in which a political body considers the possibilities available to it by the Treaties to 
be insufficient and itself creates extending competencies. In practice, the Commis-
sion itself states that, in the circumstances which it has identified above, it does not 
consider the Founding Treaties to be appropriate and therefore intends to create quasi 
new powers for itself. At the same time, it becomes problematic that the assessment of 
requirements is carried out by a political body which does not have an express compe-
tence to do so under the Treaties.39
 37 COM/2014/0158, 2.
 38 Ibid, 2.
 39 According to the Commission ‘s reasoning, the EU intervene in those cases where the mecha-
nisms established at national level to secure the rule of law cease to operate effectively and 
because of it there is a systemic threat to the rule of law and in such situations, the EU needs 
to act to protect the rule of law as a common value of the Union.
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According to the Commission, the purpose of the Framework was „to enable 
[themselves] to find a solution with the Member State concerned in order to prevent the 
emerging of a systemic threat to the rule of law in that Member State that could develop into a 
“clear risk of a serious breach” within the meaning of Article 7 TEU, which would require the 
mechanisms provided for in that Article to be launched.”40
The process of this rule of law Framework is considered to be the predecessor 
of the rule of law Mechanism, and is activated in those situations when the Member 
States are taking measures or are tolerating situations which are „likely to systematically 
and adversely affect the integrity, stability or the proper functioning of the institutions and 
the safeguard mechanisms established at national level to secure the rule of law”,41 and it 
comprises three stages:
(i) a Commission assessment,
(ii) a Commission recommendation and
(iii) a follow-up to the recommendation.
The aim of the first stage is to collect and examine the relevant information and assess 
whether there are clear indications of a “systemic threat” to the rule of law in a Member 
State. The Framework has not yet allowed for a joint examination of all Member States; 
the first comprehensive rule of law Report has been issued only in 2020, but more on 
this follows below.
The aim of the second stage of the framework is to issue a “rule of law recom-
mendation” addressed to the examined Member State, if the Commission finds that 
there is objective evidence of a systemic threat and that the authorities of that Member 
State are not taking appropriate action to redress it.42
The third and final stage of the Framework is the follow-up to the Commission’s 
recommendation. In this stage, the Commission is monitoring the follow-up given by 
the Member State to the recommendation. The Commission examines whether the 
Member State concerned have (appropriately) implemented the recommendations 
made by the Commission in the meantime to resolve the situation. As it was presented 
earlier, the Framework was set up by the Commission as a procedure established in its 
own competence. Therefore, a separate sanction system was not (then) attached to it. 
Based on the Framework, in case the Member State concerned did not (satisfactorily) 
follow-up on the recommendations, the Commission assessed the possibility of activat-
ing one of the sanction-mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU.
Before moving on to the next phase of the transformation of the Framework, 
a few thoughts are noteworthy hereby that have been provided by none other than the 
Legal Service of the Commission back in 2014. Regarding the division of competences 
between the Member States and the Union, the Legal Service argued that the Frame-
work is “not compatible with the principle of conferral which governs the competences of 
the institutions of the Union. The possibility exists, however, for the Member States to agree 
 40 COM/2014/0158 final, 4.
 41 Ibid. 4.1.
 42 Ibid. 4.2.
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among them on a review system of the functioning of the rule of law in the Member States 
[…].”43 As a direct consequence, the Legal Service concluded that “there is no legal basis 
in the Treaties empowering the institutions to create a new supervision mechanism of the 
respect of the rule of law by the Member States, additional to what is laid down in Article 7 
TEU, neither to amend, modify or supplement the procedure laid down in this Article. Were the 
Council to act along such lines, it would run the risk of being found to have abased its powers 
by deciding without a legal basis.”44
Five eventful years have passed, and on 3 April 2019, the Commission issued 
a Communication in which it assessed the status of the rule of law and summarized 
the tools available, including on the basis of the Framework.45 In this document, they 
defined the rule of law46 (under Article 2 TEU) with the definition also adopted word-
to-word by the 2020 Rule of Law Report, see below. The Commission’s “rule of law 
toolbox”47 was detailed in Chapter II of the Communication,48 which included
(i) Article 7 TEU and the rule of law framework (described earlier),
(ii) infringement proceedings and preliminary rulings, and
(iii) other (alternative) mechanisms and frameworks (e.g. European Semester, EU 
Justice Scoreboard, Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, Commission’s 
Structural Reform Support Service, etc.).
In the same year, on 17 July, the Commission issued another Communication, which 
was already a blueprint for action about strengthening the rule of law within the EU.49 
In this document, the Commission set out the possibility of a comprehensive annual 
rule of law Report covering all Member States, described below. As we saw above, the 
European clause of the rule of law requirements (values) is Article 2 TEU.50 Thus, the 
legal basis for the rule of law mechanism established in 2020 also rests on this Article. 
In its Conclusions of 21 July 2020, the European Council stated that the Union’s financial 
interests shall be protected in accordance with the general principles embedded in 
the Union Treaties, in particular the values of Article 2 TEU, as well as the respect of 
the rule of law.51 Part II describes the process of how the Commission built the current 
character of rule of law enforcement in the EU, culminating in the adoption of Regula-
tion 2020/2092.
 43 10296/14 Opinion of the Legal Service, 27 May 2014, point 24. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document/ST-10296–2014-INIT/en/pdf 
 44 10296/14 Opinion of the Legal Service, 27 May 2014, point 28. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document/ST-10296–2014-INIT/en/pdf 
 45 COM(2019) 163: Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union. State of play and 
possible next steps. See: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2019/EN/COM-2019-
163-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF 
 46 COM(2019) 163, Introduction.
 47 Cf.: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/rule_of_law_factsheet_1.pdf. 
 48 Cf. COM(2019) 163, Chapter II. 
 49 COM(2019) 343: Strengthening the rule of law within the Union.
 50 For more information on the interpretation of Article 2, See: Blanke – Mangiameli, 2013, pp. 
109-157. 
 51 EUCO 10/20, A24. See: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45109/210720-euco-final-
conclusions-en.pdf 
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 ■ 2.2. Building the Character: the Mechanism, the Report and the Regulation
Based on the above, the “rule of law toolbox” has been further developed in 2020 by 
the Rule of Law Mechanism which is based on the so-called Rule of Law Report.52 The 
Mechanism incorporates those set out in the Framework and has been complemented 
by a system of financial sanctions adopted on 16 December 2020.53 The Commission 
produced its first comprehensive Rule of Law Report covering all Member States on 30 
September 2020.54
According to the Commission’s statement of purpose, the Mechanism is an 
annual process between the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament 
together with Member States as well as national parliaments, civil society and other 
stakeholders.55 The annual Report will be compiled as part of the Mechanism, and theo-
retically will serve as a basis for discussions in the EU as well as to prevent problems 
from emerging or deepening further. According to the Commission it helps “identifying 
challenges as soon as possible and with mutual support from the Commission, other Member 
States, and stakeholders including the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission, could 
help Member States find solutions to safeguard and protect the rule of law.”56
The structure of the Report is based on four pillars:
(i) justice systems57,
(ii) anti-corruption framework,58
(iii) media pluralism and media freedom,59 and
(iv) other institutional issues linked to checks and balances.60
The first (2020) Report posits to that in the past years the EU had to develop numer-
ous instruments to help enforce the rule of law and that further debates on how to 
strengthen the EU’s ability to address such situations were triggered by severe rule 
of law challenges in some Member States.61 The Report emphasizes that its approach, 
 52 For more information on the methodology of the report, see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/
info/files/2020_rule_of_law_report_methodology_en.pdf. 
 53 The European Parliament and the Council adopted that Regulation 2020/2092 on a general 
regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget on16 December 2020 under 
ordinary legislative procedure aimed at complementing the protection system of rule of law, 
thereby creating a rule of law mechanism for financial sanctions. OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020., See: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32020R2092&qid=161450
9244631&from=HU. 
 54 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 2020 Rule of Law Report 
– The rule of law situation in the European Union, COM(2020) 580. See: https://ec.europa.eu/
info/publications/2020-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_en. 
 55 Cf. https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/
rule-law/rule-law-mechanism_en. 
 56 See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/
rule-law/rule-law-mechanism_en 
 57 COM(2020) 580, 2.1.
 58 Ibid. 2.2.
 59 Ibid. 2.3.
 60 Ibid. 24.
 61 In this part of the report, neither Hungary nor Poland are named.
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as well as that of the Mechanism is based on “close dialogue with national authorities 
and stakeholders, bringing transparency and covering all Member States on an objective and 
impartial basis.”62
However, the Report contains that it is the result of collaboration with Member 
States at a political level in the Council and “through political and technical bilateral meet-
ings, and relies on a variety of sources”.63 Consequently, the Report itself admits to its 
political nature. In the future, therefore, these annual Reports will form the basis for 
the use of the tools at the disposal of the Commission and the European Union, as set 
out above, under the EU Rule of Law Mechanism.
In 2018, the Commission suggested that the budget of the European Union should 
serve the realization of the values of the European Union, consequently there is a direct 
link between the use of EU funds (represented by the MFF, Multiannual Financial 
Framework) and the respect of its values.64
Then in the same year, the Commission presented a legislative proposal entitled 
“on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule 
of law in the Member States.”65 The Regulation 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget 
finally was adopted on 16 December 2020, and It shall be applied from 1 January 2021 
(hereinafter: Regulation).
Based on the case law of the CJEU [and on the verbatim repetition of the defini-
tion laid out in COM(2019) 163], the reasoning of the Regulation declares that the rule 
of law requires that
(i) all public powers act within the constraints set out by law,
(ii) in accordance with the values of democracy and the respect for fundamental rights as 
stipulated in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the ‘Charter’) 
and other applicable instruments, and
(iii) under the control of independent and impartial courts.
Going into some essence of its structural elements, it is said that the rule of law 
requires
(i) in particular, that the principles of legality implying a transparent, accountable demo-
cratic and pluralistic law-making process;
(ii) legal certainty;
(iii) prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers;
(iv) effective judicial protection, including access to justice, by independent and impartial 
courts;
 62 Cf. COM(2020) 580, Introduction. 
 63 Ibid.
 64 Cf. COM(2018) 98: A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union that 
delivers efficiently on its priorities post-2020. See: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018DC0098&from=en 
 65 COM(2018) 324, 2018/0136(COD).
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0324&from=HU.
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(v) and separation of powers […].”66
In its reasoning, the regulation refers to the pillars of the rule of law report and identi-
fies the efficient use of EU funds as the basis for achieving the values enshrined in the 
pillars.67 Based on the reasoning of the Regulation, Article 19 TEU expressly mentions 
the value of the rule of law set out in Article 2 TEU, and because of it “requires Member 
States to provide effective judicial protection in the fields covered by Union law, including those 
relating to the implementation of the Union budget.” The very existence of effective judicial 
review designed to ensure compliance with Union law – continues the reasoning – is 
the essence of the rule of law, and requires
(i) independent courts as well as
(ii) “the judicial review of the validity of measures, contracts or other instruments giving 
rise to public expenditure or debts, inter alia, in the context of public procurement 
procedures which may also be brought before the courts.”
In view of all this, the Regulation states in its reasoning – relatively generously – that 
with regard to the above there is “a clear relationship between respect for the rule of law and 
the efficient implementation of the Union budget in accordance with the principles of sound 
financial management.”68
In addition, the Regulation contains another concept of the rule of law,69 accord-
ing to which
(i) it refers to the Union value enshrined in Article 2 TEU70, and it includes
(ii) the principles of legality implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and plural-
istic law-making process;
(iii) legal certainty;
(iv) prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers;
(v) effective judicial protection, including access to justice, by independent and impartial 
courts, also as regards fundamental rights;
(vi) separation of powers;
(vii) and non-discrimination and equality before the law.
Article 3 of the Regulation sets out the three instances, which constitute a breach of the 
rule of law in relation to the Regulation. These are:
(i) endangering the independence of the judiciary;
(ii) failing to prevent, correct or sanction arbitrary or unlawful decisions by public 
authorities, including by law-enforcement authorities, withholding financial 
and human resources affecting their proper functioning or failing to ensure the 
absence of conflicts of interest;
 66 OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020., Reasoning (3).
 67 Ibid. (6) – (11).
 68 OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020., Reasoning (12) – (13).
 69 OJ L 433I , 22.12.2020., Article 2. 
 70 The provision also states that the rule of law shall be understood having regard to the other 
Union values and principles enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
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(iii) limiting the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, including through 
restrictive procedural rules and lack of implementation of judgments, or limiting 
the effective investigation, prosecution or sanctioning of breaches of law.
However, the procedure and sanctions set out in the Regulation can only be applied 
if the violation of the rule of law concerns specific cases determined by the Article 4, 
which provision applies with familiarly rhetorical phraseology from the early days of 
the Framework. It talks about “serious risk” affecting the sound financial management 
of the Union budget or the protection of the financial interests of the Union „in a suf-
ficiently direct way”.71
Let us stop here for a brief moment of reflection on how this new financial narra-
tive squares with our setting of the scene for this paper in the introduction. It has been 
argued above that fear and economic interests still provide the continuing motivation 
for European integration.72 This time, it is economic interest, virtually translating legal 
rule of law conditions into statistics and data-sets. With economic interest as a political 
motivation for integration comes the essential need to quantify loss and profit, assign 
them a tangible number value. This, consequently, also brings about a myriad of ways 
to quantify the rule of law, translating (some of) its consensual content into numbers, 
measuring their performance along “compliance indicators”.
This logic was what brought about first checklists73 (in a less numeric fashion), 
then indexes, scoreboards74 and conditionality lists.75 [In the context of EU integra-
tion, the latter two have been introduced as later alternatives to Article 7 proceedings, 
adding to the initial duality that has been created by the Nice Treaty within Article 7 by 
introducing a “preventive alternative” (through unanimity) to the original sanctioning 
mechanism (through QMV).]
When addressing the methodological pitfalls of measuring rule-of-law perfor-
mance through similar means, Pócza argues that the first challenge really is which 
layer (and which concept or definition) to measure, thereby referring to a very difficult 
 71 In the event of a violation of the rule of law as defined above in the Regulation, its Articles 5 
and 6 set out the applicable measures and relevant proceedings) to protect the Union budget. 
(Examples are: a prohibition on entering into new agreements on loans or other instruments 
guaranteed by the Union budget, an interruption of payment deadlines, a prohibition on enter-
ing into new legal commitments, etc.).
 72 It can clearly be seen by the international reaction to the German Federal Constitutional 
Court’s (GFCC) most recent PSPP ruling how the interplay of fear of certain economic impacts 
on Member State economic interests can trigger constitutional responses from within the 
integration. Previously, too, the most influential GFCC decisions regarding the limits of EU 
integration were the results of legal issues touching upon core economic interests and policies 
affecting Germany and the German national economy. Consider, for that matter, their OMT 
decision (2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvE 13/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2729/13) or their ESM 
decision (2 BvR 1390/12) before the PSPP. 
 73 Cf. The Venice Commission’s Rule of Law Checklist from 2016. https://www.venice.coe.int/
webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)007-e. 
 74 Cf. the EU Justice Scoreboard https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/
upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en. 
 75 In this regard, please refer to the 2018 Mechanism also dubbed „conditionality mechanism”.
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choice between the previously addressed broad and narrow interpretations of the rule 
of law concept (in the introduction and in setting the scene). Using an overly broad, 
more complex concept bears the risk of internal tensions as well: the more layers in 
encompasses, the more difficult it gets to render it measurable,76 which leads up directly 
to our conclusion.
3. Ending the Scene: Back to Square One?
Having gone through the transformative elements of crises and their resolution through 
compromises in the context of European integration with our sights set on addressing 
the issue of the rule of law, we now need to assess where we stand.
We have dealt with the necessity of a legally anchored consideration of the foun-
dational elements of the concept in all EU-level legal and political debates, from the 
point of view of the national, Member State level, referring to coexisting dimensions 
of ‘closed’ and ‘open statehood’, projecting the constitutional issues and relevant legal 
debates into the European sphere as well.
In light of the above and of what has been just argued regarding the challenges 
of rule-of-law performance indicators: we are right “back to square one”, where we 
started. Successful measurement depends on the concept used as a baseline, but this 
time, we do not fully know what the concept really is, and how it should be interpreted 
for European interests and purposes. Add to this the problematic that the “performance 
indicators” measured firstly manifest on the national level, leaving the national legal 
and judicial systems to dispose of them – and the picture does not become clearer.
European efforts to clarify the content of the rule of law as an EU value have 
been put on the backburner by early attempts at creating rhetorical vehicles such as 
“systemic violation” or “clear risk of a serious breach” to be used as leverage against 
Member States considered “outliers”, then the focus of the process shifted towards more 
than one enumerative exercise relying on pre-existing international compromises 
regarding the concept of rule of law, transformed into an EU-image. The efforts then 
quickly spilled over into the financial sphere, drawing another alternative concentric 
circle and the attached layer of uncertainty to the conceptual debate about the content 
of the rule of law.
In trying to grasp the constitutional, legal, political or even economic essence of 
the rule of law, we can create as many sets of requirements as we can think up, but we 
shall bear in mind that in the long run, creating more and alternating and alternative 
orbits around the same gravitational mass is futile and counterproductive. The inten-
tion might be to throw out the bathwater, but the action actually might hurt the baby 
itself – to paraphrase a well-known idiom tailored to the fate of the integration.
 76 Pócza, 2019, 150.
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Eventually, one might just find that only compliance with nationally-anchored 
legal criteria provide the most accommodating answer, and – for any European 
compromise to prevail – national specificities cannot and should not be disregarded 
or circumvented, with the necessary legal space afforded to those forums that are 
constitutionally empowered to settle matters in this context. Suppressing national 
specificities of and constitutional authorities in charge of rule of law might only con-
tribute to the further chilling of interstate relations within the integration, creating 
yet another crisis, sliding backwards slowly towards disintegration, towards gradual 
erosion – but not that of the rule of law.77 After such crisis, who knows what the next 
necessary compromise needs to be to preserve European unity in diversity.
The latest development in the EU rule of law saga is that on 11 March 2021, 
Poland and Hungary have announced to challenge the Regulation at the CJEU pointing 
to a lack of competence of the EU to define the rule of law and relevant conditionality 
for compliance.78 So, the story goes on, with no possible end in sight.
 77 For more on this topic, see: Jakab 2019. 
 78 https://euobserver.com/political/151211. 
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International and European Norms on the Rule of Law 
from the Perspective of the Republic of Serbia
 ■ ABSTRACT: This paper examines international and European norms concerning 
the principle of the rule of law and its implications for the Republic of Serbia’s legal 
order. There is no universally accepted definition of the rule of law, but some common 
elements can be found in international legislative acts and jurisprudence. The Euro-
pean Union and Council of Europe have substantial legislation on this issue; with 
their courts’ jurisprudence, they have a significant influence on their Member States’ 
comprehension of the rule of law principle. The Republic of Serbia has embraced the 
principle in its Constitution and developed it in its legislation. It will also accept and 
include European interpretations of the rule of law in its legislation and judicial and 
administrative practice by joining the European Union.
 ■ KEYWORDS: rule of law, EU, ECJ, ECHR, Council of Europe, international law, 
constitution.
1. Introduction
Discussions of the rule of law date back to Aristotle. It could be said that the rule is 
internal in origin, transferred to the international level and then shifted to the legal 
systems of individual states obligated to respect the rule’s international norms and 
interpretations. In the past century, the European Union (EU) and the Council of Europe 
(COE) have contributed significantly to the discourse. International law has interpreted 
and developed the concept through the courts’ case law: the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have resolved some longstand-
ing problems with their interpretation of this principle, shaping its meaning for the 
future. The courts’ decisions have influenced the legal system of numerous states in 
the international community.
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The Republic of Serbia, which aims to accede to the European Union by 2025, 
has developed its legislation to be in accordance with international norms and stan-
dards. This article analyses some of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law, such 
as judiciary autonomy and independence and judicial review of state decisions, in the 
context of Serbia’s current legal system to clarify how the rule of law is understood and 
implemented in Serbia. It concludes with suggestions for possible improvements.
2. Definition of the ‘Rule of Law’
The rule of law is a universal principle, but there is no precise definition at the inter-
national level; ‘regardless of the national legal system, it is always left to scholars 
and judges to flesh the principle out’.2 Nevertheless, there are several analyses of its 
concept.3
The term itself is usually credited to A. Venn Dicey, the English jurist who used 
the phrase in his 1885 book. He wrote that rule of law comprises three elements: 
persons cannot be punished unless they breach the law; the same laws apply to every 
person in the country; and human rights are vital to the general principles of law.4 The 
first element was mentioned as part of the principle of lawfulness and seen as crucial 
to the rule of law.5 Other scholars have since agreed that the principle of rule of law 
exists to protect human rights.6
This idea of the rule of law falls is in line with the Rechtsstaat (‘legal state’) 
tradition of constraining governments’ powers by legal means. The Rechtsstaat concept 
has been described as opposition to an absolutist state with no boundaries.7 The rule 
of law is a process, a desire for freedom and justice, not an end product.8 It should not 
represent the implementation of one government’s laws or one power’s norms sup-
ported by a state force’s monopoly but a generalised and universally applied law.9
3. The Rule of Law in International Documents
The United Nations has been dealing with the issue of the rule of law for many decades. 
That body’s Millennium Declaration (8 September 2000) promoting democracy and 
strengthening the rule of law at the national and international level has been endorsed 
 2 Pech, 2009, p. 42.
 3 Emmert, 2009, p. 554. 
 4 Dicey, 1915, p. 110.
 5 Garrido and Castillo, 2019, p. 10.
 6 den Hertog, 2012, p. 211.
 7 Jovanovic, 2015, p. 768.
 8 Carter, 1991, p. 8.
 9 Stanovcic, 2006, p. 63.
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by all the UN Member States.10 The UN International Court of Justice has also weighed 
in on the rule of law, interpreting and applying the UN Charter’s rules and general 
procedures and respecting human rights.11 The UN Charter set uniforms standards that 
should not be violated, and the global community needs to enforce these effectively.12 
Moreover, the United Nations’ Human Rights: Handbook for Parliamentarians concen-
trated on the rule of law and protecting and promoting human rights and democracy.13 
A 2005 Resolution from the UN Human Rights Commission stated that the rule of law 
consists of the separation of powers, the supremacy of law, and equal protection under 
the law.14
A wider definition of the rule of law was made by former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan, who stated that rule of law ‘requires, as well, measures to ensure adher-
ence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal 
transparency’.15
The rule of law has also been espoused by other august regional bodies, such 
as the COE, the EU, the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC), the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union (CAAU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE). In accordance with Copenhagen Document, the rule of law is not 
‘merely a formal legality which assures regularity and consistency in the achievement 
and enforcement of democratic order, but justice based on the recognition and full 
acceptance of the supreme value’.16 On this level, states should strengthen the rule of 
law in the areas of judiciary independence, the right to a fair trial, access to a court, 
the accountability of state institutions and officials, and respect for the rule of law in 
public administration.17
 10 United Nations Millennium Declaration, General Assembly Resolution 55/2 of 8 September 
2000. See: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Millennium.aspx (Accessed: 
10 January 2021). 
 11 Wright, 1946, p. 51.
 12 Carter, 1991, p. 7.
 13 United Nations Human Rights, Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, Handbook for 
Parliamentarians No. 6, Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2016, p. 75. See: https://www.ohchr.org/
documents/publications/handbookparliamentarians.pdf (Accessed: 12 February 2021).
 14 UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Resolution 2005/32: Democracy and the Rule 
of Law, 19 April 2005, E/CN.4/RES/2005/32, https://www.refworld.org/docid/45377c4c0.html 
(Accessed: 12 February 2021).
 15 United Nations Security Council, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-
conflict societies, Report of the Secretary-General, 23 August 2004, paragraph 6; Karakami-
sheva-Jovanovska, 2016, p. 7.
 16 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting 
of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation 
in Europe, 29 June 1990, paragraph 2.
 17 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Ministerial Council, Decision no. 7/08, 
Further strengthening the rule of law in the OSCE area, 5 December 2008, paragraph 4, https://
www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/8/35494.pdf (Accessed: 12 February 2021).
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Moreover, the assessment of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) should not be neglected. The rule of law represents a set of elements 
that must be taken together, including the protection of human rights, the efficient 
application of the law, interpretation of law through an independent and impartial 
judiciary, and equal access of the law for all.18
4. The Rule of Law in the European Union
Today, the rule of law is not just a principle but one of the EU’s constitutional values,19 
since the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) stated that one of the EU’s main principles 
of the European Union is the rule of law.20 That is why multiple international bodies 
have grappled with definitions of the rule of law, what it means, and why is it important. 
Article 2 of the TEU clearly stated that the EU’s foundation was based on ‘the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect 
for human rights’.21 Additionally, the Court the of Justice (Court) played a pivotal role 
in ensuring that EU law respected ‘the existence of mutual trust between the Member 
States that those values will be recognised’.22 Any state that breaches Article 2 of the TEU 
can be sanctioned, according to Article 7 of the TEU,23 known as the ‘nuclear option’.24 
Article 49 of the TEU says that to be a member of EU, a state must respect the rule of law, 
making a commitment to the rule of law a condition of membership.25 However, there 
is no universal law that applies to every country in the same way, which is why various 
organisations have tried to establish a global understanding of the rule of law.26
When an EU state does not respect the principle of the rule of law or breaches 
human rights, the EU reacts. For example, the European Commission’s concerns about 
Poland’s human rights breaches triggered the Rule of Law Framework.27 The European 
Commission has undertaken numerous actions to strengthen the rule of law at the 
international level, and written that future avenues will rest on three pillars: promotion 
(building knowledge and a common rule of law culture), prevention (cooperation and 
support to strengthen the rule of law at the national level), and response (enforcement at 
the EU level when national mechanisms falter).28 The Commission took actions because 
 18 Report on the Rule of Law, European Commission for democracy through Law – Venice Com-
mission, 4 April 2011, paragraph 27.
 19 Van Elsuwege and Gremmelprez, 2020, p. 8.
 20 Treaty of Lisbon (Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union), signed on 13 December 2007, Preamble.
 21 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 2.
 22 Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion of the Court, 18 December 2014, para. 168.
 23 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 7.
 24 Kochenov and Pech, 2015, p. 516.
 25 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 49.
 26 Florin, 2010, p. 8.
 27 Oliver and Stefanelli, 2016, pp. 1080–1081.
 28 Wahl and Riehle, 2019, p. 79.
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until then there had not been secure processes and instruments to ensure effective 
reactions to threats to the rule of law.29 Their actions were set out in a communication 
to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘A New Framework to Strengthen the Rule 
of Law’. Their goal was to deal with any possible threat to the rule of law. When the 
national courts lacked the capacity to protect the rule of law, the New Framework would 
be activated.30 The communication stipulated ‘a public, comprehensive conceptualiza-
tion of the concept by an EU institution’.31 In the New Framework, the rule of law is seen 
as the vehicle that ensures compliance with respect human rights.32
According to Annex I of the New Framework and the Court’s practice,33 the rule 
of law contains the following constitutive principles that are valid within the EU system: 
‘the principle of legality,34 legal certainty,35 prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive 
powers, independent and effective judicial review, including respect for fundamental 
rights,36 [and] equality before the law’.37
The Court of Justice affirmed that the principle of legality is crucial in the EU, 
stating that ‘in a community governed by the rule of law, adherence to legality must be 
properly ensured’.38 The Court wrote that in asserting legal certainty, the enforcement 
of EU regulation needs to be clear and predictable for its subjects.39 Moreover, the Court 
emphasised that in every EU country, relating to prohibition of arbitrariness, ‘any 
intervention by the public authorities in the sphere of private activities of any person, 
whether natural or legal, must have a legal basis and be justified’.40 About independent 
 29 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A new 
framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, 19 March 2014, p. 2.
 30 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A new 
framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, 19 March 2014, p. 6.
 31 Magen, 2016, p. 1051.
 32 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council of the European Union, ECR I-06677, Judgment of 
the Court, 25 July 2002, paragraph 38.
 33 Von Danwitz, 2014, p. 1315.
 34 De Compte v. Parliament, Case C-90/95, Judgment of the Court, 17 April 1997, paragraph 35; 
Conserve Italia v.
  Commission, Case C-500/99, Judgment of the Court, 24 January 2002, paragraph 90.
 35 Gebroeders van Es Douane Agenten v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Case C-143/93, Judge-
ment of the Court, 13 February 1996, paragraph 27; Belgium v. Commission, C-110/03, Judgement 
of the Court, 14 April 2005, paragraph 30.
 36 AM & S v. Commission, Case C-155/79, Judgment of the Court, 18 May 1982, paragraph 18; 
Orkem v.
  Commission, Case C-374/87, Judgment of the Court, 18 October 1989, paragraph 32.
 37 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A new 
framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, Annex 1 and 2, 2014, Brussels, pp. 1, 2. https://
ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-158-EN-F1-1-ANNEX-1.Pdf, (accessed: 
13 February 2021).
 38 Commission v. CAS Succhi di Frutta, Case C-496/99, Judgment of the Court, 29 April 2004, para-
graph 63.
 39 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v. Salumi and others, Joined Cases 212 to 217/80, Judg-
ment of the Court, 12 November 1981, paragraph 10.
 40 Hoechst v. Commission, Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88, Judgment of the Court, 21 September 1989, 
paragraph 19.
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and effective judicial review, the Court underlined that ‘individuals are therefore 
entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights they derive from the Community 
legal order’.41 Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) affirmed 
the relationship between a fair trial and the separation of powers, clearly declaring 
that ‘everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law’.42 The importance of equality 
before the law can be seen as a general principle of the EU,43 and it is regulated under 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.44
The first decision regarding the rule of law before EU Court of Justice of the 
EU stated the following: ‘It must first be emphasised in this regard that the European 
Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither 
its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the 
measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, 
the Treaty’.45 Moreover, it was emphasised that Court should guarantee that the law is 
observed as interpreted and applied in the Treaty.46
One landmark case was Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belas-
tingen, in which it was asserted that ‘the Community constitutes a new legal order 
of international law for the benefit of which the [Member] States have limited their 
sovereign rights,’ expressing the importance of the rule of law.47
Additionally, the Viviane Reding, vice-president of the European Commission 
and EU Justice Commissioner, discussed the issue in a speech on 4 September 2013:
By ‘rule of law’, we mean a system where laws are applied and enforced (so 
not only ‘black letter law’) but also the spirit of the law and fundamental 
rights, which are the ultimate foundation of all laws. The rule of law means 
a system in which no one—no government, no public official, no dominant 
company—is above the law; it means equality before the law.48
 41 Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council of the European Union, Case C-50/00 P, Judgment 
of the Court, 25 July 2002, paragraph 39.
 42 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 04.11.1950., 
Article 6, https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf, (accessed: 13 February 
2021).
 43 Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v. Commission, Case C-550/07, Judgment of the Court, 
14 September, paragraph 54.
 44 Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Official Journal of European Union, 
26.10.2012., Articles 21 and 22.
 45 Les Verts v. European Parliament, Case 294-83, Judgement of the Court, 23 April 1986, paragraph 
23.
 46 Fernandez Esteban, 1999, p. 104.
 47 Van Gend & Los v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, Case 26-62, Judgment of the Court, 
05 February 1963, p. 11.
 48 Viviane ReddingThe EU and the Rule of Law – What next? Centre for European Policy Studies, 4 
September 2013. See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_13_677 
(Accessed: 11 February 2021).
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The sheer number of cases dealing underscore its importance and explain the EU’s 
efforts to define the principle.49 For example, the case European Commission v. Alrosa 
Company Ltd case was important because it protected the rule of law in the post-
modernisation EU competition law regime.50 It is broadly accepted as a fundamental 
concept ‘undergirding and legitimating all European constitutional systems’.51
The courts’ findings have shown that failing to make a decision within a reason-
able time can be seen as a breach of fundamental human rights requiring an effective 
remedy.52 The courts view humans rights violations to be a breach of the rule of law 
since they consider human rights an ‘integral part of [the] rule of law’.53
5. The Rule of Law in the Council of Europe
Nowadays, constitutional law and the charters of international governance organisa-
tions endeavour to establish guidelines and practices that uphold the principles of the 
rule of law, democracy, and fundamental rights.54 Thus, the rule of law is one of the 
pillars of the COE, whose 1949 Statute stated that ‘Every member of the Council of 
Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law’.55 At a November 2008 meeting, 
the COE reasserted this:
The rule of law is one of the three core principles of the Council of Europe, 
along with the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
and the concept of genuine democracy (1949 Statute, recital 3 of the pre-
amble and Article 3). More particularly, the rule of law is, together with 
individual freedom and political liberty, referred to as “principles which 
form the basis of all genuine democracy” (recital 3 of the preamble).56
The Preamble of the ECHR affirmed that the governments of European countries should 
respect the rule of law.57 Moreover, the rule of law has been systematically referred 
 49 Pech, 2010, p. 361.
 50 Cengiz, 2011, p. 128; European Commission v. Alrosa Company Ltd, Case C-441-07, Judgment of the 
Court, 29 June 2010.
 51 Kokott, 1999, pp. 97–102.
 52 Gascogne Sack Deutschland v. Commission, Case C-40/12, Judgment of the Court, 26 November 
2013; Groupe Gascogne SA v. Commission, Case C-58/12 P, Judgment of the Court, 26 November 
2013; Kendrion NV v. Commission, Case C-50/12 P, Judgment of the Court, 26 November 2013.
 53 Arnold, 2015, p. 19.
 54 Lenaerts, 2020, p. 34.
 55 Statute of the Council of Europe, London, 05.05.1949., Article 3. See: https://www.coe.int/en/
web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680935bd0 (Accessed: 11 February 2021).
 56 Council of Europe, The Council of Europe and The Rule of Law – An overview, 21 November 
2008, paragraph 4.
 57 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 04.11.1950., 
Preamble, https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf (Accessed: 11 February 
2021).
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to in the COE’s other significant political documents, conventions, and recommenda-
tions, such as Resolution Res(2002)12 establishing the European Commission for the 
Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ).58
Also, the rule of law is named as a priority objective in the Statute of the Euro-
pean Commission for Democracy through Law (hereafter, Venice Commission), which 
was established in 1990 to provide advisory support and constitutional assistance to 
states endeavouring to adjust their legal systems to democratic standards in accordance 
with the European legal tradition. The Venice Commission has become an increas-
ingly consequential authority wielding significant influence in shaping Central and 
Eastern European countries’ constitutions. At its 86th plenary session, held in 2011, 
the Commission adopted its Report on the Rule of Law, which recognised the common 
elements of the rule of law arrived at by a consensus of scholars, judges, and others on 
basic elements of the rule of law: (1) legality, including a transparent, responsible, and 
democratic process of legislation; (2) legal certainty; (3) prohibition of arbitrariness; 
(4) access to justice before independent and impartial courts, including judicial review 
of administrative acts; (5) respect for human rights; and (6) non-discrimination and 
equality before the law.59
When assessing the rule of law, the Committee of Ministers of the COE stated 
that ‘the foregoing overviews are not sufficient to allow the drawing up of a list of key 
rules of law requirements accepted by the Council of Europe, let alone a definition’.60 
In 2007, the COE issued Resolution 1594: The Principle of the Rule of Law, in which they 
pointed out that ‘the variability in terminology and understanding of the term, both 
within the Council of Europe and in its Member States, has elicited confusion’: specifi-
cally, ‘The Assembly emphasises the need to ensure the unification that encompasses 
the principles of legality and of due process, which has the same basic elements, found 
in particular in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, by whatever name 
this concept is now used in the Council of Europe’.61
The COE’s Parliamentary Assembly also dealt with the issues of the rule of law 
and judicial independence in other resolutions. For example, Resolution 2188 (2017): 
New Threats to the Rule of Law in Council of Europe Member States, focusing on the 
rule of law in Bulgaria, the Republic of Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Turkey.62 Reso-
 58 Resolution Res(2002)12 establishing the European Commission for the efficiency of justice 
(CEPEJ), Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 18 September 2002 at the 808th meeting of the 
Ministers’ Deputies). 
 59 Venice Commission, Rule of Law Checklist CDL-AD(2016)007, adopted by the Venice Commis-
sion at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11-12 March 2016), endorsed by the Ministers’ Deputies 
at the 1263th Meeting (6-7 September 2016), endorsed by the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities of the Council of Europe at its 31st Session (19-21 October 2016), paragraphs 15–18.
 60 Council of Europe, The Council of Europe and The Rule of Law – An overview, 21 November 
2008, paragraph 22.
 61 Report on the Rule of Law, European Commission for democracy through Law – Venice Com-
mission, 4 April 2011, paragraph 22.
 62 Resolution 2188 (2017), New threats to the rule of law in Council of Europe member States: 
selected examples, Textext adopted by the Assembly on 11 October 2017 (33rd Sitting). 
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lution 1594 (2007) indicated the need to ensure a correct interpretation of the terms ‘rule 
of law’, ‘Rechtsstaat ’, ‘prééminence du droit ’, and ‘Etat de droit ’, to clarify the variability 
in terminology and understanding.63 They concluded that the terms ‘rule of law’ and 
‘prééminence du droit ’ were substantive legal concepts that were synonymous and should 
be used in documents issued by the Parliamentary Assembly and by Member States 
in their official translations.64 The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has 
stipulated that there rule of law contains six different principles. The Venice Commis-
sion’s Report of the Rule of Law also recognised six, as previously stated.65
Case law before the ECHR often deals with the rule of law. One of the most rel-
evant provisions in this regard is the ECHR’s Article 6, which enumerates the essential 
features of a fair trial, a key component of the rule of law. These include the right to be 
heard promptly before an independent and impartial tribunal that pronounces its judg-
ment publicly, the presumption of innocence, the right to be informed in detail about 
the nature of the charges, and the right to be defended with legal assistance.66 Also, the 
Court has also asserted the right to court access, with a direct reference to the principle 
of the rule of law: ‘one can scarcely conceive of the rule of law without there being 
the possibility of having access to the courts’.67 In another case, the Court addressed 
the rule of law in relation to the principles of legality, the separation of powers, and 
equality before the law.68 Elements of the rule of law can be found in other articles 
of the ECHR, such as Article 3, which prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment; Article 5, which guarantees the right to liberty and security; Article 7, which 
prescribes the principle of legality; and Article 14, which guarantees the equality of 
individuals before the law, an essential element of the rule of law.69
6. The Rule of Law in the Republic of Serbia
The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia mentions the rule of law. Article 1 defines 
the Republic of Serbia as a ‘state of Serbian people and all citizens who live in it, based 
on the rule of law and social justice, principles of civil democracy, human and minority 
rights and freedoms, and commitment to European principles and values’.70 Article 3 
 63 Resolution 1594(2007), The Principle of the Rule of Law, Text adopted by the Standing Commit-
tee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 23 November 2007, Article 3. 
 64 Ibid., Article 6.1.
 65 Report on the Rule of Law, European Commission for democracy through Law – Venice Com-
mission, 4 April 2011, paragraph 21.
 66 Article 6 of the ECHR.
 67 Case of Golder v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 4451/70, Judgement of the Court, 21 Febru-
ary 1975, paragraph 34. 
 68 Case of Iordachi and Others v. Moldova, Application no, 25198/02, Judgment of the Court, 14 
September 2009, paragraph 37.
 69 Schukking, 2018, p. 156. 
 70 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Article 1. See: https://www.srbija.gov.rs/tekst/en/130144/
constitution-of-serbia.php (Accessed :10 February 2021).
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is devoted to the rule of law, calling it a fundamental prerequisite for the Constitution 
based on inalienable human rights. ‘The rule of law shall be exercised through free 
and direct elections, constitutional guarantees of human and minority rights, separa-
tion of power, independent judiciary, and observance of Constitution and Law by the 
authorities’.71 These words clarify that the rule of law requires direct and free elections 
and respect for human rights (including minority rights). Thus, Article 1 names the 
rule of law as an autonomous principle on which the state is based, and Article 3 lists 
its constitutive elements.
The Republic of Serbia’s Judicial Development Strategy for 2020–2025 establishes 
that developing the judiciary represents one of the country’s key strategic priorities, 
along with continuing to modernise and adapt the judiciary to meet the needs of the 
state and society, uphold the rule of law, and increase legal certainty.72
The separation of powers is one of the basic principles of a democratic society 
and the rule of law. It allows mutual control of state organs to moderate state authority. 
In common law, it is known as ‘checks and balances’. Article 4 of the Constitution of 
Serbia stipulates that ‘the government system shall be based on the division of power 
into legislative, executive, and judiciary’ and adds that the relationship among the 
‘three branches of power shall be based on balance and mutual control’.73 The same 
article provides that judiciary power shall be independent.74
Article 145 stipulates that ‘Court decisions shall be obligatory for all and may 
not be a subject of extrajudicial control’.75 Mutual control does not mean that court 
decisions can be subject to the control of the legislative or executive power; this 
formulation was criticised by the Venice Commission in 2018 when it presented its 
comments on the draft version of the amendments to Serbia’s Constitution. It proposed 
that instead of mutual control, the constitutional provision should be based on checks 
and balances.76
The EU Commission’s Serbia 2020 Report devoted many pages to the rule of law. 
Fore example, Section 2.1 covered the functions of democratic institutions and public 
administration reform. Section 2.2, which covered the rule of law and fundamental 
rights. The Report emphasised that the EU’s founding values include the rule of law and 
respect for human rights. It reiterated the importance of an effective judicial system 
 71 Ibid., Article 3.
 72 Strategija razvoja pravosuđa za period 2020–2025. godine (Eng. Judicial Development Strategy 
for the 2020–2025 period), Official Gazette RS, No. 101/2020.
 73 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Article 4, Paragraph 3.
 74 Ibid., Article 4, Paragraph 4.
 75 Ibid., Article 145, Paragraph 3.
 76 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Serbia – Opinion 
on the Draft Amendments to the Constitutional Provisions on the Judiciary. Adopted by the 
Venice Commission at its 115th Plenary Session (Venice, 22-23 June 2018), Opinion No. 921/2018, 
Strasbourg, 25 June 2018, CDL-AD(2018)011, para. 14: 
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(that is, independent, high-quality, and efficient), anti-corruption efforts, and respect 
for fundamental rights in the law and in practice.77
The Report also stated that Serbia needed more preparation to apply the EU 
acquis and the European standards in the area of the judiciary, and ‘very limited prog-
ress was made overall’. The Report noted that the constitutional reforms to strengthen 
the judiciary were on hold until after the 2020 parliamentary elections, which delayed 
of the adoption of the judicial legislation necessary to safeguard judicial independence. 
The Report stated its concerns about the scope for continued political influence over 
the judiciary: ‘Overall, corruption remains an issue of concern’.78
Vis-à-vis the judiciary, the Report specified two things Serbia needed to accom-
plish in the coming year: one, ‘strengthen the independence of the judiciary and the 
autonomy of the prosecution, including through amendments to constitutional and 
legislative provisions related to the appointment, career management, and disciplinary 
proceedings of judges and prosecutors’; and two, ‘amend the laws on High Judicial 
Council and the State Prosecutorial Council so that they are empowered to fully assume 
their independent role to proactively defend judicial independence and prosecutorial 
autonomy in practice in line with European standards.’79
7. The Rule of Law in the Process of Accession of the Republic of Serbia 
to the European Union
The Republic of Serbia is in the process of accession to the EU and has ratified the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).80 This is an international treaty that 
entered into force on 1 September 2013, granting the Republic of Serbia the status of an 
associated country to the European Union.81 The Preamble of SAA confirmed that all 
the parties are committed to respecting human rights and the rule of law as common 
values.82
 77 Commission Staff Working Document – Serbia 2020. Report Accompanying the Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions 2020 Communication on EU Enlargement 
Policy, p. 18. 
 78 Ibid., p. 5. 
 79 Ibid., p. 18.
 80 Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L 278, Volume 56, 18 October 2013.
 81 The European Parliament ratified the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia on 
19 January 2011, while the ratification process in the Member States of the European Union 
concluded on 18 June 2013 after Lithuania’s ratification. National Assembly of the Republic of 
Serbia ratified SAA on 9 September 2008, prior to which the National Assembly of the Republic 
of Serbia adopted the Resolution on association to the European Union on 13 October 2004. 
 82 Ibid., Preamble.
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Article 1 of the SAA stated that one of the aims of this association was to support 
Serbia’s efforts to strengthen its democracy and the rule of law.83 Article 2 emphasised 
that the basis of the domestic and external policies of the Parties and the essential 
elements of the agreement were these:
Respect for democratic principles and human rights as proclaimed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and as defined in the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in the 
Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, respect 
for principles of international law, including full cooperation with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the 
rule of law as well as the principles of market economy as reflected in the 
Document of the CSCE Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation.84
The SAA’s statement provides additional proof that the EU legal order is strongly con-
nected with international legal norms on human rights and the rule of law. Article 80 
of the SAA dealt with the ‘Reinforcement of Institutions and Rule of Law’, stating the 
following:
[T]he Parties shall attach particular importance to the consolidation of the 
rule of law and the reinforcement of institutions at all levels in the areas of 
administration in general and law enforcement and the administration of 
justice in particular. Cooperation shall notably aim at strengthening the 
independence of the judiciary and improving its efficiency, improving the 
functioning of the police and other law enforcement bodies, providing 
adequate training, and fighting corruption and organised crime.85
State candidates aiming to adjust their judiciary to the basic principles contained in the 
phrase ‘rule of law’ as defined by the EU must negotiate with the EU in accordance with 
the Conditions for Membership and the Chapters of the Acquis. The European Com-
mission’s Screening Report: Serbia focused on the Acquis’s Chapter 23: Judiciary and 
Fundamental Rights. That condition relates to the judiciary reform, the fight against 
corruption, and basic rights. It reiterated that according to Article 2 of the EU’s charter, 
the European Union was ‘founded on the principles of human dignity, freedom, democ-
racy, equality, the rule of law, and the respect for human rights’.86 Those principles were 
common to all the Member States, and candidates for accession were likewise required 
to uphold them.
 83 Ibid., Article 1.
 84 Ibid., Article 2.
 85 Ibid., Article 80.
 86 Screening report, Serbia, Chapter 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights, Commission, WP 
Enlargement + Countries Negotiating Accession to EU, MD 45/14, 15.05.14, p. 2. See: http://www.
europa.rs/upload/2014/Screening-report-chapter-23-serbia.pdf (Accessed: 8 February 2021). 
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On 5 July 2016, the Council’s Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Nego-
tiating Accession to the EU sent a communication to the Permanent Representatives 
Committee stating that the Working Party had reached an agreement on a draft EU 
common position on Judiciary and Fundamental Rights.87 The communication sum-
marised its requirement for Serbia’s judiciary reform. To strengthen the independence 
of its judiciary, Serbia agreed to comply with the EU’s recommendations, including 
these: adopt new constitutional provisions in line with the Venice Commission’s recom-
mendations and European standards and based on a wide and inclusive consultation 
process; amend and implement the Laws on the Organisation of Courts, on Seats and 
Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts and Public Prosecutors’ Offices, on Judges, on Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, on the High Judicial Council, on the State Prosecutorial Council, 
and the Law on Judicial Academy; provide an adequate administrative capacity to 
the Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils and provide them with their own budget; 
and establish an effective mechanism allowing the Councils to react against political 
interference.88
8. Conclusion
During the second half of the twentieth century, the rule of law developed into a 
universal principle supported by the unification efforts of the United Nations, the 
Council of Europe, and the European Union, which were founded for the protection, 
improvement, and promotion of universal values and jurisprudence. The rule of law 
principle has become the primary organisational model of modern constitutional 
law and international organisations to regulate the exercise of public powers. This 
principle provides that all branches of government act within the limits established 
by law in accordance with democratic values and basic rights and under the control of 
independent and impartial courts.
The European Union considers the rule of law an essential common value for all 
Member States and a prerequisite for accession. Adherence to the rule of law means that 
the law applies equally to all: all public powers must always act within the constraints 
of the law, in accordance with the values of democracy and fundamental rights, under 
the control of independent and impartial courts. The rule of law includes such prin-
ciples as legality, implying a transparent, responsible, accountable, democratic, and 
pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty; prohibiting the arbitrary exercise 
of executive power; access to justice and effective judicial protection by independent 
and impartial courts, including effective judicial review of administrative acts; respect 
for fundamental human rights; separation of powers; and non-discrimination and 
equality before the law. These principles have been recognised by the ECJ.
 87 European Union – Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, Common position on judi-
ciary and fundamental rights, Brussels, 5 July 2016 (OR.en), 10074/16, ELARG 78.
 88 Ibid., pp. 3–4.
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The rule of law is one of the three pillars of the COE, along with democracy and 
respect for human rights. Every state and member of the COE must accept the prin-
ciples of the rule of law and accept that all persons within its jurisdiction enjoy human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. The ECHR played a critical role in distinguishing 
and explaining these terms; its judgments have contributed significantly to the efforts 
to closely determine the content of the phrase ‘rule of law’, helping to clarify its ele-
ments. The Court’s decisions indicate that legal predictability and the harmonisation of 
case law to protect judiciary independence are a precondition for all the other elements 
in the rule of law.
The Republic of Serbia’s Constitution accepts the rule of law as a universal 
principle. In the process of its accession to the EU, Serbia is obligated to respect the 
EU legislation and the case law of the ECJ. Serbia’s current legislation closely accords 
with international standards. However, it must enact certain modifications regard-
ing the judicial branch of government. When it accomplishes the necessary judiciary 
reforms, it will have met all the EU’s requirements for accession and conform to other 
international organisations’ understanding of the rule of law.
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Rule of Law, Contesting and Contested
 ■ ABSTRACT: The rule of law movement is a by-product of the post-WWII rebirth of 
human rights, which turned into a key political issue by the turn of the millennium. 
By becoming part of the language and blackmailing practice of international politics, 
it has self-emptied as well. It is an ideal; historically a function of human experience at 
individual places and times, shaped by local traditions. As a complex of heterogeneous 
values and principles, its ethos can at best be respected and approached via the never-
ending balancing of compromise solutions.
 ■ KEYWORDS: Rechtsstaat, État de droit, democracy, constitutionalism, judiciali-
sation, UN, EU.
1. Post-WWII Rebirth and Transformation into a Catchword
The end of World War II was followed by shocks in politics worldwide and of course, in 
law. Both victory and defeat questioned the continuability of the uncritical survival of 
legal positivism and reconsidered the tenet of Das Recht ist das Recht!, which had once 
given the impetus to the easy transition of dictatorial regimes born of the dramatic 
changes of power between the two world wars. They were forced to rethink the need 
to ensure the fundamentals of natural law as the basic living conditions of any human 
society. They reversed the accepted order of the ultimate values in law, prioritising 
justice over the search for legal certainty, as interwar experience had taught that in 
the event of total dehumanisation, no legal certainty could be of any value. Last, they 
breathed life into concepts that had earlier been dispersed on the margins of previous 
movements and literature, such as human rights and the barely cultivated notions of 
the rule of law and Rechtsstaatlichkeit.
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After the abovementioned cataclysm, human rights first had to be accounted 
for, and what they were and what kind of legal protection they needed clarified. Even 
the creation of the United Nations (1945) was an ordeal for the parties drifting towards 
the Cold War, and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1949) 
implied a straightforward multiplayer factional struggle over what and how to name it. 
Back then, it seemed sufficient to edify a ‘law + rule/state’ conglomerate as the broad-
est framework for their safeguard so that they would actually be implemented and 
not forced out by popular rebellion. For this reason, the Declaration had to state that 
‘human rights should be protected by the rule of law’2 (where the term may have stood 
for some rule(s) of the law, not the classical rule of law3): ‘Il est essentiel que les droits 
de l’homme soient protégés par un régime de droit’. (Since the term État de droit was 
translated from German, it never occurred to the drafters that this could have anything 
to do with the Anglo–American rule of law).
Presumably, in the disorganised turmoil of antinomic thought traditions, the 
opposition of the Euro-Atlantic West to the Bolshevik East led the former to clarify its 
own identity and as a political option, embrace the positive-sounding tradition of ‘rule 
of law’, only to thereby exorcise Muscovite dictatorship. Regardless, it was discussed in 
Chicago in 1957. A year later, in response, the Soviet bloc produced a socialist legality 
in Warsaw as its own version, only so that a new synthesis would be summoned in 
New Delhi within a year that encompassed Asian aspirations. Chicago summed up the 
Western tradition as the supremacy of law, which the French tradition simply enshrined 
as légalité. In addition, participants could still add further content to it in New Delhi. All 
this has reportedly been defined, the results of which may perhaps be educed from the 
four-page questions and hundreds of answers.4 Under such conditions, from the end of 
World War II to the Soviet atomic bomb threat to the Western world, the notion of the 
rule of law as a fundamental element of a free society lurked. However, this happened 
without going beyond idealising what the Atlantic mainstream considered good and 
desirable in public affairs.5
With this, a legally immature term began its triumphant journey. It soon became 
fertilised in use by politics and political science; was transferred to international 
 2 https://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf, p. 2, resp. https://www.
un.org/fr/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_fr_web.pdf, p. 1.
 3 Perhaps due to American universalism, not even Harvard’s excellent Catholic thinker, Glen-
don, 2004, p. 4 did notice that instead of an early use of the term, it may have simply been an 
occasional formula used by the drafters.
 4 Rule of Law as Understood…, 1959 and Katz, Schlesinger, Rheinstein (eds.), 1957, pp. 518–525; 
then Le concept de la légalité, 1961 and Tóth, 1965, pp. 274–278; in the end Marsh (prep.), 1960, 
particularly pp. 183–186.
 5 The American statesman who served as an associate judge of the Supreme Court, then as one 
of the closest associates to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, and as the Secretary of State in 
the end—Byrnes, 1947, p. 314—uses the term ’a system of collective security that will develop 
and enforce the rule of law ’ in the epilogical summary of his remarks on the tasks of the United 
Nations in a manner standing for a rule of ideal law thought of as an airy desire rather than an 
elaborate concept.
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diplomacy; integrated into the language of the United Nations; and finally, into that 
of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, set up as the latter’s agencies.6 
Therefore, it is no coincidence that even the most committed student of the notion of 
the rule of law can only characterise the turn-of-the-millennium situation by saying, 
‘One cannot get through a foreign policy debate these days without someone proposing 
the rule of law as a solution to the world’s troubles’.7 More striking is that the memory of 
its Cold War use seems to have been preserved. It was first used as a symbol of the excel-
lence of the West, then as an expression of opposition to the shame of the Bolshevik 
East,8 and finally by the UN international development financial organisations with 
explicitly blackmailing unilateralism to impose Western legal solutions on the rest of 
the world.9
This has already resulted in unspecified but rhetorical overuse, and the term 
has been inflated and wasted in international diplomacy and in the practice of the 
European Union, especially after its expansion by including countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe.10 This increase can be inferred from the growth that made the term a 
buzzword, as seen in its text frequency and use in book titles:11
word e-occur rence
rule of law 105.000.000
Rechtsstaat 4.000.000
État de droit 6.500.000
jogállam [=Rechtsstaat] 500.000
joguralom [=rule of law] 150.000
 6 In the e-world, ‘rule of law’ in company of ‘United Nations’ occurs 15,000,000 times and 
13.300,000 times in company of ‘European Union’; with ‘World Bank’ 6,150,000 times and with 
‘International Monetary Fund’ 1,510,000 times. In German, ‘Rechtsstaat’ coupled with ‘Vereinte 
Nationen’ occurs 113,000 times and with ‘Europäische Union’ 167,000 times.
 7 Carothers, 1998, p. 95.
 8 As a leading human rights movement today, the International Commission of Jurists was 
established with the support of the CIA in West Berlin in 1952 (https://www.icj.org/), designed 
to become a “Cold Warrior against Socialist Legality”; cf. Tolley, 1994, ch. I. It was made as a 
counterpart of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers established in Paris in 
1946 (https://iadllaw.org/), with the foundational presidency of the Nobel Peace Prize winner 
René Cassin (a future drafter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights), after the latter 
started documenting US war crimes committed during the Korean War.
 9 Cf., e.g., Varga, 2007, pp. 85–96.
 10 Cf., e.g., Varga, 2009, pp. 19–28.
 11 Its occurrence as a title in the Hungarian language shows a different picture. It was once a cur-
rent term because the journal Jogállam [Rechtsstaat] (1903–1938) used to publish case reports 
and book series. As a book title, it appears exclusively in Balogh, 1914, and then more recently, 
in the collection of Takács (ed.), 1995.
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books 1944–1959 1960–1975 1976–1991 1992–2007 2008–2020
ʻRule of lawʼ in title in English12 32 96 64 544 1120
ʻRechtsstaatʼ in title in German 30 120 180 180 270
Interestingly, the term came to the fore when the two-power world order collapsed 
by making Central and Eastern Europe a confusing international problem (or trump) 
anew, reclaiming and regaining the region’s old place in the world.13
Thus, it has become a fashionably common catchword to express pride for the 
self and/or contempt for others. This lack of content, the fact that the word has become 
commonplace, is hitting those struggling for the underlying ideal to be implemented 
in the Third World,14 and who must identify the enemy of their cause in those who are 
cheating with it by punting it as a panacea.15 Carl Schmitt despised the use of Rechtsstaat 
from the early 1930s, because it can mean the Recht and Staat separately. Its only trait 
is that it sounds promising, which when held accountable, makes us free to denigrate 
any opponent.16 Alternatively, as widely expressed, ‘the phrase “the Rule of Law” has 
become meaningless thanks to ideological abuse and general overuse. It may well 
have become just another of those self-congratulatory rhetorical devices that grace the 
utterances of Anglo–American politicians […]. No intellectual effort need therefore be 
wasted on this bit of ruling-class chatter’.17 However, at the same time, its indefiniteness 
in content, which sounded as a cry for others, has become an inspiring source of truly 
exploratory and not infrequently monographic works. These, the absence of a theoreti-
cally developed background and established doctrinal structure or dogmatics,18 have 
in the name of scholarly analysis often become like a program or creed that ensures 
good governance to achieve the public good by supplying the adequate quality of legal 
background with the available institutional procedures and techniques.
 12 As a book title, ‘rule of law’ became widespread early because the International Commission 
of Jurists (note 7) preferred to use it as a starting point and contrast in processing conflicting 
situations, such as in, for example, International Commission of Jurists (ed.), 1957.
 13 Even on the seemingly not politically sensitive issue of why and how the notion of the rule 
of law could reach its period of consummation, we cannot meet with either disinterest or 
clairvoyance. Despite his Polish roots, Krygier, 2014, pp. 327–346 sees the term coming to the 
fore in the surfeit of ideologies of the post-Cold War Atlantic and Western European world, 
while another interpreter—Janse, 2019, pp. 341–348—says it originated from the changing eras 
of European communality.
 14 Humphfreys, 2010, pp. 1–26 laments its ’magical, or at least talismanic, role’. Drawing conclu-
sions, Flake, 2000, p. vii states that ’the “Rule of Law” has become a buzzword of today and an 
oft-prescribed panacea for the myriad challenges of development faced by Asian nations. Yet 
seldom in such discussions is the concept of the “Rule of Law” carefully defined’. Note that as 
synonyms for buzzword, expressions like ‘hokum’ and ‘bunk’ make it even more accurate to 
understand what the author may have meant by this wording.
 15 E.g. Peerenboom, 2004, p. 33.
 16 Schmitt, 1932, p. 19.
 17 Shklar, 1987, p. 1.
 18 As characterised by Gárdos-Orosz and Szente, 2014, p. 267, in such a complex deficiency, ‘the 
main difficulty is not that there is no widely accepted general definition of the rule of law, but 
that there is no consensus on its components’.
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2. Limitlessness in Today’s Use
The first finding jurisprudence can formulate is that the rule of law is a contested con-
cept.19 Inherently,20 ‘the meaning of the concept known as the rule of law is always open 
to debate’21 as it belongs to those notions whose ‘nature and meaning are contested and 
controversial’.22 Or again, ‘The rule of law is a flexible and contested concept that can be 
defined in different ways. […] Its different definitions mean that the rule of law has no 
uniform accepted form.’23 Considering it an undefined and uncertain notion from the 
beginning,24 a ‘mixture of implied promise and convenient vagueness’,25 it is ‘exceed-
ingly elusive’ with ‘rampant divergence of understandings’.26 Thus, ‘[n]o one in the inter-
national community is quite sure’ (as ‘we are never quite sure’) what it means at all,27 
because ‘scholars are not agreed on the desiderata that would define the Rechtsstaat ’28 
and what its scattered generalities may mean without any central thought.29 ‘In fact, 
the only thing that seems to consistently garner agreement within the “Rule of Law” 
discourse is that there is pervasive disagreement within this discourse’.30 Such charac-
terisations are often formulated not as rejection or destructive criticism, but to justify 
new investigations in the hope of reaching a consensus some time in the future.
Ronald Dworkin, who was astonishingly bold by basing his theorising on the 
values of a single time and place, ended his introductory speech at the London meeting 
of the Venice Commission on the Clarification of the Rule of Law in the European 
Union, perhaps the last public act of his life, by concluding: ‘There is a paradox at the 
heart of the rule of law. That ideal demands certainty and condemns ambiguity in 
 19 According to Gallie, 1956, p. 169, those concepts are essentially contested, ‘the proper use 
of which inevitably involve endless disputes’. This issue—Gray, 1977, p. 344 asserts—‘cannot 
be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone’. 
Furthermore, Garver, 1978, p. 168 opines that a good answer is excluded from the beginning. 
Within a few decades, artistic and political categories (with rule of law included) had also been 
categorised as such. Cf. Waldron, 2002, pp. 137–164 and Collier, Hidalgo, Maciuceanu, 2006, pp. 
211–246.
 20 See Bárd, Carrera, Guild, Kochenov, 2016, p. 80, who claim that ‘defining it in the best possible 
way cannot cancel the nature of the rule of law, which is an essentially contested concept’.
 21 Zimmermann, 2017, p. 10.
 22 Allan, 1998.
 23 Lautenbach, 2013, p. 19.
 24 E.g. Ajani, 2003, pp. 3–18; Costa, 2007, p. 74; Fallon, 2007, pp. 1 and 6; Mattei and Nader, 2008, p. 
10; Rodriguez, McCubbins, Weingast, 2010, pp. 1455–1494. As officially perhaps understated—
House of Lords, 2007, p. 12, para. 24—,‘the rule of law remains a complex and in some respects 
uncertain concept’.
  Selznick, 2005, p. 29.
 25 Kirchheimer, 1996, 244.
 26 Tamanaha, 2004, p. 3 adds that it is like wishing for good: ‘Everyone is for it, but have contrast-
ing convictions about what it is’.
 27 Bouloukos and Dakin, 2001, p. 145 as well as Fletcher, 1966, p. 12.
 28 Borneman, 2007, p. 4.
 29 Higgins, 2007 states this, referring mainly to UN documents.
 30 Hamara, 2013, p. 12.
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the law. But that is great uncertainty and alleged ambiguity in the ideal itself. Firm 
adherents are locked in great disagreement about what the rule of law really is’.31 This 
is because it does not have an own object, and is largely an ‘umbrella’ or ‘container’ 
concept32 used as an indicator when describing the law, the state, politics, or the general 
situation to disclose in respect of a given legal order that what is in is actually secure as 
regulated or in contrast, absent compared to its agreed minimum. However, this almost 
free capacity makes it a ‘rhetorical balloon’ that can be increasingly inflated and made 
almost unlimited. Here, as scholars claim,33 the more it says, the less it is worth.
Thus, it is not simply that we can understand a certain object in multiple ways, 
but that we mean different objects in different ways although we call them by one name 
as if talking about a single object. As a result, there is a cacophony of naming and 
understanding. Regarding American constitutional law, Harvard’s expert explores 
its comprehensibility from various perspectives and a plethora of variations of each 
perspective.34 Another author distinguishes between at least four approaches that differ 
in subject matter and have different characteristics. According to him, ‘One could […] 
define the rule of law in terms of the values which that institution is designed to serve, 
such as human dignity or individual fulfilment through the full development of one’s 
capacities; or in terms of the several principles whereby those institutions are to be 
safeguarded, such as the rule that a legal basis must be shown for every government 
action interfering with the rights of the citizen; or in terms of the institutions, such 
as the courts, the bar, the parliaments and the police who are responsible for doing 
the safeguarding, in their own distinctive ways; or, finally, in terms of the procedures 
which those institutions use for that purpose, such as public hearings, jury trial, habeas 
corpus and the like’.35 In light of this multitude,36 we may have the impression that the 
term was a kind of desideratum, a set of desirable standards backed by a complete edifice 
of theses and criteria on the state-organised legal regime of society, based on a given 
social philosophy, and elaborated to the depths doctrinally. This is not the case—if 
not perhaps for some minds exclusively, for private use only, and with no obligatory 
institutionalisation or valid measurement standards.
Today, we are in turmoil, because the term can simultaneously mean nothing 
and anything, everything or anything. We are discussing a word that has long since 
become empty with its arbitrarily adaptable meaning-bearing capacity and inflated 
overuse, formed in response to conflicts of interest. It has no standardised meaning 
within the law; consequently, it has no legally assertable or defendable criterial 
functionality. It is political mud wrestling with millions of teammates in the world’s 
thousands of political think tanks as well as scholarly and media workshops. In fact, 
any of us can enrich it with whatever we want. In addition, it has no dogmatics, and thus 
 31 Dworkin, 2012, p. 11.
 32 E.g. Bedner, 2010, pp. 48–74 and Belton, 2005, p. 6.
 33 Frändberg, 1996, pp. 22–23 and Frändberg, 2014, p. 31.
 34 Fallon, 2007.
 35 Walker, 1988, p. 9.
 36 Cf. as well Møller and Akaaning, 2014 and Yakushik, 2018, pp. 72–84.
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no solid structure, support frame, or boundaries. Why should its expandability know 
any limitation? The theoretical literature commonly notes that ‘It is very difficult to talk 
about the “Rule of Law”. There are almost as many conceptions of the “Rule of Law” 
as there are people defending it’,37 as all kinds of authors ‘use the term as a catch-all 
slogan for every desirable policy one might wish to see enacted’.38 As an expert on the 
issue, one of New York’s leading philosophical authorities paints as a tableaux vivant: 
‘Open any newspaper and you will see the “Rule of Law” cited and deployed—usually 
as a matter of reproach, occasionally as an affirmative aspiration, almost always as a 
benchmark of political legitimacy’.39
The analysis reveals not only the uncertainty surrounding the concept, but also 
the extent to which the product that takes incessantly changing shapes amid historical 
contingencies is variable and environment-dependent, because it develops differently 
according to culture, tradition, and local conditions.40 Thus, the rule of law is primarily 
and foremost a historical category. It is based on a wide variety of historical experiences 
that differ by nation and age, which define or condition its hic et nunc particularity. 
Consequently, as ‘a product of historical development […,] the rule of law […] cannot 
be seen in isolation from the constitutional theories and traditions […as it…] is closely 
tied to the historical and institutional setting in which the rule of law has come to 
development’.41 ‘What it rules out, what it allows, what it depends on, and indeed what 
it is, are all matters of disagreement that stem from differences between political and 
legal histories and traditions, and reflect dilemmas and choices that recur in different 
forms and weights in many such histories and traditions’.42 We can generalise from 
these, but as the best-known French expert on the issue points out, then out of context, 
only an empty shell—une coquille vide—remains as the end-product.43
With this, we return to the specific problems of various national and other 
developments and to aspirations that inspire a solution, including their shoreless 
ambitions. However, what develops in this arbitrary and dispersed way locks down 
the chance of any orderly—or any—conceptuality, as the shape it takes will be a flow of 
continuous rearrangements. Moreover, ‘The idea of the rule of law is characterised by 
its programmatic character, which means that it cannot be exclusively identified with 
one or another specific legal concept, but rather comprises a whole set of principles 
that govern the morality of the exercise of public authority in a society at a particular 
time of its history’.44 As a result, uncertainty characterises not only the term as a whole, 
but also, in addition to its internal context, each of its elements separately, since each 
will be the product of the characteristics of a given historical development, that is, the 
 37 Taiwo, 1999, p. 154.
 38 Bellamy, 2007, p. 54.
 39 Waldron, 2008, p. 1.
 40 E.g. May, 2014.
 41 Lautenbach, 2013, pp. 35 and 210.
 42 Krygier, 2015, p. 780.
 43 Chevallier, 2003, p. 52.
 44 Grote, 2010, p. 175.
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diversity determined by place and time. However, as the analysis continues, behind 
the disguised commonality of its wording is again the case of multiple concepts. The 
notion of the rule of law is from the outset ‘elusive and controversial […, for…] there is 
an “embeddedness” of this term with specific national historical diversities of a politi-
cal, institutional, legal and imaginary nature. […] This requirement of vagueness plays 
strongly against any Quichotean attempts to turn the rule of law into a shopping list of 
elements’.45 Putting its building blocks together, the complete picture of an infinitely 
complex jigsaw puzzle emerges: elements with meaning and validity drawn from 
their historical hic et nunc formations, which in a given place and time, are stacked 
in an international space while preserving their generational local values to form a 
concept that can be widely shared and accepted in a given culture. Characteristically, 
when a Harvard constitutionalist analysed the components of how many innumer-
able perspectives can be identified only in legal practice in the US, with each of them 
having separate although equally defensible versions of the rule of law, he could do so 
simply by flinging them into the floating cloud of relativity, because each user is used to 
expecting to create his/her own version for his/her own use.46 Because, he continues,47 
‘It is a mistake to think of particular criteria as necessary in all contexts for the rule 
of law. Rather, we should recognize that the strands of the Rule of Law are complexly 
interwoven, and we should begin to consider which values or criteria are presumptively 
primary under which conditions’.
3. Roots and Development in Various Legal Cultures
Our age is characterised by a new ideocracy after the Christian mediaeval desire for 
spiritual brilliance. By surpassing both the historical past and human experience, 
it wants to see today’s revolutionary thoughts (concerning our gender, skin colour, 
sexuality, growing up in a family, living as a nation, and so on), hoped to be world-
shattering after the practice of millennia, as a latent but now discovered eternal quality 
of the universal human. The ideas that sparked the French Revolution also lead us 
back to our classical Greek predecessors, sometimes directly to the earliest traces of 
intellectual archaeology. However, we know that although ‘human rights’ were already 
mentioned—for example, in protest against the genocidal murder of natives in Latin 
America by a Spanish Dominican centuries ago—48 today’s movement is not rooted in 
this but comes from the Enlightenment and post-World War II conscience test, and to 
a smaller extent, as the aftermath of the 1968 uprisings. Equally obvious is that the 
 45 Bárd, Carrera, Guild, Kochenov, 2016, pp. 79, 80 and 80.
 46 Similar to case law, where the judge will draw the stare decisis from what he can learn from 
precedents he has considered to serve as a rule for his pending decision, but without publicly 
stating it.
 47 Fallon, 2007, p. 6.
 48 Bartolomé de las Casas was the first in 1552 to mention ‘las reglas de los derechos humanos’. 
Las Casas, 1971 and Corres, 2014; cf. also Pennington, 2018, pp. 98–115.
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complexity of today’s notion of the rule of law dates to the 19th century as a concept born 
mainly of German and English development.
The idea took shape largely because of the confrontation with feudal arbitrari-
ness, specifically, with the omnipotence of the absolutist state. The recently deceased 
nestor of Italian jurisprudence called this a reversal, a rights-orientation surpassing 
the ethos of obligations by the advent of the age of individualism.49 Its background was 
clearly formulated by the American revolutionary Thomas Peine in 1776: ‘In absolute 
governments the King is law, so in free countries the law ought to be King’.50 The notions 
maturing the root ideas of the rule of law can also be traced to classical Greek and 
Roman antiquity, and to early modern movements. However, it may be sufficient to 
recall the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries when the enlightened Prussian ruler had 
already included in the draft Allgemeines Landrecht that ‘The laws and ordinances of 
the state may not restrict the natural freedom and rights of citizens more than the 
common end purpose requires’. To clarify further, the contemporary textbook added: 
‘All rights of the regent are to be regarded only as a means by which the state purpose 
is to be brought about’.51
The English version was moulded by Dicey, the father of British constitution-
alism, who summarised his book-wide explanation in a few sentences. Accordingly, 
‘The rule of law […] remains a distinctive characteristic of the English constitution. In 
England no man can be made to suffer punishment or to pay damages for any conduct 
not definitely forbidden by law; every man’s legal rights or liabilities are almost invari-
ably determined by the ordinary Courts of the realm, and each man’s individual rights 
are far less the result of our constitution than the basis on which that constitution is 
founded’.52 Its requirements, summed up in three theses, are the generalised principle 
of nulla poena sine lege, the right to bring any action before an independent court, and 
the recognition of the quasi-natural law grounds53 of rights. Behind this, he saw on one 
hand, that an unwritten constitution with the affirmative seal of centuries is more dif-
ficult to move than any written charter, and on the other, the power of public opinion. 
The doctrine of the separation of the branches of state power, however, is known for 
him only in the case-law autonomy of the judiciary,54 but hardly applies to the relation 
between the legislature and executive.55 In addition, he entrusts the functions of con-
stitutional control to the skill of the functioning of English parliamentarism for many 
 49 Bobbio, 1990, pp. ix and 58.
 50 Peine, 1776.
 51 Entwurf eines Allgemeinen Gesetzbuchs für die Preußischen Staaten von 1791, Einleitung § 79 as 
well as Gönner, 1804, p. 418.
 52 Dicey, 1915, p. lv.
 53 Although topically expanded, this is discussed by Opałek, 1999, pp. 91–98 as a system of claims 
formulated in the name of humanity by natural law.
 54 Or, Jennings, 1941, p. 365 warns that ‘The English lawyer usually speaks of the “rule of law” 
where the American lawyer speaks of “due process of law”’.
 55 Wade and Forsyth, 2009, p. 18 reassert that ‘There is only a hazy borderline between legislation 
and administration, and the assumption that they are two fundamentally different forms of 
power is misleading’. See also Phillips, Jackson, Leopold, 2001, p. 26.
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centuries.56 Similarly, he records reliance on judicial decisions instead of legislation 
as an additional safeguard, which because it builds the wisdom of generations atop 
each other, is in his view the best guarantee of individual freedom and freedom from 
arbitrariness.57
The first mention of the Rechtsstaat dates to the turn of the 18th and 19th cen-
turies58 when a government’s intention to reform was expressed.59 Classical political 
scientists such as Robert von Mohl and Friedrich Julius Stahl were already explicitly 
seeking to replace the administrative state (Polizeistaat) with enlightened changes.60 
Contrary to the ‘rule of law’ as worded in English, the Germans could rely on the Staat, 
because unlike the English tradition, the state was a legal concept for them61 to the 
extent that the master of the Pure Theory of Law could simply refer to the Rechtsstaat 
as a pleonasm, as the Staat was already involved in the notional sphere of Recht.62 In 
today’s German public law, however, the Rechtsstaat is no longer an independent but a 
substitute notion. The Basic Law uses it only in relation to the territories [Länder] that 
make up the Federal Republic of Germany, and even then does not afford it more of or a 
different meaning than the itemised requirements of the Basic Law. As the latter states, 
‘The constitutional order in the Länder must conform to the principles of the republi-
can, democratic, and social state governed by the rule of law, within the meaning of this 
Basic Law’.63 This is tantamount to having no surplus over the law and order defined by 
the constitution. Consequently, as a surrogate, it is also a pleonasm in constitutional 
law—whether or not it is suitably used in other contexts and as a synonym in German 
jurisprudence and doctrine. However, it certainly has one proper message. That is, 
providing that Rechtsstaatlichkeit is expressive of already posited constitutional contents 
whose quality is part of constitutionalism itself, any idea or demand for its further 
substantive enrichment is already out of the professional profile of jurists. It cannot 
but be a direct political intention to amend the constitution.64
Compared to the previous ones, the French solution appeared late, as a transla-
tion from German, well after the First World War, although the institutional frame-
work for its effective control was found half a century ago. The first wording of what 
is meant by État de droit—‘the State is subordinated to a rule of law which is superior 
 56 Zolo, 2007, p. 9.
 57 Hayek, 1982, pp. 55–56 & 85–88.
 58 Placidus, 1798; later and in a reactionary sense, Müller, 1809, and in a liberal one Welcker, 1813; 
Aretin, 1824 ends this early series of using the term.
 59 Bockenförde, 1969, pp. 53–54.
 60 Mohl, 1832, p. 8 and Stahl, 1878, p. 137.
 61 MacCormick, 1984, p. 65.
 62 Kelsen, 1992, p. 314, reasserted by Troper, 1993, pp. 51–63, upon which the Belgian legal histo-
rian Caenegem, 1991, p. 185 can only dryly remark that here, ‘the problems […] start with the 
very word’.
 63 Grundgesetz (1949), Article 28 (1).
 64 Koetter, 2013.
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to itself that it does not create and that it cannot violate’65—expresses Rousseau’s live 
effect on la culte de la loi,66 and stemming from that, the tradition of le droit and most 
important, of la constitution and the repulsion of the gouvernement des juges from pre-
revolutionary times.67 Interest was lacking for a long time because it had little or no 
distinct content.68 However, Rousseau’s tradition soon triumphed: In a democracy, law 
can be nothing more than an expression of la volonté générale, which has to take statu-
tory form.69 The basis, source, and root of this expression is the current constitution. 
This is complemented and confirmed, sanctioned and checked by the establishment 
of the Constitutional Council (1971) and by the indisputability of its official wording, 
declaring, ‘The law as voted expresses the general will in so far as and to the extent it 
respects the Constitution’.70
What is expressed by these three legal traditions? First, we see the paradox that 
although due to random word usage, all three are historically marked by words that do 
not express what they say. Moreover, all three contradict the internal logic of language, 
since ‘rule’ stands here for either ‘regula’ or ‘authority’.71 ‘Rule of law’ is not the sum of 
‘rule’ and ‘law’, just as the Rechtsstaat is not summed up from Recht and Staat.72 Regard-
ing the third variation, an official clarification of the concept by the Council of Europe 
defines the content of État de droit not by either of the former terms, but as the primacy 
of the law [la prééminence du droit], noting that this concept is rarely used in the law 
itself. At most, it occasionally appears in professional literature only.73
Overall, the different roots of background thinking are clearly visible in the 
world map of laws. In the English development, Parliament, the king, and the judiciary 
had separate, sometimes conflicting, places. Although Parliament drafted the law, the 
precedent used in court practice is considered law. Therefore, the desire for the rule 
of law has meant not simply submission to the law, but extended justiciability, that is, 
the availability of courts to judge any conflict. In the German development, legislation 
has always defined the law, so progress has been made by subordinating the ruling 
power and thus the state to it. Finally, the French version, though a mirror translation 
from German, focuses not on the state, but as the culmination of Rousseau’s volonté 
générale expressed in legislated form, in the imperativeness that any operation of the 
state is constitutional. However, the variety of approaches seems to converge in the 
need for the chance of ending conflicts by judgement from an independent body. On the 
 65 Duguit, 1923, ch. VI, § 88: ‘L’État de droit«, p. 547; somewhat differently, cf. also Malberg, 
1920–1922.
 66 Burdeau, 1939, p. 9.
 67 Zolo, 2007, p. 14.
 68 Dyevre, 2010.
 69 Rousseau, 1762, vol. II, ch. 6, para. 6.
 70 Décision n° 85-197 DC du 23 août 1985 in https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/
decision/1985/85197DC.htm, para. 27.
 71 According to https://www.etymonline.com/word/rule, both meanings are known from the 
beginning of the 13th century.
 72 Flores, 2013, pp. 77–101.
 73 Jurgens, 2007, B-5 resp. Appendix I, I-b.
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Anglo–American side, this is justiciability for both power representatives and individu-
als, and on the German–French side, this is guaranteed by a separate body entitled to 
review the constitutionality of the acts by which the state is operated.
At a basic level, therefore, although considered that in its origin, the underlying 
ideal may have been conceived by the English in the judiciary, while the French and 
German may have been inspired by their written constitution,74 there is some com-
monality. Specifically, for a good century in England, Dicey voiced the basic expression 
of both pertinent claims.
One is the availability of state rules that are formally capable of operating and 
enforcing law and order, as well as the law’s normative force binding both the state 
and its population, that is, the primacy of law ensuring both address subordination. 
Nobel Prize-winner economist von Hayek gave a classic summary of this at the end of 
the Second World War: ‘Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in 
all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced before-hand, rules which make it 
possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in 
given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge’.75 
The past Chief Justice of England used a similar tone: ‘The core of the existing principle 
is […] that all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should 
be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated 
and publicly administered in the courts’.76
The other is justiciability, that is, the availability of an independent decision-
making forum for practically all possible cases and conflicts. In Germany, there is clear 
reference to judicial review, since the current content of the Rechtsstaat is provided for 
by the Constitution and its protection ensured by the Verfassungsgerichtshof in reviewing 
the constitution. In France, the discursive path led straight from the contrat social to la 
volonté générale, to its embodiment in la constitution, and consequently, from the need 
for constitutionnalité to effectively controlling it by the Conseil constitutionnel.77
Assuredly, ‘The first necessary and inescapable desideratum of the rule of law is 
an independent judiciary’.78 Currently, this is accepted and widespread not only in the 
United States, but also in Western Europe and elsewhere. Thus, the real issue is no longer 
the fact of it,79 but of how to find and determine the extent of adequate control. This is 
 74 Wennerström, 2007, pp. 60–61.
 75 Hayek, 1994, p. 80.
 76 Bingham, 2007, p. 69.
 77 Interestingly, we arrive at the same result if we approach it from a negative side, starting from 
the reason the ideology of the rule of law leaves Asia insensitive. Hager, 2000, p. 2 answers 
that it would be a foreign imposition upon them, being ‘a reflection of the American bent for 
legalism and litigiousness’.
 78 Sellers, 2016, p. 10.
 79 Or, as the Prime Minister of Slovenia explained in an open letter to the President of the 
European Council on 17 November 2020—https://www.gov.si/assets/PV/November-2020/Letter-
of-PM-Janez-Jansa-to-the-PEUCO-Charles-Michel.pdf—‘By definition, “the rule of law” means 
that disputes are decided by an independent court and not by a political majority in any other 
institution’.
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merely (we would say: again) the need for balance, namely that justiciability—which 
is used to gain increasing ground at the expense of various democratic representative 
institutions, that is, of further restrictions on popular sovereignty—shall not degener-
ate into juristocracy or judgeocracy, or perhaps the finality of the constitutionalisation 
of rights and judicialisation of politics.80
The dilemma in scientia iuris has been over for more than half a century, whether 
or not there are more layers added to the notion of rule of law beyond one, the avail-
ability of duly posited law, and two, the state’s subordination to it, and in addition to 
three, justiciability. Only if the question arises at all—sharing the view that ‘the rule 
of law is a multifaceted and layered concept’ 81—the distinction between their strata 
is usually made between formal and substantive, or in the English language culture, 
thick and thin.
It is easy now to recall my visits to Oxford, when in the first half of the 1990s I 
was able to talk to perhaps the most influential leaders of both directions in physical 
proximity to one another, namely Joseph Raz, who narrowed the concept to formal-
ism, and Ronald Dworkin, who needed it to be saturated with extra content. The 
former correctly argued that this concept is not about what is good (e.g. the public 
good, with the political and legal conditions thereof, including their desirable order 
and institutionalisation), since then it would be redundant. Moreover, such a demand 
would presuppose ‘propounding a complete social philosophy’.82 This view is fairly 
general,83 including the British Supreme Justice’s professional creed at the turn of the 
millennium: ‘Law should be accessible, clear and predictable; Questions of legal right 
and liability should be decided by application of the law; The law of the land should 
apply equally to all, except when objective difference requires differentiation; Public 
officials should exercise their powers in good faith, and not exceed their powers; The 
law must protect fundamental rights; A method should be provided, at reasonable cost, 
to resolve civil disputes; Adjudicative procedures must be provided by the state should 
be fair; The rule of law requires the state to comply with its obligations in international 
law’.84 Notwithstanding, current liberalism still proclaims itself as the mainstream. As 
it advertises, the rule of law is not a ‘rule-book’, but a ‘right-book’,85 which it attempts 
to fill with content taken from the fields of either human rights or judicialisation.86
Thus, the intentions of ‘improvement’ may emerge, and various previously pro-
posed resolutions, no matter how exaggerated, uninterruptedly exceed one another in 
 80 Cf. Varga, 2019, pp. 192–214.
 81 Lautenbach, 2013, p. 211.
 82 Raz, 1979, p. 211.
 83 See, as a classic in developing the internal technological minimal needs of law, Fuller, 1964; 
and in outlining another ideal, Bobbio, 1971, pp. 243–249; or MacCormick, 1984; Summers, 
1988, pp. 154–161 and Summers, 1993, pp. 127–142; and last, the original classic in reducing rule 
of law to ‘rule of rules’, Scalia, 1989, pp. 1175–1188. Cf. Atienza, 1989, pp. 385–403; Borneman, 
2007, pp. 40–41; Heydon, 2011, pp. 19–22; and Ekins, 2011, pp. 165–166.
 84 Bingham, 2007.
 85 Dworkin, 1978, pp. 259–287, reasserted by Craig, 1997, p. 479.
 86 Jurgens, 2007, Appendix I, I-c-3.
Central European Journal of Comparative Law | Volume II ■ 2021 ■ 1 258
an unceasing priority competition. This must lead to the free mixing of any desire with 
anything else, and ultimately, albeit with the intention of saying everything, proceed to 
the stage of saying nothing.87 ‘Sacrificing too many social goals on the altar of the rule 
of law—asserts Oxford’s authority—may make the law barren and empty’.88 The other 
limiting position? ‘Elided with justice, rule of law becomes an empty vessel into which 
each person pours his or her hopes for a better tomorrow’.89 However, as is usually 
the case, as soon as a flood90 or the free dreaming of the arrival of a new golden age is 
indeed to begin,91 the temptation of the gluttonous sphere always reappears: kneading 
itself until it bursts. This is because ‘the “catalogue of rights” is constantly open to 
inflation by means of anomic accumulation through successive “generations” of rights 
or normative interpolations arising out of mere factual circumstances’.92
In addition, even the infinite path to the inclusion of a full social policy is in 
advance paved by accidental considerations, because as soon as any part of the rule of 
law project encounters sympathy, the surplus act of providing both an easy environment 
for it and the conditions for the community to live it becomes the express duty of the 
state to produce them in due time. This is because only the words are abstract—warns 
an author. However, the rights we propose to substantiate the words are no longer 
abstract entities: they are from this moment life pieces. Therefore, ‘Any theory that 
understands rights outside the context of the community that gives them life will be 
blind to the meaning that those rights have and to implementing them in ways that can 
be effectively integrated into the everyday lives of people’.93 Consequently, any effort 
to make it a reality must now include ‘not only to safeguard and advance the civil and 
political rights of the individual in a free society, but also to establish social, economic, 
educational, and cultural conditions under which his legitimate aspirations and dignity 
may be realised’.94
The idea of the rule of law naturally appears in international law as well, in its 
globalising development in the company of human rights as a quasi-religious supple-
ment. The terrain is twofold. In today’s cult, the issue of the need for and attempt at 
implementation of any kind of ‘rule of law’ appears in the workings of international 
organisations and international jurisprudence, while rule of law demands for the 
domestic law of states are most often also mediated by international organisations.
 87 E.g. Sellers, 2016.
 88 Raz, 1979, p. 229. Or, as quasi officially reasserted by Craig, 2007, p. 100, ‘if the rule of law 
is taken to encompass the necessity for “good laws” […] then the concept ceases to have an 
independent function’.
 89 Peerenboom ‘Varieties of Rule of Law’ (2004), 1 and 13.
 90 According to Carothers, 2006, p. 4, the rule of law should ‘enshrine and up-hold the political 
and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the last half-century’.
 91 E.g. Selznick, 1999, pp. 21–38 and Bedner, 2010, pp. 71–72.
 92 Danilo Zolo, 2007, pp. 38.
 93 Stewart, 2004, p. 7.
 94 Declaration of Delhi (1959) https://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/1959/01/Rule-of-law-in-a-
free-society-conference-report-1959-eng.pdf. Subsequent interpretation—Lautenbach, 2013, p. 
23—links the expectation of genuine implementation to an earlier commitment to involved values.
Csaba Varga  | Rule of Law, Contesting and Contested 259
The applicability of the rule of law to the domain of international law, and to its 
actors and acts, may be an interesting topic, since such an extension is in principle fully 
justified. Moreover, the search for the common root idea of the rule of law in justiciability 
also seems structurally conceivable in the international arena.95 However, as sovereign 
states are the subject carriers of international law, it is difficult in general to imagine 
an appellate or arbitral forum capable of judging the stand of the rule of law concerned 
and of the global powers in particular, because the judiciary is part of what any rule of 
law control must address. However, if this is the case—because logically, anything else 
would not be conceivable—we must also rethink our answers to the English, German, 
and French versions. In principle, this objection applies to all domestic regimes.
It is clear from the English development that there may have been a creative 
antagonism between possible royal tyranny and a court that has always been considered 
independent, a division that may have had another bipolar version in Germany with 
the duality of the legislature and the executive powers. In both Germany and France, 
it may have taken decades (even after the need for Rechtsstaatlichkeit or État de droit was 
highlighted) to find the path to the special judicial control of constitutionality. According 
to this tenet, the applicability of the rule of law to a domestic state may long have been 
incomplete and partial from the outset, since it was only after a long time that a formula 
could be found for one branch or function of the state to be played off against another.
In the expansion of the concept, it is not singular states but international organ-
isations and intellectuals as individual authors that excel. In the international arena, 
for example, the Secretary-General of the United Nations launched a campaign in 
honour of the rule of law at the turn of the millennium, with a definition attached to it. 
In his statement, venerable but devoid of legal force, he crammed into his notion every-
thing he could bring from the various aspects of law and the state. The rule of law—he 
orated96—‘refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and 
entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are 
publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. Measures to ensure 
adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability 
to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in 
decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal 
transparency’.97
 95 Lamm, 2010, pp. 297–303 shows strong affirmation regarding the implementation of decisions 
already made, but strong reservation in respect of the role of states in the decision-making 
process.
 96 Annan, 2004, para. 6.
 97 It is noteworthy that by smuggling ‘international human rights norms and standards’ into 
the proposed requirements, the Secretary-General is also to sanction hardly standardisable 
indefiniteness. Note that the UN Member States’ individual interests differ from each other, 
but some may unite in occasional groups for either regional or historical reasons. This may be 
exemplified by the division between emitting and hosting countries in recent migration trends, 
singling out those left out from becoming target countries.
Central European Journal of Comparative Law | Volume II ■ 2021 ■ 1 260
In contrast, the contemporary definitions issued by the World Bank98 and Orga-
nization for Economic Co-operation and Development99 are formal, reminiscent of 
Fuller’s quasi legal-technological requirements of a rule’s efficiency100 formulated nearly 
four decades earlier. Last, not even the Venice Commission of the European Union, 
dedicated to ‘democracy through law’ clarifies the enigma of the rule of law beyond the 
former either in the general outline or when detailing the fundamentals.101
Regarding the European Union’s perception of the rule of law,102 initially, the EU 
position seems reassuring, both by its clauses in the Treaty and its judicial decision-
making practice. Its court exhaustively determined the basis of the EU mandatory rules 
and availabilities of judicial review, as a Luxembourg decision ascertained three and 
a half decades ago that ‘the European Economic Community is a Community based on 
the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its member states nor its institutions can avoid a 
review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with 
the basic constitutional charter, the treaty. In particular […], the treaty established 
a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of 
Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by the institutions’.103 The same reas-
suring effect may have been somewhat reinforced by the bipolarity of the construction 
and operation of European law, analogous to the solar and planetary systems, the true 
state of which at any time cannot be but the result of their mutual play.104 Moreover, 
 98 ‘The rule of law prevails where (1) the government itself is bound by the law; (2) every person in 
society is treated equally under the law; (3) the human dignity of each individual is recognized 
and protected by law; and (4) justice is accessible to all. The rule of law requires transparent 
legislation, fair laws, predictable enforcement, and accountable governments to maintain 
order, promote private sector growth, fight poverty, and have legitimacy’. World Bank, 2004, 
pp. 2–3.
 99 ‘[T]he rule of law is composed of the following separate fundamental elements, which must 
advance together: (1) The existence of basic rules and values that a people share and by which 
they agree to be bound (constitutionalism). This can apply as much to an unwritten as to a writ-
ten constitution. (2) The law must govern the government. (3) An independent and impartial 
judiciary interprets the law. (4) Those who administer the law act consistently, without unfair 
discrimination. (5) The law is transparent and accessible to all, especially the vulnerable in 
most need of its protection. (6) Application of the law is efficient and timely. (7) The law protects 
rights, especially human rights. (8) The law can be changed by an established process that is 
itself transparent, accountable and democratic’. Equal Access to Justice and the Rule of Law OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention (2005), quoted 
by European Commission, 2011, para. 27, p. 7.
 100 Fuller, 1964. For the interpretation of its requirements—which are regardless of any morality, 
purely efficiency-oriented (i.e. instrumental and as such, purely technological) preconditions 
see Varga, 1970, pp. 449–450; cf. also Lyons, 1984, p. 77.
 101 ‘(1) Accessibility of the law (that it be intelligible, clear and predictable); (2) Questions of legal 
right should be normally decided by law and not discretion; (3) Equality before the law; (4) 
Power must be exercised lawfully, fairly and reasonably; (5) Human rights must be protected; 
(6) Means must be provided to resolve disputes without undue cost or delay; (7) Trials must 
be fair, and (8) Compliance by the state with its obligations in international law as well as in 
national law’. European Commission, 2011, para. 37, then para. 41, 60, and also 15–16.
 102 For an overview, see Pech, 2009.
 103 E.C.J., April 23, 1986, Les Verts v. Parliament, 294/83, Rec. 1339, § 23.
 104 Varga, 2012.
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the analysis of the EU case law has led to a reassuring conclusion according to which 
in the possible simultaneous co-effect of centrifugality and centripetality, the bilateral 
cooperation of the EU centre(s) with any given member state is preferable to positional 
confrontation in the long run, prospecting ‘most success if it is built upon existing 
national rule of law traditions’.105
Finally, the fact that some states in Central and Eastern Europe define themselves 
as rule of law formations in their constitutions, and that their constitutional courts may 
have ruled by propagating their understanding of the term ‘rule of law’ in a manner the 
population resent,106 is relevant in the present context only as an illustration that the 
notion of the rule of law is powerless. The power of the rule of law can only rely on its 
overall societal support, owing to the society having experienced its blessings—in the 
manner that Dicey located its final strength in public opinion. Alternatively, formulated 
reversely, ‘if [the ideal of the rule of law] is represented as an impracticable and even 
undesirable ideal and people cease to strive for its realization, it will rapidly disappear. 
Such a society will quickly relapse into a state of arbitrary tyranny’.107
4. The Genuine Content
It is difficult to think of something that we know almost nothing about. It is hard to talk 
about something we want. The nonsense of such an enterprise becomes absurd when 
we try to qualify something in this way. Qualification would presuppose that we are 
holding a standard before us, and by measuring our subject, we will find out whether 
it meets it. However, if the standard is arbitrary, then our measurement will also be 
arbitrary—a false measurement, since it hardly expresses more than our like or dislike. 
No matter how normal such a procedure may be, something similar has been going on 
in the European Union for a long time. In this Union—that is, to those nations grown in 
undisturbed peace and prospered hopefully in wisdom since World War II—we joined 
with a sincere heart and sense of legitimate historical return after the fall of the dicta-
torship imposed upon. As an echo of the former and as a whip, this is also happening in 
 105 Lautenbach, 2013, p. 217. Note that it is questionable who, and on whose behalf, can judge 
or override the sovereign in matters of domestic law and rule of law in matters belonging 
to the preservation of constitutional identity. In a criticism of the latter, Rosenfeld, 2012, 
Abstract opines that ‘”Constitutional identity” is an essentially contested concept as there is 
no agreement over what it means or refers to’. It is only characterisable by ‘an incurable lack 
of determinacy, which inevitably results in arbitrariness in its use […]. [Its] practical use […] 
is poised to weaken, if not undermine tout court, the process of European integration’. Cf. 
Fabbrini and Sajó, 2019, pp. 457–473 and Drinóczi, 2020, pp. 105–130 as well.
 106 Cf., Varga, 1995 and Varga, 2008.
 107 Hayek, 1960, p. 205. As expressed by Reynolds, 1989, p. 7, ‘If people do not expect the rule of law 
and insist on it when officials move to compromise its effect, it is soon corrupted and replaced 
by rule of will’. This also includes recognising that the artificial meaning attributed to law can-
not far precede what common sense suggests, because—as Pildes, 1996, p. 2058 claims—‘laws 
will be self-defeating when they undermine social norms whose maintenance turns out to be 
necessary to make those very laws effective’.
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Hungary: a hostile, embarrassing, openly blackmailing quarrel, and an immeasurable 
yardstick for all loudmouths everywhere—as if there were some hidden knowledge of 
the subject beyond what the mood of the word may suggest to the user.
When we let exact science speak, what may be its message has definite meaning 
in any language, because it is based on observation, verified connections, and precise 
definitions. Would it be different in law? Where anything we say is not a description or 
intellectual reflection, but prescription and formal expectation, a normative standard 
binding and secured by state coercion?
However, in this case, the question is now about the subject itself. What is often 
substituted, partly intertwined with other concepts, and sometimes downright redun-
dant? In today’s German public law, as mentioned, the ‘rule of law’ is nothing more than 
the guaranteed implementation into practice of the itemised requirements of the Basic 
Law. This is almost a pun on the term, similar to what is happening with human rights, 
where outsiders besiege the gates of the law by claiming their alleged ‘human rights’ 
(tacitly engaging everyone else in tolerating and perhaps also funding their alleged 
need). However, as soon as they will have succeeded, it will be indifferent in the law’s 
normative sea why and how admission has taken place.108
The content of this object is not something that is, but what it should be, that is, 
not a simple mirror of something existing or prevailing, but a desire, an ideal.109 Alter-
natively, this kind of perfection its confessors can only strive towards, since reaching 
it is impossible from the outset, and thus, only approaching it is possible.110
Now, back to our basic question: What are we talking about? In short, this is a set 
of rights and duties with values in the background, which are guaranteed to everyone 
as a chance vis-à-vis both the state power and any human fellow. Considering that 
it contains a variety of requirements, it is impossible to meet them simultaneously 
and with the same completeness and depth, as their competing support would lead 
to the extinction of the other. Thus, in any situation, consideration and balance with 
compromise are necessary for the relative totality of the requirements of the rule of 
law to be optimally approached and fulfilled.111
Thus, only provided we could use the concept as a benchmark, answering it 
would not be a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ even if considering it within a given section of time, 
culture, or tradition. Actually, it would presuppose a lengthy presentation, and a number 
 108 Cf. Varga, 2013a, pp. 1–15.
 109 E.g. Oakeshott, 1983, p. 178. It is ‘a legal ideal’ for Lautenbach, 2013, pp. 23 & 210 and ‘an aspi-
rational ideal, pointing the way toward a more just world’ for Peerenboom, 2004, pp. 1 & 13.
 110 According to Hayek, 1960, p. 205, ‘many of the applications of the rule of law are also ideals 
which we can hope to approach very closely but can never fully realize’.
 111 It is a fundamental tenet of jurisprudence—Varga, 2002, pp. 219–232—that everything in law is 
relative and cannot have but a position ascribed to it by the law or its doctrine, or a function 
assigned to it by the conventions prevailing in the given society. This is why the president of 
the Supreme Court of Israel could uphold—Barak, 2015, pp. 6 and 119—that everything in law 
is ‘dependent upon historical, cultural, religious, social and political contexts’, condensed in 
such principles ‘in state of constant conflict […and which…] must be balanced’.
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of cases analysed with balanced arguments and counter-arguments.112 Therefore, we 
cannot speak of any sharp distinction between simple realisation and non-realisation, 
or of a more or less successful attempt at approximation in some kind of continuum,113 
or gradualness among intermediate states of the process. This is because the balance 
of the practice or the state of any given legal arrangement does not lie in semi-stages 
between the extreme points of a definite ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but in the impossibility of reaching 
a resolute answer. Therefore, we need to know that in real-world concrete situations 
it is compromise characterisations and not complete sets of features attributed to this 
concept114 that are to be met. Essentially, what matters is the kind of compromise in 
the search between different notional directions, contents, and mutually extinguish-
ing messages made, or simply, what is their ethos and value-orientation? This is what 
cannot be answered in a short way.115
Increasingly, the content itself is most often mixed and freely expandable. The 
main part of the notion of the rule of law is undoubtedly the proper formality and 
observance of the law, which is often supplemented with substantive content. Thus, 
it is filled with overarching core values blending in with democracy, distribution of 
power, human rights, and the like.116 Therefore, the development of the German tradi-
tion, Rechtsstaat and Rechtsstaatlichkeit, came eerily close to the doctrine on the forms 
of the state [Staatsformenlehre] in continental Europe, almost as a developmental part 
thereof.117 However, the more generalised it is, the more it loses its distinctiveness from 
others, and thus the meaning of its use.
 112 In these circumstances, should we consider it an honour that out of a population of 520 mil-
lion, the European Union entrusted a Dutch person with no learned profession (cf. https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judith_Sargentini) to judge Hungary regarding her rule of law?
 113 Gowder, 2016, p. 26 writes that ‘The rule of law is a continuum, not a binary: states can satisfy 
it to a greater or lesser extent’.
 114 Also practically nearly to all concepts, except those schematically projected to be found 
geometry and mathematics, for example.
 115 As the German Constitutional Court has decreed, any situation can only be judged by consider-
ing all circumstances: ‘dieser Verfassungsgrundsatz bedarf vielmehr der Konkretisierung je 
nach den sachlichen Gegebenheiten, wobei fundamentale Elemente des Rechtsstaates und die 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit im ganzen gewahrt bleiben müssen’. 1BVL14/76 [Urteil vom 21.06.1977] & 
https://openjur.de/u/60105.html, para. 193.
 116 The Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (29 June 
1990) stipulated in para. 3 that ‘democracy is an inherent element of the rule of law’. https://
www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/csce.htm, with Jurgens, 2007, para. B/5 
adding human rights to these two components, thereby producing a ‘trinity of three concepts’. 
This is why Chesterman, 2008, p. 361 explicitly admitted that ‘the rule of law sometimes plays 
as a Trojan horse to import other political goals such as democracy, human rights, and specific 
economic policies’. Moreover, resembling the colonial era, promoting the rule of law can easily 
turn into an act of imposing one’s own law, involving ‘a fairly complete vision of what society is 
and how it should look’, which is also to be borrowed by the target country. Humphfreys, 2010, 
xx, exposed by Humphfreys, 2012, 475–510.
 117 E.g. Tiedemann, 2014, pp. 170–192. It is no coincidence that at a time preceding the overwhelm-
ing rule of law boom in the West, socialist literature in Hungary—Sztodolnik, 1963, pp. 143–163; 
Péteri, 1973, pp. 309–316; Takács, 1986, pp. 521–530; Ficzere, 1988, pp. 105–111—treated the 
issue as one of the developmental aspects of the doctrine of the state [Staatslehre].
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What does it cover? This is an ideal conception in the civilisational self-
ennoblement of man on the terrain of what we project to and expect from our law 
and its practice. This is thought to be based on the state in Germany, concretised as 
case law by the judiciary in England, with emphasis on the constitution in France, and 
developed from their original—primitive—stands into forms according to what and 
how countries, peoples, and cultures learn from each other in random encounters. Its 
name stems from the time it was first described, and understood. Once some nations 
gain hegemonic position, they are induced to proclaim their own version extended to 
a universal pattern for mankind.
The idea of the rule of law is not a type of constructed abstraction. It has never 
been or has become anything other than what has been shaped through value-sensitive 
responses to challenges posed to the laws and cultures of the countries concerned: 
this way in England, and that way in the Netherlands and Italy. While it may have 
been polished through cultural contacts and may have become more common under 
a common name, it remained only a demand or signpost: a medium for the collection 
of possibilities and paths of the civilisational self-ennoblement of the nations that 
demand it, and not an inventory or a complete catalogue of items.118
In addition, the concept has evolved in recent times in the swamp fight that 
characterises today’s political moves. It is used in the legal literature as part of an over-
abundant vocabulary. Mostly, it is a group marker expressing civilisatory progress. It 
could not have been used for anything else or more demanding, as it has never become 
an operational term in law. Perhaps this is an important word? Spanning 20th-century 
Germany, it is mentioned three times only among the one thousand most important 
historical documents, and never with any emphasis.119 After the defeat of the Third 
Reich, the Basic Law of Bonn uses the word, but only to name the constitutional order of 
Länder and with no independent meaning: only those requirements already arranged in 
the Basic Law are assigned to it. This is why a constitutional court had to be established 
as the protector of Rechtsstaatlichkeit, the essence of which is already inherent in what 
is called constitutionality.
In post-World War II advancement, it played and continued to play a sublime role. 
The disgraceful blackmail via rule of law mantra serves to expand power. In our brave 
new peaceful world, owing to the prohibition of war, only occupying economic space 
and acquiring dominance through the capital market can come to the fore. Therefore, 
it will be launched worldwide to have a unified, transparent, and secure legal environ-
ment for international economic transactions, a common regime that can be mastered 
by easy routine. The best is to replicate one’s own arrangement. Thus far, various accel-
eration and modernisation programs are spreading worldwide, especially to neglected 
 118 For Chesterman, 2008, p. 361, this ‘political ideal’ should be seen ‘as a means rather than an 
end, as serving a function rather than defining a status’. It is astonishing that this recognition 
has only been formulated by a single author and as relating to the use of the notion in the 
international arena.
 119 Altrichter (ed.), 2020.
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landscapes. Moreover, even scholarship is helping this dissemination, developing a 
genuine theoretical trend to prove its interest-driven lies, saying there is a correlation 
between the rule of law and level of economic development and performance.120 That 
tested in transnational economic relations continues in international politics.
In vain does life refute, as interest is stronger. These two gigantic organisa-
tions are currently doing this to feature their most spectacular deficits with respect 
to democracy and the rule of law. After all, the literature on the United Nations and 
European Union shows that they refrain from accepting external influences. With their 
institutional structure and strength set in, they focus on protecting their own game 
of power from any counter-arguability in law. From the beginning, they rigidify and 
petrify their own law making by securing it from any provocation to change. Regarding 
the EU, by ‘shield[ing] its law from potential internal and external contestation, [t]his 
is precisely the opposite of what the classical understanding of the Rule of Law would 
imply’.121
Thus, let us expand theoretically what we have simply named the rule of law so 
far. Its character, direction, and ontological nature were illuminated three decades 
ago by an Oxford celebrity invited by the recent graduates of Bibó College,122 who 
paradoxically called his audience to listen to common sense instead of scholarly books 
on the rule of law. For, he claimed, in their books, every nation of every age articulates 
idealisms filtered through their own hard-won experiences. Well, while knowing others 
is undoubtedly a respectable undertaking, every nation must first cope with its own 
task—the torturous question of how to deal with its own challenges so as not only to 
succeed in its cause, but also to serve its civilisational self-ennoblement. With our 
demand for the rule of law, we want a moral rise to be more humane and civilised, 
through and owing to it. We do not want a mystic mandarin above us who as in the first 
decade of our constitutional judiciary, may turn a symbolic hammer over our heads, 
making it impossible for us to meet national strategic priorities by falling victim to 
important matters of national progress. In short, therefore, as he explained, no claim to 
the rule of law can serve as a collective suicide pact.123 Not only have we become clear in 
 120 The World Bank, 2004, p. 2 postulates ‘the rule of law as a sine qua non of development’, followed 
by among others, Dam, 2006, Haggard, MacIntyre, Tiede, 2008, pp. 205–234, and Gowder, 2016, 
p. 3. Mere coincidence is observed by Matsuo, 2005, pp. 59–70 and Haggard and Tiede, 2011, 
pp. 673–685. Anything of direct interdependence is refuted by Ozpolat, Guven, Ozsoy, Bahar, 
2016, pp. 107–117. As to further positions, Nedzel, 2014, p. 289 remarks that ‘“Englishness” […] 
has traditionally provided greater stability, greater protection for liberty, and incentives for 
economic development’. According to a particular position, Asia is keen to enter the path to 
achieving economic development but without adopting its corollary, the rule of law, which 
is viewed there as an alien construct threatening their identity. Clarke, 1998, pp. 28–44, and 
similarly Hager, 2000, pp. 2–5, Oshimura, 2000, p. 141, and Hong, 2000, p. 149.
 121 Kochenov, 2015, p. 74; Lietzmann, 2004, pp. 19–30; for an overview, see Hegedős, 2020, pp. 
19–21.
 122 https://bibo.elte.hu/ was the workshop of those students of law in Budapest who founded the 
political party governing Hungary from 1998 to 2002, and with a two-thirds majority, from 2010 
presumably to 2022, involving the early law-graduate elite.
 123 For detail on John Finnis’ message, see Varga, 2019, p. 198 and note 28.
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this way, but it is also the Supreme Court of Israel, which as a state that takes its national 
strategic agenda seriously, does not forget the lessons of this.124
Consequently, the experience of a given place and time, its specific particular-
ity, works in any of the variations to the rule of law. Once it is peculiar, it cannot be 
declared to have become universal, as anyone would try. What may be generalised 
from this is only the result of learning and interaction. Although we are learning 
to become somewhat more, the result will only be a newer, more advanced form of 
particularity.
It follows from this logic that when I fight for the rule of law, I assume an idea or 
the conventionalised core of something, which I contend is lacking. However, all mono-
graphs, textbooks, and kinds of practical guidance begin with the sober statement that 
nothing like this is available, only a handful of authorial opinions. From references to 
existing law and from the vast rule of law literature, it may be hoped that a common 
message will ultimately be unravelled. Think of what kind of magically tricky problem 
solving this insecurity assumes in a combat situation in the deadly moments of a battle 
from an operations commander who can only remember the nightmare when law pro-
fessors used to teach him at the military academy. What is he expected to do? Should 
he, who lives the profession of military commands with ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers, now chew 
on lists compiled here and there from a number of legal documents and self-honouring 
stands taken by authors whose works he had to toil through during his academic 
studies? Now, facing the dangerous moments of battle noise, he is expected to make a 
compass out of these himself, one he will be able to justify even when the smooth-faced 
headquarters of law may examine for years what he was forced to command in situa-
tions where each moment varied. This picture is absurd, but realistic. This is exactly 
what military law is about.125 Its latest handbook also provides no template solution. In 
the field of the rule of law, any briefing can be a benefit ‘rather as a starting place and 
a supplement for other materials and, crucially, individual thought’, for ‘the difficulty 
may well be in knowing what to read, rather than in finding something to read’.126 One 
cannot hope any added message from the NATO-accredited international centre of rule 
of law at the Hague. ‘Unfortunately, there is no common definition of the Rule of Law. 
Many IOs, NGOs, governments, lawyers and judges associations, policy think-tanks, 
 124 Barely a decade ago, Judge Asher Grunis declared—High Court of Israel (11 January 2012); 
cf., among others, https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2012/02/jabareen-zaher-israel-
citizenship/—that ‘Human rights do not prescribe national suicide’. Mitchell, 2012 writes, 
‘if Israel’s commitment to human rights clashed with policies that seemed necessary for the 
preservation of its current identity, Israel could permissibly abrogate its rights commitments 
by enacting discriminatory policies’. Exactly the lack of such awareness in Hungary has made 
me wonder whether we are still a nation that can stand up for herself, or are we already lethar-
gically tired of our difficult twentieth century. Cf. Varga, 2015, p. 62.
 125 In the field of military law, the quest for rule of law first appeared at the turn of the millennium. 
This is evident in the fact that the US Department of the Army, 1994 ignores it, but the US 
Department of the Army, 2003 stresses its importance. For an overview, cf. Lewis, 2010, pp. 
155–200.
 126 Bowman and Child (eds.) (2015), p. vi.
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and private foundations are engaged in promoting the Rule of Law and most of them 
view Rule of Law in different ways’.127
Perhaps not as drastically, but this is happening every day in the EU witches’ 
kitchens of Brussels, Luxembourg, and Strasbourg, as well as in Venice.128
Generalising the situation, we could also say that everyone has some Jolly Jokers 
in their hands, and none of them will tell you in advance how much their card is worth. 
Maybe even they do not know. However, each will receive exactly as much of his card 
as he will announce when he strikes it.
For nearly a century and a half, it has been a familiar lesson from sociology and 
other social sciences that overdoing anything can turn into the opposite. As a classic 
example, the extreme pursuit of rationality can lead to irrationality and over-regulation 
to collapse ending in anarchy.129 It is no coincidence, therefore, that such unbridled 
over-cultivation of the notion of the rule of law leads to burnout and exhaustion from 
within. In addition to those who expect world redemption from the cult of the rule of 
law, an increasing number— particularly from the United States—swear with bitterness 
that this once-hopeful concept has become a mere shell, a rhetorical chatter.
Law offers a special example to demonstrate how anything can be called any-
thing, and as long as the legal effect of this designation lasts, this is undoubtedly so in 
the normative order. Let us remember that Roman law already ‘knew’ in what order 
members of a family died in a boat sunk at sea at any unknown place and time (of 
course, only in terms of inheritance). In classical Jewish law, a woman is sometimes a 
man, and vice versa, and the dog and cat might become equally substitutable in Islamic 
law. Of course, the legislator could have the power at any time to really determine—
which has never been done anywhere—the criterion by reference to which a state can 
be called to account in the name of the rule of law. Either there is a definition of those 
facts that constitute a case of the rule of law, but in the latter alternative, we remain at 
the amorphousness of a Mädchen für alles. On the other hand, once defined, it would 
be a subject, that is, a posited position in law. For its writing into the law would eo ipso 
transubstantiate it—in the manner we exemplified by human rights, transforming in 
nature when acknowledged by the law.
In conclusion, it would be a mistake to assume a different conception of the 
rule of law behind the conflict of opinions between Brussels and Budapest. All we can 
see is that as a fake card player, one party plays Jolly Joker with cards without definite 
value, and so there is actually no card game, and the other only warns of this as not an 
insignificant circumstance. Clearly, when the latter assumed the values of the rule of 
 127 Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (The Hague) in https://www.cimic-coe.org/
branches/cic/cimic-innovation/advanced-cultural-competence-aac/rule-of-law/ (2012).
 128 Or, ‘In the context of the Convention, the rule of law is a multifaceted and layered concept. 
Yet, it is possible to distil a core contents of the rule of law from the case law, based on the 
frequency and consistency of the argumentations that are linked to the rule of law and the 
results that are obtained when the Court has interpreted the Convention in line with the rule 
of law’. Lautenbach, 2013, p. 211.
 129 Cf., e.g. Schlag, 1998 and as a Harvard case study reviewed, Varga, 2013b, pp. 63–77.
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law, État de Droit, and Rechtsstaat when she joined, it was done so by tacitly accepting 
their understanding at the time, which no one could regard or mistake as an ever-at-
please-refillable blank frame. Agreeing today that I will not war from now on, it will no 
longer mean tomorrow that I will also pass on my family and property. A new situation 
could only arise if States Parties had both the intention and legal option to prescribe 
qualities that could now be held accountable with a degree of accuracy that could be 
ascertained as a European Union definition of the facts that constitute what the rule of 
law is. With this, a yardstick could be created, and a measurement could be possible 
and available, which regardless of the name, would be a different object from the one 
we have just tried to outline.
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